

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

BY

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LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
STATE OF BIHAR

Reg. No. 477 B.—January 1930.—B.

चतुर्संगीः

कर्मानात् प्रतिभास्तुवाक्यारक्षरेदिंद्रमकाले भवत्वम्
 गिहानां चूदयानि साधु हस्तुदानीव द्वयोऽपि न सम् ।
 देवेषु प्रवयन् गिर्व इतमहो सारसानं आवातम्
 नां नालोः च इह चामुखोय ! सुचिरं विद्याचिनो भारते ॥

पापो शक्तमरौचिरचित्तस्मोदर्पान्तको दुर्दमः
 काशी सम्भातसाम्भनिर्मकयस्त्रीबूषणर्थी गशी ।
 विद्यारच्छुतलोरवैकानिकावे चोदिक्षविद्याकावे
 याक्षरेत्रा तत्र ज्ञोन्ति रङ्गः । शुभरामवाप्यहो च चर्चते ॥

तिं देयं भवतः च्छ्रुतेरकुणुकं निःपात्ता मे वर्त्तते
 यत्र केऽविसोक्तहिरन्यवा रंसजाता शर्णिषः ।
 चारेयप्रतियाक्षानाय भवतो नो शर्पमोक्षमन्ततो
 यः कष्टार्द्धनिवेद्य एष रचितः स त्रीत्ये बायताभ् ।

स्वदुरसाहृपदः वेक्षुमिथिवतरोनिदम् ।
 अन्तमाक्षारं विद्यानं कर्त्तुम् तु च चम्पाते ॥

चलारि वाक्यदिविला पदानि
तानि विदुरांग्रामा ये अथोविषः ।

* * * * *

हृषभो देववीति मत्तो देवो मत्ता चाचिषेऽ ।

Bk-Veda.

यहु गदुल्लेहुग्नो विश्वि वस्त्राण् यसामवाप्नात्वादो ।
सोऽनन्दामादोति जायं परद्व धाम्योविद्वचति चत्पश्चन्देः ॥

मुख्य वाक्यरूपं कृतम् ।

Siksh.

वाचाय च वद्यते तु वाचरविलिः ।

* * * *

तुडान् गच्छन् मा गच्छतीवापेतं वाचरवद् ।

* * * *

लीङ्गमवाचसपादायो वाच्समाचारः तुष्टिवः

कलितेष्वद्वारावद् प्रतिशक्तियो वैषिष्ठयो व्रज्ञरायः ।

* * * *

सर्वेषामपारिषदं होइ वाक्यम् ।

* * * *

वाचरवे नामेवसुखरा विचा ।

Mahābhāṣya.

प्रादिविधनं तद्यत्यतस्य यद्यत्तम् ।

विवर्त्तेऽर्थभाषेन सक्रिया करतो यतः ॥

* * * * *

तास्ये वाचामाणो तद्यात्युत्तमं ततः ।

तद्यत्तम् तद्यात्युत्तमं प्राप्त्याकरणं तु चाः ॥

* * * * *

तद्यात्युत्तमं तद्यात्युत्तमं चित्तिवित्तम् ।

यद्यत्तम् तद्यात्युत्तमं चित्तिवित्तम् ॥

Vakyapadiya.

PREFACE

The following pages present substantially my Doctorate Thesis submitted in 1934, and embody the results of my long-continued efforts to bring together in a concise form the speculations of the Hindu grammarians determining the scope, the function, the definitions of grammatical concepts and the value of grammar as a distinct branch of Sanskrit learning. The systematic study of the purely philosophical aspect of Sanskrit grammar as attempted in this book is, I believe, a long-felt want. The idea of preparing a comprehensive account of these speculations, based on different treatises on grammar, specially on the *Mahabhaṣya* and the *Vakyapadiya*, was first suggested to me by the late lamented Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, and I can well imagine how pleased he would have been had he been alive to-day to see in print the work inspired by him. It may be stated here that I have endeavoured to the best of my powers to represent the grammatical speculations of the Hindus in their true significance without unnecessarily amplifying them. I hope that the speculations contained in this book will serve to show that grammar in Sanskrit literature was not a mere by-product of scholarship; on the contrary, it was elevated to the dignity of *Smṛti* and *Agama* and considered a system by itself broadbased on philosophical principles.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging my gratefulness to Sir Devaprasad Sarvadhikari, for the encouragement I have all along received from him from the very inception of this work.

I am much indebted to my esteemed friend and colleague Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, who has read the book in proof and has helped me from time to time with his valuable suggestions. I have also profited by discussing with Mr. Kshitish Chandra Chatterjee, Lecturer in Sanskrit and Comparative Philology, some of the points treated in the book.

The index is entirely the work of my pupil Mr. Chintaharan Chakrabarti, Kavyatirtha, M.A., Lecturer Bethune College, Calcutta, who is a keen student of ancient Indian history and culture.

My thanks are due to Mr. Jogesh Chandra Chakravorti, M.A., Assistant Registrar, for his uniform kindness and courtesy.

Mr. Atul Chandra Ghatak, M.A., Superintendent, Calcutta University Press, has helped me in all possible ways in seeing the book through the press, and to him I am much indebted for the keen interest he always took in the progress of the work.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY, }
The 15th January, 1930. } P. C. CHAKRAVARTI.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Evolution of Sanskrit Grammar—Grammatical speculations—Ancient grammarians—Taksh, Vyādi, Viṣayyaka, Pīṇini, etc.

The history of the origin of Sanskrit Grammar affords a difficult field of study. It is not possible to say anything definitely either about the period when speculations of a grammatical nature had really come into existence, or about the ancient teacher who might be credited with having for the first time assimilated the principle of a regular system of grammar. An attempt is, however, made here to discuss some of the most plausible views on the evolution of Sanskrit Grammar.

Sanskrit Language, though no longer a spoken tongue, has got such a vast stock of words, and contributed so largely to the real knowledge of the intellectual world by its monumental productions, that it can defy any language ever known in the philological world. The refinement of thought, the melody of

intonation and the unsurpassably high order of spiritual and religious speculations that breathe through this "Divine tongue," reveal to us not only the intellectual capacity of the Indo-Aryans who made wonderful progress in civilization, but also serve to show the extent of perfection to which the Indian mind had developed in those primitive days. Let us begin with the first intellectual unfolding of the Indian mind—the Vedas, which are regarded either as a symbol of eternity, or as revelations of eternal truth finding audible expression through the utterances of ancient seers. The Vedas never represent, as some Western scholars have opined, a huge collection of "pastoral songs." But what is true is that they are a sublime embodiment of wisdom. It may be stated without hesitation that the four Vedas with all their subsidiary literature are in reality an encyclopaedia of human knowledge. Through centuries they continued to be the sacred storehouse of knowledge, and their authority, in matters both religious and secular, was so great with the ancient Hindus that any idea running counter to the Vedic injunctions was liable to be rejected. In the creative period of the Vedic literature we find, among other things of purely sacrificial and religious interest, the brilliant dawns of many speculations which were popularised and co-ordinated into a coherent system of thought by later thinkers. It can consequently be maintained that the Vedic literature, revealing as

it does, in a crude form, the intellectual horizon of our ancient forefathers, provided ample room for the subsequent development of different branches of science and art. There was a time in ancient India when by 'learning' people used to understand only the Vedic learning ('वेदविद्या'),¹ and a man's education was not complete until he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the Vedas. The time has much changed since then and the ordinance of Manu² is but little honoured in these days.

The reason why we have dilated upon the originality and authoritativeness of the Vedas and their influence on the history of Indian thought is that the origin of Grammar is organically and most intimately connected with the study of the Vedas. The six Vedāngas, as is well-known, mainly owe their origin to a vigorous attempt at facilitating the Vedic studies, and, among these, Grammar seems to have been the most important subsidiary. That no earnest student of the Vedas can hardly ignore the studies of these Vedāngas (Grammar, Phonetics, Etymology, etc.) is made sufficiently clear by the Sroti³ which emphatically declares

¹ ए विद्ये वेदितान्ते श्रुति च वेदान्तिष्ठो वदन्ति परा वेदविद्या च । वेदापर वाचेदो कम्बुचैः यातीदीक्षावन्तेऽपि वेदा वाची वाचारं विद्यत् वाचो वाचित्विभिति । वद मरा ववा वववारम्भिमवते ।

Meghaka Upanishad.

² वीज्ञानीय विद्ये वेदान्ताव गुणवै वसेद् । क वीज्ञेय गुणानां वच्छासि वाचाम् ॥

Maitri Upanishad, 2.

³ लाज्जित विकारात् भर्तुः वर्ती शीघ्रभ्यो यो चोपम् ।

that the unconditional duty on the part of a Brahmin is to make a thorough study of the Vedas along with these popular 'Angas.' The injunction "वेदान्तोपचिष्ठाः" does not only insist upon a regular study of the Vedas, but presupposes a knowledge of grammar sufficient for the understanding of the Vedic texts. Patañjali refers to the ancient custom 'when Brahmin students, as a rule, used to take up grammar first for their study, as an indispensable step towards the study of the Vedas. Grammar was, therefore, studied not only for its own sake in ancient India, but as a helping guide for penetrating into the structure of the Vedic texts. While enumerating the motives that are practically served by the study of grammar, Patañjali has first mentioned "Preservation of the Vedas" as the primary reason why the science of grammar should be studied with particular attention. How useful and indispensable the study of grammar is, so far as the understanding of the Vedic texts is concerned, is best shown by such descriptive epithets of grammar as "वेदान्त वेदः," "सुखावर्त वाक्यम्," etc.

When we enquire into the origin of Sanskrit Grammar from a historical standpoint, we find

¹ पुरावल एवं अधीन, एकारीकरण वापेका वायरां वाचीयै।
हेमस्तु लाभवाचन्नप्रदात्वे लो वैदिकोः कषा कर्पित्वान् । इमाद्यत्त्वाः
Vol. I, p. 8.

• Objektiv: Orientierung, Z. 1

Pseudofra. Satis., 42.

that there were three prominent causes in operation which brought the speculations on grammar into existence. First, certain principles of spontaneous growth, followed consciously or unconsciously in the utterance of significant sentence, provided the very basis of grammatical generalization. In combining one word with another so as to make a significant unit of speech, people undoubtedly made use of certain laws or order regulating the mode of their verbal expression. The question of priority of language to grammar is too well known to require any explanation. The way in which men learn almost instinctively their mother tongue without having any knowledge of grammar is an evidence of how we become familiar with the vocabularies as well as with the method of constructing sentences before we actually come in touch with grammar as such. Long before any regular system of grammar was written and studied, people with whom Sanskrit was a spoken tongue could, for example, use such a verbal form as 'अवति,' without having any idea of the grammatical operations whereby the root 'अ॒' might be changed to 'अ॑ो' and 'अ॑ष्ट' in obedience to the technical process of 'gupta' and 'sandhi.' Similarly, forms like 'अस्तुति' and 'अप्नोति' had obtained currency in a certain grammarless period when the grammatical conception of 'प्रतिकृति' and 'प्रत्यय' were unknown, and when

the conjugational difference of the root 'कृ' from 'क्षृ' could not be explained as peculiarities of two well-marked classes of roots, namely, 'कृषि' and 'क्षादि.' The rule 'कृः क्षर्व दीर्घः' presupposes a phonological principle according to which two 'कृ' or 'क्षृ' sounds having close proximity in their utterance usually and invariably show the natural tendency of being amalgamated into one lengthened 'कृ' sound. To such principles underlying the physical structure of language may be ascribed the rudiments of grammatical speculations. The fundamental basis of grammar is not purely artificial but appears to be more or less natural. A careful study of the *Paribhāṣā* (generalizations of grammar) and of the rules of euphonic combinations makes it abundantly clear that the principles of grammar have close affinity with popular axioms and laws of nature. The extent to which grammar is related to popular usage is best shown by Patañjali in his elaborate exposition of the rules of grammar.¹ The method in which Patañjali has analysed words or, more properly, a group of similar words, in order to distinguish the stems and formative elements of words, is an indication that grammar has a scientific stamp so far as its basic principles are concerned. The science of grammar does not, however, attempt

¹ नेत्र अल्पाभिधि, करि अद्यतनाकारः चरणि—वस्त्रदेवदुष्टवा
पालभावितः किमपि ? शीघ्रतोऽप्येत्याप्तः—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 116.

² किम् लक्षणदेविकावाप्तम्—Mahābhāṣya, ibid., p. 212.

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to coin new words and expressions for use, but takes them in the very forms in which they are popularly used.

Secondly, the most important factor in the evolution of grammar, as a scientific and indispensable branch of study, was the necessity, more religious than academic, of devising some practical means ensuring a successful study of the Vedas ; and the result was the evolution of grammar. By *Sabdānuśāsa* or governance of words, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has, as Kātyāyaṇī maintains, in clear terms expressed the immediate or supreme end of grammar as such, and by the expression 'र्वोवाचमन्त्रवृत्तदेशः र्वोवाचम्' he has shown the indirect purposes that are usually served by grammar or *Sabdānuśāsa*, as he calls it. "Preservation of the Vedic text"¹ seems to have been the sole purpose that made the study of grammar so useful and indispensable at the same time. It is, however, difficult to say definitely when such a necessity was actually felt for the study of grammar. It is in all probability in the transitional period² between the poetical activity of the oldest *Sāṃhitās*, and the prosaic exegesis of the Brāhmaṇas with greater tendency towards classical forms, that we may try to find out the crude beginning of grammatical speculations. The trend of human thought does not always

¹ र्वोवाचमन्त्रवृत्तदेशः र्वोवाचम्—*Mahābhāṣya*, p. 1.

² Systems of Skt. Grammar, Belzilear, pp. 2-3.

flow along the same level, but it changes its course as time rolls on. The palmy days of beautiful poetry that witnessed the appearance of the Samhitās were followed by a period of intellectual decadence, if we are allowed to say so. To be more clear, the period of outstanding originality was followed by one of interpretation and elaboration. The ancient seers or Rsis are said to have been born with such a spiritual vision as to possess all knowledge intuitively, and it was possibly through their medium that the sacred hymns came to light. The etymological meaning of the term "ṛṣi" corroborates this view. Next to these Rsis came a comparatively inferior class of seers, better known as "Srutarśi" who were not gifted with intuitive knowledge from their very birth, but rose to the eminence of 'seer-ship' by receiving instructions on the Vedas from their teachers. These sages,¹ out of compassion for the people of future generations, on account of their shorter span of existence and intellectual dwarfishness, are said to have composed the Vedāngas with the avowed intention of making the Vedic study less arduous. There is reason to believe that the exact meaning of the oldest hymns had already begun to be forgotten in the second stage spoken of above; and it was undoubtedly to preserve the

¹ अपिदेवत्य—Nirukta.

² विष्वरवानेसं कर्त्तव्यमित्येव । विश्वामि ॥—Nirukta, p. 149
(Bom. ed.)

Sarphits texts intact and to save them from misinterpretation that particular attention was directed towards grammar and the Nirukta. Yaska¹ frankly admits that the study of the Nirukta derives its importance from the fact that the meaning of the Vedic texts are not otherwise comprehensible. As a matter of fact, the Vedic hymns had ceased to be intelligible to a great extent even at so early a period, and, what is still more surprising, some teachers of respectable antiquity even pronounced in clear terms their verdict about the meaninglessness of the hymns. An ancient teacher like Yaska has recorded the contention of Kautsa² against the Vedas. The hymns, he contends, are meaningless and as such not worthy of commanding respect. When an acknowledged teacher of such remote antiquity could have assailed the trustworthiness of the Vedas on grounds, hardly justifiable, it is not at all surprising that later teachers belonging to the atheist school of Sugata and Cārvāka would come forward to demolish the glorious edifice of the Vedas. In the face of such undignified attack threatening to undermine the very basis of religion, the Mimāmsakas were confronted with a problem of great seriousness; they consequently tried

¹ यस्मात्प्राचीनवदेव ग्रन्थोपर्याप्तो न विद्यते—Nirukta, p. 115.

² एति वर्तमानानामेव ग्रन्थोपर्याप्तो वौद्धोपर्याप्तो न विद्यते—Nirukta, p. 116.

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their level best to set aside all antagonistic views regarding the eternality and the trustworthiness of the Vedas. Both *Nairuktis* and *Vaiyākaraṇas* seriously engaged themselves in the arduous task of preserving the Vedic texts intact by advocating the eternality of *Sabda*, on the one hand, and by analysing the entire structure of the Vedic words, on the other. The etymologists sought to bring out the meaning by suggesting derivation of words, while the grammarians took upon themselves the task of supporting the Vedic forms by an analytical process; and these methods, supplementing each other, proved to be of much importance in preserving the sacred texts in their pristine glory. Patañjali seems to have been conscious of this paramount function of grammar, as is clear from his statement 'रथाम् वैशालीमध्येष्ठ वाचरथम्.' In the estimation of Patañjali grammar is pre-eminently the greatest of all *Vedāṅgas*; its greatness is obviously due to the fact that grammar is indispensable to an understanding of the Vedic hymns. The epithet "Vedāṅgam Vedam," as applied to grammar by the seers of the Upaniṣads, is really suggestive of the importance and dignity in which *Vyākaraṇa* was held in those days.

In the third place, the growing popularity of different forms of *Prakṛita* served almost like an incentive to the rise of so many systems of grammar in Sanskrit. Sanskrit, even when it was a spoken tongue, had been confined to the area of the cultured community. The *Sīghas* or the

Sanskrit-speaking people had, however, to come frequently in touch with the untutored masses, and this was calculated to destroy the purity of the "Divine tongue" to a certain extent. As a result of this intercourse, many Prākṛta forms crept into Sanskrit and became almost naturalised in course of time. That Sanskrit had suffered mutilation and distortion of forms at the hands of those who failed to pronounce the correct Sanskrit words, either on account of wrong imitation or their natural inaptitude, is testified by the so-called *Apabhramśas* which represent Sanskrit only in a distorted form. The space at our disposal will not, however, permit us to discuss the much vexed question as to whether Prākṛta-*Apabhramśas* are directly descended from Sanskrit under circumstances stated above, or originated from no altogether different source. We only repeat what we have pointed out elsewhere that the Hindu grammarians, because of their unbounded regard for Sanskrit as the most original of all tongues, or for the striking similarity of the so-called *apā* forms of Prākṛta with Sanskrit, held Prākṛta to be an off-shoot of Sanskrit. To look upon both Sanskrit and Prākṛta as two sister tongues, descended from a common source, is a view that is little favoured by the Hindu grammarians. As the number of Sanskrit-speaking people gradually diminished, and Prākṛta dialects, on the other hand, began to

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obtain greater popularity till they spread all over the country, the orthodox Hindu teachers were almost compelled to notice the linguistic peculiarities of Sanskrit and draw hard and fast rules regulating them, their sole motive being the preservation of their traditionally sacred tongue from corruption. The expression शब्दार्थात्, as significantly used by Patañjali instead of the more popular term शब्दरूप, serves to indicate that the main function of grammar is as much to support the correct forms in conformity with the fixed rules, as to show indirectly how words of pure Sanskrit origin differ from *Apobhranya* which represent the linguistic corruption caused by wrong imitation and inability to pronounce the correct Sanskrit words. In the *Mahabhasya* we find it explicitly stated that 'governance of the correct words'¹ forms the main function of grammar, and by the discrimination of correct forms as *gaṇi*, the corrupt ones as *gāvī*, *gośī*, *gold*, etc., are indirectly pointed out.² Sanskrit grammar thus draws a line of demarcation between the correct and corrupt forms, the former being conformable to the rules laid down in grammar, and the latter lying entirely outside the scope of Sanskrit grammar. The spread of Buddhism, as it was accompanied by the popularity of Prākṛita, is supposed to have given a

¹ शब्दार्थात् विद्यन् वर्ते, etc., *Mahabhasya*, Vol. I, p. 101.

² गौरिनेत्रजिह्वापद्मे नाम वस्त्रावस्त्रीवस्त्रा एति ।—Vol. I, p. 5.

stronger impetus to an intensive study of Sanskrit grammar. It must be, however, remembered that the Hindu grammarians, in spite of all their attempts, as is evinced in their formulation of rules, could not entirely evade the possibility of their sacred tongue being mixed up, though to a small extent, with the corrupt *Apabhrangshas*. Kumārila speaks of the naturalisation of certain Dravidian forms into Sanskrit.

Thus, there grew up different systems of grammar in Sanskrit; commentators after commentators came to elaborate and supplement them in the light of new facts. At this stage of our knowledge, we cannot exactly determine the number of grammatical systems that once existed in ancient India. We generally hear of eight prominent systems each founded by a renowned *Sabdika* or grammarian.¹ The *Aṣṭadhyāyī* mentions the names of many grammarians whose works have, unfortunately, not come down to us. In the *Mahābhāṣya* mention is made of two eminent grammarians, namely, Vyādi and Vajapātyana, the former is supposed to have written a huge treatise on grammar called *Samgraha*, which is so authoritatively spoken of by Patañjali.² Yaska has

¹ "ऐति चाच्छु भाष्यम् वौक्ति जागद्दर्शनः। कारणं वर्त्यवान् वाक्यान् पार्थिवामाक्षरम्।"

² संस्कृत एवेत भाष्यम् परीक्षिते विष्णो च। जाग्र वाचो चति।—Vol. I, p. 6.

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recorded a controversy between two grammarians—Sākata�ana and Gārgya—each of whom had undoubtedly a system of grammar to his credit. The old treatises on grammar are almost irrecoverably lost; but those that remain are sufficient to constitute a vast literature of which there is no parallel in any language of the world. In no other land except India was the science of grammar studied with so much zeal and deliberation.

This is, in short, the history of the evolution of Sanskrit grammar. It is, however, difficult to ascertain the period to which the real foundation of the science of grammar might be traced. The analytical method upon which is based the fundamental principle of Vyākaraṇa is first seen, though in a crude form, in the *Pada-Pāṭha* arrangement of the Sāṃhitā texts, which is popularly attributed to the authorship of Śākalya. It is in this method of decomposition that we meet with the beginning of disjoining *Sandhi* and *Somita*, and the addition of *Upasarga* with the verbal forms. While the *Pada-Pāṭha* order thus represents the first step towards grammar, the elaborate phonological speculations of the Pratiśākhyaś may be said to have shown grammar in the making. Some problems of real grammatical interest are also to be found in the Pratiśākhyaś. The oldest specimens, however, of the Pratiśākhyaś, which are so akin to grammar, are not accessible, and most of the extant treatises are of comparatively

modern origin, some of them being even posterior to Pāṇini. There is ample evidence to indicate that different schools of grammar had already been in existence when Yāska wrote his famous commentary on the Nīghaṇṭo. That Yāska was preceded by a good many grammarians is clear from his statement वैद्याकरणानि वेदोऽपि¹ and the grammatical controversy he has referred to. Yāska made ample use of these earlier systems of grammar current in his time. The definition of Sandhi, वरः संविचयः संवितः, quoted by Yāska, and incorporated into his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by Pāṇini, is supposed to have been taken from some older systems of grammar. Moreover, Yāska's fourfold classification of *Padas* as noun, verb, preposition and particle, also seems to be a reproduction from a certain grammar which has not left any trace behind. The use of such technical terms as वासित्, etc., does not really indicate originality on the part of Yāska, but what is plausible is that they were undoubtedly borrowed from some earlier systems of grammar no longer extant. The loss sustained by grammatical literature is enormous; we find numerous references to several grammarians both in Yāska's *Niruktā* and Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, but it is regrettable that very little of their works has come down to us. Just as

¹ एव वैद्याकरणी वाच्यी वैद्याकरणानि चैत—*Niruktā*, p. 99.

² *Pāṇ.*, L. iv. 109.

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among the huge Nirukta literature, the work of Yāska only is available in a complete form, even so it is the *Aṣṭadhyāyī* of Pāṇini alone that has fortunately survived the numerous systems of grammar, such as those of Śākalya, Śākājyana, Gārgya, Gālava, Sennka, Sphoṭayana, Bhāradvāja, Āpiśali, Kāśakṛtasa, Vyādi, and Vājapyayana.

The identity of the first grammarian is also a difficult point of enquiry in the history of grammatical speculations. Having discussed the circumstances that paved the path for the evolution of such a scientific branch of study as grammar, we now turn our attention, though without any avail, to the question of determining the first author of a system of grammar. The peculiarities of language, specially when the older forms became obsolete and were consequently replaced by new words of spontaneous growth, provided the basis upon which was built the scientific structure of grammar. There are certain fixed laws underlying the use of words ; they are more or less natural and simple. But the real difficulty comes when we proceed to determine that clever being who first assimilated such principles and developed them into a system of grammar. The Taittiriya Saṃhitā¹ contains a narration according to which Indra may be styled the first grammarian. In an

* यस्मै वरोऽप्यात्मवान्वये देवा पश्चात्प्रतिनो यो यस्मै वाग्मिणिः.... वाग्मिणी वाग्मीऽप्यन्वय वाग्मीगामादिर्व्याप्तक वाग्मी वाग्मीः—Tait. Saṃ., VI, 4, 7.

age when speech was undivided into its component elements, it was Indra who is said to have divided speech, and thenceforward it is known as व्याकरण वाच् or analysed speech. This view, though apparently incredulous, is strengthened by the evidence of the *Mahabhasya*¹ where a tradition is recorded to the effect that Indra made a thorough study of words under the tutelage of Brhaspati—the divine teacher. Further, the name of Indra may be traced in the list of eight *Sabdikas* or grammarians. But we do not know whether it would be a truism or a positive mistake to ascribe the authorship of the so-called *Indra* grammar to Indra as a divine personage. There is, however, no wonder that the conception of a grammar had first originated with a respectable divine being, because Pāṇini is also said to have received the first 14 Sūtras from the lord Śiva and these rules are consequently known as "Mahādeva Sūtra." Nandikeśvara² in his *Kāśikā* has shown how on the pretext of beating drum the lord Śiva revealed the fundamental principles of grammar. Similarly, Sarvavarmī, the author of the *Kātchatra Sūtrav*, is said to have received the nucleus of his grammar from Kārttikeya and hence the system

¹ "वै हि शुद्धी—इष्टव्याकरणम् इत्यं वैष्णवः" परिहस्तोऽपार्थ व्याकरणम् एवाच नामं व्याप्तः—*Mahabhasya*, Vol. I, p. 5.

² द्रवदेवाचे—पूर्वावस्थायो वयाद् सक्त व्याकरणम् ।

सुहर्ष्यवाच, समवार्तिष्ठृत्वेदरम्भे विषयाकालम् ।

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is popularly known as "*Kumāra Vyākaraṇa*."¹ Whatever value we may attach to these narratives and traditions, there is every reason to suppose that long before the grammarians of the Alexandrine period, the Hindu teachers had developed different schools of grammar and succeeded in giving them a highly scientific character.

Before concluding this topic we need only make a passing reference to what has been said by Bhartṛhari in regard to the origin and importance of grammar. Following in the wake of Patañjali, the author of the *Vakyapadīya*² describes grammar as the foremost of all *Vedāṅgas* and as a direct auxiliary to the Vedic studies, supporting as it does the correctness of the Vedic forms. He is loud in eulogising the importance of grammar, for he boldly asserts that it is impossible to comprehend the meaning of words without an adequate knowledge of grammar. He maintains grammar to be the most sacred of all branches of learning and calls it "*Adhividya*" and sometimes "*Ajikkha rājapaddhati*." As an exponent of the doctrine of '*Sphoṭa*,' Bhartṛhari looks upon grammar from a different standpoint, raising grammar to the dignity of *Agama* and *Saṃpti*, for he is

¹ वर्तमाने तुष्टिर्वाचं शुभा चेऽप्यनामः । लिपिं लिपिं तुष्टि वाचं
शुभि वाचति ।

² 'वक्त्र' अवस्थात् वस्त्राभूतां चतुः । एव वस्त्राभूतां वायोदीर्घं
हुतः ॥

even prepared to maintain that the study of grammar ultimately leads to salvation.¹ *Pyakarana-Saṇṭī*, he holds, is a set of rules that helps the comprehension of correct words; it seems to be almost without beginning² (प्रारंभ), because such a process as followed by grammar appears to have been current from time immemorial.

In my "Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus" I tried to show on the basis of some passages from the Rg Veda and Brahmanas that speculations on language and grammar had their origin in India in a very remote age. The Sāmhitā literature represents, of course, the crude beginning of grammatical speculations, and there is consequently absence of systematization and elaboration. It is interesting to see that the scientific accuracy of these speculations is almost unquestionable. The earliest reference to grammatical speculations, we may venture to add on the authority of Patañjali and Sayana, is to be found in the Rāgaṇī etc., which

¹ "त्रिवर्षीयः द्वयार्थं गतिं वाचेऽपेक्षते" — T. Meywald, I, § 21, 18.
 "त्रिवर्षीयस्तु" एव लाभवर्णनाम परं वाचेऽपेक्षते
 — V. K. Chaturvedi, I, § 21, 14 & 20.

- * "वाचाविकारमे द्विषो वाचाविकारा = दीर्घ" ।
—Vikyupedya, I, Ksh. 29 and
सुचाप्रदातकं शब्दो द्वारा द्विषो वा सम्बन्धात् ।
वाचाविकारमे द्विषोः वाचाविकारम् ।
—Vikyupedya, I, Ksh. 42.

* चाहार शहर क्षेत्रों कम्पनी ने दूसरे शहरक्षेत्रों वाले नियमों सहित
दूसरे क्षेत्रों वाली दूसरी कम्पनी का किया है। —See Vol. 4, No. 2.

admits of double interpretations—sacrificial and grammatical. The bull spoken of here represents the science of grammar and is said to be a divine being characterised by sound. Its four horns stand for four component parts of speech शामार्थासोपदेश-नियमः; three feet for three tenses (present, past and future); and two heads and seven hands symbolise respectively two kinds of *Padas* (पद) and *वक्त्र* or *Vak* and वाक्यं and seven case-endings. Another *Rk*, as we have already pointed out, speaks of four different forms of speech (*Para*, *Patyantि*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikhari*) and lays down that it is the fourth form of speech that is current among men. The ancient term denoting a grammarian seems to have been “वाग्दीयविद्” meaning ‘one who knows the connection of words, *viz.*, combination of stems and suffixes’ and it is emphatically stated in a *Rk* that *Vak* ‘or speech reveals herself entirely to such ‘analysers of speech.’ While commenting on the *Rk* वृद्धेन्द्रियं वाचः,’ etc., Patanjali explains the expression सत्त्विष्णः as an allusion to grammatical case-endings which are seven in number. There are many passages in the Samhitās which have thus either direct or indirect bearing upon grammar—a fact which

Bharti also speaks of *Sabha* or, more properly, *Sabha-Brahman*, as a Bell representing the Supreme Deity—“*सर्वं ग्रन्थं विद्यते विद्युत् विद्युत् विद्युत् विद्युत्*”—Vidyapadiya, I. 122.

१. अपनी साथी-संरक्षिता के लिए तारों के द्वारा उत्पन्न वे कठीनियाँ।

“तदेव त्वं तुम्हारी वासिय परम प्रभो महाम्”—Bg. Veda, X. 31. 4.

• But Today WELL & Fit

proves beyond doubt that Indian speculations on grammar are decidedly the oldest of their kinds. In the Tait. Samhitā, as we have already shown, *Vṛt* is said to have been originally undivided into parts, and that it was Indra who analysed speech in response to an appeal made by gods.

Then, we turn to the Brāhmaṇa literature. Here we find the real beginning of grammar. The etymological explanations of words, such as, यदोदीप् लक्ष्मा वस्त्रम् and so on, showing us at once the derivative meanings as well as the method of analysing words into their parts, bring us face to face with grammar in its growth. The Niruktas or etymologists adopted this method of explaining words and have quoted largely from the Brāhmaṇas. The term *Vyākaraṇa*, meaning as it does the 'science which dissolves words into elements' (stems and suffixes) and thereby brings out their exact meanings, is in itself an indication that grammar and etymology are intimately connected with each other. It is obviously for their mutual dependence that Yaśka has expressly stated that the science of etymology (Nirukta), though it has its independent character as well, may be viewed as a complement to grammar. The difference between the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas is not, far from speaking of their subject-matter, one of melodious poetry and monotonous prose, but a careful study will reveal that there is distinct

difference of language too. In the transitional period of this literary activity we find, as we have already shown, that the older Vedic forms have almost disappeared and new words and expressions with greater tendency towards classical forms were coming into existence. That the Brāhmaṇa literature made some progress in grammatical speculations is quite evident from the fact that there occur here and there such grammatical terms as *Vacana* (number), *Vibhakti* (case-endings), *Dhātu* (root) and so on. Of the Brāhmaṇas the Gopatha deserves special mention, since it contains in a passage¹ almost all the popular technical terms of Sanskrit grammar. In its enumeration of different branches of learning the Chāndogya Upaniṣad makes mention of such a branch of study as वेदानि वैः, which is explained by Śaṅkara as referring to the science of grammar. The epithet "the Veda of the Vedas," as applied to grammar, serves to indicate the indispensable character of grammar for an understanding of the Vedic texts. That is why grammar is compared to the face of the Vedas. Patañjali also observes that grammar is pre-eminently the greatest of all *Vedāṅgas*.

Even in so remote a period as that of the Brāhmaṇas, necessity was already felt to devise

¹ वैदानि वृत्तान् । एव वृत्ते च वृत्ताः । एव वृत्तः । एव
प्रतिशब्दिनः । एव वृत्तः । एव वृत्तान् । एव वृत्तः । एव वृत्ताः
एव वृत्तिः ।

practical means for the preservation of the older texts and the natural outcome was the evolution of the *Vedāngas*. Of these *Vedāngas*, *Sikṣa* and *Nirukta* are more or less related to grammar. The *Sikṣas* or treatises on phonetics deal with letters (vowels and consonants), accents (*Udātta*, *Anudātta* and *Stutīta*), different organs of pronunciation, *Sandhi* or euphonic combination and so on. We do not, however, fail to see that the "Sikṣas," though their main importance lies in the correct recitation of the Vedic hymns, deal with the phonological side of grammar. That grammar has connection with accents is clearly shown by the fact that the so-called *Samāsas*, so far as the *Sacūlīs* are concerned, had to be determined by different modulations of accents. Here again we first meet with "*Sandhi*," i.e., the combination of letters with one another in accordance with certain euphonic principles. The arrangement of words, as shown in the "*Pada-pāṭha*", serves to evince an attempt not only at disjoining the so-called "*Sandhis*" but clearly indicates how the grammatical method of analysis had already been in operation. Early treatises on phonetics are almost irrecoverably lost. The *Pada-pāṭha* texts which are popularly attributed to Śākalya only seem to have been well preserved.

Early Sanskrit literature had to suffer enormous loss; and nowhere such loss is more remarkable as in the case of the *Pratiśākhyas* and the

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Niruktas. We have got no oldest specimen of these classes of literature indicating the historical and continuous development of so ancient but extensive a literature; and what have practically survived seem to have a comparatively modern origin. The *Pratīśākhyas*, even in their present forms, are sufficient evidence that the study of grammar as a science had already been taken up with all earnestness. "If the nature and contents of our existing *Pratīśākhya* literature," says Dr. Belvalkar, "can safely be made the basis of any inference, we may suppose that these earlier treatises (1) classified the Vedic texts into the four forms of speech known to Yāska; (2) framed and carefully defined some of the primitive *Samjñas* or technical terms; and (3) possibly also made some more or less crude attempts to reduce the words to their elements and explain the mode of their grammatical formation."

We have already referred to the fact that Yāska, who flourished at a date not later than 700 B. C., had a good many predecessors—both etymologists and grammarians; and his work is not the first of its kind. The list of etymologists and grammarians, as mentioned by Yāska, gives unmistakable proof that Yāska had already found in existence different schools of the Nirukta and grammar. We are naturally inclined to think that the speculations on grammar which had had their crude beginning in the Brāhmaṇa literature had gradually obtained

wider scope and scientific character and finally developed into regular systems long before Yāska. That plagiarism as a literary theft was unknown in ancient India is borne testimony to by the fact that a teacher, whenever he happened to cite anything in support of his particular view, either from his predecessors or contemporary authors, was not at all slow to acknowledge his indebtedness to them by mentioning their names. This practice has been of considerable help to us, as it enables us to trace the names of those teachers whose names, like their works, would have been otherwise undiscoverable. In the *Pratidikhyas* mention is made of a good many teachers some of whom were undoubtedly grammarians. In the *Taittirīya*, for instance, are mentioned some twenty teachers, but we fail to trace there the name of any reputed grammarian. Among the host of teachers mentioned by Yāska, there are four, namely, Śākata�ana, Gārgya, Gālava, and Śākalya who are credited with having founded their respective schools of grammar and their works seem to have been existing even in the days of Pāṇini. Yāska has recorded a controversy which had ensued between Śākata�ana on the one hand and Gārgya and the grammarians on the other, with regard to the reducibility of words to roots. Śākata�ana seems to have been one of the oldest grammarians, and some of his views (as his work is no longer available) might

be collected from the works of later authors. Mention is made of Śākataṭyāna in the Atharva-Prātiśekhya in connection with combination, division, and disjunction of words. Yāska has thrice referred to Śākataṭyāna and has probably given his doctrines verbatim thus:—(1) ‘All words are derivable from roots’; (2) ‘Prepositions have no significance by themselves apart from nouns and verbs to which they are prefixed’; (3) his fanciful derivation of the word “*Satya*” from two different roots (*as, iṣ*).

Though our knowledge of ancient grammarians is nothing but scanty and meagre, it is admitted without contention that speculations on grammar had already taken a definite form long before the Christian era. The few observations, as mentioned above, will serve to show the extent of scientific exactness exhibited by the Indian grammarians. Yāska had undoubtedly many treatises on grammar and etymology before him and he made ample use of them. The theory enunciated by Śākataṭyāna as to the reducibility of all words to roots was accepted by Yāska with all earnestness; he followed it as a basic principle in all his etymological explanations. He classified speech into four forms, namely, noun, verb, preposition, and indeclinable, giving their exact significance. This four-fold classification of words seems to have been taken by Yāska from some earlier works on grammar. He not only distinguishes nouns from verbs with their grammatical terminations (*as, iṣ*) but

seems to have known even the formation of verbal nouns (*kṛdānta*). In his discourse as to the priority of combination (*Samhitā*), he has given a definition of *Sandhi* 'पत् संयोजनः संयुक्ता' which was probably incorporated into his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by Pāṇini in a later period. The two well-marked forms of the language, namely, *Chandas* and *Bhāṣā* (current speech) were known to him, as he has sometimes derived Vedic words from 'laukika' (spoken tongue) roots and vice versa. He has also taken notice of dialectical varieties of Sanskrit as they existed in different parts of India, where Sanskrit had been then a spoken language.

Among the ancient grammarians, Vyādi and Vajapyayana appear to be somewhat prominent, specially as the exponents of two popular doctrines of grammar.

Vyādi and Vajapyayana are said to have been reputed grammarians. The former is well-known as the author of a huge work on grammar called 'Samgraha.' Patañjali has referred to this work, as an authoritative one, while discussing the eternality of *Sabda*. Mention is again made of Vyādi in the *Varttika* as one holding 'substance' (सूत्र) as the meaning of all words. This is, in short, what we know about Vyādi. The name of Vajapyayana also occurs in the *Varttika*. In conjunction with the Mīmāṃsaka point of view, Vajapyayana holds that all words are expressive of 'class' (आकृति).

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Next we pass on to Pāṇini, the popular author of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. As the founder of a scientific system of grammar which has survived the destroying hands of time, Pāṇini is regarded as the highest authority on grammar. Pāṇini is mentioned as one of the reputed eight grammarians. His work is often alluded to as a great system व्याकरणं स्वरूपं पद्धतिरूपम्¹ and sometimes as "Vyākaraṇa-Swṛti."² He was not a pioneer in his attempt, but had the advantage of consulting many earlier treatises on grammar before he could develop such a system which bears the stamp of scientific perfection in so remarkable a way. With him closes a period of Sanskrit literature which represents the beginning of the classical period. His aphorisms have a history behind them and presuppose a vast literature. Prof. Goldstücker in his 'Pāṇini: His Place in Sanskrit Literature' has dealt with the question of pre-Pāṇinian literature and has discussed at length Pāṇini's scope of knowledge; but my views differ from those of the learned professor in some points. The object kept in view in writing these pages is to show in broad outlines the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar and not to attempt a historical study of grammatical literature. Prof. Belvalkar's learned work 'Systems of

¹ *Padma-Upanisad*.

² "व्याकरणविषया देवा अस्मद्वर्त्तीः ॥ Vyākaraṇa and कालो न विशेषाद्यो वर्त्तीः एव ॥"

Grammar,' however, gives a historical survey of different systems of Sanskrit grammar, and is a valuable contribution to our knowledge.

Though Pāṇini had many predecessors in the same line, it is his "Aṣṭādhyāyī" alone that has survived as a great landmark in the domain of Sanskrit literature. To a student of ancient Indian history, Pāṇini's "Aṣṭādhyāyī" has got its historical importance too. Thus, judged from both grammatical and historical standpoints, Pāṇini's work is a very valuable record of Indian culture. Many other works on grammar following in the wake of pre-Pāṇinian and Pāṇinian schools came into existence and gave rise to a vast literature which is almost without a parallel. The system of grammar founded by Pāṇini was studied with uncommon zeal, ■ a *Vedāṅga*, by so reputed scholars as Katyāyana and Patañjali. Attempts were also made from time to time to elaborate and supplement it in such a way as to make it a complete whole. Katyāyana to whom is attributed the authorship of the 'Kārtikae' tried his best to supplement the work of Pāṇini, having paid keen attention to the new stock of forms that gradually obtained currency in the course of linguistic development. Then came Patañjali with his wonderful genius and unparalleled erudition and wrote his famous commentary the 'Mahābhāṣya,' which is still regarded as the highest authority on all problems of grammar. He

may be said to have changed the angle of vision. He proceeded on a new line with the consequence that grammar received a far more scientific treatment in his hands and ultimately came to be regarded as a particular system of philosophy. He approached grammar from a logical standpoint always trying to find out the principles underlying the aphorisms of Pāṇini and Katyāyana. There is indication in the first 'Āṣṭaka' of the *Mahābhāṣya* that grammar was not only a heterogeneous combination of Sūtras with Patañjali, but it was treated by him as a regular science.

Though virtually a commentary, the *Mahābhāṣya* has its originality both in method and exposition ; it brings the system of Pāṇini to perfection and provides a vast field of study. Pāṇini, Katyāyana and Patañjali are popularly known as the "Triad of grammarians" and the system as "Trītūsi Vyākaraṇa" (त्रितूसि व्याकरण). Next came Bharṭṛhari, the author of the "Vākyapadiya," who seems to have made a masterly study of the "Mahābhāṣya" which fitted him to write his famous work dealing mainly with the philosophical aspects of grammar. It was, therefore, finally in the hands of Bharṭṛhari that the philosophical character of grammar became more and more conspicuous and grammar was ultimately established as a distinct system of philosophy.

To give a consistent history of grammatical speculations and the huge literature that evolved

out of them lies almost beyond the compass of this work. What we have tried to show in the foregoing pages is to point out that the speculations on grammar which had had their crude beginning in the Brahmanas and subsequent literature had to pass through different stages of perfection before they could develop into regular systems in the hands of Sakatayana, Sakalya, and others.

The indispensable character of grammar for understanding the Vedic texts was a matter of so great concern that grammar came to be regarded as the greatest of all *Vedāngas*. The importance of grammar lies in the fact that without a thorough knowledge of grammar one cannot distinguish correct words from incorrect ones (as there is no difference of meanings) and consequently fails to attain that religious felicity which is only attainable by the use of correct words. The study of grammar enables one, on the other hand, to discriminate the correct words as opposed to the so-called "*Apabhrānta*." Bhartṛhari calls grammar "*Sārṣṭi*"¹ which has for its subject the knowledge of correct words. One may argue that the knowledge of correct words may be obtained from popular or current usage and consequently grammar does not serve any useful purpose. Bhartṛhari² meets this

¹ शास्त्रानविषया सूता व्याकरण्युक्ति । अस्मीदेव व्याकरणं व्युत्पन्नम् ।—Vākyaśādiyā, I, 146.

² द्वाष्टामीष्व व्याकरणं व्यक्ति व्याकरणात्मी ।—I. 1. 13.

argument by holding that grammar derives its importance from the fact that it lays down principles covering almost the entire field of correct words and has thus become a practical standard for distinguishing the correct words current among the "Sifas" from corrupt forms. For the recognition of current words, we should take recourse to certain principles to avoid unwarranted uses ; grammar is identified with such principles made on the authority of the Vedas, conforming to the current uses and handed down to us through generations of teachers. "Vidyaranya-Smyti", as Bhartṛhari often applies this epithet to grammar, is current from time immemorial and does not appear to have suffered any breach of continuity in the course of its development. The author of the Vākyapadiya is not content with this statement only but goes further and maintains that the study of grammar leads ultimately to salvation. How final emancipation is obtained from a study of correct words will be understood only if we, like the ancient seers, try to find out the mystical aspect of sound and look upon words as an emblem or symbol of All-pervading God. The origin of the doctrine of 'world-producing Logos' or यद्गवादः may be traced to an attempt to discover the divine element in words. Pūṇyaratja quotes a verse¹ which states that

- 1 वैद्यराजस्त्वं वैद्यमानं पितिरुपितम् ।
वैद्यं वै विद्यामानविद्यां वैद्यते ॥—Vāky., I, 14.
- 2 Vākyapadiya, I, p. 6.

water is the most sacred thing in the earth ; the Vedic *mantras* are more sacred than water, but grammar is even superior in sanctity to the Vedas. The references given above are intended to show the respect that was accorded to grammar in those days.

CHAPTER II

ANUBANDHA AND CATEGORY

Grammar—Name and definitions—The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar—Anubandhas—Category of Grammat.

The earliest name whereby the science of grammar was designated is possibly वेदान्तो वेदः 'the Veda of the Vedas,' as is to be found in the long list of Sāstras enumerated in the Upaniṣads. The popular term 'Vyākaraṇa' appears to be an old one; it points at once to the analytical process (शब्दार) by which words are dissolved into bases and suffixes. The expression like वाक्यवा वाक् meaning 'divided speech' is also to be met with in the Vedic literature. Both the terms वाकरण and विवाचरण occur in the Nirukta. Grammar is also called व्याख्या, and the grammarians are popularly known as आचिन्त and sometimes as 'पाण्डितविद्,' i.e., one who knows the combination of speech. Patañjali has used the expression 'शब्दानुशासन' instead of वाकरण at the very beginning of his work, his object obviously being to point out that the first and foremost function of grammar is to show how by their conformity to the rules of grammar correct words are distinguished from incorrect ones. He derives the term वाकरण as 'वाक्यियके व्युत्पादके ग्रन्था अनेनेति-वाकरणम्' and speaks of both words and rules as

what constitute grammar that supports the correctness of Sanskrit words (संस्कृतवाचे व्याकरणम्). He holds further that the knowledge of words does not really follow from the rules alone, but from a clear interpretation of those rules showing both examples and counter-examples. Of the six *Āngas*, Patañjali maintains, grammar is decidedly the greatest, as it directly helps the study of the *Vedas*. Durga holds that grammar consists of rules and primarily deals with the physical structure of words, whereas the science of etymology lays greater stress on the psychological aspect, viz., significance. Grammar seems to have attained to scriptural authority, for Bhartrhari and others are often found to ascribe such epithets to grammar, as व्याकरणमूर्ति and व्याकरणमय. There is a special section on grammar in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa* system where grammar has been referred to as a branch of *Smyti* having bearing upon *Dharma*. The way in which grammar comes in close touch with *Dharma* may be shewn by the fact that grammar, as a science, deals with the correct forms of words, the proper knowledge of which is necessary for the attainment of religious merits. Though the correct Sanskrit forms, says Patañjali, as well as the corrupt words are equally expressive of sense, it is only the use of correct ones that is attended with religious felicity. Moreover, grammar is the only instrument whereby correct words are distinguished from corrupt forms, and the

meanings of words are ascertained. The importance and usefulness of grammar for a thorough knowledge of the Vedic texts cannot, therefore, be over-estimated.

It will be a mistake to suppose that Sanskrit grammar, as defined above, is nothing but a number of rules that attempt to explain the formation and analysis of words in a manner that has nothing to do with principles as such. Words are so numerous and so diversified in forms, that the grammarians had had to face a great difficulty in making a thorough study of words. Scholars of the reputation of Patañjali and Durga failed to take notice of the entire field of words¹ which, as we find, is always being enlarged with the advancement of knowledge. But credit to the vigorous attempts of the Indian grammarians who succeeded conspicuously in their study of words and placed the grammatical speculations on a purely scientific basis.

It is really striking to see how the grammarians could systematise their studies of words in spite of such varieties of forms. Great as the task was, the grammarians proved equal, as they adopted the scientific method and framed the rules on the principle of generalisation and particularisation, taking notice of all possible forms. Still greater was the difficulty in determining the radical and

¹ यह न अवश्यक कुरामेविलक्षीः ३६ अवश्यिः परं तिक्तं वस्तुतम्

inflectional elements in words. Analysers of speech as they were, the grammarians had to reach the last stage of linguistic analysis, and this, as we know, was practicable by the application of the principle of व्युत्पत्तिः or the method of agreement and difference. The conclusion to which we are naturally led is that Sanskrit grammar was not busy with isolated words but was based on principles. An attempt may be made here to show that the study of grammar is not a mechanical way of mastering the conjugation and declension of certain forms and that grammar does not give a cumbersome process of fanciful derivations. Grammar, like all philosophical systems, has its own categories and logic and is ultimately based on the principles that are strictly philosophical. The study of grammar on a philosophical line received its inception at the hands of Patañjali who, in his elaborate commentary known as the Mahābhāṣya, has dealt with the grammatical problems from a different standpoint and has practically given them a philosophical character. The work of Pāṇini has been treated by Mādhyavikāryya as a system of philosophy.¹ Grammar was no longer looked upon as an artifice but as embodying the principles ■ spontaneous growth. Bhartr̥hari seems to have made a careful study of the Mahābhāṣya : this had not only widened his scope of knowledge but befitted him to

¹ *निर्विकारः*

explain the principles of grammar from a purely philosophical stand-point. With him grammar was a regular system of philosophy and he treated it as such. What Patañjali and Bhartṛhari have done for grammar is really wonderful; they would always deserve our admiration as the founder of an interesting branch of study as the 'Philosophy of grammar.' Their conspicuous contribution towards the building up of this new school of thought is none the less important and valuable than what Plato and Aristotle have actually done for philosophy proper. Thanks to the labours of these grammarians, we can boast of this peculiar system of philosophy to the rest of the world.

Having taken a brief survey about the origin of grammatical speculations and the subsequent periods to which those speculations had been systematised by the ancient grammarians in a scientific way, we now proceed to shew, following the line of thought of Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, that Sanskrit grammar may be studied as a regular system of philosophy. There was a time when the authoritativeness of grammar reached such a height as to deserve such epithets as विद्या and विज्ञा, and the author of the 'Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha' found in the Pāṇiniyan system of grammar certain characteristics which induced him to treat it, as if it were a regular system of philosophy. Now, as a system of philosophy,

grammar must have its *Anubandhas*, categories and principles. Grammar, to begin with, is mainly connected with *Sabda* and their corresponding significance, and is, therefore, popularly called *Sabda-śāstra*. The relation, again, in which words stand to the world of objects is one of *Vācya-Vācaka* (connoter and connoted), and there are as many words as there are objects to be named. Thus, we see that the scope of वाच्यवाचक covers almost the entire sphere of thought. It is said that the entire world of objects resides in words in a subtle form and the so-called *Vācya* and *Vācaka* are not really different but essentially one and the same thing. Further, no cognition¹ whatsoever is ever possible without the use of words, and the knowledge of all descriptions seems to be bound up with words.

Every system of Hindu philosophy has its own *Anubandhas*. Grammar, when viewed as a system of thought, may be shown to have its particular *Anubandhas*. (1) Grammar has *Sabda* as its subject; (2) the relation of grammar with *Sabda* is that the former analyses *Sabda* into stems and suffixes (प्रत्यय and प्रत्ययिका), and thus helps the understanding of the significance.

- ¹ वाच्येऽरनिता वाचिर्वाचकम् लिपयः ।—Vākyapadiya, I.119
and वाचुभिर्विद्य वाचं सर्वज्ञेन तादृगः ।— .. 1. 126.
- ² वाचस्तीति वाचदिव लोकवाचा वचनं ते ।—Kāvyaśāstra, I. 3.
and प्रत्ययन्वयम् इतर्व वृक्षो वृक्षवस्त्रम् । तरि वृक्षानां वृद्धिप्रसंकरणं एव दीप्तिः ।—Kāvyaśāstra, I. 4.

While explaining the expression वेदान्ति वेदः, as an epithet of grammar, Saṅkara states that grammar by division of words enables us to comprehend the meanings thereof. As regards the *Prayojana* or object, it is definitely stated by the expression अन्तर्गतास्तम्, that is, the first and foremost object of grammar is to formulate such principles as would serve to distinguish correct forms from incorrect (अपर्याप्त) ones. Kalyāṇa rightly observes that by the expression अन्तर्गतास्तम्, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* sets forth the immediate object of grammar and the statement त्रिवृत्यमात्रपदेष्टः लक्षणम् enumerates only the indirect purposes that are served by the study of grammar. So far as *Adhikāri* is concerned, it is sufficient to say that one desirous of having the knowledge of correct words is alone competent to take up the study of grammar. It is known to all students of Hindu philosophy that the Indian teachers have, as a rule, discussed the question of *Anubandhas* in the very beginning of their discourses, with the obvious object of inducing people to those studies. There are reasons to believe that this was followed as a traditional practice, because Yāska too in his *Nirukta* did not fail to treat of such *Anubandhas*.

Having dealt with the *Anubandhas* of grammar, Patañjali has drawn our attention to the fact that the statement of objects (*Prayojana*) is of no use, as both the *Vedas* and grammar are required to be studied without having any

definite object in view. The question¹ of *Prayojana* may arise with regard to other branches of studies apart from the Vedas, because it is definitely enjoined that the unconditional duty on the part of a Brahmin is to make a study of the Vedas with the six popular *Aṅgas* (grammar, etymology, etc.) and acquire a thorough knowledge of them. He gives us a glimpse of the time-honoured custom regarding the ancient method of teaching in India. The Brahmins² are said to have devoted themselves in ancient times to the study of grammar just after their *Upaḥayan* ceremony was over; and they were allowed to study the Vedas only on their attaining a sufficient knowledge of grammar. But time has much changed. People now take up the study of the Vedas first, as their shorter span of existence does not allow them to master grammar before attempting such a vast field of study. Further, they cannot practically afford to devote the greater portion of their life exclusively to the acquisition of proficiency in grammar, since they like to turn out teachers, capable of speaking Sanskrit, in course of a short duration. This is why they take to the study of the Vedas just in the beginning of their

¹ विद्विरिक्षिते एव अपेक्षयानाम् च गु वेदीयते :

—Bhāskyā Pradipodyata.

² पुराणे गताशीत् संक्षेपोरपदार्थं वराहचर्च भाष्यत्वं वाचीयते ।
मैत्रीनामद्युक्तावदार्थं विद्युष्टावपदानोच्ची वेदिकाः चक्षा चरणिकासि, लक्षणे च त्वा,
विद्यमाना लक्षणी भवन्ति ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.



academic career, Grammar is called *Uttara Pidgā* which is capable of being understood to a considerable extent by intelligent students, engaged in the serious study of the Vedas. What Patañjali has observed here is also applicable to much recent times. The present-day scholars are more or less actuated by the desire of securing recognition as *Pandits* in as short a time as possible. With this object in view, they engage themselves to the study of many *Sastras*, though superficially, before they have obtained sufficient proficiency in grammar to qualify them to take up other branches of study. The statement of *Prayojana* has indeed some other reasons. Patañjali has anticipated an objection that might be raised against the so-called necessity of making a study of grammar. We know that words—both *Vedio* and *Laukika*—form the subject of grammar. The study of grammar as a science, some may argue, is of no importance, because the Vedic words might be learnt from the Vedas and the correctness of *Laukika* or current words from popular usages.¹ The study of grammar, if pursued for the knowledge of words, is, therefore, nothing but useless. Now it is simply to do away with such unreasonable arguments that Pāṇini wrote his famous *Aṣṭādhyāyi* clearly showing the

¹ वैदादेव वैविकः कम्दन निषा लोकात् चीरिका ; असाम्यानं व्याहरयन्ति ।
तेऽपि एवं विविष्टप्रश्निभोद्देशेन युक्तं तुमा चाचार्ये एवं ग्रन्थान्यापदे—इतापि
क्षमीक्षान्वयं द्वावरेत्वम् ।—Mahabhasya, Vol. I, p. 3.

objects for which grammar should be studied. The enunciation of *Prayojana*—both direct and indirect—is, therefore, necessary to show that the study of grammar is indispensable for the knowledge of the Vedic texts and the accurate discrimination of correct Sanskrit words.

The eternality of *Sabda*, as supported by the grammarians, furnishes another objection as to the usefulness of grammar. As a matter of fact, if words are held to be eternal, the science of grammar, which teaches the formation and analysis of words, should necessarily become useless.¹ The author of the *Varttika* meets this position by holding that the principles laid down in grammar serve to put a stop to certain undesirable consequences.² One may, for instance, be led to think that the root *mṛj* always retains the form *mṛj* in all declensions (according to the wording of the *Dhatupāṭha*); but grammar in such a case brings forward certain restriction, viz., grammar teaches³ that the root *mṛj* changes to *mṛḍj* (*gets Viḍḍhi*), when it is followed by suffixes other than *kit*.

By categories of Sanskrit grammar, we mean precisely the fundamental concepts of grammar. *Sabdo* is pre-eminently the basis on which rests the entire structure of grammatical science.

¹ सद्य तद्विद्वान् वस्तुः विज्ञाने वाचनम् ?

² विज्ञाने वाचनानि विवरयेकत्वात् विरहम् ।

— *Yās., 10, under the rule, Pāg., I. 1. 1.*

³ मत्तविष विविधः विवरतः । अपीत्यत्पूर्वं वाचने वाचनानि वाचनं वाचनं विविधः —*Ibid.*

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As *Sabda* is intimately related to thoughts and logic, the extent of *Sabda-śāstra* seems to be immensely wide. The categories of grammar, looked at from a wider point of view, comprehend almost all those that are enumerated by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. Mention is here made, among others, of the following grammatical concepts:—(1) Genus and individual (*जातिव्यक्ति*), (2) Co-inherence (*सामान्यविकरण*), *सम्बन्ध* (inseparable connection), (3) *Hetu* and *Karana*, (4) Quality (*गुण*), Substance (*स्वरूप*), Relation (*सम्बन्ध*), Parts and the whole (*भाग्यत्व* and *प्रधानत्व*), *Prakṛti* and *Nikṛti*, and Efficiency (*शक्ति*). The inclusion of *Sakti* in the grammatical categories marks, however, a departure from the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* stand-points.

First, both class and individual are taken by the grammarians as the significance of all words. There is, as we know, a great controversy as to whether words denote a class or an individual. The two well-known grammarians *Vijayabhyanu* and *Vyādi* held opposite views with regard to this problem, the former, like the *Mimāṃsakas*, was an exponent of the Class-theory, while the latter advocated the Individualistic theory. We have elsewhere pointed out that the *Naiyāyikas* seem to have brought about a reconciliation between these contradictory views by holding that it is neither class nor individual alone that is usually denoted by words, but an individual qualified by the class (*जातविकृत्यात्मिक*) is the meaning of all words. As to the view of the grammarians,

Patañjali is of opinion that both class and individual are taken to be the sense of words. He particularly observes that Pāṇini had the same view before him while framing the rules of grammar.

It is not only in the Nyāya system of philosophy that we frequently meet with such terms as सामान्यविवरक् or co-inherence and कारण or cause, but grammar also has these concepts and their proper expositions. The term सामान्यविवरक् means 'the state of being substratum of two qualities.' The class ■ compound known as *Karmadhāra* is based upon the conception of such co-inherence. In an instance like शीतोष्णवत्, both blueness and 'the state of being lotus' inheres in a common substratum, i.e., lotus.

There is an elaborate treatment of both *Hetu* and *Karana* in Sanskrit grammar. The very conception of *Sāraka* is intimately related to that of cause (नियानिमित्तं कारकम्). By *Hetu* is meant the material cause. In the grammatical conception of *Hetu*, we should remember, there is no room for action. *Karana* or instrument, defined as a 'cause associated with action' (कापारबृत् कारणं कारणम्) is intimately related to action. There is, however, no essential difference between *Hetu* and *Karana*, it is only the association with action that makes the difference.

The question of quality comes invariably in connection with the consideration of *Viveṣaya*.

* इन्द्रियस्ति एतु कारण नियानितः ।—Vidyapadīya.

Vyañjana, *Itaratyāvartaka* and *Dharma* are generally the terms whereby *gupta* is denoted. The grammatical conception of *gupta* or quality is almost the same as we find in the Nyaya-Vaisesika systems. Patañjali seems to have only reproduced a Sutra of the Nyaya philosophy while he enumerates *gupta* as sound, touch, form, smell and taste. Under the rule 4.1.44. Patañjali has made an attempt to give a clear definition of *gupta*. *Gupta*, he holds,¹ is what inheres in substance, sometimes liable to destruction, found in different classes, not produced by action and essentially different from substance. Elsewhere, he explains *gupta* as what serves to distinguish an object from others (belonging to the same class विद्या गुप्तः);² as, for instance, the same entity as water is said to be either hot or cold, according to the difference of quality. Further, he continues that *guptas* are also found to be non-differentiating (अविद्या);³ as a man, say Devadatta, retains the same name, no matter whether he is a boy, young or old. The

¹ हन्ते विद्यार्थीविद्यान्वृक्षम् इति : अवेचनविद्याव विद्यावाप्तिः
दुष्टः : And विद्यावाप्तिः विद्यावाप्तिः इत्याप्तिः ।

—Mahabhasya under the rule, Pl. 4., 4. 144.

विद्या : उर्मिलासां द्वादशी दुष्टः गुप्तः ।

² and ³ Mahabhasya under the Tva. विद्यावाप्त गुप्तम्, Vol. I. p. 41.
एषोऽप्यवाप्तोद्वर्त वज्र वज्र वृषभविद्यावर्त वप्तिः । अविद्यं वौत्तम्या-
दिव्यावप्तिः ।

उपर्युक्तिः वृषभवृत्तं विद्या विद्यावप्तिः ।

grammatical idea of *Vidēṣa* (विदेषानर्थवाचम्) is, therefore, essentially the same as that of *guṇa*. According to the grammarians, words like यज्ञः, etc., are expressive of both the quality and the object qualified. Bhartṛhari, while speaking of *guṇa*, gives much stress¹ on the differentiating character as well as on the dependent² nature of *guṇa*. Its dependent nature means that we cannot conceive of a *guṇa* or quality without considering at the same time a substance in which that particular quality might inhere (सूक्ष्मपारतन्त्रम् and विद्युत्तमव्यवहारान्तरम्). Much has been said with regard to the object and quality in Sanskrit grammar, especially in the *Mahibhāṣya*. According to Bhartṛhari, genus, such as वीत्त, is also included in the category of quality.

A substance is the substratum of qualities (सुखाकरो सूक्ष्मम्). Patañjali defines substance³ as what does not lose its essence even when different qualities come to inhere in it. A fruit, for instance, remains the same, when in course of time its blueness gives way to redness.

¹ लोकिंभेदं पर्याप्तं व्याप्तं प्रतीयते । युक्तं व्याप्तमात्मा व्याप्तं व्याप्तम् ।—Vidyāyāpadīya, 3, p. 145.

² शूलपारतन्त्रम् सूक्ष्मान्तः । He holds शूलान्तः व्याप्तं सूक्ष्मं व्याप्तवाचम् ।

³ व्याप्तं व्याप्तवरिच्छिः प्राप्तुंप्राप्तुं व्याप्तं व्याप्तवरिच्छिः व्याप्तवरिच्छिः व्याप्तवरिच्छिः व्याप्तवरिच्छिः ।—Mahibhāṣya under the rule, Pg., 5, 1, 118.

Bhartrhari¹ holds substance to be eternal and enumerates soul, object, nature, body and the four elements as synonyms of *Dravya*. We give below the sum and substance of what Hesaraja has said in connection with *Dravya*. *Dravya*, he maintains, is of two kinds:²—transcendental and popular; it is the latter that are comprehended by Vyādi when he says that all words signify substance. Brought up in an atmosphere of sacred traditions and religious culture, the Hindu teachers are generally found to have approached all problems from a standpoint that is more or less metaphysical. Thus, while speaking of so concrete a phenomenon as *Dravya*, they have brought in the subtle question regarding the ultimate nature of substance, as conceived by different philosophers. *Dravya*, looked at from the transcendental standpoint, is the same as Soul. Those who support the non-dualistic view are of opinion that it is the all-pervading Soul alone that manifests itself in manifold object and appears to be diversified in association with different qualities (रूपाणि). The Buddhist philosophers hold that an object (वस्तु) having its own identity as its own mark (स्वात्मकम्) and capable of doing works is known as *Dravya*. The followers of the dualistic view understand

¹ अनुप्रवार्य एव वर्तनाम वर्त्तते । समविद्युच्चो यौद्धर्मे भेषणेन विविष्टः ॥
—Vakyapadiya, 3, p. 141.

विद्या करु विद्या वहोरं लभते विद्यानि । इन्द्रियानाम् विद्यावाच निमित्ति
विद्या ॥—Vakyapadiya (द्वयस्तुद्वय), 3, p. 65.

² एवं विद्ये प्रसम्पर्वा विद्याविद्या च ॥—Under the 8th sūtra, 3, p. 85

existence or nature by *Draṣṭva*. According to the view of Cārvāka, the four elements, namely, earth, water, light and air which, in their particular combination produce the body and sense-organs, are considered to be *Draṣṭyos*.

Sambandha or relation is of various kinds :— it may be one of *Pācya-Vācaka*, as exists between a word and its sense ; or, one representing *Bhedaka-Bheda*, as is to be found between *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, and¹ as cause and effect and so on. Words and meanings are mutually both cause and effect, so far as the verbal knowledge is concerned. Having shown that the meanings of words are either class or individual (प्राप्ति or प्रिय) or, an individual conditioned by the class, we now turn to the question as to how a particular word always seems to be associated with a particular sense. As this question has already been dealt with, a few words are only needed to explain the relation that exists between words and their meanings. The reason as to why a particular word always implies a particular sense points to the existence of certain relation, whether conventional² or fixed by nature, otherwise the word *gauḥ* might have signified a pot and so on. The Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians held, as we know, this relation to be

¹ वाचः वाचसंबन्धः स एव निर्मितवाचः ।—Vakyapadīya, p. 112.

² अपेक्षात् वाचसंबन्धैः सम्बन्धो देहः ।—Bhāskarī.

वाचसंबन्धितेषु च वाचः प्रभवति ।—Vakyapadīya (B), p. 98.

वाचसंबन्धः वाचसंबन्धो वाचसंबन्धा वाचः ।—“ “ “ 119.

■ PHILOSOPHY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

eternal, while the Naiyāyikas explained it as fixed by God's will (सत्त्वा). The question of *Sambandha* occupies a prominent place in Sanskrit grammar. In grammar *Sambandha* is generally denoted by एषि which is technically called *Sesa*. Under the rule *Pāṇ.* 1.1.49, Patañjali says that the meanings of एषि are one hundred in number. One *Sabda* is said to be related to another when both of them have close affinity regarding their places of utterance. Besides this, words may have among themselves some such relations as proximity, posteriority, etc. (प्रान्तवाद, समीक्षा).

Samarasya or inseparable connection is one in which a quality stands to the object. In *carmanī dṛḍhīnī hṛisti*—the relation of skin with the leopard is one of *Samarasya*.

Acayana and *Acayati* or parts and the whole form another concept of grammar. The class of compound known as *Ekađesti Sandes*, the *Paribhāṣās*, such as, *Ekadeśazikptamananyat*, *Avayavopratidhīḥ*, *saundāyaprasidhīrbyāyast*, and the particular division of *Adhikarana*, the *Ekadēśika* are instances that prove the grammatical conception of *Acayana* and *Acayati*. Like the Naiyāyikas, the grammarians do not take the whole to be a distinct entity from the parts of which it is composed, but consider it simply as an aggregate of parts.¹

¹ वर्णने उपरिक्षेपः ॥—M. B., L. 23.

The grammarians have taken *Prakṛti* to be the final element of words ; it is either *Nāman* or *Dhṛtu*. In instances like *Āśayā*, *dāru* and *Kundalāga* *śicaryam*, the grammarians take both post and earring as modifications of wood and gold respectively. Thus, *Prakṛti* also means the original in relation to *Tikṛti* or modification. To the Sāṃkhyaites, *Prakṛti* is the primordial substance out of which the entire universe has evolved. Bhartṛhari has also started with the doctrine that the whole world may be viewed as only *Vicarita* or modification of *Saṅda-Brahman*.

In considering the fundamental concepts of grammar, we can logically put forward what Bhartṛhari has said in connection with efficiency¹ (*Sakti*) and its different manifestations, such as, space, agent, action and time. The conception of efficiency comprehends in itself the idea of objects ; we cannot, to be more clear, conceive of any efficiency without thinking of certain objects with which it is naturally associated. We can, for instance, hardly think of the power of burning unless we think of fire at the same time. Efficiency and the efficient object, therefore, seem to be practically inseparable. It was on the ground of such inseparable connection that the Naiṣāyikas did not include efficiency in their categories, as an entity distinct

¹ यत्प्रिये प्रदर्शनात्मकवर्णनाः । विद् चापि निषा चतु चौ विभागादिः ।—Vākyapadīya, 8. 1., p. 157.

from the object. The grammarians, however, admit that efficiency, though practically dependent on the object (*dravyaparastā*), has got its independent character too. Though inseparably connected and entirely identical with objects, efficiency has its own form (*Siddhavṛtbhāva*), since all objects are found to exhibit some efficiency or energy, as we may call it, when they perform some actions. What is true is that such efficiency is not directly implied by words which signify objects. Patañjali has clearly shown that the thing and its quality or efficiency, though related inseparably, are different; as, for instance, in using the comparative and superlative forms, such as, *sweeter* and *sweetest*, we do not apply the degree of excellence to the thing itself but to its quality, i.e., *sweetness*.

Both space and time are regarded as *Dravya* by the Nātyārikas, but the grammarians take them as efficiency inherent in objects. Space involves the notions of limit, priority, posteriority,¹ and so forth. Generally, we have the idea of space when we say 'This is prior to it,' 'This is posterior to it,' 'From this place onward,' and so on. In instances like these, we get the fifth case-endings denoting *Atadhi* or *Apeksā*. But when the relation between the whole and the parts is meant, we have *Saṅkīrti*, as in *Pūrvam Kāyanya* (the fore-part of the body). The Vaiśeṣika system also mentions space as a

¹ परान्ते गते विद्युतेष्विद्युते — Vākyapādiya, 5, p. 269.

Dravya, and takes space as one eternal entity without division. The so-called divisions of space, as north, west, east, etc., are only conventional; they are usually determined by the motion of the sun (*Adityagatya*).

Next we come to the second manifestation of efficiency, i.e., *Sādhana* or activity. This *Sādhana*¹ implies that energy or activity of a thing whereby actions are performed. As an instrument of actions, this *Sādhana* is of great importance, so far as the grammatical conceptions of cases, such as Nominalative, Objective, Instrumental, etc., are concerned. The word *Sādhana* may be taken as a synonym of *Karaka*, as both of them imply an agent or instrument of action. Patañjali has identified *Sādhana* with the combination of qualities (*Guyaśmūḍḍiyah Sādhanaḥ*). What is true of a quality is that it always appears as a distinguishing mark of the thing wherein it inheres and this is exactly the case with efficiency also. Halurīja, therefore, is of opinion that the statement *Sādhavanti*² on *Dravyam* of the author of the *Mahabhaṣya* may be explained as implying the identity of *Sādhana* with efficiency. It is by drawing an identity between the efficiency and the efficient thing that Patañjali has sometimes attributed

¹ किंवाचान्तिरिक्षस्ती वाच्यम् वाच्यः—*Vācypadīya*, 3, 1, p. 172.

² का॒ धारने॑ के॒ दक्षिणे॑ वाच्ये॒ उच्चस्त् वाच्यनामित्येऽवच्छि॑ विश्वास्यवाच्यम्—Halurīja under the *Kār.* 3, 1, p. 172.

Sādhanas to things also. As a solution of the question as to why efficiency is considered to be *Sādhanā* or active agent and not things themselves possessing such efficiency, Bhartrhari continues to say that the whole universe seems to have been made up of efficient force (*Sakti-kalō*) which reveals itself in manifold thing. The manifold aspect and diversified character of the world is due to the corresponding plurality and diversity of this efficiency. Patañjali understands by active agent 'an aggregate of quality.'

Time is held to be a kind of efficiency. The *Naiyayikas*, as we know, have treated of time as a *Draegya*. Time is said to be the ultimate substratum of the world;¹ it is indivisible and eternal. In grammar, time has an important place as indicative of tenses. Patañjali² defines time as that whereby both growth and decay of objects are perceived. The division of time into day and night indicates some sorts of conjunction of actions with time; action or *Vyāpāra* means here the motion of the sun. Time is immaterial and conceived as a symbol of eternity. The popular division of time into moments, hours, etc., are only artificial. In grammar, we hear of three-fold division of time, namely, present, past, and future. Under the rule *Pāṇ. 3.2.123*, *Katyāyana*³ rightly observes

¹ कालो दि व्यवदातः वास्तवानो न विद्यते ।

² देव तु गीयन्तु दद्यन्ति वाचानं वाचाने न वाचनम् ।

—*Māṇḍūkya*, Vol. I, p. 409.

³ इति च वाक्यविभागः — *Pāṇ. 3.* तिरुचि पर्वतः । वास्तविं पर्वतः । अतः पर्वतः ।

that time, though essentially indivisible, is spoken of as present, past and future in the science of grammar. Patañjali has given three instances indicating the three different divisions of time, as 'Mountains exist'; 'Mountains existed' and 'Mountains will exist,' and goes on to say that in the above examples the existence is to be understood as pertaining to the action of the kings that are either present, past or would come in future.' Patañjali has also shown the divergent views regarding the existence of such a division of time as 'Present time.' Some say, he continues, that there is nothing like present time. Their view is thus represented:—'The wheel does not exist, nor the arrow is thrown; the streamlets do not flow towards the sea. The whole universe is motionless; there is nothing that moves; he who can realize it is not blind.' The second and third verses quoted by Patañjali remind us of the arguments whereby the *Madhyamika*¹ school of the Buddhist philosophy set aside the popular divisions of time. Some,² again, hold, on the contrary, that there is

¹ एव समर्पिताऽनुबंध एति एव विशेषान्तर्भौतिकरणः
—Nabhippaya under the rule, Pg., 3. 2. 123.

² याति चर्तवायः चक्र चति—

"ये चर्तवी चर्तवाय में याति व क्षमा से चर्तवी चापायतः।
सूर्यजोड़ दीपो ग विचेषितात्मा दो सैरं चर्तवी उत्तमनामः।

* चर्तवायात्मिकान् चर्तवायात्मिक चर्तवीः चर्तवी च चर्तवायात्मि चर्तवायात्मि
चर्तवायात्मी—Madhyamika Kāśikā.

१८ चर्ति चर्तवायः चक्र चति— चर्तिकात्मिकात्मिकात्मी—

—M. Bhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 194.

present time, though it is imperceptible like the sun's movement. Patañjali seems to have been a scholar of wide culture and thoroughly acquainted with the principal systems of Indian philosophy, consequently it is not unlikely that he might have studied the Buddhist philosophy as it existed in his time.

Next we come to *Kriyā* or action as the last manifestation of efficiency. The conception of *Kriyā* plays an important part in Sanskrit grammar, specially in connection with *Karakas*. *Kriyā* is the meaning of verbal roots (*Dhātus*)—that *Kriyā*, holds Patañjali, is immaterial, invisible and is only comprehended by inference.

The method followed throughout Sanskrit grammar is purely analytical: grammar does never attempt to coin new words, but dissolves words into their radical and formative elements in accordance with the principle of *Aucaya-Pyatireka* or the method of agreement and difference. The Indian grammarians, as we have said elsewhere, had a conception of scientific methodology, as is clearly evidenced by the way in which they had analysed words of so diversified character and determined their *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. The grammarians had to experience great difficulty in the course of analysis of words. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* gives us a clear idea as to how the grammarians, proceeding on the line of *Aucaya-Pyatireka*,

succeeded in distinguishing the radical from the formative elements. We do not like to repeat here what we have already said. It will suffice here to point out that the grammarians seem to have taken a group of similar forms such as, *ghaṭaḥ*, *ghaṭena*, *ghaṭī* and *pacīt*, *pacatāḥ*, *apacīt*, etc., and then proceeded to find out the common and uncommon elements in them. Now the common or unaltered element, namely, *ghaṭa* and *pac*, which has not undergone any important change in all those forms is called *Prakṛti*; the uncommon elements, on the other hand, *na*, *ta*, *tī*, *taḥ*, which are liable to variations in different forms, are termed *Pratyaya*. This is, in short, the process whereby the grammarians could successfully dissolve the words.

Though the adherents of the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* take all words to be indivisible and eternal and look upon all such disintegrations as purely artificial, we do not fail to notice the scientific value of such a procedure that furnishes an instrument to get into the meaning of words. There are three forms in which words generally appear: sentence, inflected form, and the radical and formative elements. Of these, a sentence is the logical unit or the significant part of speech. Words, as we have already said, have no independent existence apart from a sentence. According to the *Pātyacādīne*, i.e., those who take a sentence to be real, indivisible, and the only significant unit, the analysis of a sentence into its constituents, i.e., *Padas*, is at best artificial, but

recourse is taken to this process, however imaginary, as it provides the only means of showing the meaning of a sentence. The *Vākyādīna*, on the other hand, hold that *Padas* are real, and seek to prove the unreality of a *Vākya*, as an indivisible unit. A sentence, so to speak, is nothing but an aggregate of *Padas*, consequently a sentence has no separate existence apart from its constituents. The aphorism of the *Pratiśikhyā* defining *Sandhi*¹ is construed by the *Padavādinā* in such a way as to indicate the priority of *Padas* to *Sandhi* and the reality of *Padas* is thus sought to be established. According to them, *Padas*, though essentially indivisible, are analysed into *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* in order to bring out their significance. The decomposition of words into *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* is the central problem upon which are concentrated the entire speculations on grammar. It is by such analysis or *Saṃskṛta*, as it is often called, that the Sankrit grammarians could exclude *Aparūपrāṇas* from coming under the cognisance of their systems of grammar. The view of Pāṇini and Patañjali, as explained by Bhartṛhari and Hēlaṇja, shows that both of them were in favour of the *Vākyādīna*, i.e., *Padas* are unreal and have no separate existence, whereas a sentence is indivisible and really significant by nature.

¹ प्राकृतिः विद्यते —*Pratiśikhyā*. वर्तमा विद्यते विनिः विद्यते एव वाक्यात् —*Vākyapadīya*, 2. 59.

The expression *Padakāra*,¹ as used by Patañjali, is a sufficient indication that *Padas* are essentially unreal. It is simply for the understanding of unintelligent people that the grammarians have taken recourse to such an artificial process, as the separation of *Padas* from a sentence.

¹ व चाचेन पदकारो भवन्ति, पदकारेण सर्वाद्युपार्थं—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 117. *Padyārtha* समेत उत् *Vijayapadīya*, इति., १६८. अत एहि पदाना मत्ता अत्र तदा विद्या अस्ति अस्ति एव विद्यमान् पदमेव कुर्वन्तीति पदकारा इतीतद्वाहते यान्। तत्प्रत्यक्षावहे इत्यनुसारतः । इत्यनुसारतः यान्। यद्युपचीयत्वात् पदकाराः अस्ति एव।

CHAPTER III

SANJIDA AND PARIBHĀSA

Sanjida or grammatical technique—Paribhāsa or axioms of grammar—Role of grammar.

Every system of philosophy has its particular concepts and contains necessarily a set of corresponding terms that are more or less restricted in their sense. Terms of this description, which are specialised in their significance, are popularly called *Sanjidas* or technical terms. The Nyaya system, specially the *Navya-Nyaya*, contains a large number of such technical terms. These words, it must be remembered, are not used by the *Naiyayikas* in their popular sense. To a *Naiyayika* the words *Prakara* and *Pratiyogin*, for instance, are not denotative of kinds and competitive respectively, but usually express an adjunct and anything that is non-existent.¹ The use of such technical terms has manifold advantage. *Sanjidas* are often used for the sake of brevity and conciseness, and are consequently adopted in most of the treatises on science in their respective fashions.

¹ व्याख्यान; स ग्रन्थेष्वीः।

A *Saṃjā* generally means an enunciation or mention of something by name.¹ Vātsyāyana has used the word चक्षय, as a synonym of *Saṃjā*, and holds that the logical or scientific procedure comprehends enunciation, definition and examination, as necessary for the scientific treatment of a subject.² The grammarians also, as is evident from their method of treatment, have followed this scientific process. To enumerate something by name is what is known as *Saṃjā* and those that are denoted or comprehended by such *Saṃjā* are called *Saṃjāl*. Patañjali defines *Saṃjā* as a shortest name which is adopted for the sake of brevity.

In the *Sūtra* शिरादैष् Pg. 1. 1. 1, the word शिरः is a *Saṃjā* and चात् and देष् are *Saṃjāl*. But how are we to know that it is a *Saṃjāl*? The *Sūtra* quoted above forms the opening aphorism of Panini and there is no preceding rule like *Saṃjā* that may be taken as an *Adhikarā-Sūtra*. The question raised by Patañjali³ is that Panini ought to have used the word *Saṃjā* before the rule शिरादैष्, so as to avoid the ambiguity as to whether शिरः or चात् देष् is to be taken as *Saṃjā*. To recognise *Vṛddhi* as a *Saṃjā* naturally presupposes an adequate conception of *Saṃjā* itself. Patañjali further observes that even the

¹ नामनामदर्शी संजा ।

² विविधा वाच्य वाच्यवाच्यादि—चक्षयी वाच्य वौचा चेति ।

³ शिरादैषीया अन्यासा चतुर्थं चक्षयो च्या चता ।

Mahābhāṣya quotes the rule Pg. 1. 1. 1.

enunciation of संज्ञिकार is not sufficient enough to give an accurate cognition of *Samjñā* and *Samjñi*, as there is hardly any evidence in favour of accepting the word *Vṛddhi* as a *Samjñā* and वादेष् as *Samjñi*. He then refers to the ancient teachers' whose usage is the only criterion for the precise knowledge of a *Samjñā*. That the word *Vṛddhi* denotes a *Samjñā* (as opposed to a *Samjñi*) and not a *Samjñi* is evident from the usages of the ancient grammarians. The fact is that the technical terms like *Gupta* and *Vṛddhi*, as used in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, are not really of Pāṇini's invention, but they are rather supposed to have been borrowed from earlier systems of grammar. Similar is the history of all proper names, both popular and the Vedic; as, for instance, the name¹ Devadatta, with which parents baptise their newly-born son, continues to gain currency in the society by the force of popular usage. Another view that seems to be none the less plausible is that the grammatical techniques, such as, *Gupta* and *Vṛddhi*, were too popular terms to require any exposition or even enunciation. It is probably for this reason that Pāṇini did not think it worth his while to make a distinct rule as *Samjñā* so would facilitate the knowledge of *Samjñā*.

¹ वाचानकार्यं वृद्धिः । वा वृद्धिकरित्य—अस्मद्ब्रह्म, पृ. 4.

² वीरे धर्मादिपादे कुरुते वाचम् वाचम् लोकान्माने तत् कुर्वन्ते देवदण एवि । ततो देवदणपूर्वे इव वाच्योवाचम् लोकेति ।—इति व वाचम् वैचित्राचाचाचा वाचः वृद्धिरः संज्ञेषु वृद्धिः ।—Ded.

Patañjali continues further that some grammarians, while interpreting the rule in question, have clearly indicated that the word *Prddhi* is a *Saṃjñā* and चाटेष् is *Saṃjñī*. In order to bring out the exact significance of the rule विराटेष्, some grammarians, again, have (only given the examples of *Prddhi* as, चाटेष्, चाटादेष्) only enumerated the *Saṃjñīs* of *Prddhi*, such as, चाटेष्, under the rule चिति इति: परमेष्ठेषु and have thus made it sufficiently clear that the word *Prddhi* is expressive of चाटेष् in grammar. The relation between the words *Prddhi* and *Adātī* is, therefore, one of the indicating and the indicated. The rule serves practically a two-fold purpose: it expresses a *Saṃjñā* as well as makes the word *Prddhi* a *Saṃjñā*. What Patañjali¹ deduces from these facts with regard to the distinction between *Saṃjñā* and *Saṃjñī* is that what implies something is a *Saṃjñā* and what are so implied should be regarded as a *Saṃjñī*. The author of the *Vārtikā* has suggested two more criteria so as to show the distinction between *Saṃjñā* and *Saṃjñī* more clearly. (1) *Saṃjñā* is formless,² whereas *Saṃjñīs* are found to have forms. It is a fact of common experience that a *Saṃjñā*, like Devadatta, is given to a mass of flesh having certain form.

¹ उपासने का समाने या भजा वे वर्तीष्वे वे संविध एति ।

Mahabhasya, Vol. I, p. 38

² चाटादेष् :—एव. ८, भाग्यः । चाटानामेष् :—स्त्री । चाटानिकामः स्त्री । शोभिति । चाटानिकामः चाटानिकाम उपर्युक्ति हना विजाहे ।

Again, where there is a form, there is a difference. Moreover, *Samjñā* is one, while *Samjñās* are more than one. (2) A *Samjñā* may be recognised by some special mark.¹ Patañjali holds further that *Samjñā* and *Samjñī*, like nouns and adjectives, seem to have co-inherence as well as equal case-terminations. To the grammarians, *Ādaic* (which is formed by the process of *Pratyabhāra* from the letters enunciated in the so-called *Siva-Sutra*) is really expressive of sense. Some, again, take the word *Vyuddhi* as indicative of the forms of words, viz., the word *Vyuddhi* and *Ādaic* are mutually convertible. Patañjali has suggested a few more characteristics whereby *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* might be clearly recognised. *Samjñās*, he maintains,² like *Vyuddhi* and *Gupta*, are repeatedly mentioned in grammar, but such is not the case with their corresponding *Samjñīs*, for it is more convenient and attended with more economisation of labour to mention a *Samjñā*, say *Vyuddhi*, than to enumerate each time *Ādaic* which contains greater number of letters. When *Samjñās* are really adopted for the sake of brevity and conciseness, the word *Vyuddhi* is preferable to *Ādaic* from a practical point of view. Further, it often comes to our notice that *Samjñī* is placed before the *Samjñās*³ in the rules of grammar.

¹ लिखित ए।—२८८, ७.

² पतञ्जलिः संज्ञा अवृत्तिः इति शब्दसारं वै योग्यम्।—१६६.

³ पतञ्जलिः संज्ञी, वरोऽप्यतिरुक्ता एषा।—१६२.

(as in चक्रेषु); But the rule गदिरादेष् forms an exception, as the word *Vṛddhi* comes here first. This anomaly is explained by Patañjali as a particular instance where the word *Vṛddhi* has been given priority only to indicate a sense of auspiciousness (मृग्यतावैत्). Both *Saṃjñā* and *Samjñī* being thus reciprocally convertible, a question is raised against their mutual dependence (चक्रोन्मानवत्). As a matter of fact, we get a *Saṃjñā* like *Vṛddhi* for *Adativ* and the *Samjñā* again serves to indicate *Adativ*. The defect of such mutual dependence is finally set aside by Patañjali on the ground of the eternality of word (सेवा गित्वा परमात्म—Vñ. 9). *Adativ* are permanent word-forms, for the denotation of which a *Saṃjñā* like *Vṛddhi* is adopted, but the *Samjñā* itself does not practically bring them into existence. The eternal view of *Sabda*¹ does not, however, render the science of grammar absolutely useless, since grammar, as it is primarily concerned with the exposition of correct words, serves to remove all possible confusion and misinterpretation by the formulation of rules.

Bhartṛhari has even tried to show the permanent character of such *Saṃjñā-Sabda* and acknowledges the relation between *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* as permanently fixed.² But this view is open

1. साक्षिण चाचारी चक्रः, चाचीरत चक्राचं गदिरादेषः; महाभृते |—M. B. under the rule Pñp. 1.1.1.

2. वृद्ध एवं विश्व इष्टः; विश्व चक्राच् + वृद्ध इष्टः—Bhart.

3. विश्व एवं चक्राची विश्वादिषु चक्रिष्ट—Vñyapadiya. Kñr. 2. 350.

to objections and is contrary to our experience. *Samjñā* or proper names are purely of human invention,¹ men giving names to objects according to their own desire. The arguments whereby Bhartṛhari sought to refute this popular view are as follows: It is admitted that in certain cases *Samjñās* are restricted in their denotation by the usages of men; as, for instance, one might say, 'From this day the word *Ditha* would mean this person.' But so far as the relation between a *Samjñā* and a *Samjñā* is concerned, there is no denying the fact that the word *Ditha*, like the word *gauḥ*, is also connected with its meaning by permanent relation.² Bhartṛhari has divided *Samjñās* into two classes—*Akṣarīmā* (as *ti*, *ghu*, etc.) or artificial, and *Akyūrīmā* (as *Ditha*) or popular names current in the society. The so-called artificial *Samjñās* are of modern origin; their significance is confined to the area of those *Sāstras* wherein they are used, that is to say, they have no meanings popularly assigned to them.

Having thus discussed the different criteria for the recognition of *Seyjia* and *Semjia*, we now proceed to speak a few words more on the

And कामदीवरां च श्रेष्ठोऽस्मिन् वायामन्त्रेण वायामः । वायामन्त्रेण समाप्तं प्रियं द्वितीयं वायामः ॥३५॥ १. ३१०.

¹ नमु भ निवासं संज्ञाहृष्टवामयुग्मं रूपसिद्धिवामापापाम्—त्रिवक्त्राह-
विष्णुं सप्तभूतेष्वात्मे। संज्ञापात् एष हि प्रदीर्घवाक्यं वाप्तम्—प्रदीर्घवाक्यं

* वातानिकवायुविभिन्नः दैत्यी विविचो भवतः ।...वाह्यविकासात्मिकः वातावायासिभिर्विभिन्नः इस्तम् ।—*Megaspilus*. इनिया ब्रह्मीया वारिप्रणिष्ठीवृक्षसे ।—*Polyptile*.

number and nature of such *Saṃjñās*. Different systems of grammar have their different *Saṃjñās*; as, for instance, Pāṇini uses *ac* and *hal*, whereas Kānta system has *Scara* and *Fūṇjāla* in their stead. It will be evident from a study of these *Saṃjñās* that most of them are meaningless outside the short compass wherein they are used; they are neither to be found in lexicon, nor current as significant words in their specialised sense. *Saṃjñā-Sabda*, as a rule, are not derivable (पूर्णाद्); and though popular words, such as, *Vṛddhi*, *Gupta*, etc., are used as *Saṃjñā*, their popular significances have practically no connection with what they signify in grammar. Bharīphari says that the meaning assigned to such *Saṃjñā-Sabda* by the grammarians is to be taken as modern convention, as opposed to the divine convention. It is to be noted here that the two *Saṃjñā-Sabda*s, namely, *Scara* and *Fūṇjāla*, as are to be found in Yāska's Nirukta and in the Kānta system, and which are undoubtedly older than *ac* and *hal* respectively, are really significant (पूर्ण राज्ये पृष्ठि अति, अचलमन्त्रम्). It is, therefore, believed that the Kānta system has preserved the old grammatical technics more faithfully than that of Pāṇini, who is rather credited with

¹ Kānta system has also retained such old grammatical terms as *Kṛita* (Pāṇini has *vic*), *Vartmāṇa* (that must seem to have been the oldest term for *Vartmāṇa*), *Bhāṣīgṛasti*, etc.

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having invented a peculiar way of enunciating letters,¹ a system of *Pratyākha* unknown to other grammarians, and certain technical terms like *ac* and *hcl*, etc.

The word *Samjñā* means ordinarily a name. Just as an object is found to have a good many names in popular speech, so in grammar a form may have different *Samjñās*. It is to be borne in mind that excepting a few instances like *Scara*, *Vyajana*, *Lopa*, *Dṛgha*, etc., as used in grammar, there are *Samjñās* as *nadi*, *ti*, *gha*, etc., which are absolutely meaningless and purely artificial. There are numerous *Samjñās* in grammar; they are made use of by the grammarians with a view to secure the brevity and conciseness. They may be, however, divided into two classes, according as they are significant and meaningless. The *Samjñās* belonging to the former group are almost the same as used in popular speech, though with a specialised significance, while those that come under the second group are absolutely meaningless except in grammar. There are certain *Samjñās*, such as, *Nadi*,² *Agni*,³ *Sraddha*⁴ which are used as types to denote respectively words ending in lengthened त्, ण्, short त्, ण्, and lengthened अ्. The so-called *Siva-Sūtras*,

¹ सम्बोधनाः—*Kalidasa*—तिर्यक् पर्याप्ताः।

² PIg. 1. 4. 2—पूर्वानुष्ठानी स्वी।

³ सृष्टिः—*Kalidasa*, पर्याप्त, 8.

⁴ अ प्रवा—*Ibid.*, 10.

though unintelligible by themselves and entirely meaningless to others, representing a great departure from the popular order of letters, have great importance to the students of the *Aṣṭadhyāyī*, as they are suitable for making *Samjñās* like *ay*, *iy*, etc. Jagadīśa understands by *Samjñā*¹ all names having convention or *Samskṛta* and classifies it under three classes, namely, *Nāmīttikī*, *Paribhāṣā*, and *Anupadikī*. *Samjñās* are artificial; their origin may be traced to an attempt to find out the shortest symbol to denote a group of individuals. The system of *Samjñā* is thus important for more than one reason; it is the shortest possible name for a class and consequently marked by brevity. The *Samjñās* adopted in different systems of grammar are so variant that one cannot expect to make a successful study of any system of grammar without having a thorough acquaintance with its particular sets of *Samjñās*.

Logic means agreement of facts with truth. Grammar in dealing with the formation of words and formulation of rules has sometimes shown strict conformity to truth. What is true of logic is thus true of grammar too. Science, as is well known, takes for granted certain axioms which are more or less self-evident truths and consequently require no explanation. These axioms or generalised

¹ शब्द प्रतिवर्तनम् इति समीक्षा विनोदः—*Subodhakāraṇī*, 2. v. 17.

statements (deductions) are freely made use of by different systems of philosophy. These are deduced from common experience. Geometry, for instance, begins with a number of such axioms (*e.g.*, the whole is greater than its parts) and shows their applications in the exposition of problems. Logic, as a science, has also its particular axioms (a thing is what it is, *viz.*, the law of identity) which are not only applicable to logic alone but are found to be used in other departments of science for their incontestable validity. Here we find the reason why logic is popularly called the 'science of all sciences.' It has added undoubtedly the scientific character of grammar, for it has also treated of such axioms. These axioms or generalised statements are known in grammar as *Paribhāṣā*. The fact that is established by the *Paribhāṣā*—'A thing does not essentially become a different one even when some of its parts get deformed,' or, more clearly, 'A dog does not become anything but a dog when its tail is cut off'—is one of common experience and equally true in ordinary life also. In grammar we find a good many *Paribhāṣā*s. The *Paribhāṣā*, as used in grammar, may be explained as what represent the highest grammatical generalisation. The *Paribhāṣā* may be broadly divided into two classes: (1) *Paribhāṣā* which are not restricted in their

applications to grammar alone but equally hold good in other spheres of experience; (2) *Paribhāṣās* that are closely associated with grammatical operations and contain technical terms of grammar. The *Paribhāṣās* like पञ्चदेश-पितृतमन्तर्पत्, etc., which does not contain any grammatical term and are true to all sciences, belong to the former group of the *Paribhāṣās*. The *Paribhāṣās* falling under the second category are those that contain grammatical techniques and are couched in grammatical terms, such as, यज्ञोदये विद्यापरिमाणम्, उपयुक्तिभूमिका: कारकप्रभावस्त्रीयस्त्री, etc. These cannot be explained for obvious reasons without reference to grammar. From a study of the *Paribhāṣās* belonging to the former class, it appears that they are decidedly the older and more popular than those coming under the second group. We fail, however, to trace their origin with a degree of certainty. They are sometimes presupposed by the rules of Pāṇini and sometimes deducible from the rules of the Āṣṭādhyāyī. Pāṇini had undoubtedly before him many axioms of this description when he composed the rules of the Āṣṭādhyāyī. It is clear from the statement of Nāgoji¹ (who has collected these *Paribhāṣās*—122 in number and explained them) that some of these *Paribhāṣās* were used as regular

¹ नागोजीगणकरचालने वाराणसीमध्ये परिविवरणाते वाराणसीप्रभावस्त्रीय संवादप्रभावस्त्रीयस्त्रीत्वात् वर्त्ति वरियाप्रभावस्त्री वर्त्ति वाराणसीत्वात्।

—Paribhāṣāpendalekhara.

Sutras by older grammarians. Pāṇini has, however, incorporated some of these *Paribhāṣās* in his *Aṣṭadhyāyī*¹ and some of them are suggested by the rules. The *Paribhāṣās* established by either *Jñāpaka* or *Nyāya* have been referred to by Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of *Paribhāṣās* :—(1) *Vācanikī*—cerbatism used as *Sutra* by older grammarians; (2) *Jñāpaka*—as deduced from the interpretations of Pāṇini's rules; (3) *Nyāya* referring to the axioms either taken from the experience of ordinary life or established by logical inductions. There are, again, two different forms of *Nyāya*—*Nyāya-Siddha* and *Loka-Nyāya-Siddha*. The *Paribhāṣā*—विविष्टात्मको विवरणिति सहितात्मक— is an instance of *Loka-Nyāya-Siddha*, because the truth it conveys is sufficiently proved by the facts of daily life, viz., 'A thing should not be the cause of destroying that wherfrom it derives its very existence.' These *Paribhāṣās* are of practical help to us for understanding the rules of the *Aṣṭadhyāyī*. Nāgoji has not only taken notice of those *Paribhāṣās* alone which might be deduced or taken directly from the *Pāṇikī* or the *Bhāṣya*, but has undoubtedly treated of the *Paribhāṣās* taken from other grammarians. There is a *Paribhāṣā*² which expressly enjoins

¹ दूषकः प्रतिविधिः ।—Paṇ. 2. 1. 1.

विविष्टात्मको विवरणिति ।—Ibid. 1. 4. 1.

² वायामानीः निर्विकल्पितविदेः फृ वैदिकाद्यप्रथमः ।

that for the removal of doubt and ambiguity in connection with a rule of grammar, the interpretations of the learned commentators are to be regarded as the only authoritative and decisive ones. Some *Paribhāṣās* with their respective meanings have been referred to in the 'Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus' under 'Logic of Grammar.'

Having shown the nature of *Saṃjñās* and *Paribhāṣās* according to their grammatical interpretations, we now propose to say a few words regarding the characteristics of the grammatical aphorisms. The style followed by the grammarians in constructing the rules is the same as adopted in the so-called *Sūtra* literature. This style of composition, in which most of the standard works of Hindu philosophy have been written, was adopted by the grammarians, as they unduly favoured brevity and conciseness, sometimes to the extent of unintelligibility. How much the grammarians favoured brevity and conciseness in the composition of *Sūtras* is best illustrated by the *Paribhāṣā* 'परिप्रे-
ण मुख्योऽकृतं सम्बन्धे वेदाकारणः' The characteristic features of grammatical rules are as follows :—
(1) The *Sūtras* should be so framed as to contain the least number of letters. (2) The *Sūtras* to be constructed in such a way as to avoid ambiguity and doubt. (3) The *Sūtras*

¹ वा भाष्यरसविद्युत्याकारणं पितॄकीर्त्तयत् । निर्मितवद्य च तद् चूर्णितो भित् ।

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must be impregnated with meanings. As Pāṇini¹ is said to have composed the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyayī* with all religious solemnities and great caution, Patañjali strongly believes that even a letter of his aphorisms, far from speaking of the entire rule, is not likely to be meaningless. (4) The *Sūtras* must have widest applications. This is exactly the case so far as the general rules (*प्रधानसूत्रः*) are concerned. (5) The *Sūtras* should be free from all defects and reasonable at the same time. The *Sūtras* having these qualifications generally fall under six categories, namely, *Saṃjñā*, *Paribhāṣā*, *Vidhi* or rules that enjoin something, *Niyama* or rules that enjoin restrictions, *Pratigraha* or prohibitory rules, and *Adhikāra*. *Saṃjñā* *Sūtras* are those that point out grammatical techniques, such as, *Vyāpti*, *Gaya*, *Lopa* (disappearance), etc., *hal*, etc. As regards the *Paribhāṣā* *Sūtras*, we have already pointed out that certain *Paribhāṣā*s were incorporated by the grammarians in their systems of grammar as regular *Sūtras*. The *Adhikāra* *Sūtras* are of four kinds.² Patañjali has illustrated three different kinds of *Adhikāra*.

As to the principle followed in the formation of rules, it must be clearly stated that it was

¹ प्राच्यम् वाचम् इत्यनिकल्पः वाचम् एति एवित्ता तत्त्वा वाचम् एति प्रकल्पते च, यत्कर्त्ता देव वाचम् एति विशिष्टा तत्त्वः ।

— *Mahabhasya*, under the rule १०५, १. 1. 1.

² शीर्षः विशेषात् कथम् एति विशेष च । व्युत्थानः कथम् एति विशेषात् कथम् एति ।

Indeed a great difficulty to make a thorough study of each word. We are told that Indra,¹ even under the tutorship of Brhaspati, and continuing his study for a great length of time, failed to make an exhaustive study of words. How then the grammarians had succeeded in such an arduous task? Patañjali rightly observes that the rules of grammar should be framed on the scientific basis of generalisation and particularisation,² so as to enable one to make a study of words, though so diversified and numerous, with the least amount of effort. He clearly shows that the rules वस्तुपूर्वः पाठ. 3. 2. 1 and वाचोव्युपर्वते च; पाठ. 8. 2. 3, were written by Pāṇini having the same object in view.

Now as to what constitutes a grammar? Patañjali has elaborately dealt with the question in regard to what is precisely meant by grammar. It is too well known a fact that it is the Sutras that constitute grammar or, in other words, grammar is entirely identical with the Sutras. We use the word *Vyakarana* with reference to a number of Sutras and do not practically understand anything else. But there are certain objections in the way of accepting this view as an accurate one. The difficulty that arises on the

¹ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.

² वस्तुपूर्वतात्रीः विविद्युपर्वतः वस्तुपूर्वतात्रीः किञ्चित्पर्वतः—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.

³ वस्तु व्याकरणविविद्युपर्वतः च वस्तुपूर्वः । वृत्तम् । वृत्ते व्याकरणविविद्युपर्वतः ।—Pāt. 10. वस्तुपूर्वतात्रीः । वस्तु सुहर्षीः भवीः वीक्षात्मक तत्त्वातः । वस्तुपूर्वते व्याकरणः—Vācas. 10-14, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, pp. 11-12.

assumption of identity between grammar and Sūtras is that the question of relation, as is indicated by the expression (व्याकरणसंघटन) 'the rules of grammar' becomes necessarily incomprehensible or incompatible, that is to say, the above expression clearly indicates that grammar is actually different from the Sūtras. Again, no cognition of words would be possible, if grammar were identified with the Sūtras, because the knowledge of words does not practically follow from the Sūtras, but rather from the interpretations and expositions of such rules. Words are then held to be constituents of grammar and this view is considered to be sufficient to meet the aforesaid objection. But this is also not absolutely free from defects, inasmuch as the identity of grammar with words would render the derivation of the term *Vyākaraṇa* (व्याकिरणे व्युत्पादने भव्या अभिनिति) simply inconsistent. The drift of the arguments is that words are derived by means of Sūtras and not by other words. Moreover, the rules like शब्दः, प्रोत्साहयत्, सम अवः, तेज प्रोत्सव्, etc., will be inconsistent with their meanings, if words are held to be identical with grammar. In fine, Patañjali sets forth the conclusion that words and Sūtras in their combination form the life of grammar (शब्दसंघर्षे व्याकरणम्).

The word *Sandhi* literally means conjunction of two; in grammar it implies the combination of two letters having close proximity. The definition of *Sandhi* as given by Pāṇini (which

is also to be found in the Nirukta) lays stress on the extreme proximity of letters, whether vowels or consonants, as the primary condition of Sandhi (*Parah sannikarṣak Saṃhitā*).

It has already been pointed out that the word is the same as sound. A word is, again, of two kinds, namely, sound as produced by the beat of drum, and sound as distinctly audible and expressed by letters. To the former class belong those sounds which are not capable of being represented by letters and have no real expressiveness like popular words that consist of letters. These letters, whether 48 or 49 in number, represent phonologically all possible modulations of voice. There are eight different places, such as, chest, throat, nose, head, tongue, roof of the tongue, teeth and lips wherfrom letters are produced and they are named accordingly. The order in which letters are to be read is said to be fixed (*Siddhotarga-samānendyok*), but Pāṇini seems to have shown some amount of ingenuity, as he gives rather a clumsy arrangement of letters only to serve the purpose of forming the *Pratyāhāras*. The method adopted by Pāṇini may be scientifically accurate, but it really marks a departure from the popular order of letters.

The subtle form of *Nāda* having its origin in the *Makādhara* proceeds upwards till it reaches the vocal apparatus and becomes audible; it develops into distinct sound when it clothes itself with letters. This is usually the process whereby letters are produced. Letters are transient and liable to

disappear just after their utterance is over. According to the time required for pronouncing, a sound is said to be short, long and protracted. Letters are broadly divided into two classes : *Svara* and *Vyanjanā*. *Svara* is so called because they are distinctly audible by themselves ; *Vyanjanā* requires the help of vowels for their intelligibility. The use of *ac* and *hal* in the place of more popular terms *Svara* and *Vyanjanā* represents one of Pāṇini's manifold innovation.

There are generally two different ways in which words are uttered—rapid and slow. Patañjali maintains that close proximity is to be taken as the fundamental condition of *Sandhi*. It then follows almost naturally that no such *Samhitā* or the combination of letters takes place when two words are uttered at intervals. It is said in defence, however, that proximity of letters is the same, whether they are uttered rapidly or slowly. It is practically the time, as is required by the speaker to pronounce the words, that makes the utterance either rapid or slow. Three definitions have been suggested to explain *Samhitā*, but no one is found to be strictly accurate and free from defects. The last tentative definition,¹ which brings in the idea of order as priority and posteriority among letters, uttered

¹ अपाविरतं सहितः ; उपसमिक्तं सहितः ; पौरीक्षेत्यात् नपैति सहितः—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule Pg., 1. 4. 109.

² पौरीक्षेत्यात् नपैति सहितः चैव द्रुतेत्यात् नपैति सहितः च प्राप्तिः—
एति नपैति पौरीक्षेत्यात्—*Mahābhāṣya*.

without any intervention of time, is also open to objection, because the very idea of priority and posteriority is inconceivable in regard to letters that are never uttered simultaneously. द्वैतपात्रि is to be understood with reference to space, as we apply the terms *Pra* and *Aपरा* to things when they are found to exist simultaneously. But such is not the case with letters. It is practically seen that we cannot pronounce two letters at a time.¹ The vocal organ that operates in pronouncing the letter *ga* is not the same that gives rise to *au*-sound and so on. Again, for the transient character of sound, *ga* is no longer existent when *au* is uttered. It is to be carefully noted here that *Paurvaparya*, as stated here, is not to be taken as referring to time, because letters are liable to destruction after the utterance is over, and there can be no relation as priority and posteriority between the existent and the non-existent letters. Patañjali, then, arrives at the conclusion and brings the whole discussion to a close when he holds that *Paurvaparya*, as the essential requisite of *Sambhāsa*, pertains to intelligence, that is to say, the determination of priority and posteriority of letters is the operation of intelligence.² An intelligent man adopts the following procedure

१ एषेऽप्यर्थविविष्टाताप् च विनार्थविष्टाते नन्दीताम्—Vaz. 10.
एषेऽप्यर्थविष्टीं तो वाप् । त तौ इत्येत्यावद्यति । वैरिति भवते वास्तवी वाप् वस्त्रे
गौवारे त विष्टुतैः—, Mahabharata.

• शुद्धिकरणीय अनुसार ग्रीनोफल—Greenoflages.

in ascertaining the order of *Paurūparya* :— This word is to be used in this sense and this word consists of these letters. Then, he proceeds to determine them one after another.

There is another definition of *Samhitā* given in the *Prātiśākhya*¹ which has also given rise to a considerable discussion. The main difficulty lies in the way of disjoining the compound *Padaprakṛti* which admits of double interpretation. If we take the expression *Padaprakṛti* as meaning पदात् अत् सम्हिता अत् पदाप्रकृति, it would naturally follow that *Samhitā* or combination is the original form of speech wherefrom *Padas* are separated. It is quite evident from this exposition that *Samhitā* represents the original form, whereas *Padas* are only modifications. According to another interpretation, which treats of the expression *Padaprakṛti* as an instance of *Bahuvīhi* and lays down that *Padas* in their combination constitute *Samhitā*: *Padas* are to be taken as *Prakṛti* and *Samhitā* as merely modified forms. The question raised here is one of great importance, as it forms the fundamental problem of the linguistic science. The point at issue is to decide which of these (*Samhitā* and *Padas*) represents the original form. Durga² has advanced arguments to show that *Samhitā* is *Prakṛti* and *Padas* represent only *Vikṛti*. He

¹ पराकृतिः दीप्तः ।

² विद्यमान् व्युत्कृते वाचः ।—Nirukta, p. 185,

has based his arguments on the fact that the Vedic *Mantras* have come down to us in their *Samhitā* form (but not as isolated *Padas*) ; *Samhitā* or combined forms are first studied by the Vedic scholars and the *Mantras* are specially recited in their *Samhitā* form at the time of sacrificial performances. It is an established fact that we do not meet with an instance of विभूति in the Vedic *Mantras*.

A careful study of the rules concerning *Samhitā* will make it clear that the principles underlying such *Samhitā* are based on regular phonological basis. The rule एषो वर्णस्ति, which enjoins that ए, उ, औ, followed by ा, are changed into य, व, र, respectively, records rather a phonetic tendency according to which ए+ाँ, when uttered at a stress, are apt to take the form of य and so on. The transformation of ए into य, as in दया, is due to the fact that both ए and य are letters that originate in the same place and have necessarily natural affinity for combination. Jaimini¹ has clearly stated that in दया letters do not undergo any modification but a new letter comes into existence. The rule वालेष्वरामः enjoins that in case of *Adesa*, a letter having close affinity, either through the internal efforts or owing to the similarity of place of utterance, is to take the place and function of *Stāsti*.

¹ वर्णकल्पिनिः ख्या ४५३. ११. १३.

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These instances will suffice to show that the rules of *Saṃkīrtā* are outcome of natural tendencies, as are illustrated by phonetic laws. In popular usages, *Saṃkīrtā* is sometimes obligatory and sometimes optional. It is thus stated in a *Kārikā* : *Saṃkīrtā*¹ is obligatory in *Padas*; between roots and prefixes and in compounds; in all other cases *Saṃkīrtā* is optional.

There are, broadly speaking, five kinds of *Sandhi*, according to the nature of letters that enter into combination. Among these five, the so-called *Prakṛti-Sandhi* (an instance of *Sandhi* which is not attended with necessary changes and modifications) forms a peculiar group. We call them peculiar in this sense that the instances of *Prakṛti-Sandhi* are so rigid that they retain their original forms intact and do not come under the general principles of *Saṃkīrtā*. In an instance like *lataṁśu* where no change is brought about by rules of *Sandhi*, it is really difficult to distinguish it from ordinary forms. In cases like this, *Sandhi* is to be determined only by accents. Similarly, compounds and non-compounds were distinguished in the ancient Vedic age simply through the instrumentality of accents.

When a conjunction between two letters takes place in *Saṃkīrtā*, we usually find that two individuals do not retain their separate

¹ एवेष्वै त्रिं त्रिं भवताम् । त्रिं त्रिं त्रिं त्रिं त्रिं ॥
त्रिं त्रिं त्रिं त्रिं त्रिं ॥

forms but merge into one and consequently give rise to a new letter which, though practically different from them, has close affinity with those letters. In the course of combination, letters are sometimes dropped as in *Pṝṣṭadarah*, and sometimes, they undergo modifications as in *Dadhyatra*. The changes and modifications brought about by *Surdhi* are natural and not artificial. In etymological¹ explanations of words we find instances of productions of letters (*Gavendrāḥ*), inversion of letters (*Sīyakāḥ*), modifications of letters (*Śodāśāḥ*) and disappearance of letters (*Pṝṣṭadarah*).

¹ फलत्वो वरेष्टादी मित्रै नविलिप्तः । केवलार्थं विकासं कामु वर्णनाम् फलेदै ।

CHAPTER IV

THEORY OF SPHOṢA

Theory of *Sphoṣa*—identity of *Sphoṣa* with *Prāṇa*—its origin and nature—arguments against the assumption of *Sphoṣa*.

The Hindu grammarians are credited with having for the first time enunciated the doctrine of *Sphoṣa* which forms one of the outstanding features of Sanskrit grammar. It is at once the essence and result of Indian speculations on grammar; it embodies the careful ingenuity and keen-sightedness on the part of the Indian grammarians, and ultimately proves by drawing identity between *Sphoṣa* and Brahman that *Sabda-tatva* and *Brahma-tatva*¹ are only different in name but essentially convertible with each other. The grammarians have, however, carried this theory to such an extent and treated the final germ of speech to so subtle an element as to place the dissertations on words more or less upon a metaphysical level.

The history of *Sphoṣa*, judging from the height of contemplation it discloses, is calculated to reveal a mystical vision, and shows a

¹ वैश्वरणी वाक्यम् पूर्वोत्तरी चतुः ।—*Vaishvaramabhidhiya*, Kār. 72, and अथवा तु वाक्यं चतुः ।

चतुर्दिविषये चतुः वाक्यानां पदस्त्राणां ।—*Vakyapadiya*, Kār. 1.

peculiar pious tendency which seeks to explain all phenomena as emanating from something divine. The original conception of *Sphota* goes back to the most creative period of Indian thought, we mean the Vedic, when *Vak* was considered to be a manifestation of all-pervading *Brahman*; *Prāṇa* regarded as the ultimate germ of all speech-sounds and *Sabda* viewed as an imperishable and potential factor in the creation of the world. Philosophy, so to speak, begins with concrete objects of thought and finally arrives at more and more nice abstraction. The grammarians, in the same way, started with the physical analysis of words and conceived sound as what clothes itself with letters. They proceeded still further and on minute examination of internal phenomena, grasped the remotest form of speech, viz., *Sphota*, that is manifested by sound, eternally existent, Indivisible and really expressive of sense.¹

It is, however, difficult to ascertain as to when and with whom this theory had first originated. History does not definitely mention the name of any particular philosopher, so far as the authorship of this theory is concerned. All that we know about its history is that this theory received a strenuous support at the hands of grammarians, while almost every system of Hindu philosophy had attacked it mercilessly and rejected it as being absurd and inconsistent.

¹ अप्रभातः, शिव, वाच, व्यवहारः।

We do not, however, definitely know of any grammarian who may be said to have formulated this doctrine, nor do we find any specific mention of *Sphoṭa* in the aphorisms of grammar. We only repeat that our knowledge is not permitted to proceed beyond the limit that the theory of *Sphoṭa* found much favour with the grammarians, who seem to have carried it to such an extent as to finally inter-weave *Sphoṭa* with *Brahmataṭṭva*, thus raising the artificial character of grammatical speculations to the dignity of theological discourse. But this is not the sufficient reason why we should take this theory as one of grammatical origin. On the other hand, it might be maintained with a greater degree of certainty, on the evidence afforded by some other popular theories of unknown origin, that the Indian grammarians had already found the nucleus of the theory in existence in some form or other. They interpreted it consistently with their views and finally made it their own by giving it a distinctly grammatical stamp. What the grammarians have practically done with regard to this theory is that they popularised it with all earnestness and ultimately incorporated it into their systems as a tenet of fundamental importance. Similar is the original history of some of the popular doctrines of Hindu philosophy. The main doctrines of the Sāṃkhya school, for instance, seem to have been transmitted through generations as a common heritage of man and current as a

distinct line of thought long before they were systematised by Kapila or Pañcasikha. In this process of tracing the origin of old doctrines, we may be allowed to seek for some clue as to why the *Vedas* are emphatically declared by orthodox teachers as works not of human origin; and why it is authoritatively laid down that the Seers, who are mentioned by names in the Vedic hymns, are far from being the real authors.¹

To give a clear idea of *Sphota*, we find it necessary to start with *Prayava*. It has repeatedly been stated in the Vedic literature that the mystic syllable, i.e., *Prayava*, represents the primordial speech-sound wherefrom all forms of *Vāk* are supposed to have been evolved. This sacred combination of three particles (अ॒ ए॑ ओ॒), which is still uttered with the utmost reverence and regarded as a positive emblem of the supreme God, is said to have flashed forth into the heart of *Brahman*, while he was absorbed in deep meditation. *Prayava* unfolded itself in the form of *Gāyatri*, which again gave birth to the three *Vedas*—this is how the cosmic world came into existence from ■ subtle an entity as *Sabda*. When we present this orthodox view in all its bareness and accordingly maintain that the entire world of *Vāk* has *Prayava* as its ultimate source, we should

¹ क्षमतार्थं नदेत्युपरो वीरः द्युमनःः विश्वा चापि पर्वता चर्यादिभ्यां ए जात्याः—Mahābhāgavata Parīkṣā.

crave the indulgence of modern scholars who are likely to discard it as an unscientific and irrational theory. The *Sota-Sambita*¹ divides *Pragna* into two kinds, namely, *Pura* and *Apara*. The former is the same as *Brahman*, while the latter is identified with *Sabda*. It must be admitted at the very outset that while dealing with so mysterious a thing as *Pragna* and showing the orthodox belief in the potency of *Sabda*, we are really drifted to a land that lies far beyond the range of common experience. *Pragna* has two more aspects—external and internal—corresponding to those of *Sphota*. Vacaspati² in his gloss under the aphorism फृतिष्ठापनाः पा चोरिष्ठापनी हस्त अप्रविष्टिः has attempted to show the internal aspect of *Sphota*. There is a lotus, it is said, having eight petals, that resides in the region between heart and abdomen; the three constituents of *Pragna* represent in the lotus, the solar, the lunar and the fiery regions respectively. Above it, as the *Brahmaguidi* are only allowed to perceive, rests the *Brhma-Nada* assuming the form of परमामात्रा. This परमामात्रा (capable of being perceived only by the *Yogins*) which represents the *Turiya* or the fourth part of *Pragna* that resides in

¹ प्रदृष्ट वाच सामान्यस्थित्यकथम् । इत्येवं वर्त वृत्तात् परं वा वृत्तामगः ॥ चरतः वाचक वाचामन्दृष्टः शुभिष्ठापनीः । इत्येवं वर्तते वृत्ताम् वृत्ताः चृष्टः ॥

² वृद्धयोरसीमेऽप्येत्कुलाकारत्वं पश्यत् इत्येवं वाचामन्दृष्टिभीर्द्धुष्ट वृत्ता वृत्तामधीं विस्त वाचेष्ठापनीः—Yoga Sutra—Vaisesika on the Bellows, I. 86.

the heart of all beings, is called *Nāda-Sphota*. It is emphatically laid down that the consummation of *Yogn* lies in the positive realisation of this absolute entity. Reference is made to this *Nāda* in the *Mārkandeya Purāṇa*,¹ where it is identified with *Sakti* or the supreme potency that exists from eternity and is not capable of being uttered by vocal organs. The history of the Hindu 'Trinity of gods' seems to have a close connection with the theory of *Pragata*, for the three elements (प, व, श) constituting the *Pragata* are popularly believed to represent the three principal Hindu deities, viz., *Brahmaru*, *Vishnu* and *Siva*. Now it is almost safe to assert without any contention that *Sphota*, taken as an imperishable unit of *Vāk* (usually manifested by sound), which finally accounts for the evolution of speech, is analogous to *Pragata*; or, to take a still more orthodox view, it is the same as *Pragata*. Moreover, the expressions like अव्याप्त वा चर्षी वाप् and ए वा सर्वप्रद्वार्थस्मिः which are, strictly speaking, applicable to *Sphota* also, serve to confirm our belief regarding the identity between *Pragata* and *Sphota*. The analogy is so striking that Nāgārjuna does not hesitate to compare *Sphota* with the internal phase of *Pragata*.²

¹ नारदोऽग्निं विद्व वाक्यामि विजेषतः ।

² ए वा चर्षीः अव्याप्तवृद्धं ए ॥—*Laghuśāśvata*, p. 96.

In the Upanisads, however, we miss the term *Sphota* in its grammatical significance, but we frequently meet with the words *Prayata* and *Akṣara* as expressive of *Brahman*. Consequently, the specific term *Sphota*, as understood by the grammarians, seems to have acquired a special meaning at a later period, when the grammatical speculations began to obtain more and more philosophical treatment and ultimately encroached upon the domain of pure metaphysics. The Seers of the Upanisads have already declared in unmistakable terms that *Brahman* is reducible to *Prayata*, or, *Prayata* is a living symbol of the Supreme Being. Accordingly, they have advocated the worship of *Prayata*¹ as a form of spiritual practice that leads to a state of perpetual bliss. So much sanctity and reverence were accorded to *Prayata* and its potency and spiritual character eulogised in such a manner that *Prayata* came to be regarded as *Brahman* itself. What a unique place *Prayata* occupied in the spiritual thought of India is evident from the numerous Vedic passages and from the traditions that have gathered round it from the Vedic times. In the Yoga system of Patañjali, *Prayata* is not only held as what positively denotes the Supreme Being;² but repeated utterance of *Prayata* is also suggested as an instrument for attaining the concentration of

¹ विनिषेदवस्थाविभूतिः—Chand. I.

² स वाचः प्रयत् ।—Yoga-Sātras, 1.25.

mind. We may thus adduce abundant evidence in defence of the sacred character of *Prayava*. All scriptural passages, specially the Vedic hymns, begin, as a rule, with this sacred syllable. The natural outcome of such speculations exalting *Prayava* to divinity accounts, if we are allowed to hold, for the evolution of the theory of *Sabda-Brahman*, so conspicuously dealt with by the reputed author of the *Vakyapadiya*. We have dilated at great length upon the unique spiritual aspect of *Prayava*, with a view to prepare the ground for the belief that *Sphota*, like *Prayava*, is ultimately convertible with *Brahman*.¹

The four forms of *Vak*, denominated as *Purā*, *Patiyanti*, *Madhyama* and *Vaikhari*, may be viewed as indicating the different stages through which *Sphota* (*Nada-Vinđu*) receives manifestation. Both *Purā* and *Patiyanti* are too subtle and delicate to be comprehended by sense-organs, the former residing in the *Mulādhāra*² in the shape of motionless *Vinđu*, and the latter coming up to the naval region pushed by the internal wind. Of the four forms, it is *Madhyama* that indicates *Sphota*. All these are, however, more or less mysterious. The popular form, viz., *Vaikhari* is what is uttered by the vocal organs and is capable of being heard by others.

¹ वक्तव्यस्त्रियं इति अद्यतर्ण वहतात्—*Vakyapadiya*, Klr. I, 2. अस्मै अन्तिमीयं वच्चात्प्रतिभिरपेक्षयः।

² निष्ठांशु तत्त्वं द स्तोतः ॥—*Vaiyākaccha-Mēṣapata* under *SKP*, 22.

³ एता वाक्युक्तव्याता वज्राची गतिस्थितिः । अद्यतर्ण वहता तेऽन वैष्णवी वच्चात्प्रतिभिरपेक्षयः।

It is further held that *Nāda* is simultaneously produced by *Madhyumā* and *Vaikharī*, but there is considerable difference between the two. We may have some cognition of *Nāda* as produced by *Madhyumā*, either at the time of counting (*Japa*)¹ or when ears are shut up. What is of vital importance is that this form of *Sabda*, as is manifested by *madhyamā-nāda* is what we precisely call *Sphoṭa*; it symbolises *Brahman* and has eternal existence. *Sphoṭa* is further said to be essentially one and without division. These are, in short, the salient characteristics of *Sphoṭa*. According to this theory, however, it is one and the same indivisible *Sphoṭa* that is represented by *Pṛṣṭha*, *Pada* and *Vikya*, just as one and the same face² appears to be long and round when seen through stone, sword and looking-glass, or, as a piece of stone, taking reflection from red or blue flowers, seems to be either red or blue. The difference between 'ka' and 'ga' is not practically due to the diversity of *Sphoṭa*, but points to the peculiarities of sounds that serve to manifest *Sphoṭa*. It is to prove both the unity and indivisibility of *Sphoṭa* that it is often compared to the sky and consciousness which, though one and admits of no fractions, are said to have such attributive difference

¹ शुद्धपर्याप्त सम्बन्धस्त्रियोभां नादं सञ्चयते—Ms. B. 1. 2.

² वज्राकामादेव वर्णैरेतत्त्वैः वज्रादैः च लक्षणरवानुकृतः—Ms. B. 1. 2.

³ वज्रा च तु च अक्षिरवान्वदेव वज्रादैपर्यवसरान् देहस्तुत्वाप्तिभावं हवतु ।

⁴ वज्रादैपर्यवसरं वज्रादैविद्यं चोटे भवति ।

as, चटाकाय, मठाकाय and *Jiva, Maara*, respectively. Those who take पद and वाक्य to be similarly indivisible units, express their views in the following way:¹ Just as letters are devoid of parts, so no letters are comprehended in *Padas* as their constituent elements. Strictly speaking, it is not admissible to take words separately by splitting up a sentence. To those who advocate the divisibility² of both *Pada* and *Vakya*, it is the last letter that indicates *Sphota*, each preceding letter being only necessary for a cognition of the intended sense.

In view of the difference between *Madhyamā* and *Vakharī*, we may divide sound into two kinds,³ namely, natural or everlasting (inexhaustible) and unnatural or momentary. It is the natural sound only, which is generated by *Madhyamā*, that suggests *Sphota*. The unnatural (*apräkṛita-dhāraṇi*) sound is so called because it rises from *Präkṛita-dhāraṇi* and undergoes an amount of modifications in the shape of long and short sound. *Sphota* being essentially one and without any modification is not at all effected by the quick utterance of sound, which practically refers to *Vikṛita-dhāraṇi*. Considering

¹ असौ न वस्तुं विषये वर्णाकाया एव। यामात् यज्ञाकामात् वरिवेकी न कृष्टः—Vidyāpadiśu, 1, 77.

² पदाकायोऽप्तु चक्षाद्याकायेऽनिवारणेऽप्तु भीष्ट एव एव। शूर्पूर्णवाच्य अनुभवाद्याः—Mañjūṣā.

³ अलिङ्ग विविधः। वाक्यात् वैत्तम् । वोक्तम् वृद्धैर्वृद्धैः वाक्यी अभिविष्टैः। विजितिदे विविक्तं वैत्तम्। विविष्टैः ।—Vidyāpadiśu, 1, 17.

Sphota to be permanent, as an internal phenomenon, the grammarians have shown but scanty regard to the logical view advocating the momentary character of *Sabda*. The existence of a permanent form of *Sabda*, as is represented by *Sphota* as such, proves a dubious point, so much so that it merited no support but adverse criticisms from all leading systems of Hindu philosophy. While they speak of production and destruction of *Sabda*, the *Naiyāyikas* seem to have *Karpa-Sabda* (as opposed to *Sphota*) in their view. They refused to take a more psychological view of *Sabda* apart from what appear to be a matter-of-fact one. Consequently, they lost sight of those internal operations that are associated with the evolution of sound that goes to prove the existence of a permanent source of sound (*Sphota*). Another point which is none the less important in this connection is that *Sphota* alone,¹ as is evident from its derivative meaning, is really associated with the expressiveness of sense.² It is for the sake of convenience and popular practice that we assign meanings to *Sabdas*, but a closer examination of both the internal and external facts will show that *Sphota* is finally the significant element of speech.

As to the reason why *Sphota* is said to be one that does not admit of any division into

¹ शुद्धस्फूटादेव स्फूटः ।

² व्यापत्तिं कर्त्तव्यमिति ।

parts, we should frankly state that the ultimate nature of *Sphoṣa*, so far as it is brought to our comprehension by sound, letters and combination of words, seems to be undifferentiated. Physical structure of words only differs by virtue of *Pikrta-dhṛtī*, but the very life of *Sabda*, or, more clearly, the original *Nāda*, is absolutely one and practically changeless. What we really mean is that, though the word *Gauḥ* differs from the word *Grahaḥ* both in physical and psychological aspects, the ultimate germ giving rise to such sound is really one and the same. *Sphoṣa* being one and permanent, Bhāṣyabāri rightly observes that such difference, as is caused by sound, is not at all essential. The apparent difference¹ of words is thus due to that of sound whereby *Sphoṣa* is indicated. *Sphoṣa* is practically one; it is only the indicator of *Sphoṣa*, viz. sound, that differs.

It is evident from what we have noticed above that it is difficult to form a definite idea of *Sphoṣa* without a proper investigation into the internal phenomena connected with the evolution of sound. We assume the existence of such a mystic element beyond sound only through the instrumentality of external sound that serves to indicate *Sphoṣa*. But we are never allowed to demonstrate its existence with a greater degree of vividness. There is no

¹ योटे व्याकरणात्मकविदान एवं शब्दसंग्रही में स्पष्ट है। —Mahajan.

doubt that the internal operations, as referred to above, and connected with the materialisation of thought into sound, are what actually take place in the utterance of sound. It can hardly be denied that in the course of such translation something that lies dormant within (*Aeyakta*) gets itself manifested by degrees while passing from the innermost part of the body to the vocal apparatus. The internal wind which plays so important a part in the transformation of consciousness into sound has been alluded to in connection with the psychological aspects of language (see Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus).

In opposition to the *Naiyāyika* standpoint, according to which *Sabda* is momentary and consequently liable to both production and destruction, Patañjali has strongly supported the permanent character of *Sabda*. It is curious to note that the attributives whereby he usually characterises *Sabda*, or more properly, *Sphota*, are exactly those that are often ascribed to Brahman. There is convincing evidence that Patañjali, as a representative grammarian, had early realised the distinction between two kinds of *Sabda*, namely, created and permanent. It is explicitly with reference to *Sphota* or permanent word-form that he used such expressions as, *Nitya*,

१ यही अपार्वती निष्ठा वार्ता — Mahabharata.

Anikāti and *Kūpīśha*. In connection with the exposition of the class-theory of *Sphota*, as opposed to the individualistic one, he has given us some glimpse into the salient features of *Sphota*. *Sabda* is, maintains Patañjali,¹ what is perceived by auditory organ, comprehended by intellect, manifested by sound and pertains to the sky. This definition, if we are allowed to style it as such, though concise and garbed in highly philosophical language, seems to be impregnated with deep significance, and purports to bring out the exact meaning of *Sphota*. Having regard to the importance of this definition, we think it worth while to take up the expressions of the Bhāskya one by one and explain them in the light of Kaiyata and Nāgeśa. *Perceptible by the sense of hearing* is used to indicate that the organ of hearing is only a fraction of ether² wherein *Sabda* or sound is directly perceived. Both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems have taken *Sabda* to be a positive quality of ether. Sound³ which has its origin in the vibration of ether is capable of being perceived only by the organs composed of the same element. Patañjali seems to have an accurate knowledge of the scientific fact in regard to the production of sound. The expression *comprehended by intellect* offers

- 1. शोष्णीयनस्तिर्दिनिवाःः क्षेत्रेभिर्जनितः पाचामदैवः सत्त्वः।
—Vol. I, L 1. 3, p. 28.
- 2. यदेऽन्तर्मुखः शोष्णकाः।—Prabhāsaṅgīra Bhāskya.
- 3. वाचामदैवविद्विष्ट वीक्षणः...वाचामदैवकं वद्वा वाचामदैवम्।
—Kaiyata, 1, p. 2.

an explanation as to how words, though consisting of letters that are liable to disappear as soon as they are uttered, are found competent to express the intended sense. The answer is the same as suggested by the *Naiyāyikas*.¹ It is practically from the last letter that the cognition of the entire word is derived together with the impressions produced by the preceding letters. It is evidently an intellectual operation which enables us to retain the recollection of the entire structure of a word, even when we hear the last letter alone. *Manifested by sound* implies that *Sphota*, though permanent, is not always comprehensible, but comes under our cognition only when the vocal organs are engaged in operation for its manifestation. Nāgeśa states expressly that the oneness of ether implies similar oneness in regard to *Sabda* or *Sphota*. We speak of priority and posteriority in respect of *Sabda* just in the same way, as we are apt to say *ghatākara* and *mṛgākara* having regard only to the difference of attributes. Of both ether and *Sphota*, the so-called difference is only due to their different attributes (*upādhi*). The singular number in *Sabda* is intended, as Nāgeśa points out, to indicate both the unity and indivisibility (एकत्रित्वाद्युपलब्धम्) of *Sphota*.

It is quite evident from what he has said of Sphota that Patañjali recognized three prominent

• युवंतूदेवन्मुखदिवामित्येति वर्णन रूपान्मयम् अवाक्यात् विशिष्टाः-
स्त्रावः ।—Kalyāṇa-

characteristics of *Sphota*, viz., unity (*Ekaṭva*), indivisibility (*Akhaṇḍata*) and eternity (*Nityatva*). In considering the question of time (as is required for the utterance of a word), he rightly observes that it is sound that seems to be either long or short, but what is manifested by sound, i.e., *Sphota*, is not at all affected by the variations of sound. He takes the instance of a drum and continues to say that sounds that are produced by beat of drum¹ are not of equal velocity, some travelling 20 yds. and some 30 yds., and so on. The essential difference between sound and *Sphota*, which has proved so difficult a problem to others—is clearly brought to light by Patañjali. He declares in unmistakable terms that *Sphota* represents what is *Sabda* proper, whereas sound is only a quality, that is to say, it serves only to manifest *Sphota*. The relation is, therefore, one of the indicator and the indicated. He further elucidates the point that *Sabda* has two aspects—sound and *Sphota*; it is sound alone that is usually perceived and appears to be either long or short as the case may be, while *Sphota* remains entirely unchanged and is not readily perceptible by sense-organs.

The foregoing observations will serve to show that *Sphota*, though strictly one and indivisible, is also capable of being classified as internal and

¹ एवं कर्ते शोः चलो भविः वस्तुतः। चरमः? लेपाभावत्।
मिहीनाद्य वादिद्वयिष्टानि वस्तुते। योट्यावचेऽभिज्ञय इहिः। अभिः
स्मीकर वस्तुत वस्तुत चतु चतु चतुर्वै—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 161.

*external.*¹ So far as the innate expressiveness of sense is concerned, it is the internal form of *Sphoṭa* (that lies within and is only manifested by sound) that is really significant. The external form of *Sphoṭa*, as is comprehended by our hearing organs, has no such intimate relation with the meaning. In all our linguistic enquiries we engage ourselves more or less to the investigation of the external aspects of a language, but we take very little notice of the internal phenomenon which forms the very life of a language. We assign the meaning to sound, as we fail to proceed further so as to grasp the ultimate reservoir of sound that is really associated with the significance. It requires only a moment's consideration to realise that sounds or vocalised thoughts are not only produced by the operation of vocal organs, but have their origin in certain ethereal region of the body, which does not vary, though the modulations of voice are always different from one another. The grammarians have thus sought to explain the existence of an internal cause of sound. The external form of *Sphoṭa* is, again, of two kinds, denoting class and individual.

As a great exponent of the *Mahabhaṭṭya*, Bharṭṛhari has dwelt at length on the question of *Sphoṭa*. Bharṭṛhari begins with the enuncia-

¹ शब्दोऽपि विविधः। यत्पूर्वः वाचस्पतयः। तत्त्वाभ्याम् सुन्दरं शाकशास्त्रम्।
Kunjidī on the *Mallīyat*, p. 237. वाचस्पतोऽपि शब्दः पूर्णं विज्ञानः—
—Mad 1326.

tion of two kinds of *Sabda*,¹ as the *indicator* and the *indicated*, the former representing the ultimate germ of speech-sound, and the latter being what is really expressed by *Sabda*.

In view of the popular belief regarding both plurality and order (*krasna*) of *Sabda*, he makes his position clear by pointing out that no question of order, such as priority and posteriority, and that of plurality can logically be raised in relation to *Sphota*, which is essentially one and eternal. It is sound, he maintains, that passes through successive stages in course of articulation and appears to be either long or short in proportion to the exertion required for the utterance of a word. It is practically due to the varying modulations of voice, as caused by the vocal apparatus, that 'ke'-sound seems to be different from 'ka'-sound and so on. But *Sphota*, it must be remembered, remains unaffected. A parallel example² is then sought to explain the relation between sound and *Sphota*. It is a fact of common experience that the sun, though practically a fixed body, seems to be quivering and moving when it is seen through the agitated water of a pond. Just as the agitation of water is reflected on the sun, so (inspite of the oneness and undifferentiating character of

¹ वाक्यपदानन्देत् वस्त्री वाचकिदी लिङ् । एवो विभिन्नं वाच्यानामन्तरोत्ते वाक्यात् ।—Vakyapadiya, p. 20.

² विभिन्नं वाच्यानां लिङां लोकान्तराकारम् । अत् वाच्यजिवान्वेति वा भूतं विद्यतामन्तरोः ।—Vakyapadiya, f. 69.

Sphoṭa) order and difference pertaining to sound are falsely attributed to *Sphoṭa*. The dual¹ aspects of *Sabda*, as referred to above, imply that *Sabda* has the potency of expressing itself as well as its meaning that is associated with it by inseparable connection. This fact is further corroborated by the epistemological evidence. His main thesis may be briefly stated in the following words : *Sabda*, like light, is supposed to possess a double function, as *grāhaka* and *grāhyā*. A light is luminous by itself and serves to illuminate others. Similarly, a *Sabda* is first comprehended and then becomes expressive of meaning.

Then, he proceeds to show how *Sabda* is evolved. Reference² is first made to the view (as that of the Naiyāyikas) that does not take *Pada* to be anything but a combination of letters, and similarly does not recognise a sentence as distinct from *Padas* and letters. The grammarians, however, entertain quite an opposite view, because they maintain *Vākyā-Sphoṭa* to be an indivisible unit that knows neither division nor order. It is nothing but an artificial device of grammar to analyse a sentence into parts (*Padas*) and those parts again into stems and suffixes.

¹ शब्दं वाक्यम् च ह शब्दे तेषाम् च वाक् । तेषां वर्णवाक्यानां वै रूपाभिनिः ॥—Vākyapadīya, I, 55.

² तत्त्वं एतिरेति प्रवादविविष्टते । वाक् वर्णवाक्यं च विविक्षुः च विकल्पः ॥—Vākyapadīya, I, 72.

There are, as the grammarian maintains, two different aspects of words, namely, *Kārya* or popular form and *Nilaya* or the permanent form of speech. The former is generally produced by the exercise of vocal apparatus and serves to give a reflection of internal consciousness, the latter is what represents the ultimate germ of speech. *Sphoṭa* is identified with this latter aspect of speech.

The three views regarding the cognition of sound and *Sphoṭa* may be thus briefly summarised¹ :—(i) Sound which is produced is heard by the auditory organs and becomes the positive instrument whereby *Sphoṭa* is comprehended. (ii) Having assumed the material form through the medium of sound, *Sphoṭa* is capable of being heard. (iii) Sound acts upon the organs concerned and serves to manifest *Sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari lends his support to the last one. Sound is the outer garment of *Sphoṭa*. Though incomprehensible and inconceivable by itself, *Sphoṭa* reveals its existence through the medium of sound. Sound and *Sphoṭa* are intimately related to each other. As the scientists have found out atoms or electrons as the final factor of creation, so the grammarians started with sound and ultimately reached the subtle element of speech to which the term *Sphoṭa*

¹ यहा यसानुसारमन्तर्वाक्यों का उल्लेख है कि तथा अधिकाराद्यां एवं शोधसंबिलमेनीयकांडे जैसे वैतिहासिक, एवं—Pāṇyachāja under the Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1, 82.

was significantly assigned. As to how sound and *Sphoṭa*, related to each other as the indicative and the indicated, are to be comprehended, Bhartṛhari refers to four different views on the subject. Some say that *Sphoṭa* is recognised as identical with sound, just like a piece of marble looking red in contact with a *Jad-flower*; some holding sound (though not cognisable by itself) to be indicative ¹ *Sphoṭa*; some maintain that the exact nature of *Sphoṭa* being too subtle to be determined, it ¹ sound only that comes under comprehension; some, again, freely admit that *Sphoṭa* is really manifested but it is indistinct and unintelligible on account of the distance wherefrom it is evolved. No doubt, Bhartṛhari has here recorded the views of his predecessors and contemporary grammarians in order ¹ do full justice ¹ so important a subject. But we can hardly afford to pass over these views without taking notice of the unique advancement of grammatical speculations, as is clearly borne out by these references.

Referring to the intellectual process involved in the comprehension of *Sabda*, Bhartṛhari says that the cognition of *Sabda* practically follows from the last sound together with the impressions made by the preceding ones.

The immediate consequence of holding *Sphoṭa* to be one and indivisible was a grave

¹ असैषिक्षेवत्तदामन्तेष्य परिक्रमा चहोऽप्यपरिप्रयत्नां तु दी
प्तीडापार्थी—Vākyapadiya, Kit. I, 86.

one, as it threatened ■ strike at the fundamental principle of grammar by making all process of analysing sentence and words purely artificial.¹ The science of grammar is primarily based upon the principle of analysis. Now, to justify the procedure of grammarians, it must be said on the contrary that they had no other alternative than to isolate words from a composite sentence, in order to make the sense of words intelligible to others. It is simply due to our inability, Bhartṛhari strongly argues, that we cannot comprehend a sentence without taking it to be a combination of words and words as consisting of no parts (*Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*). An examination of facts shows that the grammatical method of analysing sentence and words into their component parts, however artificial from the standpoint of *Sphota*, is calculated ■ afford the only scientific means, so far as the knowledge of meaning is concerned.²

The doctrine of *Sphota*, as expounded by the grammarians, is not a creation of fancy and the result of idle philosophising ; it is rather based on the facts that speak for themselves. A moment's notice is only required to realise the existence of some inexhaustible potency

¹ व्याकुराद् व्याख्ये व्याप्तिरतिष्ठ वा ; — *Vākyapādīya*, 2, 234.

Padyasāstra—१५। च विवेदेभि वर्त्तनात्तु विवेदिनी वर्त्तिमानः कल्पितात् वासनिवो विवेदि वा ॥—*Coder Kār.* 92.

² वाक्योपविविधानिष्ठाविविधानः ।

lying inside the body, which is conceived to be at work at every time of utterance. Sound that we hear is not produced by the operation of vocal organs only, but has its origin elsewhere. However subjected to adverse criticisms by the opponents, the doctrine of *Sphoṭa*, with all its mysticisms, will continue to appeal to all speculators on the psychology of language, as embodying the most accurate explanation with regard to the origin of *Fāt*. That the principle of grammatical analysis is more or less fanciful is evident from the fact that systems of grammar have their different nomenclatures and technical terms, though they have practically kept the same object in view and treated of the same subject.

This analytical method, though at best artificial,¹ is supposed to have much utility, as it practically enables us to have an insight into the actual state of things. Starting with such unreal process as the division of sentences and words, with the obvious object of facilitating the study of words, the grammarians finally succeeded in obtaining a truer perspective while dealing with the problem of *Sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari² rightly observes that proper attention and close enquiry are needed to arrive at the final goal, running through a passage so artificial and bewildering.

¹ अस्तेषु ग्रन्थानि दर्शिते विद्यते :—Vikyāṇḍīya, 2, 226.

² पूर्वं यदेः पूर्वोक्तं समाप्तिर्थं या : अन्यात्मा विषयवाचेषाप्रभास्ति :—Vikyāṇḍīya, 1, 91.

As it is imperfect observation that makes a rope look like a serpent, and such delusion ceases to exist the moment it is cautiously examined, so the grammarians first treated of a sentence as having many parts and those parts as containing various letters. But their mode of vision is materially changed on a closer examination of facts and they finally describe *Sphoṣa* as an imperishable and indivisible unit without any reservation. The discourse on *Sphoṣa* reached its culminating point when *Sphoṣa* was regarded to be as great as Brahman itself. The doctrine of grammar has thus ultimately identified itself with the same transcendental reality which has always proved to be the be-all and end-all of metaphysical speculations.

The later grammarians, specially Śesakṛṣṇa, Nāgadeśa, Bhūṭiloji and Kopīlabhaṭṭa, have dealt with the problem of *Sphoṣa* more clearly and elaborately but all following the line of Patnijali and Bharṭṛhari. The arguments advanced by Śesakṛṣṇa in defence of *Sphoṣa* are briefly as follows: An indivisible¹ unit as *Sphoṣa* should be accepted on the ground that the sense usually denoted by a word can neither be derived from an individual letter (as it would render all other letters entirely meaningless), nor from a combination of letters, for letters being liable to destruction as soon as they

¹ एवं वस्तुम् न सिद्धेत् न कैवल्यतात्मिकम् । एवम् वाचका वर्णः शब्दः स च दिष्टः ।—*Sphoṣatattvavivraṇa*.

are uttered, it would be practically impossible to have a congregate of such transient letters. It is not even sufficient to say that they are cognisable by the same act of memory, because, if it were so, the undesirable consequence will be the identity between such groups of words as, *Nadi*, *Dina* and *Rasa*, *Sara* (there being difference of order only), as they consist of the same letters and are comprehended by the same faculty of retention. The grammarians have, therefore, proceeded a step further and recognised the existence of *Spkoṣa*, which is suggested by sound, eternal and not at all divisible into parts.

We can compare this view with what Patañjali has said with regard to order in letters.¹ As two letters, Patañjali argues, cannot be simultaneously pronounced on account of their transient character, it is useless to raise the question of priority and posteriority in connection with letters. This order is to be understood as an intellectual one.² Senga continues to say that the cognition of *Spkoṣa* follows from the last letter together with the impressions made by the preceding letters.³

The later grammarians have to a certain extent shown prolixity in enunciating as many

¹ एव चक्षुः नीतिस्तेवति । अस्मिन्देवं विकारं चक्षुः ।
—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 366.

² ग्रन्थिस्तेवति चक्षुः नीतिस्तेवत् ।
³ सूक्ष्मपर्याप्तवाक्याभिविद्यिति । चक्षुः चक्षुः चक्षुः ।
—Bṛhatśācāraśāstra, p. 15.

as eight different forms of *Sphota*, such as, *Varna-Sphota*, *Pada-Sphota*, *Vākyā-Sphota*, *Akhanḍa-Pada-Sphota*, *Akhanḍa-Vākyā Sphota*, *Varna-Jāti-Sphota*, *Pada-Jāti-Sphota*, *Vākyā-Jāti-Sphota*. The author of the *Sabda-Kaustubha* has clearly dealt with all these classifications. It must be, however, remembered that these varieties, with the single exception of *Vākyā-Sphota*, are more or less unreal and not accepted by all grammarians. Reference has already been made to two kinds of *Vākyā-Sphota*, viz., class and individual. An attempt is now made to see how far these standpoints (*Jāti-Sphota* and *Vyakti-Sphota*) are in concordance with the *Mahābhāṣya*. *Sabda* which pertains to all *Sabdas* is regarded to be a class, and consequently, वाक्याश्रिति by its very nature¹ deserves to be treated as eternal. Bhartṛhari has thrown some sidelight on this point. The word *Sphota* in वाक्याश्रितस्त्रोटमात्रं निर्मितस्ते has led some to favour the view that *Sphota* is virtually a class that is suggested by individual words or sounds, and that वाक्याश्रिति receives the designation of धूतानि by suggesting *Jāti-Sphota*. Some, again, hold² on the other hand, that *Vyakti-Sphota* (as opposed to *Jāti-Sphota*) is one and imperishable. As to the apparent plurality of *Vyakti*, they maintain that the interval or intervention caused

¹ विद्वीरचनमनीयतम् ।

² विद्वीरकलाद्यो गता विषयो नवादो ।—Bhāṣyapratipadyots.

काण्डिकल च—गत वा एव वर्त्तनीस्त्रेत्यपिकरणो तुष्टदेवं एवज्ञेयस्तदेव ।—M. B. 1, p. 38.

by time and words, which tends to prove the diversity of one and the same *Vyakti* as *a*, is only due to the variation of sounds whereby *Sphoṭa* is suggested. According to this point of view, it should be borne in mind, the *a*-sound in *da* is not distinct from that in *adā*. This view is, however, open to objections and is finally set aside by Patañjali. Those who like Patañjali advocate *Jāti-Sphoṭa*¹ advance their arguments to repudiate both unity and eternality of *Vyakti-Sphoṭa* on the ground that *a* seems to have more than one form, according as it is called *uddita*, *anuddita*, *starita* and *pluta*. It is not even reasonable to suggest that the same *a* which is first pronounced as *uddita* is next taken to be *Anuddita* and so on, for, if it were so, *Sphoṭa* would cease to be eternal on account of its assuming diverse forms. Thus, *Jāti-sphoṭa* is finally accepted as what gives the correct solution of the problem.²

Having thus discussed the salient characteristics of *Sphoṭa* from all possible standpoints, we now proceed to see how *Sphoṭa-rūpa*, which is popularly attributed to the grammarians, was received by different schools of Hindu philosophy. However carefully conceived and ingeniously nourished by the grammarians, the

¹ वाचिरेष स्फोटः प्रस्तवत्प्रसन्नया दृष्टि वाचीरवेः :—*Uddiyata*.

² वाक्याभिव्यक्तिं विवरणं—*Mahabhasya*, L. 12.

एव वाचिकोट्टरपि निराकृति वाचिकोट्टरात् इत्यनीवते :—*Kaīyata*.

तथा विज्ञा एवामित्ता इत्यकारा :— प्राचीना वाचिकिविवरणमेवैव वाचिकोट्टरपि अवश्यात्पितः :—*Kaīyata*.

theory of *Sphota* seems to have a strange fate, because it failed to have any favourable treatment at the hands of reputed philosophers. What is still more regrettable is that it was rather subjected to stern and vigorous criticisms. Though it embodies, so to speak, the crowning achievement of all grammatical speculations, the theory of *Sphota* unfortunately met with nothing but disapproval on all sides. The only school of Indian thought which appears to have lent support to the assumption of an invisible speech-unit as *Sphota*, is, if we are allowed to hold, the Yoga system of Patañjali. It is practically on the evidence of such aphorisms, as Yoga Sutras I. 81 and 8. 17 and the expositions of Vyāsa thereon, and partly in consequence of the supposed identity between the authors of the Mahabhaṣya and the Yoga Sutras, that the existence of *Sphota* is said to have been recognised and supported by the author of the Yoga Sutra. Truth to tell, there is no clear mention of *Sphota* as such in the aphorisms of Yoga system; it is only in the comments of Vyāsa and the gloss of Vācaspati that some light has been thrown on the question of *Sphota*.

It is too well known a fact that all objects of thought, with the exception of *Primordial matter* and *Soul*, are declared to be वाचः॑ or

¹ वाचस्पतीसन्देश सम्बन्धितः.

products by the teachers of the Sāṃkhya school. Having taken a rather perverted view against the orthodox interpretations, they have rejected the fundamental tenets of the Mīmāṃsakas, viz., eternity of sound,¹ eternity of the Vedas and eternity of the relation between sound and meanings. It requires no other evidence, hold the Sāṃkhyāites, but ordinary perception and inference to prove that *Sabda* is produced by the agency of vocal organs and has only momentary existence. The Sāṃkhya Śāstra (5.57) distinctly rejects *Sphota* as practically incomprehensible. The reason of their refutation is a very simple one. As no other element apart from letters comes to our notice in the cognition of a word, it is absolutely useless to assume the existence of *Sphota* (which pauses our vision and comprehension) as distinct from letters.² As letters are, on the contrary, directly perceived, it is more reasonable to take them to be expressive of the sense. If, again, letters are supposed to be meaningless by themselves, we are allowed to doubt the so-called expressiveness of *Sphota*. Now, the point at issue is when letters are found to be really expressive of sense, the assumption of *Sphota* in addition to letters becomes a superfluity which the followers of the Sāṃkhya school are not prepared to accept.

¹ य व्याख्यानं अद्विवितीयः ॥—Sāṃkhyā Śāstra, 5. 49.

² प्रतीक्षागोपेत न विद्यन्नाप्तं वदः ॥—Sāṃkhyā Śāstra, 5. 57.

स्फूर्तिक्षेपव्याख्यानातीतिः क्वित्वा व्याख्यानित्वम्, व्याख्या स्फूर्तः वदः; विद्यु वद्ये पदः ॥—Sāṃkhyā-Vṛtti.

There is another argument which also goes against the indivisible character of *Sphota*. As meanings are liable to changes according to the different arrangement of letters (as in *Nāṭ* and *Dīśa*) and as sounds are diversified in their character and have manifold significance, we cannot reasonably take *Sphota* to be one and eternal. The conclusion to which this argument leads is that *Sphota*, being inconceivable, is far from being *Sabda* proper. It is letters alone, no matter if they are perishable, that constitute words in the real sense of the term.

No comment is, however, necessary to show that the Śaṅkhyāites, who profess to be rationalistic, have taken notice of only the outward aspect of speech and have totally neglected the more important side of the question, viz., psychological or internal aspect. Their main difficulty is that they ascribe significance to so transient a thing as letters, but do not strive further to find out the permanent source of *Sabda*, as is manifested by sound. As to non-perception of *Sphota*, it must be remembered that the *Sphoṭavādin* also were not slow to emphasise the difficulty that lies in the way of having a perceptual knowledge of *Sphota*. They made no secret as to the necessity of a thorough concentration of mind in order to realise the existence of *Sphota*. It requires a good deal of mystical power, or some amount of spiritual vision, as is given rise to by the awakening of *Prāṇānūḍra*, to grasp the cit-aspect (*Sphota*) of the Supreme Being.

Moreover, *Sphoṭa* is not capable of being perceived by ordinary sense-organs : it is only suggested or manifested by sound.

Regarding the existence of *Sphoṭa* (as distinct from letters), the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, as ably represented by the author of the Ślokaśārtikā, are far from being reconcilable with those of the grammarians. Having taken a purely physical view of *Sabda*, the Mīmāṃsakas, like Sāṅkara, turned to the old theory of the revered teacher Upavarga¹ and accordingly identified *Sabda* with letters. To assume something as *Sphoṭa* apart from letters is, as they hold, opposed to all cognition and experience. Letters are actually perceived in a word, as, for instance, the word *gaṇa* does not appear to have any other element excepting the three constituent letters—*ga*, *a* and *nārga*. It is curious to note that while so much stress is laid on the popular experience, the importance of the logical aspect of *Sabda* has altogether been ignored, so as to weaken the ground on which the grammarians sought to build the edifice of *Sphoṭavadda*. When *Sabda*, as a combination of letters, is practically seen to be expressive of the sense and as no other factor is found to be in operation in the comprehension of the meaning, it is nothing but superfluous to assume the existence of *Sphoṭa*, as distinct from letters.

¹ वर्ण एव ग्रन्थ इति मीमांसार्थः ;—V. S., I. 8. 28.

The grammarians, it must be remembered, have declared *Sphota* to be virtually distinct from letters and further held *Sphota* to be the only significant element of speech.¹ The Mimāṃsakas² maintain that letters have no parts and that there is no such collection in the cognition of words apart from that of the component letters. In assigning meaning to words, the Mimāṃsakas had to face one difficult problem. The question presented itself in the following form :— Are all letters individually significant by themselves, or, is it an aggregation of them whereby the meaning is expressed ? The untenable character of the first view is clearly evident, since the competency of each individual letter to signify the intended sense is contrary to our experience. As regards the second view, it is not possible to have an aggregation or a simultaneous combination of letters, simply for the reason of minute intervals in the utterance of sounds. The Mimāṃsakas make their way out of the difficulty by saying that the significance of words depends upon the convention or popular usage. As the comprehension of the meaning directly follows from the letters that constitute a word, and as nothing else is required for the purpose, it is only logical, they hold, to take letters as what express the sense. Kumārila shows further how by accepting

¹ शब्दकर्ता वाचैव स्फुटः।

² मीमांसकः—Siksa-śāstra.

Sphoṭa as an entity, we are liable to make a number of unnecessary assumptions, such as, the existence of *Sphoṭa*, distinctness of *Sphoṭa* from letters and its indivisibility. It is quite clear from what we have said that the arguments advanced by the Mimāṃsakas against *Sphoṭavāda* are, generally speaking, reducible to two only, namely, the existence of *Sphoṭa* apart from letters (i) involves a negation of perceptible facts (प्रत्यक्षितम्) and (ii) is an unwarranted assumption of something that is invisible or imperceptible (प्रत्यक्षयन्तम्). The concluding verse¹ of the author reveals, however, the reason why he could not lend support to the theory of *Sphoṭa*. As a matter of fact, the assumption of *Sphoṭa*, which makes all divisions of a sentence and words merely artificial, is found to be entirely inconsistent with the main tenets of the Mimāṃsa system, for it renders *śloka*, *prayāga*, etc. (which pertain to letters, words and sentences) absolutely conventional. It is, therefore, to retain the genuine character of the Vedic texts that Kumārila made such a vigorous attempt to refute the existence of *Sphoṭa*.

The Vedāntins have fully acknowledged the eternality of *Sabda*. They have, on the authority of scriptural texts, even gone to the extent of investing *Sabda* with the potency of producing the entire world. While dealing with *Sabda*

१ वर्णविविलित; अविभिन्नताम्; चरित्र कर्ते चक्रवर्षाद्यर्थम्।

कार्यविधानसभाविधान समिति वर्षे १९४८ एवं वर्षे १९५०—Solemnisation of Constitution, 1948, 1950.

(Logos) and its 'world-producing power,' Sankara has conveniently devoted considerable space under the *Vedānta-Sūtra* 1.3.28 to find out the exact nature of *Sabda*. With his characteristic manner of presenting arguments, he first points out the incongruities that become almost unavoidable, if letters having both production and destruction, were to be regarded as *Sabda* proper. Subsequently he continues to acknowledge *Sphota* as what represents the permanent form of *Sabda*. The way in which Sankara has at first advanced arguments in defence of the existence of *Sphota*, exposing the untenable features of वर्तमान, leads one to believe, though temporarily, that he entertained no antagonistic view against the grammatical interpretation of *Sphotonāda*. This impression is, however, of a short duration, because next we find Sankara more favourably examining the view of *Upavarṣa* almost in the same way as the *Mimāṃsakas*. As to the question of production and destruction of letters, he argues that it really implies the re-recognition (पुनर्विद्यन्) of the same letter. What is meant is that different letters are not produced and uttered each time, but, as a matter of fact, the same sound, say *k*a (as in *kala* and *kōla*) is heard. It should be, however, noticed here that the *Naiyāyikas* are not prepared to take the above as an instance of re-recognition, but explain the

* *Vedānta Sūtra*, Sthāna Bhāṣya under the aphorism, 1.3.28.

sameness of *ka*-sounds as due to their belonging to the same class (क्लेश). To sum up the two views : According to the Mimāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, the same *ka*-sound is heard again and again, whereas the Naiyāyikas do not maintain the non-differentiation of the individuals and consequently take all *ka*-sounds as belonging to the same class. This recognition, continues Sankara, does not follow from the knowledge of a class ; it is individual letters that are comprehended each time. Again, we are accustomed to hold the form *gauḥ*, though it consists of three distinct letters, as one word. How is it, then, possible to have such a cognition of oneness when its component parts are far from being one ? Having attributed the diversified character of one and the same letter to the difference of sound, he proceeds to say that sometimes many things form the subject of one intellection,¹ as many trees, for instance, are denoted by one word 'forest' (*Vana*). At last Sankara sums up the arguments on both sides, viz., *Vārtavāda* and *Sphoṭavāda*, and after a minute examination of facts arrives at the conclusion that the view maintained by the *Vārtavādins*² is simpler and appeals more to reason and experience, while that of the *Sphoṭavādins* is vitiated by prolixity and involves far-fetched

¹ असीमप्रतिक्रियाविद्वान् ।

² वर्तवादी चारोंवटी कल्पना, जोटवादिष्ठ इत्यानिरहेद्यकल्पना एवं वर्तवादी वर्तवादी कल्पनास्तः वर्तवादी वर्तवादीति च वर्तवादीति वर्तवादीति वर्तवादी कल्पना चातु—*Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya*.

speculations. To hold, he observes, letters, — they are comprehended one after another, to be indicative of *Sphota*, which is said to signify the intended sense, is to take a superfluous view of the whole problem.

According to the Nyāya-Vaisesika point of view, sound is a quality of ether, comprehended by the organ of hearing, and has only a momentary existence. It is of two kinds—(1) sound as represented by letters like *ka*, etc.; (2) sound as produced by beat of drum and blowing of conches and the like. The former, *cit.*, अवश्यक, is alone significant and is generally used as a medium for communicating the ideas. Prastapada, the well-known commentator on the Vaisesika-Sūtras, has attempted to show how words are produced. The view of this commentator regarding the origin of sound is almost the same as is to be found in treatises on *Śikṣā*. A desire is first felt within, the author says, by the conjunction of the mind with the soul, for the utterance of sound (in order to give expression to the thoughts rising in the mind); then efforts are made which bring about a movement in the region of internal air. Thus moved by causes from within, the internal air proceeds upwards till it comes in contact with the vocal apparatus. This conjunction which is followed by vibrations in ether gives rise to sound that is destroyed as soon as it is uttered. A word is, therefore, *Kārya*, as opposed to *Nitya*. The Naiyayikas as well as the Vaisesikas have thus taken a

non-eternal view of *Sabda* differing from the grammarians who assume a permanent form of *Sabda*, as is represented by *Sphota*.

In his annotation on the *Bhāṣya*, Śridhara¹ has made an attempt to show the absence of logic in the grammatical conception of *Sphota*. He first raises the question whether meaning is expressed by a sentence or by *Sphota*. If a word is nothing but a collection of letters, holds the *Sphoṭavādin*, and a sentence not at all distinct from its component parts, then there would be no comprehension of the meaning whatsoever. For neither individual letter is competent to convey the entire meaning (as it would render other letters simply redundant), nor is a combination practically possible, as all letters cannot be pronounced simultaneously. The author meets this objection by holding, for argument's sake, that letters are eternal and not transitory, as in that case such an aggregate would not be incomprehensible. But this argument cannot stand for obvious reasons. It is further argued by the opponent that letters are perceived one after another and then impressions are produced in the mind. This is also untenable. For, if there is order in recollections, as shown above, there would be no co-existence of sounds to form an aggregation. As the comprehension of the meaning is otherwise impossible, the *Sphoṭavādins* have been led to acknowledge

¹ Nyāya-kāndali (Śridhara)—St., p. 267.

the existence of *Sphoṭa*, as what expresses the meaning. But such an assumption has no justification to a rationalist philosopher like Śridhara. The following arguments, among others, are sought by Śridhara to refute the existence of *Sphoṭa*: *Sphoṭa* is never directly perceived, but falsely assumed by the grammarians; the denotation lies within the word and not with an imperceptible entity as *Sphoṭa*.¹ To assume *Sphoṭa*, as distinct from letters, is as fallacious as to conceive a 'falter in the sky'.²

Before bringing this topic to a close, we have one word more. Considering what has been said about the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* by different schools of Indian philosophy, it is sufficiently clear that the main contention raised against *Sphoṭa* is based upon the fact that the assumption of *Sphoṭa* is contrary to all perception and involves far-fetched speculations. Having taken their stand on the facts established by direct perception, the opponents of *Sphoṭavāda* seem to have carried the popular view in their favour. But it would be a positive mistake to suppose that what the *Sphoṭavādins* tried to establish is nothing but fanciful. It cannot be, however, denied that the *Sphoṭavādins* made no secret as to the imperceptibility of *Sphoṭa* by ordinary means. Moreover, it is repeatedly pointed out

¹ Nyaya-Kaṇḍa (Śridhara), v.ii., 5k. section, यद्यपि स्फोटस्तथा ।—pp. 889-270. तदेव सर्वे एव क्षेत्रात्मादेव देवतानश्च प्राप्तुमा न्होटवन्ना ।

² वाचस्तुमन्तिर चोटयक्षणा च दुष्टा ।

that the realisation ■ *Sphoṭa* requires a good deal of spiritual meditation as well as perfect concentration of mind. As it is not logically correct to take anything to be unreal, simply because it is not directly perceived, we do not find sufficient reason to deny the very existence of *Sphoṭa*, which, though imperceptible, is said to be manifested by sound. *Sphoṭa*, to speak the truth, bears comparison with the soul, as both of them come under our cognition through the instrumentality of inference, the former being indicated by sound and the latter by volition, effort, pleasure, pain, etc. As to the other side of the contention, we should say that the upholders of *Sphoṭavāda* minutely examined all external aspects of words before they could grasp so subtle an entity as *Sphoṭa* by unfolding the psychological phenomena underlying the origin of sound.

To summarise what we have said about *Sphoṭa*: *Sphoṭa* is the same as *Satda-Brahman* or *Brahman* revealed in the form of *Vāk*. *Sphoṭa* represents the internal aspect of *Prasava*; it is eternal and cannot be divided into parts (*akhaṇḍa*) and expressiveness or *Vacakata* lies with *Sphoṭa* and not with *Padas*, isolated from the *akhaṇḍa-aśvaya*—the indivisible unit of speech. That there is no essential difference between *Sphoṭa* and *Prasava* has been clearly stated by the ancient seers. *Nāda*¹ or primordial sound is said to have first

१ शुद्धिग्राहकसे वर्षम् व्रजत्वा पर्येति इतः ।

व्याप्तवाच्युपसे विद्येयवाच्यने ॥—Laghuśatīyā, p. 889.

originated in the spatial region of the heart (*hrdayākūta*) of Brahman when he was deeply absorbed in meditation. This subtle form of sound is capable of being perceived by shutting the auditory passage of the ears. Out of *Nāda* arose *Omkāra*, the self-radiant, creative factor, which is regarded as the positive symbol of the supreme Being. Viewed from the standpoint of Yoga, *Sphota*, *Prayava* and *Pratibhā* are almost the same. The internal aspect of *Vāk*, as is represented by *Parā* and *Pasyanti*, is inseparable from *tilakṣṭi*, the fountain source of all cognitions. *Prayava* or *Pratibhā*, as we may call it, has its permanent seat in the heart of all sentient beings ; its fourth part is what is known as *ardhaṇātā* or *Sphota*.¹ Further, it is held that *Sphota* which serves to manifest *Vāk* is heard by the supreme Soul (*Paramātma*), when the sense-organs are inactive in a state of sleep.² Both *Sabda* and *Artha* are in reality the manifestation of one and the same Soul ;³ it is only in the grammarian that one gets the designation of *Vācaka* and the other as *Vācya*. *Pratibhā* or intelligence is shaped by *Sabda* and *Artha*. The inseparable connection in which *Sabda* stands to *Artha* also points to their origination from the same source, i.e.,

¹ शीर्षं प्रतिकारकं इदं च वैष्णवोपेतीति वाचस्पति कही ग. जीर्ण द्वयामि ।—Laghuvaidikam, p. 820.

² यद्योनि य एते वेदे शब्दे य वृद्धः ।—SŪKTA, p. 292.

एष वृद्धः द्वयो वाचस्पति वाचस्पतिः ।—Vācysapadīya, 2, 21.

Buddhi. Durga makes this point clear when he continues to say that *Buddhi* (*Pratibhā*) residing in the heart of all in the form of knowledge (*abhidhāna*) and knowable (*abhidheya*) gets materialised into *Sabda* and *Artha* respectively.¹ Again, it is said that what is denoted by all sentences is nothing but *Pratibhā* (*Pratibhā* एव वाक्यरूपः). According to Bhartṛhari, it is *mahāsād* or *mahābhūmīdurga* (ultimate reality) that is really denoted by all *Sabdas*. It is one and without any division (*vibhāga*) and order (*krama*). To him who has not attained that spiritual vision which enables one to visualise the all-pervading reality, this *mahā-sādā* falsely appears to be manifold, as the objects possessing it are differentiated in their external outlook. *Sphoṭa* is identified with this *mahā-sādā*. *Sphoṭa* is the ultimate germ of all word-forms (*Sa hi sāvasthabdarthaprakriyā*); words may differ from one another, so far as their external aspect is concerned, but the internal or intellectual one (*Sphoṭa*) remains the same. The Vaiyākaraṇas used to look upon *Sabda* as the audible manifestation of Brahman and advocated constant meditation on *Sabda* or *Sabda-Brahman* as a regular form of Yoga that ultimately leads to the emancipation of the Soul (*param Brahmādhibhiganyate*).

The standpoint wherefrom the grammarians have viewed the ultimate germ of all

¹ अपि भूतिष्ठविभिर्वा तुष्टिष्ठविभिर्वा तुष्टिष्ठविभिर्वा,.....
Nirukt., p. 47.

speech-sounds is materially different from those of Śāṅkara, Kumārila, Śrīdhara and others. To the grammarians, *Sphoṭa* is sacred and divine, so much so that it is finally identified with Brahman. Notwithstanding all adverse criticisms that have been heaped upon the assumption of an intellectual phenomenon as *Sphoṭa*, the theory of *Sphoṭa*, will continue to survive as embodying the most reasonable and scientific interpretation about the origin of sound.

CHAPTER V

Sentence and Parts of Speech

Sentence—its decomposition—Parts of Speech—Prabuti and
Pratyaya—Upanigas and Nipita

In accordance with the strict interpretation of the doctrine of *Sphota*, as we have observed, the analytical method, though adopted by the grammarians as a cardinal principle, is liable to be regarded as purely artificial. But there is no denying the fact that the grammarians had no other alternative than to take up this process of dissolving sentences and words into their constituent elements, as the only means of getting into the meaning of words. Grammar is not a creation of fancy, nor an artificial combination of rules. Grammar is rather a popular science; the principles on which the structure of grammatical generalisations stand are more or less drawn from popular experiences. That a special rule becomes applicable in preference to a general one,¹ Patañjali observes, is a fact that is neither enjoined by a divine authority nor sanctioned by the authors

¹ वैद्यर चारुप्रसवि चारि भौमुकामरा एकलप्राप्तेष्वयते चाप्तामिति ।
चिं निः । लीनिकोऽप्तं वदामः । लोहिति इति रुद्रे वाहनं मन्ति ।
Mahabharata under the rule Pāṇ., I, 1, 47.

of the religious texts, but it is a popular example which is perfectly consistent with our daily experience. Both Kātyāyana¹ and Patañjali have repeatedly drawn our attention to the most important point that the study of grammar has for its object the discrimination of correct words. Though corrupt forms are found to be as expressive of sense as their corresponding correct words, it has been stated with all possible emphasis and earnestness that the use of correct words in conformity with the rules of grammar is alone attended with religious felicity.²

Though there are eight different varieties of *Sphoṭa*, as we have already pointed out, it is the *Vākyā-Sphoṭa* alone that is held to be real, the rest being more or less artificial.³ From the standpoint of *Sphoṭa*, *Vākyā* is not divisible into parts and is the really significant element of speech. Bhartrhari has the following : Just as an unreal process like that of analysing words into stems and suffixes is also resorted to for the knowledge of unintelligent people, so is *Vākyā*

¹ शास्त्रमुदारसैद्धिन् एव विद्या एव वाक्यम् (—Vid. under the rule Phg., I, 1, 4).

² भौतिकोद्देश्यात् लभते दीने ग्राहकं पर्वतिष्ठतः (—Vid. 1.

वास्त्वम् ! क्षमीरिभुद्वास्तु वाऽप्यदेव (—Vid. 9)

वाक्यात्मानमैश्वरी वदेत् वापद्वेषं च वर्तमित्वा 'अहम्' (—

Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 8.

³ वाक्यम्बोटीमितिकर्त्त गिर्वासि वर्तमिति: (—Vaidikaṇṭyābhīṣṭapga. Ksh. 92.

⁴ वृषा ! महे विद्याने इति प्रवचयन्तः । अपिवाचना वामो वस्त्रानामुपर्वत्तैः । Vākyapadīya, 2, 10. and अपीत्यव्याख्या वामोऽपि इति प्रवचकादिवद् (— Ibid. Ksh. 8, 1.

is broken up into *Padas* by the grammarians with a view to get into the meaning of words. This *Apoddhāra* or decomposition is the first and foremost business of grammar.

There is much divergence of views regarding the precise nature of a *Vākya*. Bhartrhari has stated as many as eight different views of the ancient grammarians in regard to the constitution of a *Vākya*.¹ These views are summarised as follows :—A *Vākya* is (1) a verbal form; (2) a collection of words; (3) a class; (4) one and individual; (5) an order; (6) an intellectual assimilation; (7) the first *Pada*; (8) all *Padas* differing from one another but having mutual expectancy. Of these only 3, 4 and 6, i.e., class, one and indivisible and intellectual assimilation of meanings are accepted as proper definition of a *Vākya* by those who maintain the indivisibility of a *Vākya*. The rest, on the other hand, are supposed to form the accurate definition of *Vākya* from the standpoint of those who uphold the dissolvability of a *Vākya* (*Padaavādins*). Again, the definitions of *Vākya*, as either order or collection of *Padas*, are compatible with the view of the *Abhibhūtānucayaśādins* and those as, verbal form, the first *Pada*, all *Padas* in their different aspects having mutual expectancy, are consistent with the view of the

¹ यात्मसम्बन्धः चक्रवृत्तीः अपि व्याप्तिर्थीः एकोभावः इदः
त्वा पूरुषस्त्रीर्थः । पदमध्ये व्याप्तिर्थं शास्त्रस्त्रीर्थः । यस्तु यस्ति
मतिर्थिना व्युत्था व्याप्तिर्थाद् ॥ *Vākyapadīya*, ॥ 1 ॥

Anvījībhādhanavāda. A *Vākya*¹ is also defined as a combination of words having mutual proximity, expectancy and compatibility. These three characteristics form the mediate causes with regard to the comprehension of the meaning from a sentence. (1) *Expectancy*—An aggregate of words that are not mutually expectant fails to give a connected idea; as, for instance, no consistent meaning is cognisable from such an unconnected group of words, as गौरवः पुष्पो चट्टी and वटकमेलामाळया छाति; and so on. (2) *Proximity* implies that words that are uttered at intervals cannot have any inter-relation amongst them so as to constitute a significant sentence. (3) *Compatibility* means that we cannot construct a sentence out of words the meanings of which are mutually incompatible (as in एक्षमा चित्ता). Jagadīśa² is not, however, prepared to take these three as direct causes, so far as *Sabda-bodha* or verbal cognition is concerned, because they would tend to place *Sabdabodha* under the category of inference. The *Naiyāyikas* have, therefore, taken them to be *Sahakāri* (conditions), as opposed to direct causes. Expectancy refers

¹ वाक्यं साधे वीचकः वाक्यादिभिरुपः अदीपतः ।—B. Dvṛgpa.

² इव शाकाहारद्वयं चट्टी चलनं चट्टिंयत् ।—Jagadīśa—*Sabdabodhavivardhaka*, p. 5, 19.

³ विज्ञानस्त्रियाद्युपेत्युभिः विज्ञानादेवा विज्ञानस्त्रियाद्युभिः विज्ञानस्त्रियाद्युपेत्युभिः विज्ञानस्त्रियाद्युपेत्युभिः । उपेत्युभिः विज्ञानस्त्रियाद्युपेत्युभिः ।—Babdehadevi, II, 2, 4.

to the physical side (प्रदर्शनिका), whereas competency is to be understood as pertaining to the logical side of *Sabda* (पर्वतिका). We generally find that verbal expectancy is satisfied by words alone.¹ But what is logically correct is that expectancy is also connected with the meaning and not with the form alone, and consequently the expression पूर्वानुकृत् means a *Pada* that is indicative of the meaning having mutual expectancy with that of another. It is sufficiently clear from what Patañjali has said regarding the interpretation of nyapekṣa that expectancy really pertains to meanings that are reciprocally expectant. Similarly, competency, as a *Sahakari-kāroga*, is also to be understood as related to the meaning. As the cognition of import (सामर्पण) alone cannot produce *Sabda-bodha* independently of expectancy, etc., Gaṅgeśa recognises the necessity of their help for obtaining the so-called verbal cognition. Proximity,² strictly speaking, is not a cause; it may be so with an unintelligent man, as it tends to help his quick understanding, but in the case of an intelligent man, proximity is not unavoidably necessary for his cognition. Import is also recognised to be the meaning of a sentence. Gaṅgeśa³ states clearly that

¹ वाचीं सामर्पणं वाचेऽपि पूर्णे ।

² भास्तवः वास्तवोऽपि न वाचावः । अवश्यमित्यनेत वोद्द भास्तवः, वाचावः तु वास्तवास्तवोऽपि वीर्यी भासीनान् ।—Madhy. Kōśīp. T4L.

³ वाक्पत्रिर्वाचानान्तर् ।—Tatracintāmaṇi, p. 316. (*Sabda-*
Kāraṇa.)

the cognition of import is a necessary condition in the matter of verbal knowledge. "This sentence" is uttered by the speaker with the explicit desire of expressing this sense"—is the way in which *Tatparya* is generally obtained. But Nagेश differs from the Naiyāyikas and does not take import as an unavoidable condition for the comprehension of वाक्यान्, inasmuch as the meaning of a sentence is also cognisable even without any reference to the particular import of the speaker. The cognition of import is essential in the case of those words which have more than one meaning, as वृति, देवता, etc. Nagेश, however, maintains on the authority of the *Mahābhāṣya* that it is the knowledge of context (*Prakarana*), propriety and the like that helps us in determining the particular import of a word when it happens to have more than one meaning.

The author of the *Vārttika*¹ defines *Vākya* as a verbal form having conjunction with either an indeclinable, a *Kāraṇa*, or an adverb, i.e., a verbal form constitutes a sentence in combination with the above adjuncts. Some say,² as Patañjali observes, that a verbal form with its adjuncts is sufficient to constitute a sentence. It is further suggested that a verbal form alone³

¹ एव वाक्योन्तरां स्वीकृताना वाक्योपरिक्रमा — *Mahābh.* p. 424.

² वाक्यान् सम्बन्धान्तरादिविभेदं वाक्यम् — *Vārt.* 9 under the rule *Pāṇ.* 2.1.1

³ वाक्य वाक्य—वाक्यान् वाक्योपरिक्रमा — *Ibid.*

⁴ वाक्यिक् वाक्यम् — *Ibid.*

is competent to constitute a *Vākya*. These definitions have made it perfectly clear that a verbal form is the main constituent of a sentence. If we take a verbal form as what constitutes a sentence, the meaning of a *Vākya* will necessarily be *Kriyā* or action (*Kriyā vākyārthaḥ*). A sentence, in the grammatical sense of the term, cannot be framed without a verb. Jagadīśa does not, however, lend his support to this view. He maintains, on the contrary, that a *Vākya* is a combination of mutually expectant words and does not insist on the presence of a verbal form as the first and foremost condition of a *Vākya*.¹ A verbal form does not, therefore, occupy an important place in Jagadīśa's conception of *Vākya*. His contention is based on the fact that when a combination of words like शुभे अपान्, which does not contain any verbal form, is also found to be clearly expressive of the sense, it is not strictly correct to hold that a *Vākya* without a verb is practically incomprehensible. The grammarians hold the opposite view. According to them, a sentence is not at all possible without a verb. What the soul is to the body, so is the verb to the sentence. Jagadīśa has also rejected Amar Śivha's definition of *Vākya*,²—' *Vākya* is a combination of words ending in *sup* and *tia'*—since it is over-lapping as well as incomplete.

¹ विश्वारतिर्ति य वाक्यस्तीवादिवाच् पातो वापि विवृद्धिकालादन्तेयः ।

—Subdānakṛṣṇapratīkṣā, Kār. 12

² शुभं ग्रन्थकर्ता नेमादिवाचार्यविद्युतः ।—Subdānakṛṣṇi, Kār. 12.

or open to the fallacies of *Alicyāpti* and *Aryāpti*. It is to be particularly noticed that with the Naiyāyikas the form *ghatam* is nothing short of a *Vākya*, because it is expressive of the sense घटतिकम् तथा. The way in which Jagadīśa has defined *Samsāra* makes it clear that the form *nīlam* is as good as a *Vākya* and the form *nīlatpalam* is, consequently, a *Mahā-vākya*. The grammarians cannot do away with the verb, so far as the cognition of a sentence is concerned. As no complete and consistent sense is comprehensible without a verb, the grammarians, as a rule, understand such forms as *asti* and *bhavati* in those cases where verbal forms are not actually present. To the grammarians, the expression ज्ञाते भवन् necessarily implies such a verbal form as *ज्ञेयते* without which neither is the sense complete, nor the proper *Kāraka* (*Apādāna*) determinable.

It is also a difficult problem to decide what is actually denoted by a *Vākya*. There is a great difference of views regarding the meaning of a *Vākya*. Some hold that the meaning of a sentence is the same as what is denoted by its component parts; others maintain that a sentence is expressive of the sense that is virtually different from those that are expressed by its constituents, either individually or collectively. Kumārila has thoroughly discussed these two contradictory views in the *Vākyādhibhāṣya* of his *Sloka-Vārttika*. The doctrine of the eternality of both *Sabda* and

its relation to meaning, though so seriously supported by the Mimāpsakas in the face of much adverse opposition, was not considered to be sufficient to prove the authoritativeness of the Vedas. The validity of the Vedic injunctions, which have come down to us in the form of sentences, was questioned by the opponents on the ground that the meaning of a sentence is distinct from those of its constituents. The Mimāpsakas meet this argument by holding that a sentence is practically a combination of consistent words and denotes exactly what is expressed by each word, i. e., the meaning of a sentence represents only a sum-total of the meanings of its constituent parts. There are, in to speak, two views, as held by the two distinct schools of Mimāpsā systems, viz., Bhāṭṭa and Guru, in regard to the meaning of a *Vakya*: (1) *Abhikriḍīnayoऽवदा*¹—It means, as is implied by the very expression, that *Anaya* or correlation between the meanings,² as expressed by words through their respective conventions, is what constitutes the significance of a *Vakya*. The special import (प्रियतम्भो वोऽः) that is usually brought about by the particular connection of meanings and which does not practically follow from any constituent, is, according to this view,

¹ अभिक्रीडीय शब्दानि समित्यावाचयुक्तिः सत् । कथं एष वाक्यानि इत्यनित्यावाचयः ।—*Bhāṭṭayācakha*, p. 27.

² वाक्यानि वेक्षण्येऽपरवानेन वाक्यः वेक्षणेन गतानि ।

—*Vyāptivāda*.

also supposed to be implied by the *Padas* themselves. What is exactly meant is that the significance of a *Vākyā* is the same as is denoted by *Padas* making up a sentence ; and (2) *Avidbhūdībhidhgnavāda*—According to this view, *Padas* are first related to one another in a sentence before they can express the consistent meanings, that is to say, the usual meaning is obtained from the particular connection of *Padas*. The grammarians not only tried to prove the indivisibility of a *Vākyā*, but also attributed the same property to the meaning of a *Vākyā*. Just as there are no parts in a *Vākyā*, says Bhartṛhari,¹ so there is no division, so far as the signification of a *Vākyā* is concerned. Some hold that the sense expressed by a *Vākyā* is *effort*.² To those who, like the *Sphoṭavādins*, maintain the indivisibility of a *Vākyā*, the meaning expressed by a *Vākyā* is nothing but *Pratibhā* or intuition. It has already been pointed out that the internal consciousness (*caitanya*) reveals itself through the medium of *Sabda* and gets the designation of *abhidheya*. Bhartṛhari has identified *Pratibhā* with the *mātā-satta* that pervades the whole world of cognition. Though one and indivisible, Bhartṛhari continues, it appears to be manifold owing to the diversified character

¹ वस्तुतः ये किसानोद्यम अन्तीकरणके मरिवाहि—Vikayavdhya, दूसरे अन्तीकरणपि विर्यवाप्ति स्थिरताहि—Paryavati.

• विनोदकारी वर्गीय परिषिक्ति का बापते : उन्होंने १९५८ में समाज

— 18 —

and *unseen*) which makes it *Parvati*.

of the objects that come to our knowledge. What is commonly called *jati* or class and forms the vital essence of all things is the same as *Sattā*. This *Sattā*¹ is what is denoted by all words; it is the meaning of all *Pratipadikas* and verbal roots; it is eternal and is the same as the Supreme Soul. It is what is signified by the suffixes like *ta* and *taḥ*. Nāgeśa has clearly shown how the meanings assimilated by the intellect are expressed by *Vākyas*.

After dealing with the definitions and signification of *Vākyas*, we now proceed to consider the composition of a *Vākya*. A *Vākya* is the combination of *Padas*. *Padas* that enter into the composition of a *Vākya* must be mutually expectant and their meanings compatible with one another. *Padas* or parts of speech are generally four in number. Yākha, as we know, divided speech into four distinct elements—noun, verb, preposition and particle. These are popularly known as *Padas*. There were evidently two classes of logico-grammarians, namely, *Padāñjalis* and *Vākyāñjalis*. The *Padāñjalis*²

वाक्यपदित्तम् वाचैः विवरणात् वर्णनितुः
सर्वत्रिपुरुषो ततो एवं वाचः वर्णनिताः ॥
ते ग्रन्थिविवरं च वाचर्त्तुं च वर्णनते ।
ता विवरं ता वर्णनात् तामात्मा-वर्णनः ॥

—*Vākyapadīya*, 3. Kāvya, 33-34.

1. पदानीकारकाणीः कथा वर्णितदृष्टिः ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 3. 63.
पदमित् दृष्टि ते वर्णने ते स्मृत्यनां चाच वाचनिकामः ।—*Pṛatyāñja*,
p. 91.

and the *Pākyādīna* hold respectively *Padas* and *Vākya*, as expressive of the sense. The *Padavādīna*, in opposition to the other, take *Padas* to be the only real elements of speech, and consider an indivisible unit like *Vākya* as practically incomprehensible. This view does not carry much weight to the grammarians. The falsity of *Padas* (they are made by the grammarians), is clearly brought to light by Pūṇyārāja on the strength of an extract from the *Mahabhāṣya*, where the term *Padakara* (one who makes *Padas*) has been used as a designation of the grammarian.¹

All words, as a rule, consist of two parts—*Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. *Prakṛti* is, again, divided into two classes,² namely, *Nāman* and *Dhāra*. The analysis of words into their bases and suffixes is grammatically known as *Sphoṭakara*; it forms, so to speak, the cardinal principle of Sanskrit grammar. We propose to show the nature of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* before proceeding to consider the characteristics of *Padas* that go to constitute a sentence.

Whatever may be the intrinsic value of *Sphoṭakara* from a psychological stand-point, it cannot be denied that the assumption of an indivisible unit as *Sphoṭa* is materially inconsistent with the fundamental principles of grammar.

¹ न चक्षेत् पदानां व्युत्पत्तीः पदानीर्देव व्यवस्थापन्तः । व्याकरणं परं व्यैष्यत् ।—Under the rule व्यैष्यत् चतुर्म्. १५८., ८. १. ३०७.

² निरक्षा व्यविदेवा व्यवस्थापन्तेऽप्यः । व्याकरणप्रकल्पिता, ८६. ३४.

Making all words disassociated from a sentence simply unreal and meaningless and giving a stamp of falsity to the whole grammatical method of analysing words into their stems and suffixes, the doctrine of *Sphaga* is calculated to have shaken the very basis of grammatical speculations.¹ There may be reasons for accepting this doctrine inspite of its rigidity and apparent disagreement with the established method of grammar, but we must frankly admit that the principle of analysis, as adopted by the grammarians, is the only scientific means for getting into the meaning of words.

Turning to the question of analysis of words, it must be stated at the outset that all words or, more properly, *Padas*, consist of two parts, viz., *Prakrti* and *Pratyaya*, though such decomposition is not always possible in the case of the so-called underivable *Pratipadikas* generally coming under the *ṣṭubhi* class. Yākṣa too has referred to two classes of words, namely, words of which both accents and formative elements are popularly known² and words whereof these elements are not directly comprehensible³ by the usual method of grammatical analysis. The analytical process involved in such grammatical device forms the most important

¹ स्फगः विषयात्मक अव्याप्तिविद्युतः। चर्चेऽपि विभा समः
सर्वं दग्धोऽहीन्॥—Vākyapādīya, p. 240.

² एवंवकरणवारः॥—Niruktī, p. 154.

³ चर्चाविकल्पवारः॥—Ibid.

function of grammar and is almost the same as adopted by the etymologists (*Nairuktas*) for the determination of the meaning of words. This analysis which is popularly known as *Sayeskdra* is the criterion whereby the grammarians distinguished the words of pure Sanskrit origin from corrupt forms (*Apahkrampas*).

Prakrti, as the very term implies, is the ultimate germ of speech to which formative elements (*Pratyaya*) are added for the evolution of regular forms of words. An attempt to find out two distinct elements (*Prakrti* and *Pratyaya*) in a word that does not essentially admit of any division, on account of its unity and indivisibility, is more or less fanciful, though not altogether useless, since it helps the understanding of meanings. Bhartrhari¹ defines *Prakrti* as that form of a word which, for the purpose of its own signification being qualified by that of the other, stands in need of certain forms immediately following it. Of these two mutually expectant forms, the former is called *Prakrti* and the latter as *Pratyaya*. *Pratyaya*, as Umāpati² observes, is said to be, on the other hand, that form of a word the meaning of which cannot be shown to have any relation with that of the other without being conditioned by the significance of the word to which it is added.

¹ य चेत्तरह वकारे स्थाने वाक्यमेवादि । वर्तेन्मतोः पूर्णं भवति । प्रथम
पदः ॥—Babdañgkti under वर्त, 9.

² द्वितीयादेव च वाक्यमेवादि । वीक्षणम् वैष्वम् । वाक्यम्
चक्रविदः ॥—Ibid.

Jagadisa has, however, rejected both these definitions as insufficient. He takes both *Prakrti*¹ and *Pratyaya* to be significant by themselves (*Sarthaka*), but does not fail to notice their mutual dependence. The relation in which *Prakrti* stands to *Pratyaya* is one of interdependence, for neither of them is individually competent to express its own meaning, without having invariable association with the other. On the ground of such mutual dependence, it is contended that these elements taken individually have no particular signification of their own. As a matter of fact, if they had meanings, when taken individually, each of them might have been used independently of the other.² But it is far from being the case. No meaning is, strictly speaking, conveyed by the word *gas* when it is not associated with or followed by *Pratyaya*. Moreover, *Prakrti*³ and *Pratyaya* being connected with each other by inseparable relation, it is not grammatically correct to use them independently. Grammar does not sanction the independent use of either *Prakrti* or *Pratyaya*. This is the train of arguments whereby Patañjali seeks to establish that a word has no parts (such as *Prakrti* and *Pratyaya*), because

¹ पठ-पाचकादीः संस्कृतः, शब्दिकादः संस्कृतः स्त्रीपक्षाद्वारेत् वीर्यं विकल्पः, अव्याप्ति उपरक्षय अव्याप्तिः।—*Sabdabodhi*: *वीर्यं विकल्पः*, 6.

² कर्मदा लोकदृष्टे वै द्विवाचनात्।—*Vibh. 2. Mahabhasya*, Vol. I, p. 219.

³ विवरणादेवात्मेति ग्रन्थः इति श्रौतः।—*Mahabhasya* under the rule *Pra.*, 1. 2. 46.

meaning is conveyed by the word as an indivisible whole.¹ How, then, are we justified in discussing the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, as two distinct elements constituting a word? Here Patañjali takes recourse to the logical method of *agreement* and *difference*,² and clearly indicates how both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, as is evidenced by such forms as *vykṣaḥ* and *vykṣṇ*, may be shown to have separate meanings of their own. The base that remains almost unchanged denotes a thing having stem, branches, leaves, fruits, etc., and the suffixes signifying respectively singularity and duality. In a group of homogeneous words, as in the above examples, we find that the stem remains more or less constant but suffixes are only variant, whereas in *pacati* and *pacchati* the suffix is the same, it is *Prakṛti* that is only different. Sometimes the change of *Pratyaya* brings about a change in the meaning of words (as in *harī* and *karoh*) derived from the same origin.

Bhartṛhari has tried to show that the discrimination of *Padas* and the comprehension of their exact meanings are, strictly speaking, far from being real. There is of course no fixed principle so as to precisely determine the

¹ वाचस्पतिं क्षेत्रवाचस्पतिवाचस्पतिः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. 1, p. 518.

² Mahābhāṣya under the rule Dīp., 1. 2. 45.

Bhartṛhari—१८ व्यक्तिं विवरण्य विवेच्य व्यक्तिं । व्यक्तिं विवेच्य विवरणी फलं ॥—Vidyāpādīya, 2. 305.

१ नव वर्षा १९४१ विकासकां प्रियोंने जात्यर्थ, अपेक्षा ग्रन्थीती वेदा
वाचनीतावाचनादे उपलब्धीत भवतात् अवाचनार्थीत वाचनविद्या प्रियों
विविधिः—*Prajapati under the Vidyas*, २५., ३. १६७.

— वराणी कल्पित वस्त्रालैट वस्त्रोन्मुखीवारी : वस्त्री विक्रियालय वस्त्रालैट
प्राप्ति : — Valsaroad Fms. St. 2011.

* असमीयामुखी असमीय एवं अस्सी। उचिताह एवं सोहिं चालुक्यामी जिला अधिकारी—Vikramdeva, 2, 222.

* नारोप लेखन वर्षात् वर्षात्—यथाकलम् कुटी हि च व्रतवासीविवाहम्
विहिताम् कलम् कुटी हि व्रतवासीविवाहम् ।
—Vikramorvashī, 9, 20.

of grammar, though they practically deal with the same subject, are so variant from one another in respect of nomenclature and the method of treatment that what are shown to be the meaning of *Pratyaya* in one system are taken to be the significance of *Prakrti* in the other. Notwithstanding such examples, as shown above, we should carefully bear in mind that the meaning of a word is really expressed by both *Prakrti* and *Pratyaya* in their natural but grammatical combination.

Though different views are held as to the significance of *Nipatas*, there is, however, no divergence regarding the expressiveness of *Prakrti* and *Pratyaya*. The two well-known divisions of *Prakrti*, namely, *Dhātu* and *Pratipadikā*, have their meanings fixed by popular usages. Patañjali prefers to designate *Prakrti* as *nimitta* in relation to *Pratyaya* which is called *nimitti*. What he intends to imply is that the meanings of *Prakrti* (as are to be found in the *Dhātu-pātha* and *Pratipadikā-pātha*) are more or less known, whereas those of *Pratyaya* are not exhaustively found. Though he unconditionally admits that the whole word (as an aggregate of both *Prakrti* and *Pratyaya*) is alone capable of denoting the sense, Patañjali shows clearly how by the application of the logical method of *agreement* and *difference*, *Prakrti* and *Pratyaya*, as in गृहः and गृहै, may be distinctly specified as having their separate meanings. The terms *Prakrti*

and *Pratyaya* are treated in grammar as two technical words—the shortest name for a class.¹ The rule व्याप्ति, Pāṇ. 3. 1. 1, is explained by Patañjali as an *adhibhāra-sāstro* denoting a *Saṃjñā*. He contends further that by virtue of *adhibhāra* this *saṃjñā* may apply to *Prakṛti*, *Upapada*, and *Upādhi* and consequently they may have all grammatical operations usually pertaining to *Pratyaya*.² There arises, therefore, the necessity of making certain restrictions. Moreover, he explains the word *Pratyaya* in two ways,³ as what either expresses the meaning, or is comprehended. He then proceeds to show how to distinguish *Prakṛti* from *Pratyaya*: 'the former, it is said, is entirely comprehensible by the enumeration of roots and *Pratipadikas*, while the latter is not capable of being known exhaustively. There is another way also to bring out this distinction. *Pratyaya* is said to be more important (superior) than *Prakṛti*, its superiority or importance being due to the fact that *Pratyaya* as a class is nowhere enumerated (as significant forms of speech) except in grammar. We should not fail to notice

¹ व्याप्ता च वाल कर्ते च वाचेषः—M. B., Vol. II, p. 3.

² एतिकारिक्यं इत्यनुभवः । सा व्याप्तिः प्रदीपयोगस्तथा गतीयिः ।
व्याप्तिः—under the rule Pāṇ., 3. 1. 1.

³ प्रत्यक्षवाची वाचः । ...प्रत्यक्षवाची वाच एव । वाचोवाचः वाचस्त्वचः ।
—Ibid.

* इव च व्याप्तिः अनुभवस्तीत्यस्मी विज्ञेयः । कृष्ण वाचस्त्वचः ।
प्रत्यक्षवाचीपदैर्य च ।—Ibid.

* इवस्ते व्याप्तिः संवाचनवाचा व्याप्त—Var. 2. (व्याप्त व्याप्तिः व्याप्तः ।—Ibid.

here that *Pratyayas* like *sap* and *tir* are not mentioned separately with their respective meanings, whereas roots and *Pratipadikas* (as two divisions of *Prakrti*) are to be found respectively in the *Dhatupatha* and in the enunciation of *Pratipadikas*. This view which assigns greater importance to *Pratyaya* is based on a *Paribhāṣā*.¹ The above explanation of *Pratyaya* may serve the purpose of excluding *Prakṛti*, *Upapada* and *Upādhi* from the category of *Pratyaya*, but what still demands solution is to differentiate *modification* and *augment* (अविकरणः) from *Pratyaya*² as such. A careful study of the formation of words makes it sufficiently clear that *modifications* and *augments* (as they appertain to both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*) seem to have all the qualifications of *Pratyaya*, though they are not practically treated as such by the grammarians. The *modification* and *augment* might be included in the same class with *Pratyaya*, inasmuch as both of them are wanting in original enunciation prior to their treatment in grammar. It will not suffice to say, as Kaiyata³ explicitly remarks, that

मुख्यमन्त्रीको द्वारा असंरक्षण; तथा यह सम्बन्ध।—M. B.
under the rule Vpp., 2. 1. 1.

¹ विकासालमीड़ न परविज्ञानम्—*Ibid.* 2. M. B. Vol. II, p. 2. यत्का
पूरी अस्त्रीयत्वे न विकासालम् पूरी संस्कृति—*Ibid.*

४ यः परम् स व्यवहः न च विकारात्मा; वरे । तिक तिकी व्यवहारात्मा एव
स्वयंत्रोक्तेऽपि न अस्त्वद्वयः । न हि क्वचिभित्राद्य व्यवहारात्मा चापि तु स्वयंभूतानितित्वा
परम् । तथा च परनामादीपि व्यवहारात्मा व्यवहारात्मा भवति । तत्पादित्वा चात्मकात्मा—
स्वयोगात्मात्मा विकारात्मात्मा व्यवहारात्मा न अस्ति । तथा यि वर्णितात्मा व्यवह-
रात्मात्मा ।—Kātyāyana on the Śāṅkhyas under Ptg., 3. 2. 1.

Pratyaya has its position fixed, viz., it comes invariably after *Prakrti*, while there is no such fixity of position with regard to *modifications* and *augments*. But what is grammatically sanctioned is that *प्रत्ययः* does not really depend upon the posteriority of position, because *बहुवा* and *एकाच्*, inspite of their irregular positions, are also included within the category of *Pratyaya*. Again, forms like *nibba*, *samkāsa*, etc., though used after *Prātipadikas* in the sense of similarity, are not grammatically regarded as *Pratyaya*.¹ It must be noted here that the suffixes like *बहुवा* and *एकाच्* form irregular instances, so far as the position of *Pratyaya* is concerned. The difference is then shown by a reference to the construction of the *Sātras*. The *Sātras* enjoining *modifications* and *augments* are generally found to have एकी as what determines them, whereas *Pratyaya* is enjoined by the *Sātras* containing प्रत्ययी. There is another criterion to distinguish *Pratyaya* from both *modifications* and *augments*. *Pratyaya*, as the very term implies, is significant, though the so-called अर्थविकल्प like *ka* forms an exception, viz., it has apparently no meaning apart from that of *Prakrti* to which it is added. The *modifications* and *augments*, on the other hand, have got no signification at all.

It is quite evident that a word, taken as an indivisible whole, is what expresses the intended sense. This is the conclusion Patañjali has

¹ निर्विकार विवरणः ए ग व्याप्त व्याप्तिः.—Sābdañgī, Kār. 10.

arrived at. If this be the general principle that regulates the use of words, how can we logically say 'this much is the meaning of *Prakṛti*',¹ and 'this is the meaning of *Pratyaya*'? Patañjali meets this position by referring to the method of *agreement and difference*² whereby the distinct meanings of both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* are generally comprehended.

The question does not come to an end here. It is further argued that instead of assigning meanings to both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, it is better to hold either *Prakṛti* or *Pratyaya* alone as expressive of both the meanings; or *Prakṛti* may be supposed to be the only significant form and *Pratyaya* only indicative (*dyotaka*). This is true, Patañjali observes, so far as *Sāmanya-Sabda*, *cis.*, word denoting a class, is concerned. It must be remembered that without reference to either context or special sense, *Sāmanya-Sabda*, as a rule, cannot express the particular meaning. But when we say *arkaḥ*, what we find is that a particular sense is naturally implied. We are, therefore, bound to admit that these are not *Sāmanya-Sabda*. Now what deserves our attention is that in a word both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* have their respective meanings consistently related to each

¹ एतम् यज्ञे विभृति वस्त्राणि च च यज्ञः विभृतिर्विभृति वस्त्राणि यज्ञं पर एति—Mahabhasya under the rule Par., I. 2. 45.

² इह सन्दर्भविधिवाक्यम्—Par. 2. Mahabhasya, Vol. I, p. 212.

other so as to express one indivisible sense. The base, as Patañjali has shown, and the suffix in the word *arkyāḥ* means respectively (1) a material body containing roots, stem, branches, leaves, etc., and (2) oneness or singularity. Elsewhere it is said that oneness as well as *karmalak*, etc., are the meanings of the case-endings.¹

There is another difficulty with regard to the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. As systems of grammar have no agreement so far as the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* is concerned, one finds it difficult to determine the meaning of them with a degree of certainty. What is said to be the meaning of a *Pratyaya* in one system of grammar is taken to be the meaning of *Prakṛti* in the other.² This is why the *Sphoṭakādins* have rejected both *Padas* and *Pudarthaḥ* as unreal. There is nothing, Bhartrihari argues, as *Pada* fixed by its very form,³ and no meaning follows from a *Pada*, but from a sentence. A *Pada*, in its grammatical sense, has no real existence apart from the sentence of which it forms an integral part. How, then, are we to justify the principle of grammar which treats of such unreal things as *Padas*? Bhartrihari continues that *Saetrar*

¹ एकान्तरीयित्वात् : तु पा वर्त्तमानीः अवात् : —M. B., Vol. II, p. 58.

² ये विविध सामरथ्य दद्यान्तेभीत्यन्तेऽप्य व्याख्यातेभीत्याः । चक्राण व्याप्तिरूपादाय पात्रकर्त्तव्यः । चाप्तमप्यवादाद्य पात्रकर्त्तव्यः —M. B. 58, p. 508.

³ न वि विकल्पं परं तत्त्वं कर्त्तव्यं विवर्त्य हर्षितः —Vikyāṇḍīya.

(grammar) by their diversified methods and procedures only serve to exhibit *Avidyā* or false impressions.¹ It must be, however, admitted that the method adopted by the grammarians in the analysis of words, whether real or unreal from the standpoint of *Sphoṭacāda*, is not only scientifically perfect but immensely helpful to the beginner. Though dealing with words that are unreal and transient, the science of grammar, as we have already seen, does not fail to serve a very useful purpose. Just as one is liable to pass through many unreal phenomena in which he is born, before he reaches the final goal of reality, so the grammarian starts with a false appearance as *Padaś* and is ultimately qualified to have a glance into the mystical element of *Vak*, we mean *Sabda-Brahman*, by unveiling the screen of ignorance.²

Upasargas and *Nipātas* or Prepositions and Particles are, as we have seen, enumerated by Yāskas³ in the list of *Parts of Speech*. Their linguistic aspects, with reference to their possibility of having been once used as regular forms of words, have been discussed in the Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus. Now we propose to deal with the grammatical side of the question. We do not find any difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of *Nāmavas* and *Dhātuvās*, but it

¹ यत्तेषु प्रतिवाचमिदैर्यनिष्ठयोऽपर्याप्ति ॥—7.16.

² असुले नामिति विज्ञा वसः कर्म वाचोऽप्तः ॥—Vākyā. 2. 22.

³ यास्कादि पश्चात्यापि वाचाभ्यां वीकर्मनिष्ठवाः ॥—Nirukta, L. 2.

is more or less a matter of doubt¹ whether *Upasargas* and *Nipdas* have the power of expressing the intended meaning in the strict sense of the term. To determine the precise significance of these two classes of parts of speech is a difficult problem over which the grammarians and the *Naiyāyikas* seem to have been conflicting.

The definition of *Upasarga*, as given by Śakatayana, purports to show that *Upasargas* have no meanings when they are dissociated from verbal forms.² What follows necessarily from this statement is that they are not significant by themselves. The view of such a grammarian of revered memory seems to have received approval of Yaska and later grammarians. The indicativeness (*dyuktakarca*) of *Upasargas*, as opposed to their direct expressiveness (*vīkākarma*), is clearly pointed out by Yaska³ when he lays down in agreement with the grammarians⁴ that *Upasargas* are far from being expressive of sense, but serve only to qualify or specialise the meaning of *Dhātus*. *Dhātus* are said to be of various meanings. The meaning which we generally assign to *Upasargas* is really denoted by the root itself. The additional sense (as that of *perfection* in an instance like

¹ एषुर्विषयम् निरपेक्षविद्यतः। तिते चाचीकृती वीक्षणं।—*Sikṣapradīpi*; p.—Quoted by Dutta.

² ए निरेता उपसर्गं चर्तविषयकिं वाच्यदग्रहतः।—*Kirātī*, I. 8., p. 57.

³ नामाकालक्षीयं चक्षेष्यन्वितेष्योवचा चर्तविषयः।—*Ibid.*

⁴ तितानिवेष्यत उपसर्गः।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 266.

prabhavati) which is usually assigned to *Upasargas* is said to be expressed by *Dhātu*s themselves. Gārgya, on the other hand, emphatically supports the opposite view and clearly shows how various meanings are often expressed by *Upasargas*.¹ It is no wonder that Gārgya, who is said to have assigned meanings to each individual letter that enters into the constitution of a word, would differ from the majority of the grammarians in making all *Upasargas* expressive of particular meanings. Whatever be the real value of Gārgya's arguments, we cannot help admitting that his standpoint, though finally rejected by the grammarians, is not absolutely unreasonable. The way in which *bhaṣati* differs from *prabhavati* and *tishtati* from *pratiṣṭhate* (stoppage of motion and motion being respectively meant) in their respective meanings is calculated to show how roots like *bhp* and *stkh* in their pure and compounded forms are distinctly different in respect of meanings. The method of *agreement* and *difference*, when applied in such cases, makes it sufficiently clear that the additional sense, as is obtained from the use of roots combined with *Upasarga*, is due to the presence of *Upasarga*, that is to say, the special meaning is directly implied by *Upasarga*. We meet with many instances of verbal forms to which the addition of *Upasarga* materially changes the meaning

¹ वर्तमान व्यक्ति विद्धि :—Nirukta, 1. 3, p. 57.

of roots—a fact which may be adduced to confirm the position taken by Gārgya. This is the reason which led Gārgya and his followers to maintain the expressiveness of *Upasargas*.

Those who, on the contrary, advocate the indicativeness, argue in the following strain : *Upasargas* have no specific meanings of their own apart from those of roots to which they are added ; the additional or special signification that is apparently given rise to by the presence of an *Upasarga* is, strictly speaking, denoted by the root itself. *Upasargas* serve only as a symbol of indication. That *Upasargas* are merely suggestive and not expressive of sense is best illustrated by the expression विष्णुम् श्रिष्टी. *Vishnu* or worship cannot be taken as the sense of *Upasarga* (*वा*), for in that case there could be no passive voice in विष्णुम्, as the root वृ is intransitive. Neither is it possible to consider a combination of वा and वृ as a root, because it is not so mentioned in the *Dhūlupātha*; nor the process of reduplication and the addition of *augment* (अ and अ) affect *Upasargas* at all. The verbal roots are said to have various meanings. Those that are given in the *Dhūlupātha* are not all exhaustive, but in most of the cases they are simply indicatory. For the verbal form भवति in 'वाग्मी लग्नी भवति' is found to imply *production* instead of denoting simply becoming. Thus, the meaning usually expressed by सोपसर्वचारु, such as *anubhavati*, *parabhabavati*, *abhibhavati*, etc., are all

capable of being denoted by the simple root *bha*. What useful purpose is, then, served by *Upasargas*, if they have nothing to signify? Their function, so to speak, is to manifest or give prominence to the latent meanings of roots (which are not ordinarily expressed when the root is simply used). The analogy of a lamp, as shown by Durga,¹ is a well-conceived one, for it illustrates the part played by *Upasargas* in the comprehension of meanings. Just as certain properties (as height, length, etc.) belonging to a thing are rendered visible through the instrumentality of a lamp, and those properties, as a matter of fact, appertain to the thing itself and not to the lamp, even so the addition of *Upasargas* serves to bring out the meaning of roots. The particular sense, usually assigned to *Upasargas*, is essentially what is expressed by the root itself.

Patañjali explains the *Upasarga* as what particularises the action; the verbal form *pacati*, for instance, implies the action, viz., cooking, and when *pro* is prefixed to it, it serves only to qualify the action, adding the special sense of perfection (पूर्वीः) to the meaning of the root. He did not, however, fail to notice that in instances like *tishkali* and *protishkale* the addition of an *Upasarga* materially changes the meaning

¹ यथा एवीषमादेवि इन्द्रस्य कुरुतिर्गोत्रिभ्यवानानि इन्द्राणां रा जाति च
सहीपात्रः ।—Nitakin, p. 50.

² शिखरिर्गोत्र उद्देशः ।—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., I.2.1. गोत्रिभिरुक्ता वस्तु एव विश्वाः ।

of the root. What follows from this is that it is the presence of *pro* that causes such changes in the meaning (e.g., 'stoppage of motion' and 'motion'). The above is an instance in which there is apparent opposition between the meanings of *Dhatus* and *Upasargas*. The *Kārikā*, as quoted by Pūṇyarija,¹ clearly brings out the characteristics of *Upasargas*, as will be evident from the substance given below : Sometimes the so-called denotation of *Upasargas*, as in the above instance, seems to be in opposition with the meaning of *Dhatus*; some follow the meaning of the root without any disagreement, and some only serve to specialise the signification of the root. Having recourse to the theory that a verbal root admits of more than one meaning,² Patanjali lays down clearly that *Upasargas* have no direct expressiveness (like *Nāmanas* and *Dhatus*) and that their supposed meanings, as perfection, proximity etc., are, strictly speaking, derivable from the root. Accordingly, *tishhati* alone (without having connection with any *Upasarga*) is capable of denoting both motion as well as stoppage of motion.'

Bhartphari is not satisfied with the remark that *Upasargas* are only suggestive, but

• बाहरपै वाहनी संकेत करियामनुसारे । यदीप विविधता वाला वाहनीप्रिय-
गिरा ॥

² जापा एवं भूमध्य द्रविण।—M. B. under Prof., I. R. I.

• विषुविशेष विविक्षणात्, तिहतिरिय विविक्षणात् विभविष्ट—Mahabhasya under Plan. 1, S. 1.

has discussed all possible standpoints wherefrom *Upasargas* might be viewed. It is not sufficient, he holds,¹ to take *Upasargas* only as suggestive, because some of them, as *pra* in *pratiṣṭhāte*, seems to be quite good in expressing the sense. Again, when the special meaning is practically expressed by the root and *Upasarga* in their combination,² it is not unlikely that *Upasargas* also have their contribution, so far as the expression of the intended sense is concerned. Thus, we find that *Upasargas* may be viewed from three different standpoints, namely, *cōkta* or expressive, *dyotaka* or suggestive and *sahakāri* or auxiliary; these three correspond to the three classes, as shown in the *Kārikā* referred to above.

So far as grammatical operations are concerned, *Dhṛitīs* are generally found to be categorically distinct from *Upasargas*. In the *Dhṛitipāṭha* mention is only made of roots and not of *Upasargas*. Again, the process of reduplication (*dviśvacana*) and the augment *aṭ* (*adīgamāt*) are functions that pertain to a *Dhṛitī* alone. Bhartṛhari³ here supports the non-difference of verbal forms (*abhedapāṭṭa*)

¹ य चाचारी विद्याका सत्त्वान्वितावौपि च। असःवस्त्रम् चाचारी
सत्त्वारी शुभ्यते ॥—Vikyāpadīya, 2, 190.

² यस्मद्दक्षीयं सम्पूर्णवैतितिवेदं एव च चाचारीविद्यावै चाचारी
कारणः ॥—Prayāraṭīja under Vikyāpadīya, 2, 151.

³ चाचारीना सत्त्वारादेव इत्यहेच विवरणम् ॥—Vikyāpadīya, 2, p. 158.
Prayāraṭīja under it—चाचारीवैवस्त्रावैत्याचार्यं लोकै भवतः प्रवृत्तिरिदा कल्पतः
सीप्रवृत्तिरिदा चाचारी ॥

and maintains that *Dhātu*, though not capable of being differentiated from *Upasargas*, are separately mentioned only for the sake of reduplication and *adāgama*, but they are virtually expressive of the specific sense which is sometimes assigned to *Upasargas*. By *Dhātu* we should, therefore, understand *Dhātu* with the necessary *Upasarga* (*Sopasargyājñatva dhātu-tvaum*). This view is strengthened by the existence of such root as *samgrām*,¹ which is inseparably united with (*Upasarga*) *sag* and gets both reduplication and *adāgama*, as in *asamgrāmayat* and *asamgrāmayate*. The particular action, according to this view, is denoted by the combination of *Dhātu* and *Upasarga*. Their undifferentiated character is made clearer when Bhartṛhari continues that it is the specialised action (*Kriyā-viśeṣa*), as is signified by a *Dhātu* jointly with an *Upasarga*, that gets itself connected with a *Kāraka*.² This is why the root *ah*, preceded by *an*, becomes transitive and is capable of being used in the passive voice (*karma-cācya*) as *anahāgata*.

There arises a considerable difficulty in deciding whether a root is first joined with an *Upasarga* and is afterwards associated with *Kārakas* or vice versa. The conjunction of

¹ कथा पि वस्तुमन्तः कोरकौपितिः श्रूतः ।
विकारितिः नेत्रैः वाक्यने इत्यादितः ॥

—Vikyāpadya, 2, p. 164.

² वापदीकृति उपासि गतामृता यत् लिपा ।—॥५॥

Upasargas with roots is a question of grammatical importance. Under the rule Pāṇ., 6. 1. 185, Patañjali has referred to two *Paribhāṣā*: (i) a root is first joined with an *Upasarga* and then gets itself connected with *Sādhana* (*Kāraka*); (ii) a root is first added to a *Sādhana* and is next related to an *Upasarga*.¹ The second *Paribhāṣā* seems to be more acceptable on the ground that an *Upasarga* serves to specify the action that is accomplished by *Sādhana*. The action is not fully accomplished until it is related to a *Kāraka*. Though more reasonable than the former, the second view is not entirely free from objections. Those who lend support to the view, Patañjali holds, that a *Dhātu* is first connected with a *Kāraka* and then with an *Upasarga*, will find some difficulty in explaining the transitive use of the root as in the expression "प्रयते गुरुम्". It is really the presence of *Upasargas* like *अपि*, *अनि* and the like that accounts for such uses. Bhartṛhari also has not totally discarded the first view, but has adduced a few arguments supporting the priority of relation between a *Dhātu* and an *Upasarga*. The drift of his arguments is as follows:²—A *Dhātu*

¹ मूँ हि शास्त्रपत्रं तुम्हि प्रथा॒ कामयेऽस्मि॑ । तेऽस्तु वाचम् । मूँ भृः॑
मार्गेऽव तुम्हाते॑ वदास्तुःकृत् ॥—Mahabhasya, Vol. III, p. 98.

² को कि॑ अन्यते॑ मूँ वस्य॑ । लापनेन॑ तुम्हाते॑ वदास्तुःकृत् ॥ तस्य॑ आवश्यि॑
मृष्टिकृत्यात्॑ वापात्मै॑ तुद्दिति॑ विव॑ वदास्तुः॑ वाग् ॥—Mahabhasya,
Vol. III, p. 84.

³ वास्ति॑ वापात्मै॑वात्॑ वात्मिः॑ वावात्मै॑ वात्॑ । वादुल॑ वापात्मै॑ वावात्म॑
विव॑ हवात्माम् ॥—Vidyapadiya, L. Krt. 286.

is so called because of its relation to a *Kāraka*. But how is it justifiable to get the designation as such (*Dhātu-samjñā*) before the action (*Irityā*) is completed by actual connection with a *Kāraka*? The action (the meaning of a root) is not likely to be accomplished before it is related to a *Kāraka*. In order to justify *Dhātu-samjñā* in a similar case where the root gets itself first connected with an *Upasarga* before actually coming in touch with a *Kāraka*, we must be prepared to assume that even the possibility of having future relation to a *Kāraka* is considered to be sufficient to indicate the relation of *Kriya* to *Kārakas*. This sort of assumption is not altogether unwarranted and rare in Sanskrit grammar. The rule *Dhātuh karmayah samanya-kartṛhadicchāyām tād* is an instance where the expression *Dhātuh karmayah* is justified on the possibility of a root having future connection with the objective case (of the root *it*). The grammarians take it to be an established fact that roots admit of more than one meaning. The special meaning (as is supposed to be the denotation of *Upasargas*) is necessarily considered to be what is actually denoted by the root itself.

Having shown the three distinct classes of *Upasargas*, Bhartrhari proceeds to maintain the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* (*dyotakata*) on the ground of logical inference.¹ The three views

¹ सावित्रि कृष्णेन वर्णनं यु अप्योः कथामुखस्तीर्थिकापद्मां परिचयते ।—*Vakyapadiya*, 2. 191.

in regard to the meaning of *Upasargas* are as follows : (1) *Upasargas* are only suggestive of the sense; (2) *Upasargas* are sometimes expressive of particular meanings; and (3) the root and *Upasarga* jointly express the sense. The conclusion to which Bhartṛhari has finally come is that *Upasargas* are only suggestive of the sense. According to popular usage, it should be remembered, the term *tiṣṭhati* is always used to mean stoppage of motion and, consequently, *tiṣṭhati* alone (without *प्रा.*) is found to be incapable of denoting 'movement.' Here arises the necessity of taking recourse to inference.² It is to get rid of this anomalous position that the grammarians have sought to establish the dictum *anekārthī dhatvādah*, so as to render *tiṣṭhati* alone competent to express the sense of movement. It is to be noted that the so-called suggestiveness of *Upasargas* can also be logically supported. Bhartṛhari proceeds further to show how the method of logical inference called शास्त्रानुसृतः³ lends support to both the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* as well as to the plurality of meanings of the verbal root.

Before concluding this discourse on *Upasargas*, we propose to give here the substance of what Gangeśa has said in this connection. Quite in keeping with the grammarians, he begins with the statement that *Upasargas* are

² व्यक्तिकृत उपर्याप्त व्योम अनुशेषिण चरत्वात्वये।—Papyaṭṭa, p. 108.

³ भास्त्र वाक्यादीप्तेन्द्रियादेवामेवादः।—Bhd.

only suggestive¹ and not expressive of the sense independently of verbal forms. When we take *Upasargas* to be suggestive, what is necessarily implied is that they help us in understanding the specific sense of the root. But it may be argued on the contrary that *Upasargas* are, in accordance with the principle of agreement and difference,² as good as significant forms of words like *Nāma* and *Dhātu*, inasmuch as *pra* in *prajñayati* gives the idea of perfection (*prakarṣṇa*) and *abhi* in *abhyagacchati* brings out the sense of 'proximity' and so on. Moreover, if the plurality of meanings on the part of roots is brought forward in support of the suggestiveness of *Upasargas*, they, it may be argued, might also be taken as possessing manifold meaning.³ To these contentious Gaṅgeśa gives his answer in the following way :—That roots admit of numerous meanings is accepted by all grammarians, but there is no such consensus of views so far as the meaning of *Upasargas* is concerned. The sense of *perfection* and *proximity* is also denoted by the root, *Upasargas* like *pra* and *abhi* being only *तत्पर्यात्मक*. The expression *तत्पर्यात्मक*, as applied to *Upasargas*, is

¹ अद्वैतस्य योग्यात् न वाचवाः। योग्यात् च वाचोपरिविद्ये तात्पर्यात्मकम् तत्पर्यात्मिक तद् अविद्या।—Tattraśāstra, ap.—Subdakshay., p. 85.

² उपसर्वाकालिकानुविधानम् उपसर्वाकालिकः एव; —Tattraśāstra, ap., p. 84.

³ अतीतिर तत्पर्यात्मकम्।—*Ibid.*

an indication that the Naiyāyikas have recourse to *lakṣyāt*¹ when they take *jayati* to be expressive of 'to be in a state of perfection.' Next, he draws a fine distinction between *Dhātu* and *Upasarga* by holding that the root *sthā* preceded by *pra* has the power of denoting movement, whereas *pra* (*Upasarga*) is not (*sakti*) expressive of the sense by itself but appears like its adjunct (*saktitattvavededaka*).² That *Upasargas* are nowhere used as *vakya* may be further proved with reference to an instance like *ayatīcī*³ (where the radical element is dropped); it is not *ci* and *ati* that are to be regarded as expressive of the sense, but we are compelled to recall to mind the root which is really significant.

Thus the grammarians have agreement with the Naiyāyikas so far as the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* is concerned. That *Upasargas* have no power of expressing the sense like *Nimitta* and *Dhātu* is clear from the fact that we are not allowed to use शोभनः प्रः with the same breadth of meaning as is denoted by the expression शोभनः वक्तव्यः. Moreover, neither *Upasargas* nor *Nipātis* are capable of being qualified by adjectives. It should be, however, remembered that the capacity for independent use is not the only criterion for discriminating the

¹ एतिहास इष्टवा देवीचित्प्रसादम् वास्तुपैदिक्षेवरकृति; वाचाद्यनु पाठ्यमव्याख्या; —Tatracintāmaṇi, p. 866.

² तोत्राद्येन वक्तव्ये वक्तिर्विद्या वाचाद्यन्तेद्वयो व वक्तव्यः; —Ibid.

³ 'यतिक्षी' इत्यही युहः युहो वासुदेवस्त्वाम् वाः; —Ibid. p. 967.

expressiveness of words; for *Pratyayas*,¹ though they are never used by themselves, are regarded to be expressive of sense. The rule Pāṇ., 1.4.85 may be cited as an indication of the meaninglessness of *Upasargas*.

What gave rise to much controversy² between the Naiyāyikas and the grammarians is the question of *Nipatas*. The ground of disagreement is that the Naiyāyikas seem to have drawn a specific line of demarcation between *Upasargas* and *Nipatas*. They included *Nipatas* in the category of *mātraka*³ to the exclusion of *Upasargas*, whereas the grammarians have not made such whimsical distinction. Thiska⁴ has, however, shown that *Nipatas* have a good many meanings—similarity, collection, etc. According to the interpretation of grammar,⁵ *Upasargas* form only a special class of *Nipatas* having connection with the verb. As both of them belong to the same class of indeclinables, one is hardly justified in like *Nipatas* expressive of sense and the other as merely suggestive. The so-called *Nipatas* only form a class of *Aeynyas*. Words like *pro* and *ca*, which have no power of denoting a substance (*dravya*), are called

¹ अवैषम्यः प्राप्तव्यते विषेनाप्यनात् ।—Mātibhāṣya, Vol. I, 219 and अहिस्त्वयस्मिः कर्मार्थस्मीप्यत्वमिदं च—Taittirīyaśāstra.

² पात्री वोद्धारामहस्य याचका द्वय वाचनमेहिति विषेनाप्यनात् शुक्लसामान् ।—Naiyāyikasāṃkṣepa.

³ ग्रहणः ग्रहणेऽपि विषेनाप्यनात् ॥ विषेनाप्यनात् ॥—Mātibhāṣyaśāstra, Kār., 6.

⁴ वाचावचेष्यत्वं विषेनाप्यनात्—Nisikita.

⁵ वाचावचेष्यत्वं विषेनाप्यनात्—Pāṇ., I. 4. 85.

Nipātas. The same reason whereby the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* is evidently established may be put forward to prove the equal suggestiveness of *Nipātas*, there being nothing to account for their differential treatment. The Naiyāyikas recognise the expressiveness of *Nipātas* for the following reasons: In instances like अभ्युक्ते, साकात्कृते, विनियते, etc., the addition of *Nipātas* is attended with a special significance, as cannot be obtained from the simple root *kr* and *bhū*. Moreover, *Nipātas* like *sakṣat*, *namah*, etc., is found to have their respective meanings fixed by lexicon and popular usage. The grammarians refuse this position. They hold, on the contrary, that the usual meanings expressed by *anubharati*, *sakṣatkari*, etc., i.e., feeling and interviewing, are really denoted by the roots (*bhū* and *kr*), and *Upasargas* as well as *Nipātas* are only suggestive or मात्रपूर्यसाकृत. As a matter of fact, we might have used the expression शैलयम् in the sense of a beautiful collection, if a *Nipāta* like *ca* were really expressive of the meaning. As the word *vykṣay* alone cannot give the idea of a collection (शैलयम्), the Mīmāṃsakas take the particle *ca* as expressive of collection. They do not recognise it to be merely suggestive. But the grammarians are not prepared to take *Nipātas*

¹ वृत्तिवाः वस्त्रदी में निवारणाद्यवाचा—Vaupikavayabhringita. Ksh.
42.

प्राक्ते दीमक वास्तव्य बोधको इसि व्यापकी छिंति रैषमनुरूप
दर्शनाधारिकि ।—८५॥

as well as *Upastargas* as capable of expressing the sense independently of *Nāman* and *Dhāraṇī*. It is on the principle of *Anvaya-*
vyatireka that the *Mimāṃsakas* have proceeded to maintain the expressiveness of *Nipātas*. Their arguments are open to criticism, since they have unduly attributed the significance to *Nipātas*. When the meaning (collection, etc.) is actually obtained from words other than *Nipātas*, the assumption of *Sakti* or significance is nothing but unnecessary, so far as the expressiveness of *Nipātas* is concerned. If we are allowed to have an assumption of this nature, the word *Gangā* might have denoted 'bank' (without the help of *lakṣayit*) by means of its primary significance or *Sakti*.

The negative particle *na* (*nañ*) is also a *Nipāta*. Generally speaking, the particle *nañ* has got six meanings—similarity, non-existence, difference, smallness, imperfection, contradiction. But Kondabhatta has tried to show that the sense of imposition (*चारोऽपितत्वं*)¹ is also suggested by *nañ*. Accordingly, the word *चाराचूष्ट* does not only mean 'a man other than a Brähmin,' but one who pretends to be a Brähmin² (say a *Kṣatriya*). Following the line of arguments of the *Bhāṣya*,³ Kondabhatta has also suggested another view, according to which non-existence

¹ चारोऽपितत्वं चार-योगम्—Talpikaranya, Kit. 40.

² Due to above the quality of a Brähmin is falsely attributed.

³ चामारी भा चर्यंस्तु पाण्डा हि वह्निशब्द—ibid. Kit. 41.

is the sense that is denoted by *naḥ*. The expression *nirṛttaṇḍūrthaḥ*¹ (as in the Bhāṣya) is explained by him as implying the idea of 'non-existence.' Nāgeśa, however, does not agree with Kandabhatta on this point. The negative particle appears to be either substantive or attributive in relation to its *pratiyogin*.² असर्वः (as a pronoun) is an instance where *naḥ* is used as an adjective and the negative particle is used as a noun in a word like असः meaning *fire*. Raghunatha Śiromāṇi³ is of opinion that both reciprocal negation and negation of association are denoted by the negative particle.

Karma-praṇavayyas is also regarded as a class of *Pada*. Some grammarians, as Bhartṛhari maintains,⁴ have treated of *Karma-praṇavayyas* as a special class of *Padas* categorically distinct from *Upasargas*. According to this view, there are five different kinds of *Padas* including *Karma-praṇavayyas*. Those who strictly support the four-fold classification of *Padas*,⁵ as enumerated by Yaska, are likely to argue that *Karma-praṇavayyas*, often used as adjuncts to the relation between *Kriyā* and *Keraka* or, simply

¹ Bhāṣya on Paṇ., 2. 2. 6. तत्त्वं नन्दि यद्-विवेकः पदुभौः।

² असर्वाः न विशेषीः।

³ असर्वोमादेऽसर्वोमादः च विजडः।

—Goswami, *Nāñ-Pāda*, pp. 1-10.

⁴ शिख वैष्णव एव निर्द अनुचो गवामयि एः।—Vākyapādīya, 3. Kār. 1.

⁵ शास्त्रप्रबन्धवैकल्प्या लिङ्गादिवेदोपादिताम् व्याख्याते हैततः इति शास्त्रप्रबन्धवैकल्प्यादेवादिवेदोपादिताम् व्याख्याते हैततः।

—Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapādīya*, 3. Kār. 1.

as indicative of relation, deserve to be treated as *Upasargas*. There is hardly any justification for recognising them as a different class of *Padas*. In some cases *Karmapratyaya*s like *anu*, *prati* and *et* exactly look like *Upasargas*, though they cannot be grammatically treated as such. So far as grammatical operations (specially the rules enjoining *samskrta*) are concerned, it is clearly laid down that the very name (*samjñā*) *Karmapratyaya* is an indication that *Karmapratyaya*s are excluded from the categories of both *Gati* and *Upasarga*.¹ *Karmapratyaya*s being thus categorically different from *Upasargas*, we are not allowed to have *samskrta* in examples like *pari-sidoati* and *strikam*.

Now what is a *Karmapratyaya*? It is a class of words which is generally used as an adjunct to *sambandha* or relation between *Kriya* and *Kāraka*.² In grammar *sambandha* is usually denoted by *Kriyā* or action.³ In some cases, *Kriyā* by its very nature gives rise to a kind of relation and then disappears without leaving any trace behind. The expression *rājaparīkṣak*, for instance, though apparently

¹ नामपरीक्षयमन्तः—Bhattaji.

² कृत्याव विद्या एति । वस्त्रवद् विद्या विवाहवद्विद्या च अन्ति ।
—Prajñā under Vidyapadīya, §. 190.

³ रथो हि सर्वः सम्बन्धं विद्यतः—Hedekji.

⁴ तद् विद्या वस्त्रवद् विविला विद्या विविली तदा राजपरीक्षक एति । अत एति राजपरीक्षके ; प्रकाशे क राजा एवं विविलि, अति भरतवाचामित्रवाचामित्रवाचामित्र वस्त्रवद् विविला विविला ।—Prajñā under Kā. §. 190.

devoid of any *Kriyā* or verbal form, grammatically means 'here is a man who is supported by the king.' Here the action *bharana* (to support) which denotes a relation between the king and his man as one of the supporter and the supported is no longer existent. In some instances, on the other hand, *Kriyā-pada* is practically present (as in *mātah smorati*) and there is no such difficulty in comprehending the intended relation. Logically speaking, a verbal form serves as a link between two concepts, i.e., establishes some sort of relation between them. *Sambandha* is thus shown to be a product of *Kriyā*. But there arises some difficulty with regard to the knowledge of such *sambandha*, when the verbal form is not actually present. When the verbal form or *Kriyā-pada* is practically absent,¹ one may doubt whether the intended *sambandha* is really given rise to by *Kriyā* or by other agents. In cases of doubt like this, says Pūnyarāja, *Karmapracacanīyas* serve to determine the proper relation. The main function of *Karmapracacanīyas* is thus to point out the particular relation denoted by a *Kriyā*. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* takes the word *Karmapracacanīya* as a significant one (*anarthasamjñā*). He understands by *Karmapracacanīyas* those words that are

¹ यदा क्रियापदं कर्तव्यं कृतोऽहम् तदा विकल्पकीर्त्तं कार्यात् तदेह च कृपादनीयेष तदा क्रियां विकल्पे विकल्पे च विकल्पविकल्पः कर्त्तव्यवकीर्त्तः क्रान्तव्यः।—Pūnyarāja.

no longer expressive of *Kriyā*, but indicate the relation given rise to by a *Kriyā*, whether present or absent. The difference between *Upasargas* and *Karmapravacaniyas* is that the former directly indicates *Kriyā* or specifies the action denoted by a verbal root, whereas the latter only qualifies the particular relation given rise to by a *Kriyā*.

What we have learnt from the foregoing discussion is that *Karmapravacaniyas* are not indicative (*dyotaka*) of *Kriyā* like *Upasargas*. But one may, however, argue¹ that the verbal form that is absent (*Kriyā-pada*), as we have already shown, is deductible from the use of *Karmapravacaniyas*. According to this view, *Karmapravacaniyas* should be regarded as *akṣepaka*, i.e., as what serve to derive by inference a *Kriyā-pada* that is not actually present. *Bhartṛhari*² has put aside this argument by holding that words whereby such verbal forms are inferred are generally found to have case-terminations, but never designated as *Karmapravacaniyas*. The second case-ending in *prādeśam*,³ as in *prādeśam* *vipariṇīkhati*, is due to its connection with the word *ei* which practically suggests the act of measuring (मीत्वा) and is only a shortened form of

१ वस्तुप्राप्ताद्यतः निराकारं कर्मितवाः कर्मप्रवचनीयाः कर्मप्रवचनीयाः एवाच।—*Pugyartīja*

२ एव विवादहेत्यः च वाचक-निविदिः।
यज्ञते विनेता गत्वा विवादनुदर्शनाः॥—*Tillyapadīya*, 2, 84, 200.

३ एव विवादः स्वविषयाः अविवादः। वाचकं विवादं पर्वतिकारीष्वद्विवादः॥
—*Pugyartīja*.

śimdyā. Thus, we have *drīḍyā* in *prādeśam* as a case-termination (*Kṛtaka-vibhakti*) and not one obtained in conjunction with a *Karma-pratocanīya*. Pupyaṛāja further observes that *drīḍyā* available in connection with *Karma-pratocanīyas* is generally found in cases where *sādhī* in the sense of *tambandha* in general would have been otherwise applicable. 'In some cases,' a *Karma-pratocanīya* like *ānu* becomes a link to the third case-ending denoting *Artha* or cause.

From what has been said regarding the characteristics of *Karma-pratocanīyas*, it is almost clear that they are not indicative (*dyotaka*) of *Kriya* like ('passive', not directly expressive of *tambandha* which is rather denoted by the second case-ending used in substitution of *saṭṭā* and not suggestive of a verbal form like the word *ai*, as in *prādeśa-siparitikkati*. Having thus rejected the three views, namely, Indicativeness, denotativeness and suggestiveness of *Karma-pratocanīyas*, Bhartṛhari¹ has finally arrived at the conclusion that *Karma-pratocanīyas* are those that qualify the relation brought about by a *Kriya*, whether present or absent.

¹ शारद्यावाचि प्रता गतीता द्युष्मनः ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 2, 206.

² विदेषा शोषकी नाम कल्पना = लाभः ।

कानि विद्याप्रसारी द्युष्मन् तु मेत्कः ॥—*Ibid.*, 2, 206.

CHAPTER VI

PRAKRTI AND PRATYATA

Pratipadika—desirable and undesirable—its meaning.—Gender—
Dhatu—a division of *Prakrti*—*Pratyaya*—its classifications
—*Svap* and *Tit*—*Tatthita* and *Kriya*—*Pratyaya*—
their meaning.

Prakrti is of two kinds—*Nāman* or *Pratipadika* and *Dhatu*. This classification of *Prakrti* is accepted by Jagadīśa. He observes particularly that what is called *Pratipadika* by Panini and others is essentially the same as *Nāman*. *Nāman* is defined by Yāskā as what denotes an object—*वस्त्रप्रदिकुनि नामादृ*. Jagadīśa defines *Nāman* as that crude form of a word which requires to be invariably followed by prathama (*vibhakti*) for the expression of its own meaning. Objects are generally denoted by such pronouns as *त्वः*, etc. While giving a definition of objects, Bharthari has explained what is really meant by Yāskā's statement '*अदा इति वस्त्रानामुपादेष्यः*' Durga¹ observes that *Nāman* and *Dhatu* are not really different and entirely unconnected with each other. There is, on the other hand, an idea of object hidden in the meaning of a *Dhatu* and consequently *Kriyā*

¹ यस्मि एष चार्यः वस्त्रप्रदिकोपादेष्यः... वासिनिवस्त्रानामुपादेष्यः... वस्त्रानामुपादेष्यः एष तत्त्वम्—Muktika, p. 40.

is indirectly implied by *Nāman*. It has already been pointed out that *Nāman* too has *Dhātu* as its ultimate base. Now this radical element which exists in *Nāman* develops into a *Pratipadika* while followed by *kṛt*-suffixes. In this process of transformation it loses its power of directly expressing *Kriyā* and necessarily comes to denote a substance having number and particular genders.

Pratipadika or *Linga*, as it is called in the *Kaṭantra* system, is defined as that crude form of word which, though significant by itself, is other than roots and detached from *vibhakti*.¹ What is really implied by holding *Pratipadika* to be significant² is that each of those letters that go to constitute a word is not allowed to bear the designation of *Pratipadika* (simply because of their meaninglessness). It is needless to repeat here as to how letters, though meaningless by themselves, give rise to words that are found to be significant. Śripati,³ the author of the *Kaṭantra Parīṣṭa*, explains the term *avikalpa* as expressive of both existent and non-existent things, and states emphatically that by 'significant words' one should understand those words only which have the power of

¹ वर्णसदादुराधारः प्रतिपदितः—Pāṇ., I. 2. 46.

² वर्णसिद्धि वर्णसीकरण सर्वतो च एव वृद्धिः।

—Mānasikāya under Pāṇ., I. 9. 46

³ वर्णसिद्धि वर्तोऽपि वार्णवसिद्धिमनुष्टोः वर्णसेवनित्यवाचसिद्धिः, वर्णसिद्धि, वर्णसेवनसिद्धिं संज्ञा (वर्णसम्बन्धान्)।—Parīṣṭa.

expressing the intended sense independently of others. But *Pratyaya*'s from their very nature are only significant when they come in contact with *Prakrti*. It is, therefore, inconsistent with the view that makes *Prakrti* dependent on *Pratyaya* for its expressiveness.

The well-known commentator Gopinatha has raised an important question in connection with the import of the word *arthacat*. In an instance of absolute negation as, *dah-vigraha*,¹ (the horns of a hare), he contends, there will be no *Pratipadika-samjñā*, as the expression does not convey any sense that is materially existent. But what we actually find is that the expressions like *dah-vigraha* and *akala-kramavati*, etc., are used as regular *Paras* having *sug* added to them. This anomaly is afterwards explained by him in the following way :—There are two kinds² of objects having transcendental or absolute and practical existence, according to the Vedānta standpoint; it is only *Brahman* that has real existence (*Paramitṛttha-sattā*), the evonic world exists only in our experience (*cittabharika-sattā*). Words like *ghataḥ*, *pāṭah*, etc., signify objects that have popular existence, whereas the expressions, referred to above, denote things that have practically no material existence. In

¹ दहविग्रहः अस्तीति युताचारावदेव विद्यन् यावज्जप्तिमिदापातः ।
—*Gop. Paridipa*.

² अस्तीतिः यावज्जप्तिमिदापातः विद्यन् य विद्या । —*Ibid.*

¹ एवं है सिद्धिः—परमात्मा विनाशक, अप्यवश्यक विद्युत्प्रविष्टम् कथम् ।—*Ibid.*

grammar, we should remember, both of these classes of words are held to be significant, and as such, there is no bar to apply the *Pratipadihī-*
saṁjñā to them. The reason is this. It is not
 absolutely correct to say that the expression
 'सुविग्रहः' is absolutely meaningless, because
 the two constituents, namely, विग्रह and विद्या,
 when taken separately, are found to have their
 own meanings as here and horns, but what makes
 the sense inconsistent is the relation between the
 parts and the whole.¹ It must be, however, admitted
 that the above expression is not altogether
 meaningless, inasmuch as it might be appro-
 priately used as an instance of 'absolute negation'
 or utter impossibility. Bhartṛhari² seems
 to have realised the fact when he says that words,
 no matter whether its meaning is existent or
 non-existent, are always found to produce certain
 cognition. Gopinatha cites in support of his
 view the authoritative statement of Durgasimha
 and arrives at the conclusion by holding that
 meanings of words are cognisable objects,
 whether existent or non-existent.³

Patañjali has expressly made mention of
 two classes of *Pratipadihīs*⁴—derivable and

¹ च एवो वाक्यं तत्त्वविवरणं वाक्यानीद्वयम् निरपेक्षकालित्वा वाच् यादौ :

—Paribhāṣā.

² च वाक्याविविहेऽप्युच्चं वाचः वर्णेति त्वं :—Vākyapādīya.

च तो वाक्याविविहेऽप्युच्चं वाचः वर्णेति त्वं :—Laghuśabdajīva.

³ च तो द्वयं दीक्षावाच्योऽप्युच्चं वाचः वर्णेति त्वं इति वाच्यद्वयं पराम
 शास्त्रं विविहेऽप्युच्चं त्वं :—Parāśaka (Nāmaprakarana).

⁴ च वाक्योऽप्युच्चं वाचिकानि :—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 441.

underivable. The words formed by the so-called *uṇḍī* suffixes are generally called underivable words. The underivable words are those that are not capable of being derived from the recognised roots according to the rules of grammar. That words formed by the *uṇḍī* suffixes are underivable, is, as the *Vārtikas* maintain, known by the way in which Pāṇini has comprehended the *Pratiṣṭipadikas*. To keep up the scientific character of his system intact, Pāṇini did not think it worth while to make provision for supporting the correctness of this class of words that are too rigid and diverse to come under any grammatical generalisation. These so-called *uṇḍī-śabda*s are not of Pāṇini's making, but usually attributed to the authorship of Śakaṭayana, who is credited with having enunciated the doctrine of 'reducibility of all words — verbal roots.' Śakaṭayana seems to have been a grammarian of great reputation whose doctrine was accepted by Yāska and some of the grammarians. As he was not in favour of such a doctrine that tends to make all *Nāmava*, without exception of even *Nāmāṇi*-*śabda*, derivable from roots, Patañjali had but scanty regard for this old grammarian. This is clear from the way in which he has derived the word Śakaṭayana (*Śakaṭaya* *tatam*). According to the interpretation of Yāska, the underivable words are as good as *gaṇeṣījñāta-śabda*, because their accents, grammatical analysis and the radical elements cannot properly be determined by the

usual method of derivation. Of the three classes of words recognised by Durga, the so-called underivable words come under the category of *Prakalpyakriya-sabda*, as opposed to *Pratyakṣakriya*, inasmuch as in cases like these the radical element or the meaning thereof has to be supplied by means of inference. The words of this description, as they do not admit of regular derivation, should be derived on the analogy of words having likeness with them, either physically or psychologically. In deriving words like these, observes Patañjali, one is to supply either *Prakṛti* or *Pratyaya*, as the case may be.

The Naiyayikas have classified *Nāmane* into four classes, namely, *rūpa*, *lakṣaṇa*, *yoga-rūpa*, and *gaṅgiṇa*. The *rūpa* or *samṛddha* is a *Nāman* the meaning of which is fixed by *sanketa* or divine convention. The words belonging to this class are generally found to be restricted in their particular meanings, which are somewhat different from their derivative significance. The word *gauḥ*, for instance, though derived from the root *gam-*—to go, does not mean ‘one that moves,’ but restricted to a particular sense (an animal possessing dewlap, hoofs, horns, etc.). Jagadīśa has made a further classification of *Samṛddha*, such as, *anisitīkī*, *paribhāṣīkī* and *anyādhīkī*. Words, when they are used in a secondary significance distinct from the primary or natural one, are called *lakṣaṇa*. Generally, we have

recourse to *lakṣaṇa* or assume a special significance when the import of a sentence seems to be inconsistent with the primary significance (*smṛthyārtha*). The usual meaning of the word *Gangā*, as in the expression *gaṅgāyam ghoṣah*, is practically incompatible with that of *ghoṣa*, for the current of water is not likely to be the habitation of people. The word is, therefore, not used in its literal sense in the above instance. The word is necessarily taken to indicate the bank so as to render the import perfectly consistent with our experience. It must be carefully noted here that there is not a distinct class of words that are always used as *lakṣaṇa* and enumerated as such either by the grammarians or rhetoricians, the same word being used as *vakta* in one expression and as *lakṣaṇa* in the other. There are certain words, as we have pointed out elsewhere, like *pracīpa*, *kusala*, etc., which are seldom used in their primary or original sense (skilful in playing on lyre and one who takes the knot-grass), but have acquired a more generalised meaning (i.e., expert). The *yoga-rūḍha* words are those that possess in themselves two-fold significance—derivative and conventional. The word *pānchāya*, taken as a whole (*sāmādhyā-lakte*), means a lotus; by the force of grammatical derivation (*avayava-lakti*) it means almost the same thing i.e., 'anything growing in the mud' (*pānchāya-karīptva*). Though substances other than lotuses are also found to grow in mud, the force

of convention has so restricted the sense of the word *pankaja* as to mean a lotus and not the aquatic moss. The *gaugika* words are so called because their meanings are the same as is expressed by their constituents, i.e., *prakrti* and *Pratyaya*. The *gaugika* words, such as *kṛukku*, *pātakku*, etc., denote the same meaning as is usually signified by their component parts to which they might be dissolved by means of grammatical analysis. In view of the words like *māyapā*, *mahārājā*, etc., some have recognised another class of Nāman called *rūḍhikā-gaugika*. The word *māyapā*, unlike *pankaja*, has got two distinct meanings. When dissolved into parts, the word means 'one who drinks scum'; and when taken as a whole (*rūḍha*), it means 'a house.' Here the derivative meaning is materially different from the conventional one. In treatises on poetics we find a special class of words known as *caryākāra*, viz., suggestive. The *Naiyāyikas* as well as the older school of grammarians have not recognised *caryākāra* as a separate *tyāti*.

There is another way of classifying Nāman, i.e., according as they are restricted in their use in regard to numbers. There are some words in Sanskrit which are never used in the singular number; there are some having neither singular nor plural forms; again, there are others that have neither singular nor plural forms. Thus, number also has been made a criterion for the classification of words. Jagadīś

has already shown the five¹ different varieties of *Nāmāṇa* (according to their numbers), as suggested by Patañjali: (1) There are words like *eka*, *viddhi*, etc., which are always used in the singular number. (2) Words like *ubha*, *dvi*, *puṣ्पacant* (which means both the sun and the moon), *asvini* (heavenly physician), *rodasi* (meaning both earth and heaven) are used to denote dual number only. (3) Words like *prīṇa*, *tri*, *kati*, etc., are found in plural number only. (4) The word *ubhaya* is used in both singular and plural. (5) Words like *ghāṭa*, *pata*, *vṛkṣa*, etc., are allowed to have all the three numbers.

Having shown that all words are expressive of *Pratibhā* or ultimately serve to bring out *Intuition*,² Bhartrihari proceeds to discuss the meaning of words and refers to more than one philosophical view in this connection. The utterance of a word, some hold, brings out the sense of a thing only and not its particular form and inherent properties. No qualified cognition is possibly derivable from a word, i.e., what is signified by a word is only a thing without any qualifications. Just as certain words, namely, *dharma*, *scaryu*, *devatā*, etc.,³ fail to present

¹ एवैतम् कथा दायते वचनेभिन्नेत् च। वाक्यात्मकाद्युक्तं वाल पदविष्ट व्याख्या ॥—Gobindakāśikā, Kāvya-36.

² वाक्यात्मकं प्रसिद्धात्मिकं; वाक्यं प्रसिद्धात्मिकं; वाक्यः ॥—Vidyāpadīya, 2. 119.

³ वाक्यात्मकाद्युक्तं; वाक्यात्मकाद्युक्तिं ॥—Ibid.

before us any material form, so words like *gaush*, *asvah*, etc., do not convey the idea of any particular forms. But difficulty arises when we actually consider the meaning of words like *gaush*, and *asvah* which, as we know, denote objects along with their respective forms. The upholder of the view says in defence that the idea of a being having hump, hoofs and horns does not really follow from the word *gaush* itself, but cognition of the particular form is drawn from some other sources,¹ viz., common experience obtained from the use of words. The qualified knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the form) is far from being the meaning of a word. Some, again, hold the opposite view. As in some cases words are found to denote a class and sometimes individuals, it is only plausible to maintain that the meaning of a word cannot be an unqualified one. This view, however plausible, is rejected on the following grounds. There are no words that denote only a class, because the idea of individuals invariably comes in, as a class is inconceivable without a substratum (individuals). Again, a word denoting a class alone is not competent to convey the sense of individuals. The word *gaush*, for instance, is capable of denoting a class (*gatva*), but fails to bring out the particular

¹ अधिकार्याद्वयाद्वाक्याद्वयाद्वयः ॥
एव एष्व विषेऽपि विवरणेऽपि—Vikyapadya, 2.

form of a cow-individual.¹ Similarly, the word *ghoṣṭh*² signifies only a thing (a pot) and does not imply the particular form with which the object generally comes to our cognition. Some hold, on the contrary, that the meaning of a word comprises in itself all possible cognitions about the thing denoted.³ According to this view, the meaning of a word is *saṅkalpaśā*. The particular knowledge (*vidiṣṭa-jñāna*) of a thing presupposes a knowledge of its qualifications. Some philosophers have tried to show that knowledge of all descriptions is likely to be more or less qualified. Finally, a way is made out of these conflicting views. Some words are really found to be denotative of objects having particular forms and some (words like *devatā*, *etava*, etc.) producing only formless or immaterial notions.⁴ Another point is then raised. There is no fixed meaning that is always signified by a word. The meaning of a word is so variant that we are hardly allowed to say *this is exactly the meaning of this word*.⁵ Just as a thing, though retaining its form unmodified, appears to be a different one owing to the defective organs through which it is perceived,

¹ एतम् अविद्याय स्वात्मानिकादेवाप्तं।—Vidyāśāstra, 2.

² अदृशीयं न भवते इति प्रत्यक्षविद्या भवतः।—Ibid.

³ चाहुकायोऽपिविद्या चाहुकिंचन्नस्तु रथः।—Ibid.

⁴ अविद्यावद्यतः सर्वेषां चाहुकिंचित्प्रवाचनः।

ये ही शब्दसम्बन्धे संक्षिप्तान् लिखेत्वा ॥—Ibid., 2, Kar. 125.

⁵ अप्रकृत विविधत्वं एव; विद्यापातः—Prayogaśāstra.

on the meaning of a word seems to be variant according to the knowledge of the speaker and the person spoken to. It is not unfrequently that we meet with words which are taken in various senses by different men. The word *ghāṭaḥ*, for instance, might be used by the *Vaiśikas* in the sense of *whole* (*acayat*).¹ The *Sāṃkhyas* may take it as implying a *combination of qualities* and the Buddhists and Jains as an *aggregate of atoms* and so on. What should we then do under these anomalous circumstances? Human knowledge is limited by nature. It is not possible for a man to know anything in its entirety. To realize the ultimate essence of a thing lies practically beyond the range of human intelligence and what is almost incontestable is that our knowledge and experience, as *Bhartr̥hari* rightly observes, are in most cases liable to be inaccurate and imperfect. Arguing from an orthodox point of view one may say that the knowledge of ancient seers² (*Rṣis*), who are supposed to have visualised the ultimate reality underlying all phenomena, is free from all limitations and imperfections and that we should do well to know everything according to their observations, so as to get rid of this stupendous anomaly. But this is far from being the actual state of things. One cannot possibly use words strictly in conformity to the manner

¹ *Pāṇini* under the *Vākyapādīya*, Ed. 2, 137.

² अपीति एवं यत् तदि वा निरपेक्षम्—*Nid. 2, 141.*

of these seers. But what experience goes to prove is that they are not even above Imperfection and illusion, so far as the use of words is concerned. Papyaraja has quoted a verse¹ which seeks to establish similarity between a child and a learned man, since both of them, depending more or less on popular usage and figurative use, are liable to reveal the same ignorance in regard to the use and knowledge of words. Human knowledge, it must be remembered, is bound to be of different types, the same object being variously perceived by different men. Truth does not reveal itself to all persons. A man's intelligence, however sharp and far-reaching, does not help him in getting into the real nature of things. If we closely examine our experience, drawn from personal observations, we do not fail to see how often we are deceived by it. Knowledge, as it comes from experience (cf. Locke), is subject to error. Some concrete examples are put forward by Bhartrhari to show a number of striking inaccuracies involved in our observations or experience.² To give one of them. Even those who are gifted with clear vision are found to say '*śākha gaganalakshmi*', though the idea of *sala* or lower surface is not at all compatible with an entity like sky that pervades the entire sphere.

1 शुद्ध-वपदीवाच्च शीतिष्ठै नैनि भित्ति ।
श्रौते प्रथमिष्ठामै च सहस्री लक्ष्मिष्ठी च

2 स्वरूपाद्यै शीते चापोते रुपवर्त्तिः ।
६ वैदिकि वर्त्त नैनि च चापोते कृष्णः ॥—Vākyapadiya, 2-142.

What course should, then, be adopted? As our observations are likely to be false and defective in most of the cases, we should not treat them as the basis of our experience, without examining their validity by means of reasoning.¹ Thus what is perceived directly by sense-organs requires to be fully determined by reasoning. Observations unaided by reasoning are not to be relied on as evidence at all. With regard to words the meaning whereof is indeterminable (*asavdhyeyatattva*), we must depend on popular usage and use them accordingly. The meaning of words in general, says Pūjyāraja, is determined by one's own range of knowledge. The way in which he has brought this lengthy discussion to a close deserves particular notice. From an extreme *Advaita* point of view, *Padārtha*² has no material background and the relation in which a *Sabda* stands to its meaning (*artha*) is nothing but a false one (*adhyāsa*). This being the actual state of things, it is only idle to dilate upon a question like *Sabdārtha*.³

The determination of the precise meaning of *Nibha* is really difficult. The sense that is usually conveyed by the utterance of a word is regarded to be the denotation of *Prātipadikas*. A word and its meaning seem to be inseparably connected with each other; and whenever that word is uttered, the particular meaning is at

¹ तथात् गवाच्चनामेषं निःष्टोपीयते तु किञ्चत्—*Tatkṣyapadīya*, 2.

² एवम् वाच्यम् पदार्थस्य भौति निर्वाच—*Pūjyāraja*.

³ शब्दसे निरपूर्वकत्वाद्बहुतर्दद्यते विज्ञा—*Ibid.*

once comprehended. Now, what is actually denoted by the so-called *Prātipadikas*? The views that are held to solve this question may be brought under three distinct classes: (i) It is class that is denoted by all words, (ii) It is individual, (iii) It is an individual qualified by the class. It should be noted here that the Mimāṃsakas are the upholder of the class theory. They maintain that all words signify class alone, the usual meaning of an individual arising on account of the mutual dependence of the class and the individuals. Among the grammarians, Vajapyayana and Vyāḍi, as we find in the *Mahabhaṣya*,¹ hold respectively class and individual as the meaning of words. The Naiyāyikas have, however, brought about a reconciliation between these two discordant views. They hold that it is neither class nor individual alone but individual qualified or conditioned by the class is what is really denoted by a word. The defect of the class theory, as pointed out by Jagadīśa² and others, lies in the fact that the cognition of an individual is not produced at all, if class alone is taken to be the meaning of all words. The individualistic theory is, on the other hand, open to such fallacies, as *endlessness* and *vagueness*.³

¹ *Mahabhaṣya*, Vol. I, under the rule Pāṇ., I. 2. 54.

² आत्मादेव ये कर्तव्यप्रयोगीन् एतद्ब्रह्म—*Cādālakī*, Kār. 19.

³ अपन्यासाभिनाशं यथा विदेः चक्षुः च गुणसे—*Kṛtyaprakalpa*, under Kār. 10.

In view of the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*,¹ Patañjali observes, it appears that both the class and the individual were held to be the meanings of words by Pāṇini. It is further held by some that gender, number, and *Karakas* are also signified by *Pratipadikas*. There are, therefore, practically six different views with regard to the meaning of *Pratipadikas*. Kṛiḍabhatta² has made reference to five different views—(i) class, (ii) class and individual, (iii) class, individual and gender, (iv) class, individual, gender and number, (v) class, individual, gender, number and *Karakas*. Gadādhara has also alluded to these five views. While we take such a wide view in regard to the denotation of a *Pratipadika*, we cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that *Pratyaya*s necessarily become only indicative (*dyotaka*), if all possible meanings were assigned to *Pratipadikas* alone. The second view, i.e., both the class and the individual are meant by words, is explained by Patañjali in the following way: it is not at all reasonable

१३८ श्री बुद्धराजगिरि भवानी कालीकालाम् । उत्तरविद्याह । वर्षे भाद्री ।
पूर्णमास भाद्र एव उत्तरविद्यागिरि । *Mallikarjuna*, Vol. I, p. 6.

आदी दृष्टि के लिये व सुना करारित था। जली वेद आजानकामः दृष्टि-
विभासः—३—Created by Chaitanya das ॥१६॥ दृष्टिविभासः।

“ एक विक्रियां लाल चतुर्थ वर्षार्द्ध तथा । वसन्ती देवि कोंमी पवाः
प्राप्ति [प्राप्तिः] ॥ ४२॥

³ न चाहुलितवादिकथा इ प्रदावर्य द्रव्यमन्तर्भूतवाक्य वाप्रविलेप यदाः; वैभवीकर्त्तव्यं पदार्थः । वाप्रविलेप किंवित् वैभवात् त्रिविक्रम्य व्यपुत्रम् । वाप्रविलेप कर्त्तव्यात्मकः इष्टवान्तर्भूतं, द्रव्यं वैभवात् । द्रव्यमन्तर्भूतवाक्यात्मकः वैभवात् । Mahābhāskṛya under the rule Pāṇ., I, 2, 64, p. 348 (Vol. I).

to maintain that words denoting a class are never found to express the sense of an individual and vice versa. But what appears to be exactly true is that both the class and the individual are signified by words. Examples are not wanting to show that a word which has a class as its meaning is also capable of denoting an individual, with this difference that in one case the sense of a class is directly obtained and that of an individual is only indirectly implied. Similar is the case with regard to words denoting individuals. Some grammarians have also explained this view from the Naiyayika standpoint. They hold that the meaning of all words is *an individual qualified by the class*. There arises, however, some difficulty when one attempts to maintain gender, number and Karaka also as the meanings of Prātipadikas themselves. It is almost like a grammatical fallacy to include gender, number and Karaka within the meaning of Prātipadikas. According to this view, nothing is left to be expressed by *Pratyaya*. If we take *Linga* as pertaining to word and explain the rules Pān. 1.2.47. and 4.1.3. as referring to Prātipadikas denoting both masculine and feminine genders, *Linga* also appears to be denoted by Prātipadikas. It is definitely stated in the *Lingānuśāsanā* that Prātipadikas are expressive of *Linga*. Nāgēśa also holds the same view. The way in which the rule Pāṇ. 4. 1. 4. has been explained by Patañjali makes it clear that *Linga* is also denoted

by *Pratipadikas*, the suffixes like *॑प्*, *॒प्* being only indicative. The real difficulty arises in connection with number and *Kāraka*. Patañjali has explicitly stated elsewhere that oneness, duality, plurality, etc., as well as *Kārakas* are signified by case-endings. Moreover, the method of agreement and difference, as applied to the analysis of words into base and suffixes, shows that number and *Kāraka* should be taken as the meaning of *Pratyaya*. We have already pointed out the difficulty of arriving at a solution whether the entire meaning of a word is denoted by the base itself and the suffix serves only as an indicative or vice versa. Bhartṛhari seems to have doubt with regard to this position. He maintains that the case-endings are either indicative or really expressive of sense,¹ or the meaning is expressed by both *Prakrti* and *Pratyaya* in their combination.

An examination of the grammatical treatment of gender has been made in the Linguistic Speculation of the Hindus. *Pratipadikas*² form the base to which *Pratyayas* like *॑प्*, *॒प्*, are added. The grammarians³ failed to make a scientific treatment with regard to the problem

¹ योऽस्मां विद्या एव सुविचारेत् इति;—Vidyapadya, Kār. 2, 184.

² ग्रन्थपरिवर्तनविद्या; विद्याविवरणं विविधतरपद्धतिः अथ एव प्रतिपदिविविलयतया दीक्षयति। Vyavasthitāda, p. 119.

³ वृत्तिशब्दः वाचानीपरिकृष्ट वृत्तिशब्दः इति एव;.....प्रत्यक्षज्ञाते वाचेऽपि विविधतरपद्धतिः, कार्त्तः वाचम् जातेऽपि;—Durge Sopha on the rule वीक्षीवाचाराम् विविधतिः—Kālīka, 23.

of gender. The popular conception of gender¹ had its origin in the distinctive features of sexes such as male and female. But it is very difficult to justify the grammatical use of genders simply on the evidence of physical characteristics. A *vrkṣa* or a *khaṭvā* does not possess, as Patañjali rightly observes,² such physical features as would justify its gender. Grammar had to depend so much on popular usage with regard to the determination of gender that it failed in most cases to give a scientific explanation. One turns to grammar in vain to explain the question of sex in words like *jyotiṣṭha* and *śat*. The fact that accounts for such usage should be sought elsewhere. It is rather a poetical fashion, which represents all that excite pleasurable sensations and exhibit female virtues (beauty, loveliness, submissiveness, etc.) as females, that is to a certain extent responsible for attributing the female characteristics to the 'moon-beams' and 'current of water.' The word *śat* seems to have its gender similarly fixed by a poetical outlook of nature. The seers of the R̥ik Veda,³ as they are often called *kavi* or *kṛutadarśin* (one who has visualised the finality of a thing), were not wanting in poetical idealism when they described

¹ सन्तानिदर्शी ची क्रमोवतः पुरुषः सूर्यः । *Mahabharata*, Vol. II, p. 196.

² कदाचार्षी न विवरः । 166.

³ कृती दीर्घपूर्व गोकर्णा मर्त्येन वीजामनेति वाच् । R̥ik Veda.

Uṣas (dawn) as the beautiful wife of the Sun-god. This is, however, a tentative explanation, as it does not apply to all similar cases. Though a flower appears to be tender and graceful to our sentiment, the word *kueṇa* is used in neuter gender only. There is so much laxity of the idea of sex in the use of gender that it would be a positive mistake to look upon grammatical genders strictly as an indication of sex. The words ¹ *ādi* and *kalatra* form another instance of the irregularity of gender. Though denoting the same thing, *e.g.*, wife, they are so sanctioned by popular usage as to be used in masculine and neuter genders respectively. As in respect of our knowledge of *taukila* *litigia*, we are guided more by popular usage than by conception of sex, Patañjali has repeatedly drawn our attention to the fact that the determination of genders from a scientific point of view lies almost beyond the jurisdiction of grammar.

Patañjali² has said it more than once that the popular use of gender is too rigid and fanciful to come under any general principle. The popular conception of sex has, therefore, very little to do with the grammatical use of gender.

¹ एवाचेऽप्यदावलादृष्टे निरुपमन् : Mahabhasya, Vol. II, p. 190
प्रदावलादृष्टे निरुपमन् : काता : वाकरे अर्थेष्वि ; Durg's Pupils made the rule वीक्षिप्तस्ताप्तु इत्यस्मिन् ;—Kālīpa, 23.

² तत्पात्रं मैत्रोऽवरदेः शब्दं चोक्तव्यं शिष्यमास्यात् : Mahabhasya on the rule Pd., 4.1.3.

Patañjali has, however, suggested two characteristic features of males and females on a more or less physiological ground.¹ According to this view, a female being is one wherein something is developed; a male serves as the agent of production; and that which represents an intermediate stage between these two aspects (development and production) is known as *nāpumāsa*. The popular conception of sex does not help us in the least when we try to explain the propriety of gender in *vykṣa* and *khaśvā*.² These criteria are not even applicable to all cases, since production and development refer to qualities and not to persons.³ Both males and females are found to be the substratum of these qualities. What, then, should be the standard of making such a distinction between sexes? Patañjali finally says that the desire of the speaker⁴ in what accounts for such use, *viz.*, when development or growth is intended to be implied, we take it as female and so on. Gadadhiara is of opinion that the suffixes like *śāp*, etc., enjoined by the rules *striyām*, *ajādīyātāśāp*, etc., are sometimes found to express *striśva*, as an adjunct to what is denoted by the base. The grammatical use of *striśva*

¹ संवादवत्ती विज्ञानोद्दीक्षा वृत्तावलम्बः। M. Essays, Vol. II, p. 197.

² लाटुकची न किमतः। *Ibid.*

³ अस्य तु ये नपर्य ची वासिनो तुमन् ? वृत्तावलम्बः। *Ibid.*

⁴ विवाहातः। संवादविवाहातो चो विवाहविवाहो तुष्ण्युत्त्वोर्विवाहात वद्युत्कात्। *Ibid.*

does not necessarily bring out the idea of a female being. It is not logically correct to say that *sriśīrṣā* is directly meant by such suffixes. The words *khaṭo* and *cṛkṛi*, etc., form exception to the popular conception of gender. The addition of an adjective as *human being*¹ does not even remove the difficulty. The word *devatā* (though it means divine being—both male and female) is found to be used in feminine gender only. According to the grammarians,² *sri-pratyayas* are only indicative (*dyatika*) and not expressive. The grammarians have comprehended gender also in the meaning of *Pratiṣṭipadikas*. But Gadhdhara does not fully agree with the grammarians. He maintains on the contrary that *sri-pratyayas* are only expressive of *striśīrṣā*. It is why *litigā* has been specially mentioned as distinct from *Pratiṣṭipadikartha* in the rule P&q. 2. 3. 66. He is quite right when he says that the *sri-pratyayas* in words like *khaṭo*, *aśi*, and *devatā* are absolutely meaningless.³

Just as in the Samkhya doctrine of evolution, *Prakrti* is held to be the primordial substance out of which the entire world, both material and intellectual, has sprung up, even so in grammar

¹ श्रीविष्णु विद्युत्पैदि वैशाली विभागात् । Vyāptividhi, p. 118.

² श्रीभवान्तु श्रीकहः पवः । Ibid.

³ पुराण सप्तिपदिकादेहेऽनामनामा वित्तिविवरणां श्रीविष्णुते श्रीवान् । आवैश्याचोरमो श्रीवान्नामो तदेवत्त्वकमनीयितम् । Vyāptividhi, p. 128. and अथवान्तु तु यत्प्रस्तुत्याकारादिति वैष्णवरौक्तं एकं गुणम् । शब्दान्ति उक्ते द्वारा, 54.

Dhātu represents the ultimate element whence from all possible forms of words have evolved. The verbal roots are the last result of grammatical analysis and form the real foundation of all verbal structure. The roots, very much like the atoms of the chemist, do not admit of further division; it is to such roots or phonological types that the *Nairakar* and grammarians look for the starting-point in their process of derivation.

According to the *Hoot-theory*, as expounded by Śakatayāga,¹ all words, even without the exception of proper names, are derivable from roots. *Dhātu* is significant by itself and is said to be the final germ of all word-forms. It denotes *Kriyā* or action (*dhātvaarthyah kriya*). Jagadīśa's classification of *Prakṛti* is essentially reducible to one, i.e., *Dhātu*, for *Prāṇipadikas* or *Nāmāṇas* too have roots as their final elements.

According to Yāska, the meaning of a verbal root is *Bhāva*, i.e., action or becoming. *Bhāva* or *Sattā*, as we have already said, is the meaning of all roots. It is one and all-pervading, but seems to be manifold on account of its association with different *upādhis*. This *sattā*, though intrinsically one, has got such potency as to reveal itself into manifold form.¹

• श्रीमद्भागवति वर्षात् । २०१०।

^१ प्रभुभासासाः कामव इत्यपि । दयानि सिंहोद वा नीवा तथा विविदेष
चर्देष प्रसिद्धा सुते । . . . तद्वान्द वर्णक्ताक्षेत्रमाद्यभैरवविभागद्वयात् । काम-
वाचाप्या चकिताक्षाः अतिः कामविभागपरिवर्त्तनात् विमहीव्यवधिः ।

According to the followers of the *Agama*, Brahman, as Hēlārāja says, comprises all *Sakti* as its own self. *Avidyā*, which is only a *Sakti* of Brahman, is capable of showing innumerable modifications and appears to be manifold owing to its diversity of actions. The doctrine of Vāryāyaṇī, as elucidated by Yāska,¹ shows clearly how *bhāva* or *mākā-saṁtā* manifests itself in six different aspects, namely, *jāyate*, *aeti*, *vipariṇamate*, *varddhate*, *upakṣiyate* and *olasyati*. We must remember that every thing is liable to pass through these stages. These successive stages from production to final destruction are to be regarded as *rūpa* or modifications of *bhāva* which, under different *upādhis*, is called by so many different names. Hēlārāja² maintains that a thing by its very nature is first produced before it is said to be existent. The question of *rūpa* only comes in connection with *bhāva* or objects that are already existent. One *rūpa* or modification of a state into another does not retain its nature unchanged for a moment; *pariṇāma* or modification is immediately followed by growth and growth by decay and so on. This is exactly harmonious with the Sāṃkhya doctrine of

¹ एव भावविकारो मनसीति वाचोद्देशं तस्मै विपरिकल्पने वर्णते प्रवृत्तिष्ठैर्विलक्षणतीयता ।—Yāska, p. 41.

² सर्वतिनामादाकामाय सूक्ष्मं जगत्त्वं वाचसीति परमस्तीयता । वाचसीति विकल्पावप्निति विपरिकल्पने तस्मै विपरिकल्पने बुद्धसंख्या भावविकल्पते इति वर्णते वाचस्तीयते विकल्पते उक्तोऽपनीतये ।

—Hēlārāja under Nāgāpādīya, Kār. 8. 36.

parināma. The whole world is in a flux of constant changes and nothing, as Patañjali observes, remains in its own form unchanged for a single moment. There is no growth that is not followed by decay and no decay that is not attended with destruction. In this way everything undergoes a series of changes and loses its nature every moment.

Patañjali has suggested two definitions of *Dhātu* as *kriyāvacana dhātuḥ* and *bhāvavacana dhātuḥ* which practically mean the same thing, i.e., (i) a root is expressive of action; (ii) a root denotes becoming (*dhāra*). He observes further that the meaning of a root, i.e., action, is invisible and is only comprehended by inference. That a root signifies action is clear from the fact that the verbal forms like *pacati*, *gaechati*, etc., are found to have co-inherence (*samanādhikarayya*) with *karoti*.¹ To be more clear, the meaning of all roots is capable of being expressed by the term *karoti*.

By the meaning of a root, Nageta understands 'action that is attended with efforts and leads to the fruit.' In pursuance of the view of Patañjali, Kondabhatta² says that

¹ य शुद्ध लक्ष्य लक्षितमनि वृहत्कर्मादिः। नरेण या बाह्यमैय
लक्षितमन्तर्भावैव ता वृक्षरे।—Mahibhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 271.

² भर्तु एषांश्चर्ते विप्रावचनः प्रचन्दन गतिः च भैवेष्या कर्तित्वा व्याप्तिर्विप्र
भर्त्यात्। किं भर्तीति? एषांश्च। किं कर्तिति? अप्यति।—Mahibhāṣya,
under the rule Phn. 1. 3, 1.

* प्रकाराद्यो वर्वर्तिती व्याप्तिर्विप्रभैः।—Mahibhāṣya,

* भगवान्प्रस्तोभित्विषयतर्ते तु विष्णु वृक्षः।—Vaiśikīśvaraprabhāṣya, 1, 1.

both the action (favourable to the result) and the fruit are expressed by roots and that the substratum alone is denoted by the suffix *tis*. The Mīmāṃsakas hold, on the contrary, that the fruit alone is denoted by the root, the action being denoted by the suffix. But this view goes quite against that of the grammarians. The rule Pd. 3.4.69., clearly shows that the suffixes like *tip* have nothing to do with the action (*tyāpāra*), but they simply indicate the agent, the object, number, etc. The followers of the Nāya-Nyāya school maintain that the meaning of a root is *action favourable to the fruit*. According to this view, the verbal form *pacohati* means 'an action, i.e., movement, leading to the conjunction' (*samyoga*).¹

There is, however, certain difference in regard to the way in which the grammarians and the Naiyayikas construe a sentence for the sake of deriving the verbal cognition (*abda-bodha*). Both the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians arrange the words of a sentence in such a way as to render the action (*kriyā*) principal in a *vākyārtha*, with this difference that the former take action to be the meaning of suffixes, while the latter comprehend action as the signification of roots. The grammarians are expected to put the expression *Caitrastanyulam pacati* in the form of a logical

¹ *विद्युत्प्राकृति व्याख्या*.

proposition which will run thus: *Caitra-kartṛka-tanjula-karmaka-pākoh*, viz., 'the act of cooking which has Caitra as the subject and rice as the object.' The *Naiyāyikas*, on the other hand, will bring out the meaning of the expression by such an arrangement of words as would make the meaning of *prakānidūta-taddo* (words having first case-ending after them) as the principal one. According to their construction, the sentence will mean: *tanjula-karmaka-pākohukāla-krīḍān* *Caitrāḥ*: viz., 'Caitra is the substratum of action that is favourable for cooking rice or which has rice as its object.'

Pratyayas are held to be significant by the grammarians, though their expressiveness depends on their association with the base. *Pratyayas* are of different kinds and numerous. Jagadīś has classified them under four heads:¹ (i) *vibhakti* (*sūp* and *tīk*), (ii) *pratyaya* like *śid*, *sau*, *yā*, etc., that form part of the root, (iii) *taddhita*, (iv) *kṛt*--suffixes. Of these, the *vibhaktis*, viz., *sūp* and *tīk*, are primary suffixes and the rest are only secondary, the former being added to *Prātipadikas* and roots to denote number, whereas the latter, though coming after *Prātipadikas* and roots, have special signification. Both *sūp* and *tīk* generally denote

प्रत्ययस्त्रियाः प्रत्ययस्त्रियः प्रत्ययस्त्रियः
व्युती व्युती व्युती व्युती व्युती

—Saddhāktiprakāsh, Kār. 50.

number. *Sap* is, again, of two kinds¹—(i) *sap* as denoting *Karakas*; (ii) *sap* as specially enjoined in conjunction with certain words (*Upapada-vibhakti*).

The author of the *Pārtikā* has expressly stated that subject, object, instrumental, etc., as well as number (singular, dual and plural) are denoted by *sap*-terminations.² Patañjali has also lent his support to this view which is directly based upon such rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as *Pāg.* 2.3.2. and *Pāg.* 2.3.15. The author of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhbūṣaṇa*³ enumerates substratum, limit, object, relation or efficiency alone as the meanings of *sap*. It must be, however, remembered that the expressions current in a language are so varying and numerous that the above enumeration of meanings is found to be far from being accurate and exhaustive. The *Naiyāyikas* and the grammarians have tried their utmost in forming the definitions of *karmavat*, *kartṛvat*, etc., so as to render them applicable to all possible instances. But they could not successfully cope with the immensity of the task. A careful examination of some

¹ कारकसंवर्ती च सूप् लिपा च विकल्पीः—*Sabdadeśī*, 221, 47.

² सूपो वर्जनशब्दोऽप्यतोऽनुपात वेद यथा विकल्पः—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 58. सूपो संकाष्ठा वेत्तयेः कर्मावकरः।
वर्तमानदर्शी विकल्पादृष्टः (and एवमानदर्शी विकल्पादृष्टः) :

³ कारकसंवर्तीविद्युत्स्त वर्णन्तः विकल्पीय यत्र ।

प्रधानस्य विकल्पादृष्टः सूपो कर्मावकरः ।

—*Vaiyākaraṇabhbūṣaṇa*, Kār. 24.

Instances will make it clear that the meanings of the *sup-terminations* are manifold. We may hold without going into minute details that the *substratum* is the meaning of the accusative, the instrumental and the locative. *Kर्मान्* is the substratum of the fruit resulting from action. In connection with *K्रिया* and *Kरका* two things are to be specially noticed—action (*स्वपदः*) and the fruit resulting from it (*विषयतात्पर्य-कर्मफलम्*).

In an expression like 'Devalatta is going to the village', the action, i.e., movement, resides in Devalatta, while the fruit produced by such action, viz. conjunction, accrues to the village. In the same way *Kरणा* and *Adhikarण* may also be shown as what denote the substratum of action. Now what we like to impress is that the second case-ending, as shown above, does not only denote *substratum* but has manifold significance. In the *Vyutpattivāda*, Gadādhara has elaborately dealt with the meaning of *cibhaktis*. We propose to give here only a few instances from the *Sabdasaktiprakāshika* and the *Vyutpattivāda*.

On the strength of the rule *Pñ. 2.3.2.*, Gadādhara observes that the second case-termination signifies *karmavat*, i.e., the state or quality of possessing the fruit resulting from an action (*kriyājanynaphaladittram*). Generally speaking, *ādheyavat* or the state of being the subsistent is the meaning of the second case-termination, as shown in the foregoing examples,

but it has other meanings also. In the sentence 'ghatam jñāti, viṣayate or 'the state of being the object of cognition' is directly implied by the second case-termination, while *śūnit* is denoted by the same case-ending in *ārabhya tasyām dadamīt ca yāvāt*. Again, the second case-ending is also found to signify *vidheyata* or *uddeṣyata* in connection with roots meaning 'to infer,' as is evident from the example *vahnim-anumānomy*.¹ In *tatvam tyajati khagah*, the *dravyā-vibhakti* means separation (*vibhaga*), and *adhiyatata* in an instance like *Kāśīmanorasati*. Thus we find that *adheyata*, *uddeṣyata*, *avakīta*, *vidheyata*, *nirupinīta*, (as in *māṇastareya*), *pratiyogita*, *anyogita* (as in *dāyām vīra*) are all denoted by the second case-ending.

It should be also noticed that *vibhaktis* fall under two classes in grammar. *Kāraka* or case-terminations and *Upapada-vibhakti*, the former denoting *Kāraka* and the latter coming only when certain words are added and have no connection with *Kriyā*. When these two classes of *vibhaktis* are simultaneously applicable so regard to an instance like *sāvaskaroti deśān*, the *Puribhāṣā*² enjoins that case-terminations will have preference to *Upapada-vibhaktis*.

¹ एव वाचात्मक विकारं विद्यता वा विदीयता—*Sādhanika*.

² व्युत्पत्तिशब्दान्वयेभि विद्यते व्युत्पत्तन् वा विदीयते—*Tyutpativida*, p. 65.

³ अनाधरीत-पूर्वे एव विदीयता विद्युत्पत्तनम्—*Ibid.* p. 77.

⁴ उपदेहकितः कारकविद्युत्पत्तिभिः

The rule *Pds.* 3.3.16. implies that both the agent and the instrumental having relation to *Kriyā* are primarily denoted by the third case-ending. Durgasinha observes that in sentences like *prakṛtyā cāra* (beautiful by nature) the word *prakṛti* may be taken as denoting the instrumental (*karaya*) in connection with such a verbal form as *bhartati*¹ that is to be supplied to make the sense complete. In *dṛḍheṇa ghatah* (which is admittedly an instance of *hetu*) the third case-ending, as Jagadīśa² maintains, indicates *karayatva*, though it is not regarded as a *Kāraka* on the ground of its having no relation with action. In *gṛhatecañ jñāti*, *tṛtīya* implies *prakṛitata* or the state of being an adjective. As both subordination³ to the action of the agent as well as a cause⁴ associated with action are denoted by the third case-ending, Gadgilara arrives at the conclusion that it has a two-fold⁵ signification. This view is quite analogous to the statement of Bhartrhari.

Substratum or recipient is said to be the general meaning of the third and seventh

¹ प्रकृतयोनात्मविकरणमनुष्टि भवतीत्यनामानाम् ॥—*Śīla* under the rule शेष विद्यने तत्त्वं कारणम्—*Kalpa*, 215.

तदा चक्रियप्रवर्त्ती चक्रियां कारणम्—*Ibid.*

² वृष्णेष च इत्याद्य दर्शीतात्मेऽकारणम् । वृत्तं यत्ता कारणं विद्यामन्वितम्—*Bhāskarācārya*.

³ स्त्रियार्थे वर्त्तकापारात्मीयर्थं विद्येष्वामीवद् ॥—*Vyutpattiśāstra*, p. 66.

⁴ कारणां दर्शीवाप्तेः ॥ च चाकारणप्रकारात्मेऽपि ॥—*Ibid.*

⁵ वृत्तः स्त्रियिकापारात्मीयापारायेत्वा वाद्यव्युत्पादात्मेऽपि दर्शीवाप्तेः विद्याम् ॥—*Vyutpattiśāstra*, p. 66.

case-endings. From the very definition of *kartṛya* and *adhibharanī*, it appears that both the agent and *adhibharaṇa* are, as a rule, regarded as the substratum of action (*kriyādārayatva*). The difference between them lies in the fact that the agent is directly connected with a *Kriyā*, while *Adhibharaṇa* connects itself with a *Kriyā* only indirectly, i.e., through the medium of either the subject or the object. This is quite clear from the definition of *Adhibharaṇa* as suggested by Bhartṛhari:¹

The fourth case-ending denotes *Sampradāna*, i.e., implies the purpose (*uddetya*). This sense is obtained from the expression *yasmabhiprati* in the rule Pāṇ. 1. 3. 82. The fourth case-ending also indicates *adheyatva*, as in *maitrīya-racote* and *rīgavite* in such instances as *Caitrīya luptiyati*, *pañcaphhyah spṛkṣyati*.

The fifth case-ending denotes *ekadhi* or limit of separation. It also means *janyatva* or the state of being a product, as in *dharma-dṛḍha-dyute sūkham*. Here virtue is the cause that produces happiness as its effect. Sometimes it implies substratum and place of origination as, in *cuhmīkṛigṛīt prabhāratī* and *himavatī Gaṅgā prabhāratī*. It is not grammatically correct to use the word *dkraṇo* in its literal sense, i.e. 'motionless,' as in that case one fails to support *Apādāna-kāraṇa* in the example

¹ कर्तुं विभागन्ति नामवाचावाचारस्य लिपाद्।
सप्तकुर्म्म लिपासही शाखे हृषिकार्ष चूल्य एव—Vākyapādīya.

dhāvata advāt patītah where the limit of separation is far from being motionless. But Patañjali has taken a peculiar position. He maintains that in *dhāvata advāt patītah* (fallen from a running horse) 'the state of being a horse' and the swift motion are to be considered as *akravat*.¹

The genitive implies *sambandha*; it is said to have various meanings. The relation is of various kinds. It is to be particularly noticed here that *sambandha*, as is denoted by the genitive, is excluded from the category of *Kṛaka*² and *gaṇhi* is not treated as a co-termination (as it has no direct connection with the action).

After showing the different meanings of case-terminations, the grammarians have finally arrived at the conclusion that efficacy or *Sakti* alone is denoted by all case-endings.³ It has already been pointed out in these pages that all objects of thought, as are denoted by words, represent but different manifestations of *Sakti*,⁴ and that time, space, action, and *Kārokae* are only various forms of *Sakti* which pervades the entire world of thought. The inconceivable

¹ वस्त्रोऽपानाद्यविमिश्य लक्ष्यते एव भूर्भुवः—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 327.

² सम्बन्धो वा कारकं, वा वा व्यविधात् वा वा भास्तविमिश्य—Bhāskarabhāṣya, prakāśikā, under Kārt. 61.

³ अलिप्तिसञ्ज्ञिकाः—Hellartja on the Vākyapadiya, Kārt. 2, 19.

⁴ विविदेवादेवेष्व विष्णुः गतिः गतिः चौका वस्तुत्वमित्यात्मानस्तुपि विविदाः—Vākyapadiya, B. 37, p. 222.

force that brought this universe into existence and whereby everything is being regulated is considered to be an inexhaustible and perpetual reservoir of *Sakti* or efficiency revealing itself through diverse objects. What is called life or conscious principle is ultimately an emblem of this all-pervading force. According to this view, therefore, everything is made up of *Sakti* or essentially a congregate of efficiency. This *Sakti* is, again, said to be either identical with, or different from, the object wherein it inheres.

Substratum¹ (i.e., the agent and the object) is said to be ordinarily meant by *ākhyāta*-terminations. We have already said that action as well as fruit are expressed by roots (*phala-nyāyapradayordhātulas*). Udayana² maintains that effort (*yatna*) favourable to action is the meaning of all *ākhyātas*. A root, some hold,³ signifies only effort and *ākhyāta* denotes the favourable action, the sense of effort being derivable by means of inference. Some hold that terminations express action (*vyāpīra*) and do not actually signify the agent. The grammarians, however, do not agree with them; for whenever a verbal form is used, the subject is at once comprehended. The

¹ भास्त्राक्षिरितिहृत्युक्तं कर्तुकमेव अपवृत्तिः । तत् वर्त्तिर् कापादाच्च च वर्त्तिः कमाद्याच्च । अपवृत्तिमयमहुगदन्तु वर्त्ति तित्तु—Ma6j656 (विकर्त्तिविक्षय) अग्नि चापद्ये तु तित्तु च चाच्च—Vāyuktacupubhūtispa.

² भास्त्रेव वा शब्दान् वर्त्तिवाचान् दीप्ताः ।—Kārttikeya, 5. 2.

³ वस्तुतः एव; इतिवृत्ति चाभ्यांश्च वायुमूलकान्वादान्वात्तेषामाचेष्टार्थ च वक्तव्याः ।—DhD. 17.1.

Mimāṃsakas¹ hold that *bhāvanā* or action is practically denoted by suffixes,² the subject being cognizable by means of *arthapatti*. The grammarians have rejected this view on the following ground:—if action or *bhāvanā* is to be regarded as the meaning of terminations, there would be no idea of action in *bhaktavyam* which has got no *ākhyata* suffix immediately following it. The rule Pāṇ. 1.3.9. is also an indication that roots are expressive of action. According to Kātyāyana, it is the root that expresses action and not the termination; for in *pacati* and *npākṣit* the meanings of the suffixes are varying, whereas the root *pac* with its significance remains practically the same. By the application of the method of agreement and difference it is possible to determine the distinct signification of both bases and suffixes.³ It is further held that number, time, Kārakas and action are generally denoted by *ākhyatas*. The expression ‘‘Caitra is going to the village’’ means accordingly an action favourable for the present conjunction of the agent who is one and non-different from Caitra with the object that is non-different from (or identical with) the village.

¹ नवाग्निकाः—कर्मनाय पात्रस्त वाप्तम्, वाप्तस्तः ।

² संख्यात वारते कोकी भिन्ना हि प्रत्येति ।

कर्मन् वाच तद् विद् वाचना निष्ठ-किञ्चित् ॥ (Kārttikakarṇa).

³ तिर्थ अन्वयवलिखितान्वयम्—Tir.

⁴ एकस्मात्वचिह्नादिप्रतिवर्त्तयो वर्त्तत्वात्प्रतिवर्त्तयो वर्त्तमित्वर्त्तिलिङ्गो वा संवैष्णवद्वाच्युतो वाप्तम् ।

According to the *Naiyayikas*, *lakāras* imply the agent, time and number. *Lok* means present time (*casṭanāka*). There is also doubt whether the sense of *lakāras* is expressed (*sācya*) or suggested only. Bhattoji seems to be in favour of the expressiveness of *lakāras*. *Lit* is used to denote *pārokṣya*, viz., the state of being invisible, or imperceptibility of action. When *lit* is used in the first person, sometimes we have a peculiar meaning. The expressions श्रूतिर्विफल ज्ञानात्, भाव विकल्प ज्ञानात्, etc., are intended to show that the speaker was either in a sleeping mood or in a state of oblivion. *Lok* means almost the same as *lit*, that is, injunction, invitation, etc., or, in one word, inducement (*nāparitandā*).

There are certain suffixes like *kyac*, *kyañ*, *kānyac*, *son*, *yan*, which appear to be the last part of a root. These are called secondary suffixes ; they have either *Nāman*¹ or *Dhātū* as their bases. The suffixes like *kyac*, *kyañ* are added to *Nāmans* (*nāmadhātū*), while *son*, *yan*, etc., come after roots (*dhātṛantāgayañvarṇpah*).

It is not correct to say that the *taddhita*-suffixes, as a rule, have *Nāman*¹ as their bases, because case-endings as well as suffixes like *kyac*, etc., are also added to *Nāmans*. By *taddhita*,² Jagadžīva understands those suffixes

⁷ शास्त्रानुसिद्धार्थ शास्त्रानुसिद्धार्थ—*Sabda-shakti*, p. 109.

^१ विजयविकास देवकिनारा विद्योत्तम— ३४. १०

• विविध सारोक्त: वृत्तिया—

that are distinguished from *abhaktis* (*ap* and *tī*), suffixes that form the last part of roots and *Ārya*-suffixes. The *taddhita* suffixes are of different kinds. We give below only a few specimens of these suffixes:—(i) some of them are patronymic suffixes (*apatyarthā-pratyaya*), as, *āya*, *īya*, etc. (*kṣutara*, *aupagava*) ; (ii) some express modification as, *dharma* (modification of stone) ; (iii) some express colouring ; (iv) some denote one's deity (*āśya devatā*) as, *Saīta* (one who has Siva as his adorable deity) ; (v) some denote one's place of residence ; (vi) some express one's possession, as, *goṇāḥ* (one having cows) ; (vii) some denote a collection, as *yonvalam* (an assemblage of young ladies) ; (viii) some are expressive of time, as *mānika* (continued for a month). From a grammatical point of view, the *taddhita*-termination *ay* in *aindrāṇī* is used to express (*āśya devatā*) the clarified butter which is offered to Indra as the deity. Kṛdāvibhaṭṭa says that the suffix *ay* in such a case means 'what is to be offered to a deity' (*devatā-viṣṇum deyam*). In the above instance, *deyam* or what is to be offered is used substantively and the deity to whom such an offering is made appears to be attributive.¹ According to another view, both the deity and the substance to be offered are the meanings of the suffix.

¹ इति तिर्विदे देव अवाप्तः ।—Vaiyakaraprabhāṣya.

२ अवाप्तं सर्वदे विदेषम्—Vaiyakaraprabhāṣya, K. 2. 32.

It is also held that the base denotes the deity and the suffix expresses the offering.¹

Bhāva (*Sattā*) or existence is what is expressed by all *Prātipadikas*. This *sattā* is the same as *anuśāśanīya genus* (*mahātāmāya*²) which permeates through the world, only cognisable as differentiated in different individuals. It is expressed by all words; it is signified by all *Prātipadikas*, roots and suffixes like *tra* and *tal*. These two suffixes generally express the idea of a class and sometimes indicate existence or the ultimate reality of things. Patañjali has clearly shown what is precisely denoted by the suffixes *tra* and *tal* while commenting on the two *Varttikas* on the rule Pan. 5. L. 119. Kṛṣṇabhāṭṭa says in the beginning that the signification of the two *taddhita* suffixes, i.e., *tra* and *tal* (expressing 'the state of becoming,' or quality, or property) has been fully discussed by Bhārtṛhari in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* (which is no longer available). The drift of his statement is as follows: the suffixes *tra* and *tal* are added to *kṛdanta*, *samastata* and *taddhitanta* as expressive of relation.³ 'The expression of relation' is the sole purpose that is served by the addition of these two suffixes. The following

¹ वैकारका पट्टिके च व्यवहारः वर्णितये दाः—*Vaiyakaranaṭkāshagīra*.

² सम्बद्धस्मिन्दाय सत्त्वं ग्रन्थान् वर्णितुः। जातिरिक्त्याते हन्ति इति शब्दा अवलोक्यताः। तीर्त्प्रतिपादेषां च धूमर्थं च व्यवहारैः। एष निवाय च व्यवहाराद्या व्यवहाराद्याद्याद्याः।—*Vaiyapadija*, 2. 34.

³ धूम/धूमस्मादेवाः सम्बन्धान्वितान् ऋगेऽप्यत्रैषां व्यवहार—व्यवहारान्वितस्त्रिवेदेभ्यः।—*Vaiyakaranaṭkāshagīra*, under वृत्ति, 49.

instances will make the point clear. In *rājapuruṣatva* a relation between the king and the servant; in *pīcakatva* a relation between an action and the agent; in *upagubatva* a relation between the father and the son is denoted and so on. Kalyāṇa observes that when the word *grāh* is used to denote only a class (*gata*), these suffixes would then imply only 'the form of a word' (*Sabda-śarīraḥ bhāva-pratyaya*), but when it is used to express only an individual, the suffixes would then necessarily imply a class that would serve as an attributive. The terminations denoting an abstract idea, as in *sato bhāvayatā*,¹ are generally used to indicate a class. Kalyāṇa finally concludes that *satta* or existence is the only meaning of such suffixes (*bhāva-pratyaya*).

There are two *Vārtikas* which throw much light on the meaning of *bhāva*. The first *Vārtika* is intended to imply that the suffixes *ita* and *tul* are used to express that outstanding property (*guṇa*, *jati*) or the ultimate reality of a thing) by virtue of the possession of which a thing generally gets its particular designation or name. According to this interpretation, what accounts for the use of a word in a particular

१ वराहाः क्षमा एवा श्रीलिपादकृष्णस्तु तेऽनि वैष्णवस्तु पूर्वानुभवः।
—Bhagavata.

• कृष्ण आवादित सा काव्यम् ।

• लगांव सुवन् द्वारिष्ट् निवस्यत्वदिवी शर्तैव पापास्त्रावत्पा ।

• शिर्ष सु छन चुहक मासाईने कम्पनीसहायता न-सर्वी ।

sense is the inherent properties (*guṇa*, *jāti*, etc.) of the object denoted (*pravṛttinimitta*). The Naiyāyikas hold that these suffixes are added to words (as *ghaṭatra*, *māṇḍyaṭra*, etc.) to express the idea of a class. As the Naiyāyikas usually comprehend the individual with direct reference to the class to which it belongs, they are apt to speak of a *ghaṭa* as *ghaṭatradacchinnī*, i.e., the concept of *ghaṭa* as conditioned or qualified by that of the genus (*ghaṭaṭra*). It is almost evident that the meaning expressed by *tra* and *tā* seems to be as good as a qualifying attribute in relation to the meaning of the base to which they are added. This is exactly what is meant by Kondabhatta when he states *prakṛtyarthapratyākṛtam*.¹ According to the second *Vṛtti*,² the meaning of a word is exactly what it signifies by the force of its natural expressiveness. The word *grāsh*, for instance, has *golva* as its *pravṛttimimitta*, or the object for which it is used. Here *abda* itself, with its meaning as denoted by the suffixes *tra* and *tā*, acts as an attributive. The sense denoted by a word serves as an instrument so far as the use of that word (for the purpose of expressing the sense) is concerned. That it is the same with the knowledge of the meaning is also sufficiently clear from

¹ महानिष्ठवीकृतप्रार्थी अस्ति ।—Bhāṣaj under the rule Ptg., 6, 1, 119.

² वदत् कौरु भाषा: सेव यस्मिन् यस्मिन् ए तेऽपि अनुष्टुप्प्रार्थी ।—Vṛt., under Ptg., 6, 1, 119.

Gangāśā's definition of *Sabda-pramāṇya*¹ or the trustworthiness of *Sabda*.

Kṛt-suffixes have roots as their bases. Those that are used in the active and passive voices denote respectively the agent and the object.¹ The suffixes like *ghāś*, *kta*, etc., generally express bhāva (action). Bhāra denoted by a suffix like *ghāt* is accomplished (*siddha*). The word pākalya is found to require a verbal form as *bhavati* and has both number and gender. Patañjali² has shown two-fold bhāva—bhāya and abhyantara. Bhāva denoted by suffixes like *ghāś* is called bhāya and that denoted by suffixes as *tūṇa*, etc., is denominated as abhyantara. Kriyā or action manifests itself in two different forms, namely, *siddha*³ or accomplished and *asiddha* or un-accomplished; the former means an action like gamana that is accomplished, i.e., cessation of movement, and the latter indicates the continuity of action as *gacchati*. A bīda when accomplished and followed by a kṛt-suffix seems to be as good as a substance and in consequence of such materialisation it comes to have gender

^३ प्राचीनतमस्तु विवरणाद्याः स्मृतः शब्दान्—Tat्त्वशब्दान्।—
Sabbalakshana, Vol. I, p. 5.

³ शंखमैविषयकाः शंखमेवी शंख—शंखः, शंखमैविषयकम्।
p. 109.

¹⁰ *Mahābhāskarīya*, Vol. II, p. 177.

- * विद्यार्थी; चिकित्सको विद्या चौधारणा च चौर्दि स्ना

ବିଦ୍ୟାରେ କୁଳମାତ୍ରି ପାଇଁ ଉପରେ ଏହା ନିର୍ଣ୍ଣୟ ହୁଏ—Vidyapadiya.

सांख्यिकीय विधा तथा उपक्रमांकन

सिद्धामीर्थ वन्देश्वरः कु चापादितिकम्भः ॥—Vaidikaśāstraḥ स्त्रीभूतः

and number and is finally treated as a *Kāraka* in relation to some other verbal forms, as *gaṇanam karoti*. This is the import of the grammatical dictum¹ (कृदित्विती भावो द्रव्यवृ प्रत्यये) which clearly states that an action (*bhāva*) expressed by *kṛt* suffixes appears to be just like a substance and thus deserves all the functions of a *Pratipadika*. *Kriya* (*tacca, anlyā, etc.*) and *khalartha-pratyayat*, when used to express *bhāva*, denote an action that is unaccomplished. Similar is the case with the suffix *ktv* when used to denote *bhāva* only. In an instance like *edhilaryam*, it must be borne in mind that there is no desire for any other verb to make the sense complete. Patañjali² has clearly shown the difference between *bhāva* as expressed by *tis* and *kṛt* suffixes, the former suggesting the idea of time and person and the latter producing the sense of a thing. There is another way of distinguishing them, as *bhāva* denoted by *tis* is generally connected with the agent, while *bhāva*, as expressed by *kṛt*, is not similarly related to the agent (pacati gives the idea of an agent but *pākā* simply means the action, i. e., cooking). Words formed by a number of *kṛt* suffixes such as, *tūtan, kṛtīc,*

¹ *Mahābhāṣya* under the rule २५४, कृदित्विती वच—३. 1. ६७.

² कर्ता त्रिवितः कृदित्वितीम् सत्त्वं विकलितिस्त्वं च। विकलितिस्त्वं प्रत्ययं कालपृथीप्रयहा एविष्वामि, कृदित्विती द्रव्यं स्वामने...तिकर्त्तव्यिती भावः कर्ता संस्कृतात्। तदित्वितीः कुरुते संस्कृतात्।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 57.
अतः तिकर्त्तव्यितीत्वितीयत्वात्। इदमप्यद्वयं इत्येवं वदत्। पात् ।

संस्कृतात्वितीत्वितीत्विती भावस्त्वां द्रव्यितीत्वितीत्वात्॥—*Brihaddeśīta*.

पानु, etc., are grammatically treated as indeclinable (*anyaya*). These forms,¹ better known as *anyaya-kṛt*, denote bhāva as distinct from substance (*asat्त्राभूता-भावा*) and have no regular number and gender. The verbal forms having *kta* and *tum* are generally used as adjunct in relation to those that follow them. So far as the suffix *kta* is concerned, the two *kriyās* are related to each other, as both of them have got the same subject and stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority. On the authority of the rule Pan., 8. 3. 10, Nāgessā holds that *tadartha* as implying a purpose is also indicated by *tum*. In accordance with this view, the expression *Kṛṣṇam dravīm yati* will mean one's movement for the purpose of seeing *Kṛṣṇa*.

¹ Mahābh., Upadharśitapāṇi, pp. 1058-61.

CHAPTER VII

KĀRAKA

*Kāraka—its definition—Sakti manifested as Kāraka—
different forms of Kārakas.*

Closely connected with the meaning of case-terminations is the function of *Kārakas*. *Kāraka*, as the very term implies,¹ is intimately related to *Kriyā* or action. The idea of *Kāraka* is dependent on that of *Kriyā*. It is its relation with *Kriyā* that determines the nature of a *Kāraka*. *Kriyā*, which plays so important a part in the determination of *Kārakas*, is, as Patañjali² observes, denoted by roots and is invisible, formless and only comprehensible by means of inference.

Generally speaking, *Kriyā* means action (*vyāpद्रे*). *Kriyā* implies, some hold, action, effort (*kṛti* or *yatna*) and result (*phala*). There is a peculiar combination of these three in the grammatical conception of *Kriyā*. *Kriyā* is, after the grammarians, an action accompanied with effort and leading to the result. According to Udayana,³ the meaning of a root is

¹ नित वर्तीनि वाचकृण् अस्यत्वानि वाचकम् ।

² भगवः नितः विवाहयो चाप्तः । नित वर्तीनि वाचकानां विकल्पाणां वाचकानुभावेन्ना ॥—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 3. 1.

³ एष एव कुर्वते गृहौ सर्वत्र देवं प्राप्तम् ॥—Kumāraśālli, Kār. 5. 2.

effort (*yatna*) producing an action. When this exertion is directed towards the production of the result, it is called *bhāvāṇī*, as is denoted by the *akhyāta*-suffix. Durgā¹ has defined *kriyā* as what appears to possess both prior and posterior parts. The process of inference whereby *Kriyā* is usually comprehended has been clearly illustrated by Patañjali.² Sometimes, when all the requisites of cooking, such as pot, fuel and fire, are actually present, we are not allowed to say *pacati*, until there is a particular effort indispensably necessary for the purpose. This sort of effort (*sādhana*) without which nothing is accomplished is called *Kriyā*.³ A *Kriyā*, like *pacati*, consists of many parts all of which, viewed as an undifferentiated whole, tend to produce the same result.⁴ From a grammatical point of view, *pacati* means a group of actions, namely, to place a pot on the fire-place, to set fire to, to throw fuel on and the like. As synonymous with *Ikā*, *yatna*, etc., *Kriyā* comes within the scope of quality and as such pertains to things.

There are various agents (*sādhana*) whereby actions are generally performed; these agents, whether directly or indirectly related to action

¹ विष्णुः एति द्वया एव पूर्वाधीनात्मका :—Under the rule *Kalpa*, II (Akhyāta).

² एष चर्यु वाक्येण विविद्यु वसापित् वचनीमेवपवि वसापित् भवति ;—*Mahābhāṣya* under *Pīp.*, I, 4, 22.

³ विष्णु वापि विविद्यु वचनीमेवपवि वा एवं द्वयः ;—*Ibid.*

⁴ वृक्षस्तुरस्याद्यः वृक्षः वृक्षस्तुरस्याद्यः ;

सुदामा ग्रन्थान्तरमिति; वा विविद्यु द्वयः ;—*Vakyapadiya*.

(*Kriyā*), are grammatically called *Kārakas*. There are, therefore, as many *Kārakas* as there are *sūkshmas* in relation to a particular action. In conformity with the interpretation of Durga,¹ *Kriyā* is immaterial and formless; it comes under our comprehension only through the medium of *Kārakas*. *Kriyā*, like *guṇa*, is an inherent property lying dormant in all things, but gets itself manifested when objects are in operation to produce some sort of result. As the action denoted by the verbal form *patali* comprehends four things, namely, tree, leaf, ground and wind, we have in such a case as *apūḍāṇī cikṣāt parīṇam patati bhūman* precisely four *Kārakas*, according to their relation to the particular action (falling). The tree, for instance, which indicates the limit wherofrom the leaf falls down is called *Apūḍāṇa-kāraka*; the leaf that falls down and is thus primarily associated with the action is named *Kārtv-kāraka*; the ground which forms the substratum of action is known as *Adhikarana-kāraka*; the wind that causes the leaf to fall is termed *Kāraṇa-kāraka*, or instrumental. The name of each *Kāraka*, as shown above, is thus suggestive of the relation in which a *Kāraka* stands to a *Kriyā*. Nāgeśa² has dwelt at length on the definition of *Kriyā* as suggested by

¹ अद्याति द्वि विष्णु विष्णवान् चा द्वि वास्तविक्लिङ्मतान् वास्तवयैर्विश्वानी सम्पत्ति निराद्युम् ।—Niratka, p. 28.

² वर्णकारात् भास्त्रे इष्टः ।—Ingham's Life, p. 541.

Bhartṛhari. He begins with the statement that all *Kārkas*, as a rule, get themselves connected with *Kriyā*.

Turning to the definition of the term *Kāraka*, we meet with considerable difficulty owing to the difference of views on the subject. First, the term *Kāraka* seems to have been too popular to deserve any definition; Pāṇini accordingly speaks of *Kāraka* as only an *adhiśāra-sūtrā*. Patañjali takes the word *Kāraka* as indicating a *samjñā*¹ and goes on to say that grammatical *samjñās* are generally made by such words as are popularly found to be denotative of *sunna*.² With the object of pointing out that the term *Kāraka* serves to indicate both *samjñā* and *anujñā*, he has defined it in the following way : 'सिद्धकम् निरपेक्षकम् कारका-सम्जनां भवति,' which means that an agent gets the designation of *Kāraka* by virtue of performing some action. He has clearly shown the difficulty that becomes almost unavoidable,³ if the *samjñās* are not specifically indicated by the *samjñā*. Patañjali takes *Kāraka* as a *mahā-samjñā* with a view to show that the derivative meaning of the word (*karoti*; *kārakam*) is exactly harmonious

¹ विविद् चारक स्त्रिः । एतदित्येवः पू—Mahibhāṣya under the rule Plg., 1. 4. 72.

² एव तु नामरती द्वे त्रिंशो अधिवेशवाक्याः व्याख्यातिरिक्ताः विवेत् ।—*Ibid.*

³ तत्त्वं विविद् इष्टवेत् । व्याख्यातिरिक्ताः व्याख्यातिरिक्ताः विवेत् ।—*Ibid.*

with what it usually signifies.' But we cannot take *kāroḍī kārakam* as an accurate definition of *Kāraka* from a grammatical point of view. To define *Kāraka* simply as 'what performs an action' will serve to exclude all *Kārakas*, excepting *kartṛ-kāraka*, from the category. As a matter of fact, it is *kartṛ* alone that acts as the direct agent, so far as the performance of action is concerned; but *Kārakas* like *Karaya* and *Adhikaraya* are only indirectly (*i.e.*, through the agency of *kartṛ*) related to *kriyā*.

Patañjali next proceeds to show how *Karaya*¹ and *Adhikaraya* may also be used as *kartṛ-kāraka* consistently with the etymological signification of the word *Kāraka*. The meaning of the roots like *poo* seems to be different in relation to different *Kārakas*.² We say *Devadatta pacati* when Devadatta is found to pour water in the pot, to throw fuel into the fire-place and so on. This is so to speak, the instance where the main agent of action is treated as *kartṛ*.³ But *kartṛya* is sometimes transferred to *Karaya* and *Adhikaraya*, as in *kṛṣṇanti pacanti* and *sthāli pacati*, respectively.

¹ करयः कर्तव्यः; करन् एतद् वरीक्षयन्ते विद् शा. विष्णु,
करीक्षयन्ते कारकमिति;—Mahābhāṣya under the rule 'Kāraka.'

² विद् वर्त्ताविकरकाः प्रकृत्यावः;—*Ibid.*

³ पवाणीना वा विकारेण विदा विष्णुः;—*Ibid.*

⁴ एतम् उच्चारयन्तः कर्मस्तु;—*Ibid.*

Under the rule *Kalāpa*, 221 (*kār.*), Durgasimha is found to have given a definition¹ (*kriyā-nimittam Kārakam*) which means ‘*Kāraka* is the cause of action.’ This definition, we are told, is sanctioned by the popular usage. We have other definitions as well—*kriyājanakatvam*, *kārakatvam*, *kriyāsayitvam*, *kārakatvam* and so on. There is, however, some difficulty with regard to the definition as suggested by Durga, because the word *nimitta*, as synonymous with *kāraka*, means cause and, consequently, it must have antecedence to *kriyā*.² But in an instance of *nirparittha-karma* such as, *ghaṭam karoti* (making a pot), the pot is not logically supposed to have existence prior to the action, and, therefore, it is not strictly correct to take *ghaṭa* as an example of *karma-kāraka*. Having raised this objection, Suṣeṇa proceeds to support it by holding that the antecedence of the knowledge of pot is here attributed to the pot itself by a process of transference (*upacāra*).

Sambandha, though indirectly connected with *kriyā* as a remote cause of action, is grammatically excluded from the category of *Kāraka*, inasmuch as the term *Kāraka* is used by the

¹ विवाचित्वं चारणे शीक्षणं विद्यत् ।

² एवम् विवेच्य चर्तु विवेष्यते चित्तम् ।

³ एव हयोनिक निकेन्द्रियस्त्वा एवं विवाचित्वम् । विवाचित्वी चरण निवलपूर्वकत्वात्मावाह । कारणः । विवाचित्वी चरणाद्य गृह्णत्वात्प्रियद्वाग् । चरणापि पूर्वविषयकार्यस्त्वे अपेक्षा ।—Kāraka, Kārikāja on the rule 220,

grammarians as a technical name¹ (*rEdha-sabda*) applicable only to six cases. The way in which Jagadtsa has discussed the definition of *Kāraka* and specially the nature of *sambandha* deserves special consideration for logical accuracy. He defines *Kāraka*² as what is denoted by *up* or case-endings and is apparently used as a qualifying attribute in relation to *kriyā*. As to the exclusion of *sambandha* from the category of *Kāraka*, he observes that neither *pañhit*³ (as expressive of relation) is regarded as a case-termnation (*Kāraka-pañhakti*), nor is *sambandha* grammatically treated as a form of *Kāraka*, simply for the reason that *sambandha* does never directly qualify the action. Consequently, an expression like *bṛuddhasya pacati*, directly connecting the verbal form with a word indicating *sambandha*, is not at all sanctioned by the popular usage. The word *seṣa*, which is a grammatical name denoting *sambandha*, is an indication that *sambandha* is excluded from *Kārakas* as such. Instances like (i) *durgolānta pratikurutto*, (ii) *padmasyānukuroti*, (iii) *Lakṣmīrupakurute pereśīm*, etc., where the genitive is directly connected with *Kriyā*, present, so to speak, no

¹ चार्यक विकारितिस्त्रि विष्टु चार्यवाद्य चरमात् व चार्यविनिः
स्त्रीम्—Kavitaśa (Kaitip).

² चार्यकोमे चार्यो च सूर्यः चोदय चार्यव—Saddatāla, K. V. 67.
यन्म लियाचार्यादीपूर्णीतः चार्यवः—Ibid.

³ सच्चर्यो न चार्यव न य ग्रन्थिभाष्य वही चार्यविनिः।—Ibid.

anomaly. Jagadīśa¹ makes his way out by holding that the above instances, like *vidhū
amarati*, *caurasya hinasti*, are special cases where the genitive is optionally used (in place of *deitīyā*) in connection with some particular verb, viz., the accusative of the verbal form *karati* preceded by the *Upasargas* as *proti*, *anu*, *upa* getting *sāṃśhi* instead of *deitīyā*.

Reference is further made to such instances as *dāydena ghaṭāḥ* and *bhātale ghaṭāḥ*² in order to show that the instrumental and the locative in these cases are not, from a strictly grammatical point of view, indicative of *Kṛtakas*, since they have no relation to *Kriyā*. The primary condition of a *Kṛtaka* in general is to have a direct connection with *Kriyā*. *Karayn*, as a class of *Kṛtakas*, is thus differentiated from *hetu*, for it has no necessary or indispensable connection with the action. But what has proved a stumbling block to Jagadīśa is an instance like *mama pratibhāti*,³ where the genitive seems to be irreconcilable with the verb. On the strength of such popular usage as *mī me pratibhāti*, we hold that the plausible view in support of these expressions and the like is to comprehend certain words (*idam* or

¹ विद्यानिर्विद्योनि कर्तव्योनि चाहीः प्रतीकाक्षं प्रत्ययैषां भूतोर्मिः प्रतीकाक्षं विद्यानिर्विद्येऽप्यस्मद् ।—*Ibid.*

² इसेव एट राखी हु रखीवाप्ते; वाराणसिर्थे य आरते धर्मसमाप्ते ।—*Ibid.*

³ अविकादितिप्रथमकर्तव्यादिः समव्यः प्रत्यय च चेत्याकार्यरिप्रतिकार्यादिः तु विद्यानिर्विद्या—*Gaudabudhī*, under the II&. 67.

etad) agreeing with the verbal form *pratibhāti* and to explain the genitive in *mātra* with reference to such words as *mānidhas* or *sakāda* understood.

While considering the different manifestations of *Sakti* or efficiency, we have seen that *Sādhana* which means an active agent in relation to an action also comes within the domain of *Sakti*.¹ Having taken an extreme view of *Sakti*,² some have tried to show that the entire universe is intrinsically made up of *Sakti*. How are we to know that it is *Sakti* and not *dravya* that is to be regarded as *Sādhana*? A thing is composed of a collection of *Sakti*. A *ghata*, for instance, is essentially a combination of such *Sakti* as the capacity for fetching water; a seed has the power of producing a sprout and so on. Thus, all objects are found to be efficient for performing some actions. As *Sakti* is sometimes discriminated from *dravya*, as a distinct entity, Bhartṛhari understands *Sādhana* by *Sakti*, which is perceived to have direct association with actions. A thing, on the other hand, is not identified with *Sādhana* in accordance with this point of view, because a thing, limited as it is by its form, is not practically competent to perform all those diverse actions which naturally presuppose some kind of *Sakti* as the real active principle. Every

¹ विद्यावत्तदिविषयकी वाचनं यावत्तं फृ—Vākyapadiya, 3, 1.

² परिमाकारमुपम सिद्धानेवर्त्तयः—Ibid.

thing' has its inborn *Sakti* that is manifested when it is at work. *Sakti* always comprehends things as its substratum, and consequently, it cannot have its existence independently of things. The relation in which *Sakti* stands to objects is one of co-inherence (*samardya*). Having thus shown *Sarvanya* as a form of all-pervading *Sakti*, Bhartṛhari continues that *Sakti* is said to have six distinct but permanent divisions or forms corresponding to six *Kārakas*.¹ A question may, however, arise here as to the precise number of *Sakti*, since *Sakti* appears to be numerous and diverse in its aspects, according as things wherein it inheres are manifold and seem to be different from one another in several aspects. Bhartṛhari takes recourse to the argument that a close examination of the various activities is sure to prove the reducibility of *Sakti* to six only. As an alternate view, it is further suggested on the analogy of *Kārakas*, which, having either direct or indirect connection with actions, express but *karyas* in its different aspects, that one and the same *Sakti*² may be said to have six different forms just in proportion to the number of causes that serve to manifest it. The point

¹ वायु वरणा विनिर्वाचनविकल्पः—*Vakyapadīya*.

कामदाससमेतपूर्व वाक्यः—*Hellīkya*.

² विकारः वद् विकारः—*Vakyapadīya*.

and द्वयालालापदिनेत्रिव द्वावापरिविक्षा एव।

हृष्टस्ते तज्जातां तु वट् इच्छी वर्तिकांत्वे ॥—*Vakyapadīya*, 3. 46.

³ विशिष्टसेवादैकेव विकार विकिः प्रीतिः ॥—*Vakyapadīya*, 3. 37.

that deserves particular notice in this connexion is that the term *Kāraka* is, strictly speaking, applicable to *kṛtī-kāraka* alone,¹ the other *Kārakas* (such as *Karaya*, etc.) getting their particular designation only as indicative of the different aspects of *kārtya*.

After dealing with the views with regard to both unity and diversity of *Sakti*, Bhartṛhari next takes up the question whether *Sakti*² is undifferentiated from things or has a distinct character of its own apart from the object. The grammarians, as Hēlārañja observes, are in favour of the latter point of view, as it is supported by both popular usage and grammar. Referring to the method of agreement and difference, Hēlī further attempts to strengthen his standpoint that *Sakti*, as represented by *Kārakas*, is virtually distinct from things. The burden of his arguments is as follows: as the meanings of case-terminations indicating *Kārakas* (*Karaya* and *Adhikarana*) in forms like *vr̥kṣena* and *vr̥ke* are actually different from those of the stem (*vr̥kṣa*), it is but reasonable to take *Sakti* as a distinct object of thought to which the grammatical term *Kāraka* is generally applied. It is almost incontestable that the standpoint

¹ निष्पत्तिस्यै कर्त्तव्यं स्वरूपात् उत्तमं, एवं तदनुभवात्तिवाद् प्राप्तात् निष्पत्तिः—Vākyapadīya, 3, 29, again—दीर्घा वस्तुस्यैवाकृष्टतृष्णिविवक्षणः—Ibid., 3, 37, वस्तुविवक्षणव्यापाश्चित्तिवक्षया करकाकिंचपदेवय यतो भवते—Hēlārañja.

² रात्रे एव अर्जुनौषधे यज्ञस्तिर्त्यं बहुत्तरै—Vākyapadīya, 3, 28.

taken by the grammarians goes directly against that of the Naiyāyikas who refuse to take *Sakti* as a separate entity. According to the Naiyāyikas, fire and the power of producing burning sensation (*dahikā-sakti*) are not materially two distinct objects. They do not recognise any difference between *Sakti* and the object possessing it (*saktimān*). What we practically learn from a careful study of the various aspects of *Sakti* as such and what proves to be of vital importance from the grammatical point of view may be thus briefly summarised : *Sādhana*, which is only a name for *Kāraṇa*, is nothing but a form of *Sakti*, and, accordingly, *Kāraṇas* like *Karman*, *Ketana*, etc., so far as they are denoted by particular case-endings, are only indicatives of *Sakti*, or the power of performing actions as we may call it. Moreover, a mere grammatical derivation of the terms *Sādhana* and *Kāraṇa* is sufficient to show that they are synonymous for all practical purposes and are expressive of *Sakti*, *i.e.*, efficiency or efficient object (if efficiency is held to be undifferentiated from the efficient object).

Gopinātha, the well known commentator on the *Kaṭaṇṭra-pariśiṣṭa*, has also elaborately dealt with the grammatical aspect of the problem. He seems to have arrived at the same conclusion, *i.e.*, identity of *Sakti* with *Kāraṇa*. The question¹ is first

¹ एष स्वाम्भवो च स्वसिद्धात्मो च अभिनवी च पारदाति ।—Pariśiṣṭa, Kāraṇapratyakṣayam.

raised whether substance, quality, action, class, etc., or the potency inherent in them, or, 'things possessing such potency' are to be taken as *Kārakas*. Next, he proceeds to show that none of these standpoints are free from objections. The defect underlying the first view is as follows : if substance, quality, etc., which have their essential character, as is represented by the class, unalterable by nature, are identified with *Kārakas* as such, we cannot possibly justify the instances¹ like *sthātī pacati*, *sthātgā pacati*, *sthālyām pacati*, and *sthātm pacati* where one and the same substance (*sthātī*) appears to be different so far as its connection with the action is concerned. *sthātī pacati*, for example, where *sthātī* is used as the direct active agent, is distinguished from *sthālyā pacati* where *sthātī* is no longer *karta* but only an instrument of action (cooking). But as a matter of fact, *sthātī*, as is conditioned by its essential aspect (*sthātīता*), is one and knows no diversity at all. The second view is also untenable, for if it were so (i.e., if only activities of things were *Kārakas*), it would be unjustifiable to use the term *Kāraka* with direct reference to things² (as we take *cṛkṣa* to be an instance of *Apādāna-kāraka* in *vrkṣet pṛgam patati*).

¹ अपादानादित्वात्प्रकारमनुभवेत्यत्त्वं इत्याहास्त्राण्—Paribhāṣa.

² अपादानादित्वात्प्रकारेषो गोपयते उत्तरात्प्रकारमनुभवेत्याहास्त्राण्—
Ibid.

* ए विवेचः । अपादानादित्वात्प्रकारमनुभवेत्याहास्त्राण्—Paribhāṣa,
Kāraka.

The third¹ one is also open to criticism on the ground that *Sakti* can neither be taken as an attributive (*videshaṇi*), nor as an *upalakṣana* (characteristic) with regard to things, the former giving rise to mere prolixity and the latter rendering the assumption of *Sakti* entirely futile. Having thus shown the untenable features of the above-mentioned standpoints, Gopinātha then puts forward his own views. *Kāraka*, he holds, is the same as *Sakti*, which is supposed to have different forms; substance, etc., are to be understood as the substratum of such divergent *Sakti*. As to the application of the term *kāraka* to a thing like *erka*, etc., Gopinātha explicitly states that it is simply to imply the non-difference between *Sakti* and the object possessing *Sakti* that things are popularly comprehended by *Kārakas*.

He has further raised an important point. There is, strictly speaking, no such rigid principle as to restrict the use of certain *Kārakas* to particular things, because the subjective element, such as the intention of the speaker, appears to be a prominent factor that often regulates the use of *Kārakas*. Thus one and the same thing, such as *asi* (sword) may be either used as *kārka* or *Kāraṇa*, according as the

¹ एव वृद्धिः । विषयानामात्रः । एव विविद्यतः वारके विविद्यतेऽप्यनुरक्तं एव ।—Prabhāt.

² एव वृद्धिः वारकः । विषय वाचि वारकः । विषय वाचीनामात्रे वारकः ।—Prabh.

३६५ उप वृद्धिः वा का विविद्यतेऽप्यनुरक्तः । उप उप वृद्धिः वृद्य विविद्यतेऽप्यनुरक्तः ॥

—ibid.

speaker intends to imply by the operation of the active agent or that of the instrumental (*acitkhanī* and *arīkā chinī*) with regard to the action (*cutting*).

A word is only needed to ascertain the precise number of *Kārakas*. Hari has referred to six manifestations of *Sakti* corresponding to the six *Kārakas*. *Sakti* is essentially one and indivisible. It is *avidyā* or falsity that makes it look like different. The ultimate unity of *Sakti* is only cognisable on the disappearance of *avidya*. The whole world with all its diversities is only a materialised image of the infinite *all-Sakti*. Viewed from a transcendental standpoint, the so-called division of the world as *external* and *internal* has no real meaning. The word *Kāraka*, as used in grammar, seems to be an underivable one (*acaryapūra-sabda*)¹ that is restricted to the neuter gender only. That *Kārakas* are six in number requires no further explanation. But Gopinātha seems to have shown some ingenuity in pointing out the possibility of reducing this number to five and ultimately to two only. *Kārakas*,² he suggests, may be divided into five classes, according as

¹ एविद्यावपदात्मानो हरात्मै एवाहृति, एविद्याविषये नेत्रवेत्तम् प्रवाप्तारे एवं शीर्षवान् :—Hallikāja, under the Vidyasphidya, K. 5. 20.

² कारकावस्थोऽप्यन्युक्तस्य निमित्तवर्तीः कारकावस्थुऽप्यविषयः—Padī (Hallikāja) on the rule 291 (Kāraka).

³ कारकं वृक्षं अनुविकाशान्विकाशसेवत् परमित्यः सूक्ष्म निमित्तं स्वात्मवाच्यं परं विकाशात् च—Padī (Hallikāja, Kāraka).

they are represented by substance, quality, action, class and the essential property. They may, again, fall under two categories, viz. *matabda-tāya* and *paratāba-tāya*, as they are denoted by their respective technical terms or by some other words.

Of all *Sādhanas*, *kārty-kāraka* or the nominative case is taken up first, as one having direct connection with the action. Considering all those qualities that go to constitute a *Kāraka*, *kārty-kāraka* alone seems to be primarily connected with *kāryā*, and as such, is the *kāraka par excellence*. The aphorism of Pāṇini defining *kārty-kāraka* lays much stress on the independent character (*svatantrya*) of *kārty* by virtue of which the agent is distinguished from the rest. Patañjali expressly takes the word *svatantra* as an equivalent of *pradhāna* and explains such *pradhānya* with reference to the characteristic non-dependence of the agent on any accessories, so far as the performance of an action is concerned. It is to be particularly noticed¹ that cases like *Karaya* and *Adhikaraya* are but auxiliaries that bring about the completion of the action under the direct operation of the subject. The agent, on the other hand, is not similarly subservient to those instruments of actions in the strict sense of the term. This is why *kārta* is called *svatantra* or self-dependent in opposition to the rest, that

¹ भरतस्मै च वाच्यनिर्विवरेण स्वतन्त्रे वाक्यम् :—Halākṣa on Vākyā, 8. 98.

are more or less *paratastra* or dependent on the agent. Patañjali has referred to both *svatantra* and *paratantra* and rightly observes that the entire question of dependence and independence is practically based upon the intention of the speaker.¹ Thus, as a matter of fact, one and the same object may be treated either as the limit or separation (*avasthi, i.e., Apādāna*) or as the agent of action (*valakshet
vidyatate* and *valaksho
vidyatate*²). We now draw an example from common experience. Just as the representatives of a king appear to be subordinate in the presence of their king, though they are independent for all practical purposes when they work independently of the king in their respective spheres of activities, no *ekātī* may be taken either as *svatantra* or *paratantra* according as it is intended to be spoken of either as *pradhāna* or merely as an auxiliary in relation to the action. *Vivikja* or the intention of the speaker being thus an important factor that determines the nature of a *Kāraka*, we are allowed to use the word *ekātī*, for instance, as *Karta*, *Karma*, *Karaya*, and *Adhikaraya*. From what we have seen above, it is sufficiently clear that in view of the preponderance of *ricakṣa*, the word *svatantra* in the rule *svatantrāḥ karts* should be taken as

¹ वर्णनात् वाक्यात् 'प्रत्यय' च विविधः—Mahabhasya, Vol. I, p. 225.

² Mahabhasya, Vol. I, p. 225.

³ वाक्यादीना पक्षा तद् समवति प्रत्ययः, अथै वाक्यान्—Ibid., p. 225.

implying *svakāra-śākākṛtya*, as opposed to the inherent or natural non-dependence. When the speaker, Bhattoji says,¹ intends to transfer the usual operation of the agent to *Kārakas* other than the agent, it is not unlikely that cases like *Karaya*, and *Adhikaraya* may be grammatically used as *Karī* having *śākākṛtya* in their respective functions. How are we to understand the super-independence of *Karī*?² The answer is not far to seek. It is a matter of ordinary experience that even when all the requisites (fuel, utensils, water, fire, etc.) for cooking are brought together, we are not practically allowed to say *pacati*, i.e., 'cooking is going on,' unless and until the cook is at work. This is an indication that accessories of action, such as are represented by *Karaya* and *Adhikaraya*, etc., have to depend on the agent so far as regards the completion of the action. Though there is no contention regarding the independence of the agent, we should not lose sight of the fact that cases like *Karaya*, etc., have an independent aspect also, so far as their respective efficiency is concerned. Wherein, then, lies the superiority of the subject?³ The

महा चोदयालियक दीप्तिमिनु कृष्णर वर्णन्नामने न विवरणीति तदा कारणात्-
प्राप्तिः वर्द्धं संक्षा वर्गमें व्याप्तमर्ते छुट्टन्नवाद—Siddhanta Kaumudi, Bhasya
644—चाही एक्षोर्ति चित्तवारपत्रम् वर्त्तम्, कार्याति वैष्णवौति वारचत्तम् कर्त्तव्यम्—
Mahabhasya, Vol. I, p. 325, and प्रस्तुतं वारचत्तमिवरत्सोः चतुर्मात्रः—
Mahabhasya.

^१ यह दुर्जनीयता कर्ता व्यापकिति ? क्य लेने शरणे यतिहासिक वर्ता प्रसंगिता समझ—Mahabharata, Vol. I., p. 226.

• अस्त्रीयमि स्वाप्नि स्वप्नाम् शोक्षः पर्वे गृहणः

subject has certain special features or properties, as are clearly shown by Hari,¹ which serve to distinguish it from other *Karakas*. As an efficient cause of action by itself, the agent does not derive its specific function from any other accessories whatsoever, but renders such instruments only subservient to its operation. The so-called independence of cases like *Karaya* and *Adhikaraya* is only borrowed from that of the agent; the accessories are employed by the agent desirous of attaining the accomplishment of action, and their functions are liable to be stopped as soon as the agent ceases to work. The supreme independence² of the agent is also clear from the fact that the agent, like *Karaya*, etc., cannot have a substitute without a change of action. Moreover, the agent is allowed to have its operation unimpeded even when no other instrument of action is sought for, but the reverse of the case is impossible, that is to say, *Karaya*, etc., are not competent to accomplish the action independently of the agent. Helārīja³ makes an important observation here. He says that the independence of the agent is

¹ करकः इतिवाचन् अद्यतात्मकाह्वा॑। तदीनाहप्रियम् प्रतीति
विकारात् । बहुताम् उत्तिष्ठेत् परिषेवा॑ च वाचाम् । कराद्युपासिते अप्यन्तः
स्तुद्यते ॥—Vakyapadiya, p. 98-100.

² करवर्तीन् उत्तिष्ठितः । वर्तु च वाचे—Helārīja and वाक्यकारियो
विविधी वर्ते ।

³ एष उत्तरवाचेष चर्तुः करवर्तीना विविधी विग्रहीयतात्मकाह्वा॑चि—
कामः । प्रथमविविधात्मकाह्वा॑ एति इत्येवं वर्त्तते च तु वरवादेः कराद्यु
पासितावीष्टेः—Helārīja on the Vakyapadiya, p. 98-100.

so prominent that the instrumental or *Karaya*, though more closely connected with the action than the agent itself, is not popularly designated as such.

While *independence* (*svatantrya*) is explained with such a breadth of implication and the agent made a repository of so many properties,¹ we can hardly preclude the apprehension as to how inanimate objects such as *agni* and *ratha* in *agnih dhati*, *ratha gacchati*, etc., can legitimately be taken as the agents. Bhartrhari seems to have his answer ready. It does not necessarily follow, he says, that objects possessing those properties are only capable of being regarded as agents, but what is plausible from a grammatical point of view is that anything, whether animate or inanimate, may be used as the agent, only if such properties are verbally attributed to the object in question.² It is from the use of words that the agent is comprehended. It does not matter much if such grammatical agents are found to have no innate relation with those properties which are usually ascribed to them. Further, as a system of study entirely devoted to words and their popular signification, grammar does not care so much for strict adherence to reality or

¹ व्याख्यातिः ग्रन्थे निष्पत्ति न तु चरमः। वार्तृपर्विषयात् चर्चाण करो प्रवीचते।—Vākyapadīya, 3, 100.

² शब्देन स्वैरां धनोः असम्बन्धे न करो—Halasija.

agreement of thought with truth,¹ but takes words and their meanings as they are popularly used. The real factor that accounts for such transference of properties to inanimate objects, is, as we have already pointed out, the desire of the speaker himself. As the independence of the agent is a matter of *visakha*, one and the same thing (as the soul) may be used, as in the example *ātma-nāmatma hanti*, either as the subject, the object, or the instrumental. Under the *Vārtika*, *ātma-snākyoge karmakarṇaḥ karmādarśat*, Patañjali has clearly shown how one and the same soul may become both the subject and the object (*ātmātātuṇi hanti*) according to the desire of the speaker. The differentiation of the soul, as in such a case, is far from being real, but is only comprehended by different forms of the word (*ātmāvom*, *ātmāne* and *ātmā*). As there is hardly any contention regarding the unity of the soul, of course from the Vedānta standpoint, we are justified in raise the question what destroys the soul and what is really destroyed by the soul.² It is curious to note how Patañjali has advanced arguments in support of the duality of the soul. Self has, he holds, two distinct forms,³ namely, corporal soul (*sūkṣmātmā*) and intellectus.

¹ ए तु ननु व्यापत्तका परोपादिता व्यवस्थेऽपीतः । विनाचेतनाविद्या
चित्तविदि वदी व्यवस्थास्त्री च विद्युत् च विद्युत् ।—Hebbelji.

² Cf. शास्त्र इति न इत्येवे ।—Oliver.

³ चाचु तु कर्मात्मा इति, ची व्यापत्त इत्यात्मा । इत्यात्मालाभवनात्मा वरीत्यात्मा च ।
—Habellius, Vol. II, p. 68.

soul (*anārātmā*); the corporal soul performs those actions whereby the intellectual soul enjoys either pleasure or pain and vice versa. Kaiyata's observation on this point:¹ difference of souls is here actually meant and not the agency and objectivity of one and the same soul. According to the Sāṃkhya system, *antardhīna* is the same as (*anātakarasa*) intellect, which is said to be active; the Naiyāyikas, on the contrary, take *puruṣa* to be *antarātmā* on account of its being the active agent, unlike the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyites.

The instance *akūro jīyate* (a sprout is growing) presents another difficulty. There is much controversy regarding the question whether it is really *existent* (*sat*) or non-existent (*asat*) that comes into being. This question, as is well known, embodies the first philosophical enquiry² about the genesis of the universe that had early engrossed the attention of the Vedic Rsis in the remotest period of the intellectual history of mankind.

The reference is to the well-known *Sat-vāda* and *Asat-vāda*. According to the *Sat-vādins*, it is *sat* or something having existence that is produced (*endeta jīyate*); the *Asat-vādins* hold, on the contrary, that it is *asat*

¹ सत्त्वा द्वयाप्यमिति न लेखने च कर्त्ता वृत्तिः च । वैष्णवो चतुःकर्त्ता द्वयाप्यमिति वृत्तिः । तु देवस्थाकर्त्तुमात् । देवादिवाप्यमिति एवी तु पूर्ववाचानात् च एवमन्तरामेवि विवरितः ।—Kaiyata on the Brāhmaṇa.

² यदा रथम् चासीम्, चरमा दृष्ट्वा चासीम् ।—(Cf. Nāṇādīva Bākta) Trishatīgopanisad, 2, 7.

that comes into existence. A thing seems to be non-existent before it is actually produced. This kind of non-existence is called *prāgabhāva* by the Naiyāvīkas. Again, what is *sat* is not liable to destruction, and it is equally true that nothing comes out of nothing.¹ *Sat* is one of the three aspects with which Brahman is usually conceived by the Vedāntins. *Asat* or *abheda*² is also maintained to be the ultimate cause or final principle by a section of the Buddhist philosophers.

The sprout is found to have no existence before it grows;³ and it is not therefore strictly correct to assume a non-existent thing as the agent of the verb *jāyate*. To get rid of this difficulty we should either explain the production of the sprout on the assumption of existence however unreal, or depend entirely on the desire of the speaker as what accounts for such transference of existence. Moreover, the word 'sprout' is used in like instances by the speaker, as if the sprout were already existent. The order in which the six *bhāṣapikās* have been arranged by Vṛṣṭyāyapi evidently shows that *asti* presupposes *jāyate*,⁴ i.e., a thing cannot be said to be existent before it is produced. But it does not strictly represent a correct view.

¹ अस्ति निष्ठौ वासी नामादी निष्ठौ चतुः ।—Bha, 2, 65.

² ब्रह्माभावाद्यपिलोक्यत्वं वाक्योऽपि ।—Nyāya Sūtra, 4, 1, 11.
ब्रह्माभावी वाक्यं एव वज्रिण्यत्वम् ।—Nyāya-Saṅgraha.

³ उत्पन्नः दावदात्मो मुदारकानिकानः । उत्पन्नः सर्वेष वाऽसत् उत्पन्नः ।—Vākyapadīya, 3, 108.

⁴ न वाचादीश्वराद्यत्वे ।—Dvijā, under Niruktā, p. 46.

In course of explaining the expression *jāyati* *iti pūrvadhācayādīmācute*, Darga does not fail to observe that *jāyate* also comprehends existence.¹ The reason is quite obvious. A thing that is non-existent is not capable of being produced. We can, however, assume a causal connection that serially links one *bhāva* with another. The ultimate reality (*bhāva*) is the final cause of which these *vividhas* are only different manifestations. There is only one *bhāva* or *satta* that permeates through the entire sphere of existence. *Kriyā* implies an action having both prior and posterior stages. *Praeśparya* is to be understood with relation to time and space. *Prajātī* means accordingly a collection of actions all tending to produce the same result (conjunction with a particular space). *Jāyate* and *asti*, *viparyate* and *caardhate* and the like are all related to each other. A thing first comes into being and is then said to be existent and so forth. Having shown their mutual relation, Darga concludes with the remark that *jāyate* means only *production*² and not the next stage (existence), which invariably comes in association with the idea of *jāyate*.

According to the Buddhist philosopher,³ a *kāryava* has to destroy itself before it can bring into existence a *kāryā*. The sprout is

¹ ए भूमिकामो कर्त्तवी ।—Darga, under *Niruktā*, p. 45.

² आपसि विद्या इद्यो विद्या विद्या विद्या ।—Pād.

³ ए विनाशिते विद्ये कर्त्तव्यविद्ये विद्ये ।—Nyāya-Niruktā under *Nyāya-vātsa*, 4. 1. 14.

found to grow only when the seed is destroyed. As long as a seed remains a seed, there does not grow a sprout as such. The destruction of the seed is, therefore, the immediate cause that gives rise to a sprout.¹ What we gather from this trend of arguments is that a sprout grows from non-existence of the seed² (*abheda*). As it seeks to trace the origin of all things to a huge nothingness or nihilism, this view was rejected by all orthodox teachers.

The *Nātyāvikas* argue in the following way : It is really out of a seed and not out of its final destruction that a sprout is produced.³ A change of physical composition is brought about in a seed when it is about to give birth to a sprout. The seed is not essentially destroyed but some cells are developed in it wherefrom the sprout is formed.⁴ The seed is, therefore, to be considered as the material cause of a sprout. Here the agency is to be understood as pertaining to *kārya*, i.e., what is produced (sprout). The sprout is supposed to have intellectual existence before it is actually produced. As a matter of fact, the material existence of the sprout before it is actually produced is contrary to all experience; but it must be admitted that the

¹ शीतिकांजोद्युरवाचेविदि — *Nyaya-vartika*.

² अमात्यादाने जापते :—*Ibid.*

³ एवं च शीतिकार्यं तु सम् :—*Ibid.*

⁴ शीतिकार्यला पूर्णप्रसिद्धी लक्षण्याद्युपासी च च अकाल्याद्युपासी चर्तविशेषीति :—*Ibid.*

solution suggested by the grammarians refers more to the use of words than to the actual state of things. The grammarians¹ have repeatedly drawn our attention to the fact that they unhesitatingly take the meaning usually denoted by a word as its real significance and do not insist upon the material validity of such meanings. Here the science of grammar bears close comparison with the deductive logic which, as we know, is more or less concerned with the formal side of the proposition (as opposed to the material truth). An expression like *golden mountain*, though the material existence of what it denotes is really questionable, does not practically lie beyond the scope of the deductive logic.

Bhartṛhari seems to have approached this question from a different point of view. It is shown with reference to the *Vṛttaśāstra* how the cause is changed into the effect and is said to be *svayate* in the shape of *kāryam*. He seeks to establish the non-difference² between the cause and the effect as well as between *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* (substance and its modification). This is another problem of much philosophical importance to decide whether it is the cause or the effect that is to be considered as *sat*. Some hold, as the

¹ वाचस्पति हि भद्रस्त्रियः—Bhāskara.

² वारदं वार्दनमिति एव एव अविकृतेः । वार्दनमेतत् वार्दु वार्देनाम् वार्दी । *Vṛttaśāstra*, 3.151. Bhāskara has the following:—वर्तिष्ठाम् द्वार्दे वर्तिद्वयं एव चक्षते । वार्देकरण्योः प्रदृशितिवार्दनम् चोरं द्वयं वार्दनम्, द्वेष्टव्युपै चक्षते चक्षते द्वयं वार्दनमिति क्षम्यामास्तावाद्वयाद्वयादिव्याकरणाम् काहन्विति ।

Naiyāyikas, the cause to be *sat* and look upon the effect as essentially different from *īś* (*asat*). The Śāṅkhyaites take the effect to be real (*sat*), i.e., as what represents the cause only in a changed form. According to this view, *kārya* and *kāraṇa* are the same as *prakṛti* and *nिकृति*. In contradiction with the view that an effect is virtually different from its cause, Hari maintains identity between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* and *prakṛti* and *nिकृति* on the ground of such instances as 'milk is turned into butter,' and 'the seed is transformed into a sprout' in order to show that the cause and the effect are not distinct entities, but represent only different phases of one and the same object. In accordance with this stand-point, the expression 'a sprout is growing' should necessarily imply that the cause which has existence is what gets transformed (in the form of *kārya*) at a later time. This explanation seems to be based on the so-called *परिगमन-वद्दोन्न* as expounded by the Śāṅkhyaites.

Referring to the difference of the cause and the effect,¹ Bhartṛhari has attempted to show how *anikuta* may be viewed as the agent. It is an indisputable fact that the sprout, as an individual (*vyakti*), cannot be supposed to have existence before it is produced; but it is equally true, we must admit, that the sprout,

¹ जातिकारकदोन्नेवादिप्रति वाचोऽपि चीर्ण विविहूसनात् ।—Bhartṛhari.

भौतिकीयं वा अपि वाचेभ्यः प्रत्येति । सत्र जगत्पर्वतिष्ठेत्वा तत्त्वाद्य व्याप्तिः ॥—Vidyasuddha, 106, and जगत्पर्वतेष्व च व्याप्तिष्ठेत्वा व्याप्तिः ॥—Bhartṛhari.

viewed as a class, is comprehended to have perpetual existence (cf. the Nyāya conception of class as an eternal entity). What we learn from Bhartṛhari and Hellvinja regarding this point is that the sprout (a sprout is growing) appears to be the agent when taken as a class, and that it is said to be a product when it is viewed as an individual. The agent and the object that grows are, according to this interpretation, not different from each other, the former representing a class, and the latter representing an individual. The seed develops into a sprout or assumes a formal change in the shape of an effect. Moreover, the class and the individual being mutually dependent, we are not justified in taking one as distinct from the other.

The discussion on such a nice point does not, however, end here, but has practically given rise to a far more complicated question. It is really difficult to say whether *prakṛti* or *citṛi* should be taken as the agent of production, because there is no consensus of opinions with regard to this problem. A careful examination of facts,¹ it must be remembered, goes to show that both the cause and the effect might be treated as the agent according to the nature of *vivikṣā*. In an instance like 'milk is turned

¹ प्राति-स्तुतिचिकित्सापादः एवेऽपादेकरणम्: शब्दोदयितः :

—Hellvinja.

निष्ठानो वस्तुः यस्मां नास्ति विद्यते । निष्ठानं विद्यत्वात् लोकं विज-
ग्नीते ॥—Yuktapadīya, 3. 113.

into curd' (*kṣīram dadhi sampadyate*) we find that the relation in which *prakṛti* stands to *vikṛti* is one of co-inherence (*sāmanādhikareṇya*). An expression like *bijamākuro jāyate* is sanctioned only to show the non-difference between *kāraṇa* and *kārya* or *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. A sprout is not materially different from the seed wherefrom it grows; it is only an aspect of the seed or development from a crude form into a bulky one. *Mākuro jāyate*, therefore, means that the cause (seed) which is *set* gets a new life (*jāman*) or reveals itself in the form of a sprout. Now there arises a doubt as to which of them is predominant in relation to the other. It is necessary to find out the dominant one, as it is dominant or *pradhāna* alone that is to be regarded as the agent in connection with the verbal form. There are practically two different views, namely, one supporting the agency or *karikṛtva* in favour of *vikṛti*, and the other upholding the agency of *prakṛti*. *Vikṛti*¹ comes to be regarded as the agent, when there is absence of co-inherence and the words denoting *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* are found to have different case-endings (as in *bijat mākuro jāgata*). The rule *janikurtvah prakṛtih*, Pāq. 1.4. 30, which undoubtedly ascribes the agency to *vikṛti*, may be explained here to show not only the formal but also the material difference between *prakṛti* and

¹ श्रद्धिरात्रां गु अभिष्टः प्रतिविकृपत्वमनुष्ठानं वाचविमर्शः। अभिविकृपत्वा गु अभी विकृपत्वः...विकृपत्वमनुष्ठानः—Gadkāra.

vikāra. The agency of *vikāra* is also clearly pointed out by such expression as *mātraya nāmāpadgate yātīgāḥ*, i.e., *mātram jāyate*. What is deducible from these popular instances of grammar¹ is that *vikāra* is directly connected with the action, and, consequently, treated as the agent; and that *prakṛti* has only indirect connection with the action and is generally used in the ablative case in order to prominently bring out its difference from *vikāra*. The expression² *saṅkārapīṇḍajah kūṭjale bharataḥ*, where the number of the verbal form agrees with that of *vikāra*, serves to strengthen the view that *vikāra* alone should be used as the agent. But examples are not, however, wanting to show also the agency of *prakṛti*. The expressions *sāṅghibhāvanti Brāhmaṇādāḥ* and *ātmanāmāpadgate* clearly indicate how *prakṛti* is used as the subject. Now it is almost clear that both *prakṛti* and *vikāra* are entitled to be regarded as the subject, according to the nature of the examples.³

The discussion on *Kārikas* in general, and *kārtṛ-kārikā* in particular, will be hardly complete and exhaustive without an adequate reference to the logical method of interpretation. The Naiyāyikas, specially the followers of the *Navya-nyāya*, such as Jagadīśa and Gudādhara, have supplemented the study of grammar in a

¹ वृत्तिपूर्ण जागृत—कार्यक्रम विकारस्त्रियं विकारवस्त्री व वृत्तिः।

Heldrija.

² *Mānabhāṣya*, L. L. I, Vol. I, p. 7.

³ *Nātyapādikā*, *Kārikā*, 3, 114-115.

large measure ; they have dealt with the problems of grammar in their characteristic fashion with the result that niceties of an incomprehensible nature were sometimes allowed to mar the perspicuity of the subject to such a degree that the study of grammar ultimately passed through a completely different channel at their hands.

To do full justice to their labour, it must be said, however, that they have practically given, as it were, the finishing touch to the interpretation of certain problems of grammar and have undoubtedly shown a new line of thinking and approaching a problem. The advent of the *Navya-nyāya*, with its characteristic tendency to abstrusities and a peculiar stock of technical terms, opened the portal of a new realm of thought which has more or less influenced all later philosophical speculations. This influence, as is quite evident, is nowhere so prominent, as in the case of later commentaries on philosophical treatises and grammar. The last phase of grammatical literature, both in language and mode of interpretation, seems to have been moulded by this process of thinking. Such well-known grammarians, as Nagesa, Bhattoji, Koplabbatī, Durgasidhu, Gopinātha, Susepa and others, are supposed to have been thoroughly acquainted with the *Navya-nyāya* line of arguments.

As the logical method of definition is free from all defects and scientifically accurate, the grammarians have conveniently followed it in forming

the definitions of grammatical categories and concepts with the obvious object of getting rid of the so-called *atīcāpti* and *avycāpti*. How far the grammarians have assimilated and absorbed this particular process of thinking and the line of arguments is borne testimony to by the fact that if any modern grammarian is asked to give an accurate definition of *Karma-kāraka*, he would not possibly say *kartṛvīpsitotamah karmā* or *yat kriyate tati karma*, but would give his answer in the strictly logical form, i.e., *kriyā-janya-phala-saṁśleṣa karmavat* and so on. Jagaddīśa's *Sabda-nākta-prakalpa-Nikā* and Gadadhara's *Vyutpatti-viñoda* are two important works that give us purely logical interpretation of the grammatical problems; Durga and Suṣeṇa (two well-known commentators on the Kālāntara system) have also dealt with the problems of grammar from a strictly logical point of view.

The logical definition of *kārtṛka*¹ is *kriyā-dravyātmaḥ kartṛyata*, i.e., the agent is the substratum of action. This is based on the assumption that the action is generally denoted by the root, and the idea of a substratum follows from the suffix *-īk*. As this definition is likely to prove the agency of time also which is the final substratum of the world (*kālo hi jagadā-dhāraḥ*), Suṣeṇa² has made some improvement

¹ धर्मलेप सम्याक्षराद्याद्यावस्था—Durga (Kālāpa-Tīrtha) and धर्माद्यावस्था चर्चा।

² धर्मलिपि कर्त्ता कर्त् तस्म भवान्वयत्वे विषय धर्मावस्था—*Kālāpa* under the rule 230 (Kālāpa).

by adding *prādhānyena* to the aforesaid definition. The state of being a substratum of action is not a correct definition from a grammatical point of view. If so, the objective case, affected as it is by the action, may also be treated as *karta*. The definition finally suggested by Suṣeṇa is as follows : *prādhānyena ikātucdoyavāyapāravat्तम्* (*karta* is the main substratum of action as is denoted by a root).

To show an instance how the logical process of arguments has its application in grammar, we give below the summary of a discussion on the definition of *Kartṛ-karaka*. There arises some difficulty with regard to the definition of *Kartṛत्वा* as given by Sārvavarinna (yah *karoti* et *karta*, *Kalpa*, 220), because this rule is not, strictly speaking, applicable to such instances as *ghato bhucali*, etc. (the pot does not do anything but is simply brought into existence by the agency of the potter). The logical definition is not even sufficient to solve this anomaly, inasmuch as the adjunct *kriyātrayatvam* is equally applicable to *Kartṛ* and *Adhikaraya*. It is, therefore, necessary to add the expression *sākṣat kumbhakena* (by direct association) to the above definition in order to differentiate *Kartṛ-karaka* from *Adhikaraya*. The reason is that both the agent and *Adhikaraya* are used as the substratum of the action (*kriyātraya*), the difference lies in the fact that the subject is directly or primarily connected with the action, while *Adhikaraya* has only indirect association with the action.

(through the operation of the agent). But the train of arguments and counter-arguments does not end here. The additions of *sākṣat sambandha* is not, however, sufficient to make the point clear, because in an instance like *gata baddheā gauriyate*, the locative is found to have been the direct substratum of action (binding). Now it is necessary to make further addition to the definition (*ananya-prayajyata*) for the purpose of eliminating both *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. The special characteristic,¹ which serves to distinguish the subject from the cognate ones, like *Karana* and *Adhikarana*, is the super-independence² of the agent, i.e., the agent is capable of accomplishing the action without depending on the so-called accessories.³ The agent presents itself in three forms, namely, *Buddha*, *prayojaka* or *ketu*, and *karmakarita*.

Both *Karana* and *Adhikarana* are intimately related to the agent; they help the agent in the accomplishment of the action. In accordance with the definition of Pūṇi, *Karanya* is held to be the most important or indispensable of all accessories that help the agent in bringing about a completion of the action.

¹ वाती कार्यकर्त्तव्यात् कारण इत्याचेति... प्रयोजकी ये वाती कारणादिभूगताः, तथा एव सूक्ष्मिक प्रयोजकात् कारण, कारणादीना तु अस्तिविनिर्दिष्टात् प्रयोजकात्—Heldtje,

² कार्यकर्त्तव्यात् कारणादिभूगताः प्रयोजकात् कारणादिभूगताः—Kanti, 282 (Edd.).

³ कारणात् एव कारणाकारणादीनां वाती कारणात्—Ibid.

Patañjali in his characteristic fashion has anticipated certain objections against the desirability of retaining the suffix *tamop* after the word *sādhaka* in *sādhakatāmā karayam*. If *Karaya* is said to be, Patañjali argues, merely an accessory and not the most important one, the undesirable consequence will be that all *Kārakas*, by virtue of their direct or indirect association with the action, will be entitled to receive the designation of *Karaya*.¹ It needs hardly be pointed out that all *Kārakas*, as the very term implies, are practically ~~in~~^{with} many accessories (*sādhakas*) with reference to the accomplishment of the action. The use of *tamop* (superlative degree) is not therefore meaningless, because it serves to differentiate *Karaya* from other *Kārakas*. Again, it may be further argued that the sense usually conveyed by the suffix (*atitayya*). i.e., excessiveness, is also comprehensible even in the absence of that word. We can justify this point of view by an illustration drawn from popular experience. As, for instance, when one says 'a daughter' should be given in marriage to a handsome person,² what we necessarily understand is that the person spoken of should be 'perfectly handsome' (*abhirūpaloma*), though the word denoting excess or *super-excellence* is not explicitly mentioned. Similarly, the word *sādhaka*

¹ तुम्हें कारवेत् वरदर्शक वरामेत् तद् वरदैव ते कारवायि
कारवायि—Nishabhaṇya, under the rule Pāṇ. J. II. 42.

² एविष्याम् भवा देव...तात्पर्याकालेति वर्णते—*Ibid.*

might be alone sufficient to denote as much meaning as is usually expressed by *sādh-karana*. Now what follows from this discussion is that the suffix *tamap* is redundant. The rule *sādhakarana-karayam* might be reduced to *sādhakarana-karayam* without any alteration of the meaning. But it cannot be denied that Pāṇini had some particular object in view so far as the use of this suffix is concerned. What Pāṇini¹ likes to indicate by the use of *tamap* is that the suffixes (denoting degrees of excellence) *tarap* and *tamap* should have no application in the rules defining *kāroka-amṛtāñjīvā*, or, in other words, the *Paribhāṣā* (*gaṇya-mukhyayor-mukhye kāryasam-pratyayah*) should have its application restricted to this rule and not to any other rules belonging to the section of *Kāraka*. This is why the grammarians do not insist upon *apāya* or physical separation alone (according to the strict interpretation of the rule), but also acknowledge the validity of intellectual separation (*buddhi-kṛtāpāya*) in the determination of *Apādāna*.² Similarly, the rule *vidhāro'dhikarayam* is not only applicable to *śleṣa* (*ślānam*), but comprises such instances also where the entire substratum is not pervaded by the thing inherent.³

¹ वाचस्पदतःसा तदन्तर्मोहो च धर्मविवरणमि शिष्यं प्रस्तुत—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pdo., I. 4. 42.

² सांख्येन्द्रियः दाटनोदुष्कृत अभिभूतरः ।

³ नानादः बीजः, शृणु पर्युक्तम् ।

यथा छतुर्मुखापात्रावाचार्यो महावैः तेजैश्च परम् शिष्यो हेतु कर्त्रि मर्हिगिरिः । गद्यानां नामः, शृणु लोकुभिस्त्वय च लाभः—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule I. 4. 42.

Wherein lies the superiority or relative importance of *Karaya*? Those that help the agent in the accomplishment of the action are grammatically called *upakāraka*; of all such *upakārakas*, *Karana* is decidedly the most indispensable accessory¹ that comes in close contact with the agent (*sannipat�opakāri*) in course of operation. The relative superiority of *Karana* is mainly due to the fact, says Bharībhari,² that the accomplishment of the action actually takes place immediately after the operation of *Karaya*. The part played by *citakṣet* or the desire of the speaker in the use and determination of *Kārakas* in general has already been referred to. Bharībhari³ emphatically lays down with special reference to the Instrumental case that it is not possible to say (with regard to a thing) that this is always *Karaya* and this is not, as if it were fixed by the rules of grammar. It is the desire of the speaker that practically accounts for the use; as, for instance, one and the same thing (as *sthāti*) might be used both as the substratum (*sthalyām pacati*), and as the instrumental (*sthālyā pacati*) according to the desire of the speaker.

¹ करयि विद्विद्यी शूलि परमाणुं वातिष्ठने तत्त्वं पृथुं प्रहृष्टीवकारक-
मन्तरा विविते तदेव वर्तमन्तरा।

² विकायः स्त्रिविद्विन्देवत्प्राप्तवाच्यतः। विस्तव्ये ज्ञा तज्ज करकं
नदा गृह्णत्।—Vikyapadiya, 3, 92.

³ करुत्वदिवेऽपि न हि अप्य विविद्यतः। वात्त्वा वच्च उभया विविद्या
हृष्टते एव; ५—Vikyapadiya, 3, 90.

In accordance with the definition as suggested by the Naiyāyikas, *Karaya* is the same as *Kāraya* (*vyāparacat kāryam karayam*) only with this difference that *karaya* is closely associated with the action, i.e., cause, when it is actually in operation to bring about the accomplishment of the action, is what is called *karaya* in grammar. Gaudīdhara maintains that the words *karī-
vyāparādhanata* should be added to the above definition (*vyāparacat kāragash karayam*) so as to clearly indicate the subserviency of *Karaya* to the agent. An accessory (as *Karaya*), as we find, cannot accomplish the action unless and until it is set to work by the agent (*karī-vinigraha*). This being the actual state of things, one may possibly bring forward the argument that it is more plausible to attribute the adjunct *sādhakotata* to the agent itself in preference to *Karaya*.¹ Bhartṛhari² meets this objection by saying that the primary function of the agent is to employ the accessories to operation which, thus engaged, immediately accomplish the action. This is to show how *Karaya* comes between the agent and the action, and, consequently, has greater proximity to the operation than the agent itself.

¹ वास्तुविभेदोन्नीतरकामे नारदमार्गा वाहचेदपि अल्प कहुयै यामहतम् व्याख्याति—B. B. D. J. 2.

² सावधेऽप्येऽप्यनिकारमार्गस्य व्याख्यातः। करयन् हि वाचां प्राप्ते व्याख्यातीये ह—Vidyāpūrvak, 3. 98.

* विनिष्ठीनो हि वर्त्त्याभ्यतः।

Now it is sufficiently clear why *Karaya* is said to be *sādhakatāma* in relation to other accessories. Bhārtubāni has again alluded to the preponderance of *civokpa* and the difference between the agent and *Karaya* by referring to the example *asidhiuatti* (where the function of the agent has been attributed to the instrumental), viz., sword, with a view to indicate the independent activity or excessive power for accomplishing the action on the part of *Karaya*). In the above example, it should be noted,¹ the sharpness of the sword comes to be regarded as *Karaya* when the sword itself is used as the agent.

Though apparently synonymous, *Hetu* and *Karaya* are, however, distinguished² by the grammarians, the criterion of such difference being 'the invariable association with the notion' on the part of *Karaya*. The first and foremost thing necessary for a *Kāraka* is to have close relation with the action. *Hetu* generally gives the idea of a substance and has practically no invariable connection with the action. Bhattoji³ has clearly elucidated this distinction. A substance unconnected with action is called *Hetu*, but *Karaya*, as a form of *Kāraka*, is

¹ यसाद्वौषा तु कर्मे नैकादि कर्त्ता इतः—Vikyapadiya, 8, 24.

² इमं दिव्यवाचे देवः वात्सं विभवत्विद्यन्—Ibid.

³ इव तद्वयात्प्राप्तं विभवत्विद्यन् एवं च विद्युत्स्वरूपम् ।

कर्त्तव्यं तु विभवत्विद्यन् विभवत्विद्यन् एव—Bhattoji under the rule
Pao. 2, 2, 23.

necessarily found to have connection with the action. *Hetu*, to speak the truth, is the cause (*samatvāyikārana*) pure and simple, and continues to be so as long as it does not come in close touch with the action, but the moment it does so, it ceases to be a *Hetu* and becomes a *Karana*. The Naiyāyikas have agreement with the grammarians on this point. Gadaḍhara takes *dharanena kalam*, *vidyayā yataḥ*, etc., as instances of *hetu*, since *dharanā* and *vidyā* have no direct association with the action (*kriyāyagābhāṣat*). Jagadīśa has, however, taken a slightly different view. He insists that even the third case-ending in *dāyātēna ghaṭeḥ* is really indicative of *Karana*, though *dāyātēna* is not grammatically regarded to be a *Karaka* as such,² obviously for the absence of relation with the action. On the ground of having close proximity with the action, *Karana* is virtually the same as cause (*janaka*).³

Under the rule *hetvarūpī*, Durgasibha has clearly shown what is meant by *hetu* in an instance like *anūnena carati*. So far as the popular usage is concerned, Durga maintains, a thing, though not actually connected with an action that leads to the final result, is called *hetu* simply on account of its having capacity for the accomplishment of action (*phalamanispādāgyānnapi kriyāyogya tayoḥ hetvarucyate*). *Hetu* is of

¹ तदेव यस्मान्युपरिचयोऽप्यत्रैष्ट्विकाराः प्रत्यक्षान्विद्यान् ।—Gadaḍhara's *Mīmāṃsā* under *Kar.*, 71.

² यद्यपि एव दायात्रेण विद्यान् विद्याः—Gadaḍhara's *Mīmāṃsā*.

various kinds. One that intimately connects itself with the accomplishment of the action is termed *Karaya*. *Suzeps* has referred to two-fold *hetu*—grammatical as well as popular. The nominative case of a verb used in a causal form (as *kārayati*) is an instance of grammatical *hetu* (*kārayati yah iti hetutca—Kulipā*). A *hetu*, in its popular sense, is an object that is capable of performing the action favourable to the result (*phalonādhanayogya-padartha*). *Hetu* means capacity and not actual connection with *kriyā*.

Adhikaraya is the substratum of action. What is popularly known as *adhara* or substratum of action is technically called *Adhikaraya* in grammar. There is, however, some difference between the popular and grammatical conception of *Adhikaraya*. According to the popular usage, substance,¹ quality and action are all comprehended by *Adhikaraya*, but in grammar the word is often used in a specific sense, i.e., *Adhikaraya* is said to be an accessory (that indirectly helps the accomplishment of the action) that forms the substratum of action only indirectly. Bhartṛhari lays much stress on the dependence of *Adhikaraya* upon both the agent and the object and defines *Adhikaraya*² as an *upakaraka* or accessory that becomes the substratum of action only

¹ शीर्षिरिवरथमतिरेप्य इन्द्राद्युष्मिनः विषयविधीयते—*Hētaḥpaṭa*.

² कर्तव्यं लक्ष्यतामदातु भासेत् विषयः। समर्थस्तु विषयितो यत्ते-विकारां चूतम् ॥—*Vākyapadiya*.

through the intervention of the agent or the object, and serves, though indirectly, to accomplish the action.

We actually find that the effort or the action principally inheres in the agent and partially in the object; consequently they form the real substratum of action in the strict sense of the term. This is why Bhartrhari¹ has used the expression 'through the medium of the agent and the object,' and has thus made it sufficiently clear that *Adhikarana* is only indirectly related to the action. Intimately related to *ādhara*, is *ādharya* or what inheres in the substratum. The relation in which the inherent stands to the substratum is manifold, such as conjunction, inherence and so on. But Gadadhara² has here raised his voice of objection so far as 'conjunction' is concerned. He argues in the following strain:—the relation between *ādhara* and *ādharya* cannot be one of conjunction (*sauyoga*), for, if it were so, there would be no criterion to distinguish the one from the other, that is to say, *ādharya*³ also might be treated as *ādhara*, as the very idea of conjunction comprehends two things (*sauyogasya dvishaktat*).

Patañjali has divided *Adhikarana* into three classes, namely, *vyāpaka*, *upastegika*, and *taisayika*. Of these, *vyāpaka* is the principal

¹ बहुवाक्यविद्याम्—समा फले वर्णि प्रतिपादी—*Mahabhas.*
Vākyapadiya, 2. 1. व्यदिक्षरप्त्यधिकारः।

² आपादांशकान्वय न संस्कृकिदिक्षरप्त्यधिकारः—*Vyāptipatiśāstra*.

³ कुष्ठाविद्योदिनोः प्रतिपादेऽप्यकामापात्तवाच्छ्रू—*Ibid.*

form of *Adhikaraya*. An expression like *tiletu teilam* constitutes an example of *vyāpaaka*. The special feature of this class of *Adhikaraya* is not only that the inherent (*ādheyā*) and the substratum are related to each other by co-inherence (*samacāya*), but also that the entire space of the substratum is pervaded by the inherent. 'Devadatta is sitting on a mat' is an instance of *upasṭeṣṭika*, because here the agent sits only on a part of the mat and does not occupy the whole space. Here the relation between the inherent and the substratum is one of simple conjunction. *Paisayika* is expressed by such examples as *mokṣe icchāti* (there is a desire for salvation). Hebbelja has cited the *takṣṇayāḥ* as an instance of *paisayika*, and observes that it does not strictly come under *upasṭeṣṭika*, because the sky being one and indivisible cannot possibly have any parts. The so-called division of *Adhikaraya* as *ādhipika* denoting proximity does not really form an additional class. Helīraja has explained the sentence *Gangāyāṁ ghoṣak* as an instance of *upasṭeṣṭika* that indicates the residence of *ghoṣa* in certain parts of the bank having close proximity with the current of the river.

Adhikaraya is generally denoted in grammar by the seventh case-ending. Both Jagadīśa and Gadādhara¹ hold that *saṃtāni* indicates *ādheyatea* (as is implied by the *Adhikaraya*) or

¹ विद्युत्तमस्मान्—व्यापत्तिरिदा.

the state of being the inherent.' *Saptamī* has more than one meaning in grammar. In an instance of *dhāve saptamī*, the seventh case-termination precisely signifies 'contemporaneousness of action' (*svayakālīnatā*); in *carmayi dṛḍhipinam hanti*, *saptamī* denotes *nimittatva* or 'the state of being the cause' and so on. There is, however, some inconsistency with regard to such examples as *vिद्यम् sabbah* and *karve sabbah*, etc., because there is no verbal form so as to clearly give the idea of a *Kāraka*. Qadfallur rightly observes that in cases like these, where the verbal forms denoting an action are not explicitly used, we are forced to understand such verbs as *dhāta'i*,¹ etc., in order to explain the *Kāraka-sibhakti*. But the grammarians also seem to have the same answer, as they have taken recourse to the dictum² according to which a verb, though not expressly mentioned but only understood, is even said to be competent to account for the case-ending.

From a grammatical point of view, *Kārakas* are denoted by *sibhaktis*. A question is, however, raised by Bhartṛhari,³ if *sibhaktis* have any signification of their own so as to indicate the nature

¹ वाक्यसर्वं पात्रवाच्यान्वये इति—Vyākaraṇīśāstra.

² पंतु कामवाच्यान्वये एकाव वाक्यीकरणात् । वाक्ये वाक्यविकीर्णोपारेव सर्वादः । —Vyākaraṇīśāstra.

³ वाक्यान्वये विद्या कारकसिद्धी कर्त्तव्या ।

• वाक्यान्वये वाक्यविकीर्णोपारे उपर्युक्ते ॥—Vākyapādya, K. 2, 2, 43.

of *Kārakas*. The meaning¹ is expressed by a word taken as a whole and not as a composite of two parts, i.e., *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. Attention has already been drawn to the fact that the meaning of *Prakṛti*, as in *erka* and *erkaṇa*, remains the same, while the sense usually denoted by the case-endings, i.e., *abstratum* and *instrumentality*, only seems to be different. But the decision of the grammarians is of a peculiar nature. Since they hold that the meaning is expressed by a word as an indivisible whole (*akhaṇḍa*), the grammarians have given their verdict in support of the unreality of *pratyayārtha*, as distinct from *prakṛtyartha*. It is, however, contrary to the usual principle of grammar, because we find that the meaning of a *Pratyaya* is related to that of a *Prātipadika* in order to determine the nature of a *Kāraka*. What is, therefore, plausible is that the meaning of *Pratyayas*, as distinguished from those of *Prātipadikas*, is a fact that can hardly be denied. As the whole discussion on *Kārakas* depends on the assumption of meanings on the part of the case-endings, the meaning of each *nibhakti* has been specifically shown by the grammarians.

Papini defines *Karman* as what is sought to be obtained by the agent as the most desirable

¹ चरेत्पुरि एकान्तं उपे तदविद्यादी विकल्पात् वाचस्पतयम् परिचयः। यत्र तत्र च विमोक्षयात्तदन्। वैष वामिदिवालोक्यादी चक्रादी इट्टारी नवान्वेद्याणि विभागितिः। वाकाद्यसूत्रोऽनपत्तरोऽपि। चाचनस्त्रवद्विवृद्ध्य-
राज्ञीदृष्टि वाचस्पतयः॥—Hollis under the Vākyapadiya, 2d, p. 49.

thing. According to the logical conception, *Karmaṇ* forms the substratum of the result as is produced by the action (*kriyājanyaphalaśabdītām*). As it is not always the most desirable thing alone that the agent likes to obtain, Pāṇini had to frame another rule (Pāṇ., 2.4.50) to make provision for such cases as *vigam dhūmkle*, where an undesirable thing like poison is even used as the object. But Patañjali thinks that this rule might be done away with, as the preceding rule is capable of being interpreted in such a way as to apply to all these instances. His arguments stand on the following facts :¹ sometimes swallowing of poison also happens to be desirable on the part of a certain man. It is not unlikely that a man suffering from various kinds of distress (as poverty, bereavement, etc.) may be compelled to take to poison as a desideratum or relief; the swallowing of poison is as desirable to him as other eatables. Patañjali has finally arrived at the conclusion that the negative particle 'in *anipśita* does not indicate simply the opposite, i.e., undesirable, but denotes anything other than the desirable.

In the Kāṭaṇṭra system, *Karmaṇ* is defined as what is done by the agent (*yat kriyate tat*

¹ निष्पत्तयमि कर्मणीर्थान् दात् । यद्युपात् एव एव ननुष्टो दुःखार्थी अप्यति शोऽधानि दुःखावग्निकामा निष्पत्तयमेव अप्यति ननुष्टो ॥—Nabābbhūya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 50.

² अ॒द्याचोत्तं वद्यन्तीर्थावग्निकामा—*Ibid.*

Karma), and neither Sarvaverman nor Durga has spoken of such divisions of *Karma* as desirable and undesirable. Susema has made some important observations in connection with the interpretation of *Karma*. Following the method of the *Naiyayikas*, he defines *Karma* as forming the substratum of the fruit produced by the action (*kriyānyaphalabhaṅgītām*). A careful examination of examples will, however, show that this definition is only a tentative one, and is not absolutely free from defects (*atreyāpti*). According¹ to the strict wording of the definition, the extent of the objective case would be so wide as to comprise even the agent, for, in an instance like 'Deradatta is going to the village,' we find that the fruit of the action, i.e., conjunction, does not accrue only to the object (village), but goes to the subject also as equally partaking of the fruit. It is, then, necessary to make further addition in the definition so as to render it applicable exclusively to the object.² The additional words *parasamavetata* would serve to distinguish the object from the agent in this respect that the former is the recipient of the fruit of the action that relates to others, viz., the agent (that is to say, the action is first brought into existence by the agent, the fruit

¹ श्री यशस्वि देवदत्त ग्रन्थी विजितान्वयवर्णदेवदपवक्षमित्ताम् श्री-
यामल वास्तव तथा कर्तव्य वाचः। एति भैरु परामर्दितिवाक्यवक्षमित्तामि-
त्तम्।—Kārikā (Kārtika) or 219.

² परामर्दितिवाक्यवक्षमित्तम् वक्षमित्तम्।—*ibid.*

whereof next accrues to the object). This is, however, not sufficient to preclude possible vagueness and misinterpretation, for, if the word *para* in *parasamavata* is taken to imply something different from the substratum of the fruit (*phalatrayābhinnata*), the village, as in the above example, would not have legitimate claim to be treated as the object. When this definition also proves insufficient for reasons stated above, Suṣeṇa at once suggests another which runs thus: ' *Karman*, though it does not directly form the substratum of the action (like the agent), comes to partake of the result produced by that action. But the example *parvataśevarohati* (descending from a mountain) furnishes an obstacle in the way of accepting this definition as the most accurate one. Because in the above example (i.e., descending from a mountain) the mountain, though unaffected by the act of moving, is practically found to be the substratum of the fruit of the action (*vibhaga*), i.e., separation. Consequently, it should be treated as the object and not as *Apādāna*.' But grammar does not sanction such an usage.

Prompted by a strong desire to suggest a definition that would not involve any defect whatsoever, and aided by his intimate acquaintance with the logical method of argument.

^१ तात्पुरिकामध्येष्टो चति उद्यमित्यावनकाशुभास्त्रित्यवित्ति।—K. २०५।

- परंपरागति व्यवस्थाएँ अन्य व्यवस्थाओं परिवर्तन के बहुत ज्यादा संबंधित हैं।

Saṇęga has afterwards said the last word on the subject.¹ He says that though it does not comprise in itself the action, *Karman* is the recipient of the fruit of that action as it is qualified by the meaning of the root. Here *qualified by the meaning of the root* is to be taken as an adjunct of the 'fruit.' *Avacchedaka* means something like *attribute* or the object for which the action is resorted to (*yadudditya bṛīḍ pravartate*). The act of descending has *conjunction* with the *posterior place* as its result, which does not pertain to the mountain (*ūttaradēśasākhyogaśc parvate na vidyate* etc) so as to make it the object of the verb *avacchedati*. The mountain, so to speak, is the substratum of separation (*vibhagātraya*), and is not consequently entitled to get the designation of *Karman*. This is, therefore, the most accurate definition conceivable, from both the logical and grammatical points of view, that applies to all examples of *Karman*.

The association with the fruit is the criterion whereby roots are divided into two classes,² namely, *sakarmaka* and *akarmaka* or transitive and intransitive. A root is said to be *sakarmaka*, when it denotes an action leading to the fruit, and *akarmaka*, when it denotes

¹ कार्यित्यन्वयमेऽपि चलतोर्बन्धेष्वकीयत-वृत्तिसामन्यज्ञानादिभूतस्तिति।—Kāvyaśā.

² असुः इवापच्छिम्यानवाचिते उद्धि चक्रेवता, विश्वामायारविचिते सम्पर्केवता। एवं

विश्वामकेदर्थं असु चक्रं वाचो विश्वामितः
सदैव कर्मसामुष्यं कर्मदुश्चापद्मेणः॥—Kāvyaśā.

only an unqualified action. Thus, when we minutely follow the line of thinking, as revealed here, and consider the cogency of those arguments whereby definitions after definitions were rejected till one was found acceptable, our wonder is really excited to a great extent for what has been done by the Indian logico-grammarians.

Karman, it must be remembered, has got the widest and most varied applications in grammar. Just as *sashti* is allowed to be used as a substitute for most of the *vibhakts*, so *Karman* is the only case that may grammatically replace all the rest.¹ It is expressly enjoined by the rules of grammar that *Karman* should have the preference to other cases (when it is so intended by the speaker). The examples of the so-called *doikarmuka-dhāta* (viz., roots having double objects) furnish evidence how *Karman* might be used in the place of *Apādāna*, *Sampradāna*, and *Adhikarana*.² The indirect objects in such cases as *gām dogdhī payah* might be treated quite as good as an *Apādāna-kāraka* and so on.

There are, broadly speaking, seven different forms of *karman*,³ namely, *nirvartya*, *vikārya*,

¹ वाक्यसिद्धि पृ.—Pāṇ., I. 4. 51.

² या शीघ्र पदः, कलित्य तृतीयापर्वता: तु च त्रै च नेत्र, विवित्य एवं लक्षणप्रवेशः। अन्यकर्मकर्ता च उच्च, विवित्य तृतीयापर्वता।—Mādhyādhyāya under the rule Pāṇ., I. 4. 5L

³ विवर्तयन् च विवित्य च विवर्तयन् च इति।

तत्त्वविवित्यान् वर्त्तमानां विवित्यान् ॥—Vidyāpadīya, Kāra., 3. 45.

prāpya, andātīnya, anpalito, sañjīvāntara-nākhyāta and *anyapūrvaka*. According to Bhartṛhari, the first three are to be regarded as principal varieties and the rest are more or less fanciful (*kalpita*). (i) *Nirvarṇya* generally means what is brought into existence by an action. We have a *nirvarṇya-karman* when the word denoting *prakṛti* or material cause,¹ whether existent or non-existent, is not expressly mentioned. *Ghaṭam karoti* is an example of *nirvarṇya-karman*. Here we find that *prakṛti* or material cause, whether existent or non-existent, is not expressly mentioned. We notice that *Prakṛti* or material cause (i.e., earth) of the pot is not expressly said to have assumed the shape of a pot (as *mr̥ydā ghaṭam karoti*) by way of modification, so as to show the non-difference (*abhedā*) between the cause (earth) and the product² (pot). Now, what is desired by the speaker is to show as if clay and pot were different (as in *mr̥ydā ghaṭam karoti*) or the product were not a modification of the cause. *Prakṛti* is existent, but is not actually said to have undergone any change so as to re-appear in the

¹ कर्ता या विद्युतम् या स्फुरित परिकल्पी ।

वस्तु वाचीकृत तथा विवेचित वस्तुते ॥—Vakyapadiya—

² वस्तु विवेचक चटादैः चक्रिः वस्तु या यस्तु यदादिकां चक्रिवस्तु या परिकल्पयन्नदिका चक्रिदेव वाचीकृते, वस्तु चट वाचीकृतेष्वव्यवहारा न विविधा, किं वाहि ? यस्तु चट वाचीकृतिस्मैषैः ॥—Bellutta—

form of *kārya*. When the modification (*purvijñāna*) of *prakṛti* or cause is intended to be expressed, we have *vikārya-karman*, as in *mṛdā ghaṭam karoti*, *kṛtū kaṭam karoti*, *aṅgirāṇ bhrama karoti* and so on. It should be, however, remembered¹ that *ghaṭam karoti* may also prove to be an example of *vikārya-karman* to those who take the product or the effect only as a transformation of *prakṛti* or the material cause. It is difficult to determine what really comes in existence (*sat* or *asat*). The question of production and existence with particular reference to their mutual dependence has already been discussed. What is now produced, some hold, was non-existent previous to its production (*asat*). Again, some hold that it is really existent (*sat*) that is produced (*satēva jāyate*).

According² to both these views, *Karman*, as manifested or brought into existence by the activity of the agent, might be regarded as *nirkaryna*. Those who are *satkāryavādins* like the Samkhyaites are likely to support *nirkaryna-karman*. A thing that comes into being by some sort of action or is simply manifested by its birth (*jātiśand gat prakārata*) is called

¹ एष कर्तुर्गैवत्यानि विद्यते परिवर्तिते विषयादेवितः।

—Vaijñānakarabubhūṣaya.

² सत्त्वात्मकी वसा अन्तर्बन्ध वा विकल्पे च वस्ते वेदां इति विज्ञानम्।—Utkyopadīya, 3, 42.

nirvartya. Here *jāman* implies the manifestation of something that was previously existent, as *putram prasāte* (giving birth to a son) necessarily means the birth of a son that was existent before delivery in an embryonic stage. But when *prakṛti* is intended to be expressed by the term *jāman*, what is produced may be looked upon as *vikṛta* or modification in relation to *prakṛti*.

Vikṛtya-karman is so called because it appears to be a modification of *prakṛti* or material cause. *Vikṛta* means a change from one state to another and presupposes existence, i.e., modification pertains to things that are already existent (*labbha-sattaka-mevāvasthāntara-mūḍyate*). It is principally of two kinds,¹ namely, (i) as produced by the entire annihilation of the material cause (*prakṛtyuccheda-sambhālam*), as in *kṛtīkṛti bhūma karoti* (reducing the fuel to ashes); and (ii) as characterised by some different properties or qualities (distinct from those of *prakṛti*), as *svarnam kandalam karoti* (earrings are made out of gold).

Quite in agreement with the definition of *nirvartya*, the expression *bhūma karoti* is to be taken as an instance of *nirvartya*, since *prakṛti* or material cause (fuel), of which ashes are only modification, is not expressly

¹ निर्वर्त्यैवेदन्तु विविधं वाचामिकावरम् । विविधं वृक्षानांस्त्रुपाणा
तुष्टीविविकरणम् ।—Vikṛtyapadiya, 2, 60.

mentioned. In the first case *prakṛti* is found to have entirely lost its own self in course of modification. That the difference between *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* is only formal¹ and not material is made clear by the example *svapnam kṛṣṇālambanam karoti*. Those who support the view² that product or *vikṛta* has its existence in the cause (fuel) in the shape of effluency are not likely to differentiate *prakṛti* from *vikṛti*, assuming *causes* to be already existent in the fuel.

From a strictly Vedāntin point of view, *kṛṣṇālambana* is *vikṛta*, as opposed to *vikṛta*, because it differs from gold only in form but not in essence. From what we have seen above, it is clear that there is, strictly speaking, no remarkable difference³ between *nirvartya* and *vikṛtya*, as the instance *ghāṭam kuroti* has been explained in both the ways; the difference is mainly created by the desire of the speaker. A *Karman*, as Helārjña clearly points out, is called *nirvartya* when *prakṛti* is not directly mentioned (by the speaker), and the same is called *vikṛtya* when *prakṛti* is expressly mentioned.

¹ वाचित् शब्दविवरणवृत्ति यद्यपि नव्यावस्थारूपात् विभेदेन्द्रियौ—Helārjña.

² वाच्याख्ये वाक्यावस्थामन्त्ये विभेदेन्द्रिय स्थानः वाक्याद् । ते वा वारचेषु एवं विभेदेन्द्रिय स्थानात् विभिन्नात् ॥—Kavīrjña (Kālīga).

³ वाच्यानि यत् वर्तेति, विभेदेन्द्रिय कर्ते विभेदविवरणः । विभवात् ॥ विभावेत् ॥—Helārjña.

(3) *Prāpya*, i.e., *prāpya-karman*¹ is that wherein the action of the agent does not produce or give rise to any special feature or quality. Usually we have a *prāpya-karman* when the action does not produce any *vīśea* or change comprehensible either by direct observation or inference. A *karman* in its ordinary grammatical sense is known as *prāpya*. In *ādityam pātyati*,² mere perception serves only to suggest a relation between the action and the object observed, and nothing like *vīśea* is cognisable. In the case of a *nirvātya-karman* as *ghāṭam karoti*, the speciality that is (*kriyākṛta-vīśea*)³ perceptibly brought about by the action is the production of the pot. But sometimes inference also helps us to get a specific cognition, as one can easily determine through the help of inference whether a man is enjoying pleasure or not only by observing his facial features. But in an instance of *prāpya-karman*, such as *ādityam pātyati*, we find that the action (seeing) does not bring about any change or special feature in the sun.

Some, however, do not recognise anything like *prāpya-karman* on the ground

¹ विद्यावस्त्रविद्याव विद्याव एव अस्ति । एषामस्तु विद्याव एत विद्याव एव ॥—Vidyāpadīya, B. 61.

² इदं देवकर्ता विद्याप्राप्तवान् एव विद्यावो विद्येषः, विद्यां तु विद्याव एव विद्यावान् विद्येषः ॥—Halakāja.

³ वाचः विद्यावान्वयनमेव विद्याप्राप्तवान् वाचः कर्ता । विद्यावान् विद्याप्राप्तवान् तु कर्त्तवी, न च च एव विद्येषः ॥—Bhā.

that the action is invariably followed by some sort of changes, whether directly perceptible or comprehensible by inference only.¹ Even the simple act of seeing is sometimes attended with *vikāra*. Snakes² are proverbially said to have poisonous look; whoever is eagerly seen by them, though not actually bitten, is sometimes found to be in an agony of pain.

(1) *Auddhaya*.—It is what is done by the agent through indifference; as, for instance, a man while going to a village may happen to touch a straw on his way (*grāmam gacchan tyām spṛtati*), though in so doing (touching) he has got no particular object in view. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has illustrated this class of *Karma*.

(2) *Adipsita* or undesirable *Karma*.—This has been explained in connection with such examples³ as *cītam bhrūkite* (taking poison).

(3) *Anākhyāta*.—This, too, has been explained with reference to the rule *akāthitam ca*.

(7) *Angopārakāni*.—This refers to those cases where *karma-kākās* are specially sanctioned by the rules of grammar in the place of other *kākās*, as in *kr̥namablikruñihyati*, etc.

The objective case also admits of other divisions, such as direct and indirect, in

¹ यत्तेष शब्दकम् चर्तुर विशासविभिन्नात्मात्मा ।—Harttja.

² रुद्रविद्वैतिविद्विरीक्षो विस्तो अवन्मात्रतीर्ति च कर्ते ।—Ibid.

³ Fig., 1, 4, 56.

connection with those roots that comprehend two objects. We have already alluded to the condition (the desire of the speaker) under which *Karaya* and *Adhikaraya* might be used as the subject. There are instances like *pacyate odanah*, *īyate kedārach*, etc. where the objects are found to have practically changed into the agent. The so-called agent is known in grammar as *karmakarṭa*.

Heloraja has spoken of two more divisions of *karman*, namely, *antaranga*, as denoting things, and *bahiranga* as comprehending such objects as time. Some intransitive verbs¹ (*ōste*, *scopiti*) are allowed to be governed by only such objects as denote particular time, country, path and action. Therefore, in grammar² intransitive verbs are those that can have no other objects excepting time, country, etc. Bhatīhari is not prepared to take these as regular objects; his contention is that it is impossible to conceive of any objects in connection with the intransitive verb. What appears to be reasonable on a minute examination³ of such examples as *indśamāste*, *kurūn scopiti*, etc., is that their *karmakarṭa* is,

¹ वाक्यानीयोदयवक्ता: कर्मसंवा पूर्वसंबोधः—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 296.

² केवा देवकासुदिग्भिः कर्म न संप्रवति तेऽपापन्न वा:, न विद्यमानीनोदयः—Śabdānīkālakāṇḍa under 1. 1. 52.

³ विकल्परोपेषु तेषां कर्मस्तु—Halākhala. आपातिकत्वात् विषमाद्यात् कर्माद्योगी अनुट्ठीत नामस्तु—Halākhala.

strictly speaking, due to their implied relation with some other verbs as *vigāpya* meaning *lasting for* (understood). According to this interpretation, the expression *mīśamīśte* really means *mīśanti vīḍyāgāste* (staying for a month).

Patañjali has referred to another form of *Karmas*, namely, *kalma*,¹ which means 'an unaccomplished object' (*aparisomāplam karīna*). These irregular *Karmas* (as are illustrated by the rule *akalitītān ca*) take *deśīyā* as their only characteristic feature, but do not generally receive all those grammatical operations which are applied to the regular objects alone.² Kaiyata observes that the term *kalma* was used by the ancient grammarians as a technical name for those objects that are mentioned and recognised as such by the rule *Pāṇ., 1.4.51.*

Apoddāna is that form of *Kāraka* which denotes the limit of separation. The definition of Pāṇini (*Pāṇ., 1.4.24*) deserves careful examination, specially with regard to the word *dhrura* as occurring in the *sāitra*. The word *dhrura* generally means 'motionless,' but this sense is hardly compatible when the limit of separation is also found to be in motion,³

¹ विशेषं ग्रन्थानि तद् यत् यस्मीन् विशेषं—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 335.

² च भूमित्वा वर्णेति वर्त्त्वे वर्त्तिति विशेषं, विशेषं, विशेषं।

³ गविदुजेवपादामसु तो वीक्षणेऽपादाम—*Vāc. ad. the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 24.*

as we say 'fallen from a running horse.' Here both the horse and the rider are equally in motion and, consequently, it is not possible to have the cognition of a fixed limit so far as the act of separation is concerned. How, then, are we justified in taking the word *śūla* in a sentence like 'fallen from a running horse' as an instance of *Apādāna-kāraka*? Patañjali holds that there are also some stationary or permanent elements in the horse, such as the genus (*dhvato*) or the state of being a horse and 'the swift motion' which are said to be the implication of the speaker in a sentence like *dhvato'tvāt patitah*. He thus makes it clear that in like cases what the speaker desires to indicate refers really to *dhvato* or motionlessness and not to the opposite.

The word *dhr̥ṣṭa* should not be taken in its strictly literal sense,¹ i.e., motionless. Of two things, namely, the limit and the object that is actually separated, the former, i.e., tree, as in *ṛkṣāt paryam patati*, is more or less unaffected by the act of separation; consequently, it is grammatically called *dhr̥ṣṭa* in relation to the leaf that falls down as the result of separation.

Bhartibari has stated clearly that *Apadana* forms the limit of separation, whether movable

³ यह तावद्वयवासन प्रतिकृति—उसी वरदाने द्वारा भाष्यकारी वह शब्द इन्हें लिखते हैं।—Mahabharata, Vol. I, p. 827.

" द्रव्याभासी व जीवनिति के व्योगी हैं। " परमार्थवज्र श्रीकृष्ण लालचिन्द्र-
विष्णु।—Vakyapadiya, 3. 3. ८ 'कृष्ण' विजितभित्ति द्रव्याभासी दीप्तिभित्ति
त एवं अस्तेवापन—Muktika.

or fixed (*calam* or *yandi* *reclining*) and that the limit, though the substratum of separation, is not practically affected by the operation of the wind which is the direct cause of separation. In the example *kudyañt palatoñcit patitah* both the wall and the horse are to be regarded as *dhrusa*, the former constitutes the limit of separation in regard to the falling of the horse, and the latter in regard to the man who falls down from the falling horse. The word *dhrusa* is thus used as a relative one; it does not necessarily mean an absolutely motionless thing, but generally what remains more or less unaffected in the course of separation. When separation is brought about by the reciprocal action of the two, as in *apāgāmto nṛgūḍapasarati meghaḥ*, each of them is to be considered as *dhrusa*¹ in regard to the action of the other.

It is necessary to make one point perfectly clear. In the oft-quoted instance of *Apādāna*, viz., 'a leaf is falling from a tree,' the relation, it must be remembered, between the tree and the leaf is one of simple conjunction and not of co-inherence (*samatāya*), that is, we have *Apādāna* only when the leaf happens to be brought over the tree either by the wind or by birds, but not when the leaf stands in an inseparable connection with the tree.

¹ अपादानापरिवर्तनम् १८५, १८६। अथवा अपादानम् अपादा
न एव परिवर्तते—Vikyāpallīya, 3. 6.

When, on the other hand, co-inherence is intended to be expressed, we get *sasya* instead of *pāṇḍita*, as in *vrksasya paryam palati*.¹

As the act of separation equally affects the tree as well as the leaf (the very idea of separation comprehending two objects), Sūṣṭupa argues that the leaf also may have the designation of *Apādāna* in such a case. But it is against the desire of the speaker. Moreover, *paitcamī*¹ in *yataḥ* is indicative of limit, which, in the fitness of things, applies to the tree and not to the leaf. Sūṣṭupa² then suggests a logical definition of limit—' though practically unaffected by the operation (of the wind) that relaxes the connection, the limit or *Apādāna* forms the substratum of separation.'³

Separation may be either physical or intellectual. Patañjali has recognised the desirability of acknowledging the intellectual separation and has, consequently, rejected some *nūtras* and *vartikas*, such as Par., 1.4.35, 1.4.36, 1.4.27, 1.4.28, as superfluous. In accordance

प्रथम एवं द्वितीयों वर्षों में विहरिता :—*Vikramaditya*, द्वितीयों पर्वत काली अध्यात्मीयों में विहरिता, तृतीय वर्षों में विहरिता :—*Hallika*.

² अदीपेति स्वतन्त्रानि या कल्पवृक्षः ।—Kālpa. Kṛtak. 214.

* बृहदार्थ त्रिपुरा विधानसभा में विवाद उत्थी पारल। यह परम्परागतीय विवाद है, क्योंकि इसका अधिकार संसदीय विवाद का एक उत्तराधिकारी विवाद है।

४ वरमिलू—सिंहासनदीपुराणाद्यविभाषणे कृति निर्मात्रमन्त्र।
—कल्पना।

with his view,¹ the rule *gṛhṇatāmapdye'pādānam* is quite sufficient to explain all those instances that are usually supported by the additional rules.

Bhartṛhari speaks of three kinds of *Apādāna*,² namely, *nirdigñatiyam*—when the limit of separation is fixed, or, where the sense of separation is directly denoted by the verbal form, as in *gramaddīgacchati* (coming from a village) and *atāt patītah* (fallen from a horse); *upāttavatiyam*—when the sense of another verb appears to be either principal or subordinate, as in *calahakat̄ vidyatate* (lightning flashes forth from the cloud); *apokṣitakriyam*—when the act of separation is to be understood, as in *kuto bharām* (wherfrom do you come)? Here the verb like *dgacchati* is to be supplied.

Sampradāna is that form of *Kāraka* which is desired (by the agent) to be the recipient of the fruit of ownership (*svātā*) pertaining to the object of the root *da* (to give). Suśeṣa explains *yanabhibhrāti* as what is connected with the action (*daridri*) by the instrumentality of the objective case. *Abhibhrāti* gives the idea of a relation which is, in the logical terms, thus expressed: a recipient of the fruit, i.e., ownership pertaining to the object of the action (*kriyajanya-karmaniṣṭha-avatāphalabhbhāgitram*).

¹ य एव गतुः देवास्तुष्टारी वर्णि च पक्षि तु जीवान्ति कर्मेभ शक्तम् शीर्षः । य वृद्धा संसार निवासे । य इष्टवध्यनेऽपादानमित्येव विवरः ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāg., 1, 4, 94.

² निर्दिग्निकर्ता द्वि निर्दिग्निकर्ता यता ।

परिविकर्ता वित्त विवरादाव्युक्तिः ॥—Vākyapādīya, 3, p. 126,

According to the interpretation of the Vyut-pattivāda,¹ the example *viprāya gām dadati* (giving a cow to a Brāhmaṇa) will mean 'a Brāhmaṇa who is the object (*uddesya*) of the desire for gift which is made with the intention of making him the recipient of the ownership of the cow, as is effected by the act of giving.' *Sampradāna* is, therefore, the same as *uddesya*,² i.e., a person to whom something is made over. This is clear from the language of the rule *yaamai ditaś*, etc. (Kālāpa, 216).

The word *sampraddna* is treated as an *anvarthasamjñā*, i.e., it means exactly the same thing as is denoted by its derivative meaning (*saṃpradīyate yātne*). It is a gift¹ (*dāna*) by which the previous owner transfers his legal right to another. Prayer,² acceptance and inducement are considered to be the causes that persuade a man to make a gift of his own right. A gift¹ in the religious sense of the term should proceed from a desire for either worship or favour as in *devolāyai puṇḍram dadati* (offering flowers to a deity) and *bhrityaya tastram dadati* (giving clothes to a servant), when in so doing the person to whom something is made over is entitled to the actual ownership.

- ३ वात्सल्यविद्यालयकी विद्यालयविद्यालय वामपुण्यविद्यालयी वाराणसी ।
- ४ वामपुण्यविद्यालय विद्यालयी वामपुण्यविद्यालयी वामपुण्यविद्यालयी ।
- ५ वामपुण्यविद्यालय वामपुण्यविद्यालय वामपुण्यविद्यालयी । —Kavīśvara-
- ६ वामपुण्यविद्यालय वामपुण्यविद्यालयी ।
- ७ वामपुण्यविद्यालय वामपुण्यविद्यालयी । दीर्घामीम संवीकाश वामपुण्यविद्यालयी ।

The word *Karman*, as in Pāṇ., 1.4.32, is used to exclude the objective case from getting the designation of *Apādīna*, since what is desired by the agent (*yam-abhiprati*) is a qualification that also applies to the object. It is generally explained as particularly implying the object of the root *dā* (to give), but the author of the *Bhaṣya* has taken it in the sense of action (*kriyā*) in general. He has also cited popular instances to show that the word *karman* is used with the same signification as *kriyā*.¹ *Kriyā* is sometimes called *karman*. As there is no difference of meaning between the two expressions, namely, *kim kriyām kariyasi* (what action will you do?) and *kim karma kariyasi*, one is allowed to use the word *karman* in place of *kriyā*. Patañjali calls it a kind of artificial (*krtr̥mī*) *karman*. It is called artificial² because its use in this particular sense is not sanctioned by the grammarians in general. If *karman* is taken to be synonymous with *kriyā*, one may apprehend some difficulty in explaining the rule Pāṇ., 1.4.49, since it is impossible for one *kriyā* to render another as the most desirable one (*katham ca nāma kriyā kriyepitataṁ syāt*).

¹ निष्पादि उपर्युक्ते—Mahābhāṣya.

² निष्पादि उपर्युक्ते—प्रतिक्रिया विषयतः कर्म उपर्युक्ते। अर्थं प्रतिक्रिया विषयतः कर्म उपर्युक्ता भवति? निष्पादि विषयतः कर्म उपर्युक्ता भवति? इह एव ननु एव चापूर्णार्थी विषयतः कर्म उपर्युक्ता विषयतः संज्ञेऽपि गच्छते; गच्छते चापूर्णार्थी विषयतः कर्म उपर्युक्ते विषयतः विषयतः कर्म उपर्युक्तिः;—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule 1, 4, 32.

How minutely Patañjali¹ used to observe the logical sequence of facts is clearly seen from the way in which he has shown the successive stages through which one kriyā or action may become the most desirable by means of another action. The usual order is as follows: a man first conceives something by his intellect, then he feels a desire to have it, next comes the effort which is followed by the actual commencement of action, then the completion or accomplishment of the action, and finally the attainment of the desired end.

As it is not always the case that Sampradña should be invariably connected with the object of the root *da* alone, Katyayana has added a Varttika² obviously to widen the scope of Sampradña. On the strength of this supplementary Varttika we are allowed to explain Sampradña even in the case of an Intransitive verb like *palye āśe*, where the root being an intransitive one, we cannot grammatically expect to have an object that might be connected with Sampradña as such.

Patañjali seems to have minutely scrutinised every part of the *sūtra*, Pdg., 2.4.32. He does not take the root *da* in its strictly literal sense (to give), nor does he lay much stress on

¹ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 220.

² विद्या कर्मिणि दीपि चक्रम्। Patañjali has विद्याकर्मणि चक्रम्, दीपि वा साम्—अत्र दीपि, ग्रन्थं चक्रमि।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 220.

the derivative meaning (*sampradīyate yasmāti iti*), but considers *Sampradāna* to be one to whom something is actually given. The instance *kṣiydya capetāni dadāti* ('gives a slap to the pupil'), as cited by Patañjali, is a clear indication that he held a far wider view of *Sampradāna*. It is not evidently the use of the root *dā* that always gives the idea of *Sampradāna*, because in the example *rājikasya castram dadāti* (where the genitive is intended by the speaker) the explicit mention of *dadāti* is not even attended with *caturthi* (*Sampradāna-kāraka*).

Suṣeṇa explains the rule Pāp. 2.4.39 in the following way :—*Sampradāna* is what is desired by the agent through the instrumentality of the object. It is neither 'the object of the verb in general, nor virtually the object of *dadāti* in particular wherewith *Sampradāna* is really connected; for, according to the first view, the village, as in *ajdm grāmām nayati* ('brings a goat to the village') would be quite as good as *Sampradāna*; according to the latter, the designation *Sampradāna* might be applied to the 'Washerman' in the example 'clothes are given to a washerman.' The anomaly presented by the above instances received an ingenious solution at the hands of Suṣeṇa. The drift of his argument is as follows: as the sense of giving naturally follows from the very

¹ विषयात्मक वर्णना है देखति, इसके बारे में 2 वाक्, चला चले काली—प्रथमी चान्दादि संवर्तनवर्तनात् । वर्ति विरीदि, रजतस एवं चलादी-विवरणतिवर्तनात्—Kavīkāja (54ra).

construction of the word *Sampradāna* (*anarthasamjñā*), the definition is not vitiated by the fallacy, viz., *atīyoga*,¹ that is to say, the village cannot grammatically have the designation of *Apādāna* owing to the absence of any connection with the root *dā*. Similarly, as the preposition *sam* in *Sampradāna* serves to indicate that *dadāti* does not mean merely giving, but signifies gift in its legal sense, i.e., the waiving of one's own right (in regard to a thing) so as to allow another to enjoy the same as his own possession, the washerman cannot be treated as *Apādāna* even in connexion with the verbal form *dadāti* (*dadāti* means here 'to make over' [*arpaya*], and not actual giving [*dāna*]).

Suzepa, therefore, explains *dāna* as a kind of 'desire'² to transfer one's right to another after the entire cessation of one's own right, and gives the accurate definition of *Sampradāna* in the following terms—*tyāgajanyasvastopalabhadgitram*, i.e., *Sampradāna* is the recipient of the result of right or ownership that is transferred by one by formal gift. He further asserts that the principal³ or direct instances of *Sampradāna* are

¹ एवम्, नेपदाविकान्वयेत्तदादा श्री-वार्णीः इत्यापार्थिवामै...एव; अप्य-कर्त्तव्य सम्बन्ध प्रतीतसे वर्णं वत् लोकादिभिः चुन्यता लोकान् चूलीचपात्रकामापाहाने इषातेरपि वाचने।—Kavirūpa.

² लोकतर्थं व्याप्तं परम्परागच्छित्तः संकल्पितो दम्भम्।—Kavirūpa.

³ एवम् एवं एव वाचाविक्षणं वरं सुखमिति वैतामनः। वाचाविक्षणं एव विवरणात्मेकं स्वीकार्यं वाचाविक्षणः।—Kavirūpa.

those where the transference of right actually takes place, and that in regard to other cases, it is generally the desire of the speaker (*rirakṣā*) that accounts for the use.

The validity¹ of *Sampradāna* in *pradyatām Dūdarthāya Maithili* (as Ravana had no legal right over Sītā so that he might be entitled to make a gift of her to Rāma) depends upon the desire of the speaker, i.e., it is said as if Rāvana had transferable right over Sītā. The fact is that one cannot give anything to another in the legal sense of the term, if he does not own it actually.

Bhartṛhari has spoken of three kinds of *Sampradāna* :—(i) *anirākṛit*—it means a kind of *Sampradāna* that does neither accept nor refuse what might be offered to it ; as, for instance, *Suryāya argham dadāti* ; this one neither solicits worship nor is likely to refuse it ; (ii) *prerakam*—i.e., what induces others to make over something to him, as in *ripṛḍya gām dadāti*. Here the Brāhmaṇa is supposed to have induced the man to make a gift of the cow to him ; (iii) *anumāṇī*—who approves of a gift, i.e., permits a man to make over something (though he does not actually request him to do so) as in *upāñjigāyāya gām dadāti* (presenting a cow to the teacher).

¹ इसके दरमानक विभिन्न व्याख्यानोंमें वास्तविकता की विवाद फैला रहा है।—
Kavirāja.

CHAPTER VIII

SAMĀSA

*Samāsa—definition—The meeting of *samskrita*, skirtibilities and cognates—Classification of *Samāsa*—Power of expressing the additional sense.*

The psychological principle underlying the formation of compounds and the unity of sense denoted by *Samāsa* has been considered in my "Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus." An attempt will be made here to show the grammatical side of the problem with particular reference to the conflicting views held by the *Naiyāyikas* and the grammarians on the question of the additional denotating power of *Samāsa*.

The word *Samāsa* literally means brevity,¹ i. e., condensed or concise expression. This grammatical device has the advantage of condensing a sentence without any change of signification. It must be, however, remembered that it is not only words, or more properly *nāmās*, that combine with each other in a compound, but their meanings, too, are so consistently related to each other (as noun and

¹ समाप्तं अनामः पूर्णः।

adjective) as to give rise to one qualified idea. Though composed of two or more *padas*, a *Semasa* produces only one idea in the mind.

According to the rule *samarthas padacidhīḥ*, Pñ. 2.1.1, which is quite as good as a *Pariśkṛt*, words are allowed to form a compound when they are found to be mutually expectant and their meanings compatible with each other. Sūrvārman has *nāmnāmā samāsa yuktārthaḥ*, which means that a compound represents the 'consistent unification of the meanings of two or more nāmans.' A combination of nāmans expressing a united sense is what is grammatically called *Semasa*. The meanings are consistently united when the words forming a compound are related to each other as substantive and attributive. The *kārikā*¹ quoted by Durga goes to show that *cideṣya* and *vigraha* in their harmonious association are only competent to form a compound. *Semasa*, holds Durga,² is distinct from a sentence. But it is generally expressed by a sentence (*vigraha*) only to help the understanding of unintelligent people. The word *samartha*, as used in the *śūtra*, is of considerable importance and has given rise to various interpretations.

Patañjali has explained *samarthya* from two different standpoints, namely, *vyapakṣa* or mutual

¹ निरेष्व निर्विष्व निर्विष्व तुष्टुपादि । यसामात् ॥ इति चाच्छिद्गोत्पर्जा
३५ ८ ।

² ए तु चाच्याद्यामात्मा चाच्याद्यामात्मा एव तुष्टा चाच्याद्यामात्मा चाच्या
तुष्टा चाच्याद्यामात्मा ॥—Kālpa, TII.2.

connection and *ekārthibhāva* or the oneness of meanings. He has made it abundantly clear with reference to all forms of compounds that no *Samsa* whatsoever is grammatically admissible in the absence of such *samartha* or competency. He has also suggested various meanings of the word *samartha* in order to show how the word might correctly be used to imply both *vyapekṣa* and *ekārthibhāva*.

According to his interpretation,¹ the word *samartha* may be used in the following senses, namely, consistent or mixed up (*sāṅgatīdrtha*), united (*sāmṛtēśārtha*), visible (*vīṇaprekṣīdrtha*) and connected (*sambaddhārtha*); the first two meanings indicating united into one (*ekibhūtam*) are agreeable with the *ekārthibhāva* point of view, and the last two indicating connection of meanings being harmonious with the *vyapekṣa* standpoint. So far as the *ekārthibhāva*² view is concerned, the word *samartha* should be taken as implying united meanings (*ekibhūtam*), and it brings out the sense of 'connected meanings' (*sambaddhārtha*) or 'reciprocally expectant meanings,' when *vyapekṣa* is considered to be the essential condition of *Samsa*. The word *samartha* indicates that words are not allowed

¹ Mahibhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2, 1, 1.

² एव तत् वारदैवतीर्थः तथाचे गृहः विष्णुः परिषमि संगताः समृद्धिः समार्थः समृद्धिः इति च वैष्णवानिं कर्मात्—Mahibhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2, 1, 1.

to form a compound unless they are *samartha*, i.e., have either mutual connection or compatibility of meanings.

Patañjali then proceeds to bring out the full import of *samarthya* and clearly shows why *Samsas'* does not usually take place in expressions like bhāryād ājīvāḥ puruṣo devadattasya and mahaṭ kāṣṭam ēritāḥ. What he means ■ say is this: no compound is possible between two words when one of them is grammatically connected with another word that does not form a part of the compound; in mahaṭ kāṣṭam ēritāḥ the form kāṣṭam is *asamartha* (incompetent) to be compounded or consistently united with the word ēritāḥ on account of its having relation with the word mahaṭ that qualifies it. Here *asamarthya* for a regular combination in order to form a *Samsa* is due to the fact that the words mahaṭ and kāṣṭam are mutually expectant as noun and adjective.¹ To use the logical phraseology, *sopakeśatva* implies the state of having relation with a word that is not a member of the compound.²

The grammarians, as a rule, are not prepared to allow the formation of compounds in cases of such *sopakeśatva*.³ This is what is actually meant by the dictum *सविषेषान्वयम्*

¹ एषामपेत् — Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2, 1, 1.

² सपि॒क्षेषत्वे॑ वा॒क्योऽि॑ — Ibid.

³ कुरुते॒ वै॒ गुरुत्वदृष्टिरिक्षमाद्यनिः॑ वारिक्षमः॑

⁴ न सौचे॑ इत्यहित्याकाशः॑ — Mahābhāṣya.

criticas, that is, a word cannot enter into combination with another word (in a *Samāsa*) if it happens to have an adjunct. A question may arise at this stage as to how compounds are admissible in instances like *rājapuruṣo abhirūpaḥ* and *rājapuruṣo darśanīyah* (a beautiful officer of the king), because the word *puruṣa* is here compounded with the word *rājan* inspite of its relation with the adjective *abhirūpa*. Now Patañjali comes forward with his argument to justify the formation of a compound in such cases. When the principal member and not the subordinate one, he holds happens to be spoken or connected with some other word (as adjective), there is practically no restriction for the formation of a compound. What we actually find in *rājapuruṣah abhirūpah* is that the principal member, i.e., *puruṣah*, is connected with the adjunct *abhirūpa* and, therefore, *Samāsa* is grammatically admissible.

But sentences like *Devadattasya gurukulam* and *caitrasya dīsyabhārye* (the wife of the servant of Caitra), etc., which are avowedly correct in popular usage, present further difficulties. Patañjali first tried to get rid of this anomalous position by explaining the genitive in *Devadattasya* as implying relation with the whole and not with the

¹ *Mahabharata*, p. 200 : जात्यान् सर्वेषु भवति च प्रयात्त वारिष्ठानि वर्णाः।

word *guru* alone, but this argument also proved futile, because, the sentence is really intended to express particularly *Devedattasya yo gurustasya yat kalam* and so on. He then finally concludes that *Semissas* are admissible in these cases (even inspite of *sāpekṣatva*) on account of *gamakatva* or power of expressing the intended sense. A compound is said to be *gamaka* when it is capable of expressing the very same sense (no matter if there is *sāpekṣatva*) as is implied by the words that go to form such a compound. This is exactly what is meant by the statement *sāpekṣatvapi gamakatvat sañcayah*. As to why *Semissa* is not admissible in what *kṛṣṇa* states, there is no denying the fact, says Patañjali,¹ that the signification of the sentence in this case is not necessarily the same as is expressed by the compound. This is the way how Patañjali relaxed the rigidity of his previous statement (*sāpekṣamaramartham bhavat*).

Jagadīśa² ventures to differ from the grammarians. He has little regard for the view that a compound and its *cirrāha* (the sentence to which the compound might be

¹ एष समानार्थक ग्रन्थेन व्याख्या च लिखन्तः। व्येकार्थी वाचेन समाने नहन् वर्ते दिति एति च व्याख्यात् व्याख्यात्वा व्यवै तद्व्याख्यात्वं रुपः। प्रथा मनसी नयने व्यवै व्यवै रुपः; कथा दित्यस्तत् भुव्युक्तम्।—Madabhāya, Vol. I, p. 361.

² विष्णु एष समाधानार्थी वोक्यत्वं तर्ह, च तु व्यवै लिप्तार्थाः, विष्णु सम्मीलित्वांश्चार्थीव्यवै व्यवै रुपेण रुपेणः नामान्वयोऽन्वयात्।—Buddhaśāstraśāstra, under the dīkṣā, 38.

dissolved) must have the same meaning,¹ and holds in opposition that the *vigraha*, as a rule, should bring out the sense of the compound but it is not equally binding that a compound should necessarily express the entire meaning of the sentence. He has, accordingly, disjoined the compound *sphuradēśī* (articulate speech) as *sphurāṇīm tāñīm* without having any regard to the equality of case-terminations between *vyāsa* and *Sāmīda*.²

The two views—*ekarthibhāva* and *vyapekṣa*—correspond respectively to *jahatsvārtha* *vyāsa* and *ajahatsvārtha* *vyāsa*: the former means that when a compound is formed, its component parts cease to retain their individual meanings, and give rise to only one united sense; and the latter implies that such constituent parts do not, as a rule, give up their meanings (as in a sentence) as a necessary condition of *Sāmīda*.

According to the first view,³ *sāmīda* implies the oneness of meanings (i.e., the members of a compound having different significations are made to signify only one sense). A sentence, on the other hand, is made up of different padas that continue to retain their own meanings as *rājāḥ puruṣaḥ*. We have to deal here with a problem of great importance.

¹ वाक्यस्त्रियोद्दृशार्थम् ।

² शब्दानुकूलव्याप्तिः शब्दव्याप्तिः ॥—Vā.

³ इत्यादीपनीयानीयाः शब्दव्याप्तिः ॥—Mahābhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, there is no material difference between a sentence and a compound so far as the meaning is concerned;³ for instance, the compound and the sentence like *rājāḥ puruṣa āṇyatām* and *rājapuruṣa āṇyatām* grammatically mean the same thing, viz., 'fetch an officer of the king.' It, therefore, goes against the assumption of Jagadīśa who made a distinction between *Sandśa* and *vigraha* with reference to their meanings.

Wherein, then, lies the difference between *vṛddha* and *Sandśa*? The criterion to distinguish a *Sandśa* from a sentence is that the former is characterised⁴ by *nikopadya* and *cikāsvarga* from the grammatical point of view. The prominent points of difference are as follows⁵ :—(1) there is no elision of case-endings in a sentence as in a compound; (2) in a sentence other words (adjectives) are allowed to intervene between such mutually expectant words as *rājāḥ rddhesya puruṣa iti*, but such is not the case in regard to the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ*; (3) in a sentence there is hardly any restriction as to the syntax or order of words, but one cannot possibly alter the order of a compound without substantial change of meaning; (4) in a compound

³ एष सम्बन्धेन वाक्येन वर्तितं कर्मादिं च।—Mahabhattaya.

⁴ विकापदसंवर्त्तनं विभिन्नतरं च वर्तितवाणीयता एवै।—Kalyana.

⁵ शुल्कोपी वक्तव्यात् विवेदवाचार्यविविष्टवाचः पृथक् इति।—Mahabhattaya.

there is only one accent and not two as in the sentence *rājñāḥ puruṣāḥ*. It might be, however, observed here that these special features, as enumerated above, are not really brought about by *ekārthībhāva* or oneness of the sense, but they, strictly speaking, represent the result of Patañjali's interpretation.

Then, Patañjali continues to point out other points of difference between *tyāga* and *Samāsa*¹ : (i) there is difference of number in a sentence, as *rājñāḥ puruṣāḥ*, *rājñōḥ puruṣāḥ*, *rājñām puruṣāḥ*, but no such difference is comprehensible in the compound (*rājapuruṣāḥ*) ; (ii) the meaning of a sentence is clear, while that of a compound is sometimes ambiguous (the reverse of the case is also possible, viz., a compound appears to be sometimes more clear than a sentence) ; (iii) an *upasargā* or subordinate member is allowed to have a qualifying adjunct (*rddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣāḥ*) in a sentence, whereas there is a positive restriction that a member of the compound cannot have grammatical connection with an adjective lying outside the compound. This also, to speak the truth, does not constitute a special feature of *Samāsa*, because compounds in *Devadattasya gurukulam*, etc., have already been declared admissible on the ground of expressiveness (*gamakatvā*) ; (iv) or is used in a sentence

¹ वैतरिक असामयव्यवहारिका एवं—Mahibhāṣya,
Vol. I, p. 802.

(in the sense of collection), but not in a compound.

Some explain, on the other hand, 'mutual connection' as the proper implication of *samarthyā*; 'the expression "mutual connection" should not be, however, misunderstood as referring to words (reciprocally expectant words), but as pertaining to their meanings.' When, *vyaapekṣā* (mutual connection) pertaining to the meaning is thus held to be the denotation of *samarthyā*, both the king and the man, as in *rājāḥ puruṣāḥ*, seem to be related to each other. The king¹ is connected with the man as the master (*mānūdyamānī*), and the man also gets himself related to the king on account of his being dependent on him (*chamasya*). The genitive is thus indicative of the relation between them. The older grammarians are supposed to have been in favour of *vyaapekṣā* as an indispensable condition of *Samsāsa*.

In course of interpreting the rule 2.1.1 (P&g.), Patañjali has referred to various standpoints regarding the characteristics of *Samsāsa*. If *Samsāsa* is considered to be a *citti* (i.e., if it, as a rule, always brings out a specific signification),

¹ यत्त्वरसपैषां समानं देहः—Mahābhāṣya.

¹ Mahābhāṣya, p. 366. या तु च समानोपेतेषां च तु च समानानि चिरं च चिरं च चिरं च—Mahābhāṣya, p. 366.

¹ इति चक्रः इति उच्चं परमा कुवचपैषां समानानि, उच्चोऽपि राजानामपैषां तु च केवलः केवले विशिष्यन्ते चक्रे च एव चक्रां चक्रिः—Mahābhāṣya. Under the rule P&g., 2. 1. 1.

these views, holds Kondabhatta,¹ are, by minute examination, reducible to two only, namely, *ikshatapārtha* and *gīghatapārtha*.

The three views mainly discussed in the *Mahabhāṣya* are as follows;² (i) *ekārthibhāṣa* or the unity of meanings takes place in a compound as the salient characteristic, but a *vigraha* (sentence) comprehends *vyaapekṣā* or *vyaapekṣā* is found to be the primary condition of a sentence; (ii) on the assumption of *vytti*, *Saṃśā* will fall under the category of either *jahātavartha* or *ajahātavartha*; (iii) just as *vyaapekṣā* or mutual connection is necessary in a sentence, so it is in a compound, i.e., some hold *vyaapekṣā* (as the real meaning of *samarthyā*) to be the main factor that goes to form a compound.

Kaiyata, like Patañjali, supports *ekātmanabheda* as the most plausible view from the stand-point of the grammarians who ascribe eternality to *abda*. He argues further that the question of *vṛtti*, as shown above, is absolutely immaterial to those who take a sentence as containing no parts (*niravayava*), and look upon *abda* as eternal. The division of *vṛtti* into *jahatsvārtha* and *ujahatsvārtha* represents the view of those who take *abda* to be *kāraṇa*.

¹ Valsikarapabbhaga, Tr. 30.

*Samāsa*¹ is a *vykti*, that is to say, *Samāsa* is attended with a special significance. *Vykti* is of two kinds, namely, *jahatsaṁarthā* and *ajahatsaṁarthā*. According to the standpoint of *jahatsaṁarthā-vykti*, the members constituting a compound generally give up their particular meanings and the compound necessarily acquires a special signification. This special sense may be produced either by *sakti* (denotation) or by *lakṣṇa* (implication), the former helps us in getting the *united meaning* (*ekārtha-bhāva*) and the latter is resorted to in case of *vyapakṣa*. Patañjali has here made use of a very well-chosen example to show the nature of *jahatsaṁarthā*. 'A carpenter,' for instance, when engaged to perform the work of a king, is compelled to give up his own work to a certain extent.' So far as the other form of *vykti* is concerned (*ajahatsaṁarthā*), the members of a compound continue to retain their respective meanings; as, for instance, 'a beggar'² does not necessarily leave off what he procured first even when he happens to secure alms for the second time.' But there is some difficulty in accepting this standpoint as a reasonable one. The compound form should necessarily have the dual number, if each of the members

¹ परामीभित्तिर्थिः। परम अप्यत्र विभेदवस्थिति समाप्तये वा एति विभेदः।—Kaiyāla.

² कृष्ण राश्वर्त्तिर्थवस्थितिः कुरु अप्यत्रि।—Mahabhasya, Vol. I, p. 364.

³ निष्ठुरीयः Roffet निष्ठुरीयः चूटि च अप्यत्रि।—Ibid. p. 365.

(*rājan* and *purṇa*) were allowed to retain their respective meanings.

Patañjali has thus examined the validity of several views in regard to the exposition of *samarthyā* and advanced arguments as well as counter-arguments either to support or to reject them. But the question that still awaits solution is to determine which of these two views is really acceptable from the standpoint of grammar, and appeals more to reason. In view of the emphasis laid on the *ekārthibhāva*, it is clear that Patañjali accepted it as the most correct explanation. From what we have been able to gather from his lengthy discourse on the rule *samarthāḥ padavīdhīḥ*, it appears that Patañjali, whose decision is held to be authoritative on all problems of grammar, was in favour of the *ekārthibhāva* point of view (or *jahatvārthā*). The *ekārthibhāva* view, it must be remembered, is also the only reasonable explanation so far as the psychological aspect of *Sāmāsa* is concerned. According to Haradatta, both *vyapekṣā* and *ekārthibhāva* are necessary in a compound. In the absence of *vyapekṣā* or mutual connection, words are not allowed to form a compound.

Patañjali has, however, drawn attention to the fact that *jahatvārthā* does not mean

¹ एष व्यापेक्षा व्याप्तिः च अस्मि, एकार्थीयोऽपार्थी यत्तु नैविः—*Kaṭyāyana* on *व्यापेक्षाव्याप्तिश्च*.

² लक्ष्मणस्त्री गुरुं व्यापेक्षा व्याप्तिः । यः पदवीर्योऽपार्थी व्याप्तिः व्याप्तिः ।—*Mahābhāskṛtya* under the rule *Pāṇ., 2, 1, 1.*

that the constituents of a compound are liable to give up their respective meanings altogether. But only that sense which is found to be inconsistent with the specific signification (*parārthaśirodhī*) as denoted by a compound, is forsaken. This is why the expression *rājapuruṣa āniyatām*¹ does not simply mean the bringing of a man, but particularly *the man having relation with the king*.

Sāmarthyā has been explained by some as pertaining to *vṛtti*. According to this view,² difference (*bhedā*) as well as association (*sanyoga*) are the meanings of *sāmarthyā*.

Patañjali has raised another question which is not less important in connection with *Sāmādhi*. A compound is generally said to be optional, that is to say, we may have either a *Sāmādhi* as *rājapuruṣah* or a sentence like *rājah puruṣah* without any change of meaning. To form a compound, or to use the compound-form depends upon the desire of the speaker. This view does not carry much weight with Patañjali. What he means to say is this : there are practically two views, namely, *vṛttipakṣa*, i.e., compound and *avṛttipakṣa*, i.e., sentence. Both the sentence and the compound have their distinct characteristics fixed by nature, and there is nothing to confuse the one with the other.³

¹ राजपुरुषानि तु देवताप्राप्यतम् वर्तीति । नैव दीपः ।—*Mahibhāṣya*.

² भिसंबन्धी या सामर्थ्यं विद्यते चाह ।—*ibid.*

³ स्मादहर्विद्यन्वयं वाऽप्य च समाद्वय ।—*Mahibhāṣya* under the rule
P^g. 2. 1. 1.

Kaiyāṭa¹ clearly shows the difference between a sentence and a compound by stating in clear terms that no compound is admissible in case of *vyapekṣa*, and, therefore, a sentence is impossible when *ekārthibhāṣa* is intended to be implied.

It must be noticed that the view held by Hāradatta goes against such a rigid distinction. Some hold, on the contrary, that *ekārthibhāṣa*, *vyapekṣa* and *ajahatocārtha vṛtti* are all that is required in the formation of a compound.² Those who hold the non-eternality of *abda*³ are of opinion that compounds are capable of being formed optionally out of sentences, the formation of compounds being a matter of option with them. Those who, like the grammarians, maintain that *abda* is a permanent entity⁴ (*saityababdika*) opine that sentences and *Saṃḍeṣas* are materially different, that is to say, *Saṃḍeṣas* represent a permanent combination of words, for they are so fixed by usage that they do not admit of any decomposition. To be more clear, the drift of Patañjali's argument is that the so-called process of disjoining a compound into *vyāk* or *vigraha* (whereby a compound is dissolved into its elements) is at best

¹ एष अदिवाको यस्मात् वा वरति, प्रवाचनीयम् यात् चैति :—Kaiyāṭa.

² समादेव वैभाग्यविषयाद्युपलक्ष्यते चेति वा व्युत्पत्तं विभागाद्यतिषेकः—Vaiyakarṇabhedāṇa, under Krt. 32.

³ वापीविद्यते वापीदेव विवरेव शब्दं विवरते सप्तमात्—Kaiyāṭa.

⁴ नैव विविधात् विभागे विवेद विभागिती यज्ञयोः—Ibid.

artificial, and that recourse is taken to such a method only for the purpose of bringing out the signification of a compound which is really an indivisible unit of speech. This view is analogous to what we have already referred to in deciding the priority of *samhitā* to *padas* (*padaprakṛtiḥ samhitā*). Further light is thrown upon this view by the so-called *nitya-saṃśas*, because we are not allowed to disjoin a compound like *kṛṣṇasarpaḥ* (as we cannot do so without altering the sense); this class of compounds is not capable of being broken up into parts without necessary change of meanings. They do neither admit of *vigraha* in the usual way, nor are their meanings directly expressed by their component parts, but some other words are required to bring out their signification (*avigraha* or *astapada-vigraha*).

Bhartṛhari¹ has also shown the difference between a sentence and a compound. *Saṃśas* is held to be an indivisible unit and the so-called *vigraha* is after all an artificial method that serves to bring out the meaning of a compound to unintelligent people. Durga has *tato'nyat vākyamīti*, which implies that a compound is distinct from a sentence by its very nature. There are, so to speak, two

¹ अनुसन्धानप्रयत्नम् विविष्ट इति वाचेः । अनुसन्धानस्त्वा यदि वाच-
वाक्यादीः ।—Vākyapadiya.

different views on *Samāsa*,¹ namely, (i) a compound is a permanent unit of speech; (ii) a compound² is only a condensed form of a sentence, or, in other words, a sentence is reduced to a compound-form for the sake of brevity or conciseness. Patañjali and his followers seem to have supported the first view. Others hold that there is no material difference between a compound and a sentence, that is to say, *Samāsa* is a designation that may be optionally applied to a sentence under certain conditions.

Samāsa depends more or less on current or popular usage. According to Durgasinha, *Samāsa*³ is sometimes permanent or obligatory (as in *Kṛṣṇasarpaḥ*), optional in the majority of cases, and is not admissible in some instances (*Kāmo jāmadagnyāḥ*). A *Samāsa* is called *nitya* or obligatory, when its constituents fail to express the intended sense, as, for instance, the members of the compound *Kṛṣṇasarpaḥ* mean simply a *black serpent* by their respective powers of denotation, but it is far from being the actual sense, viz., 'a snake that cannot be subdued either by medicinal herbs or by snake-charmers.'⁴ An optional

¹ समासां भूत्यादि। यस्मि गुणिति विशेषाभ्युपरिकी नाम ॥—Durgu's Trilok on the rule 'यस्मि यस्मादो त्रुतार्थः' ।

² वाक्यार्थं च सामासाद्यात् न च वर्त्तितुमाह—वै उक्तं या विशिष्टाभ्यान् वति ।—Durgu.

³ विशिष्टः विशिष्टः विशिष्टः वाम ॥—Ibid.

⁴ विशेषाभ्युपरिकी विशेषाभ्यः ।

compound means that we are allowed to say either *rājapurneś* or *rājñah purneś*, the former having only the advantage of conciseness. According to this point of view, most cases of compounds are simply dependent on option. *Samaś* is grammatically inadmissible in those cases where *pades* are so related to each other that they cannot give rise to any special signification (*pararthabhibhāṣa*).

It should be particularly explained here what is really meant by holding *Samaś* to be a *ṇṛiti*. *ṇṛiti* means, as Patañjali maintains, 'the power of expressing the sense that is different from those that are denoted by the members of a compound,' that is to say, *Samaś* is expressive of some special or additional signification.

Patañjali has dealt with the problem of *Samaś* with such elaboration and in such minute details that his successors have had no room for making further contributions to the subject. In a number of popular *karikas*, Śripati¹ has carefully summarised all that can be said concerning *Samaś* in general. Jagadīśa's² definition and exposition of *Samaś* are such as to show that the followers of the *Nāyaka-nyāya* considered a compound to be the same as a sentence, though

¹ एतिकोनिष्ठदस्यन् सरकारे उपकारीः। भूतज्ञवेदादिति वृत्त्युक्तेन
मिथुनैः—Edu. Purāṇī.

² शास्त्रान्तरं सरावस्पदान्तरं निष्ठान्तरं, वाचान्तरं लोक्युः स वाचावस्पद-
पदः।—Sambodhi, Kar. 21.

in a condensed form, and, unlike the grammarians, they did not necessarily recognise the special signification of *Samāsa*.

In course of showing the applicability of his definition to all cases of *Samāsa*, and dealing particularly with certain irregular forms of compound, Jagadīśa has made some important observations which one can hardly afford to pass over for an adequate knowledge of the subject. We give below only a few instances of *Samāsa* where Jagadīśa has given a stamp of his originality of exposition.

(i) The *vṛyāha*¹ (the sentence whereby the meaning of a compound is usually expressed) should be such as would bring out the entire meaning of a compound, but there is no such rigid condition in the case of a compound. It is generally found that a compound-form does not contain anything to give an exact idea as to the precise number and gender of the *vṛyāha*. Thus, Jagadīśa refutes the view that 'both *vṛyāha* and *Samāsa* are exactly expressive of the same sense.'

(ii) In cases other than those of *Nipātas*, the meanings of two *Mātrās* (words) are related to each other as if they were identical.²

(iii) As the genitive (denoting relation) is dropped in a compound like *rājapuruṣa* (as a

¹ विषये एव समासान्तरं विवक्तं तत्, एव च सामृद्धि विद्युतिर्थः—
Buddhalil.

² निपातान्तरिक्षान्ते समानं विवक्तं विद्युतिर्थः—*Ibid.*

necessary condition of *Samādhi* in general), the Naiyāyikas¹ have taken recourse to *lakṣaṇa* to expressly indicate the relation of *pūrṇa* with *rūḍha*.

(ii) Though *Karmadhāraya* compounds having pronoun like *yad* and *tad* as their last members are not generally recognised by the grammarians,² Jagadīśa has supported the validity of such a compound as *paramātma* on the Authority of Jñānarāgaṇḍī.

(v) If a compound is allowed to be formed by the combination of more than two *padas*, it should be either *Dvaandha* or *Bahuvrishi*, i.e., excepting these two compounds no other compounds are generally found to consist of three or more members.

(ct) An anomaly is presented by the expression *karttavāṇḍālāyogaottamam*, because *yogottamam* (resulted from the conjunction) cannot be grammatically taken here as an adjunct qualifying *pāpa* (sin) which forms a part of the compound *pāpakaṣayāḥ*. Jagadish meets this position by suggesting that *yogottamam* should be taken in the sense of *yogaprayojyam* (i.e., resulting from a conjunction of *Bahu* with either the sun or the moon) which might be

१ दासदुर्दण १८७८) मूर्खहे वाहतेनांके वार्षिक अधिकारात्मकी रंगकरी ।—
Babdañkari.

* तदस्यादपेक्षा, वर्णवाचम्; प्राप्ते वैततो, वस्ति वौकुपादं चास्त्राद्
उपादि परीक्षा इतिहिती अनुरूपं च मुख्यमन्वितः परमं च इत्याद्यादेष्वामाः
प्रत्यक्षप्रिपुष्टि ।—५५६।

• यसकी वर्णनिका ग्रन्थी विकास लाल :-

consistently connected with the meaning¹ of *pāpakṣaya* by the relation of identity.

(vii) As *Dvigu*² and *Karmadhāraya* compounds are found to have a striking similarity between themselves from both physical and psychological aspects (each having the first member as an adjective and both indicating the relation of identity) only with this difference that in cases of *Dvigu* the first pada is a numerical adjective, Jagadīśa has no objection in including *Dvigu* within the category of *Karmadhāraya*.

On the evidence of the rule Pāṇ. 3.1.28, Bhattoji³ also speaks of both *Dvigu* and *Karmadhāraya* as two special classes of *Tatpuruṣa*, taking a wider view of the latter.

(viii) According to Jagadīśa,⁴ a *Tatpuruṣa* compound, with an adverb as its first member, is also admissible. He recognises *stokapakta* as an instance of *Karmadhāraya*. But there is some difficulty in explaining the compound as such, because the meaning of the adverb *stoka* (little) is not such as may have the relation of identity (*taddēśya-sambandha*) with that of

¹ शीरोऽभिमृष्य शीरसोऽभिमृष्य, ए परीर्थि शारवदीप्तिः; —
Subdakshī.

² विनोः कलेय दधारद्विनोऽपि न विनः; — II.4, under the § 2, 38.

³ तद्भुतविद्युत् वक्तव्यवहारिष्यते विज्ञुः;

⁴ स्त्रीकथने वादौ विकटिविद्यते; वक्तव्यवहार एव. सम्बन्धित्वादिवा इत्यादौ वक्तव्यवहारिष्यते..... वास्तवेचक्षवेदे एवत्याकाशसंविकासेदान्वयते वक्तव्यवहाराद्वापात्; — Subdakshītigrahaṇī under Kōr. 30.

pak्त्य (one who cooks). As a matter of fact, the adverb is really connected with the action (cooking) and not with the agent. Here Jagadīśa has been compelled to admit the validity of *nāmārthaikadeśānugraha*, that is, the relation with a part of the meaning of a Nāman, and, accordingly, suggests on the strength of such examples as *mātukāvī*, *mātūrījīla* (where mātūrī or greatness refers respectively to the state of being a poet and that of being wise, that the adverb *stava* is related to *pācana* (cooking) which forms part of the meaning of *pak्त्य*.

(ix) By supporting such expressions as *stobhanam* *stobhāyam* (as used by Kālidāsa), Jagadīśa has sought to refute the view that 'no compound' whatsoever is admissible with an adverb.'

(x) Jagadīśa has thoroughly rejected the grammatical definition of *Agyayibhāva* compound, as it involves the fallacy of *neyapti*. It is not strictly correct to say that an *Agyayibhāva* compound has always an indeclinable as its prior member, for, in instances like *āñjikapari*, *ekapari*,¹ etc., we find an indeclinable as the last member; *agalo*, *trijānumāni* (a collection of three Jurobas),

¹ द्विपर्वतेकष्टः कमाद एकान्तुपूर्व रुदी तु न द्विष्टम् —*Sabdaśakti* under *Kār. 80.*

² च अपि इति नामदि—इति अपि नामदि अपि विभवत्वा विभवत्वे च सप्तूप्रकाशनम्—*Sabdaśakti*.

lohitagangam (the country where the Ganges is red) are examples of *Acyayibhāva* where no indeclinable is traceable.¹

There is evidence to believe that it was accent that determined *Samsāsa* in the early stage of the Sanskrit language. A slight defect² in the use of accents is said to have proved fatal to the sacrificee himself. What an important part was played by the variation of accents in the determination of *Samsāsa* is best illustrated by such examples as *trivṛtti* (*apākāvṛtyam*) which with slight difference of accents may be taken either as *Angayibhāva* or *Bahuvrīhi* compound.

The ancient grammarians³ are said to have divided *Samsāsa* into four classes according to the predominance of the meanings of members forming the compound. The principle underlying these classifications, as we shall see later on, is connected more with the meaning than with the physical aspects of *Samsāsa*. They are as follows : (i) *pūrṇopadītrībhāvāt* as *Angayibhāva* In this class of compounds the meaning of the first member (Indeclinable) seems to be principal in relation to that of the last ; (ii) *uttaropadītrībhāvāt*, i.e., *Tribhūvya*—it is so called because in all varieties

¹ द्वीपजलस्त्रियस्त्रावानाम् ।—Mahābhāṣya, p. 62.

² दृष्टः प्रदः अर्थो वर्णते वा निष्ठा व्युत्ती व वर्णेन्द्रियः । वा वाच्यवृक्षमार्गं हितलि वर्णेन्द्रियः व्युत्तीप्राप्तात् । शिल्पः.

³ एव नविन यत्तातः पूर्णपूर्णवाच्यम्, कवित्यस्मवाच्यवाच्यः, वाचिद्वयवाच्यवाच्यम्, कवित्यस्मवाच्यवाच्यः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 379.

of *Tatpurusa* compounds, the meaning of the last member appears to be predominant ; (iii) *mūyapadārtha-prakṛitīna*, i.e., *Bahuvrīhi*—the characteristic feature of this class of compounds (*anekānanyapadārtha*) is that the sense of a word that does not actually enter into the combination comes to have the predominance ; (iv) *sarvapadārtha-prakṛitīna* as *Dvandva*, where the meanings of all members are of equal importance. Following the classifications of earlier grammarians such as Vābhūta¹ and others, Jagadīśa has made an addition (*madhyapadā-prakṛitīna*) to the aforesaid division of *Samskrītī* as given by Patañjali. *Tatpurusa* compounds like *skatānudhikarṇīṣī* and *prati-yogitānacocchedakāḥ*, etc., are explained by Jagadīśa as instances wherein the sense of the middle *pada* (i.e., non-existence—as denoted by the negative particle *na*) is predominant, and he, accordingly, calls them *madhyapadārtha-prakṛitīna*. On a close examination of facts it is, however, found that these classifications of the earlier grammarians are neither sufficient to cover the entire field, nor free from the fallacies of *atīcāypti* and *avayāpti*. Bhattoji² has clearly pointed out how the principle underlying such divisions cannot be applied to instances like *atimālāḥ*, *unmattagorgam*,

¹ मूर्तिवस्तुतवाच्यवाच्यवाच्यः त्रयः । शास्त्रे पश्चिमः वीक्षणः उत्तरादिभिः । बहुवर्ती, द्व. ३२.

² सर्वप्रथमं शब्दं तु व्याप्तिः ।—Bhattoji.

etc., from a strictly grammatical point of view. In conformity to the rules of grammar, *āśmālaḥ* is taken to be an example of *Tatpurusa*, though the sense of the first member in this case appears to be the principal one. Thus, the predominance of the sense of the first member of a compound cannot be grammatically regarded as the only criterion for determining an *Avyayibhāṣa* compound.

According to the popular divisions, *Samāsa*s are six in number, or seven by the inclusion of the so-called *Upapada* compound. Some grammarians, however, interpreted the rule अत् युग्मः, Pāṇ., 2.1.4, in such a way (applying the principle of *yogaśabdīga*) as to establish six¹ different kinds of *Samāsa*s; the peculiar among these being the compound made of two verbal forms as *khadatānrodalā* on the strength of the *gopasattra—ākhyatāmākhyatena kriyātālaye*.

According to Jayāditya,² *Samāsa*s are capable of being divided into two well-known classes, namely, *anīya* and *anīya*. *Anīya-Samāsa*s are those where the addition of the case-terminations to the members of the compound is sufficient to bring out the sense, as, for instance, the genitive and *prathama* respectively in *rājñāḥ* and *puruṣāḥ* are competent to express the meaning of the compound *rājapuruṣāḥ*. In the case

¹ तुप्तं दृष्टं तिक्तं चला वायव्यं विष्णु विष्णुः ।
शुभलोकीः निष्ठोऽपि स्वास्त्रं वद्विष्णुः यैते ॥

² विविचयाद्युपेष्ठित्वाभ्यन्तरालम् ।
शुभं विष्णुविष्णुविष्णु विष्णुविष्णु विष्णुविष्णु ॥

of *nitya-saṃdeśas*, on the other hand, the mere addition of the case-endings to the constituent elements cannot fully bring out the sense of the compound, for by simple analysis of the compound *kṛṣṇasarpaḥ* as *kṛṣṇācīśau sarpa-aceti* (meaning any and every kind of black serpent) one cannot get into the meaning of the compound (*i.e.*, a snake irresistible either by medicinal herbs or physicians).

The most important question that deserves to be particularly considered in connection with the problem of Saṃdeśa is to decide whether the sense denoted by a compound is virtually the same as is expressed by the constituent members, or a compound has by nature the power of expressing a special signification distinct from those of its members. This is a problem over which the grammarians and the Naiyā�ikas hold different views. Jagadīśa¹ has referred to Patañjali and his followers as *saṃdeśa-tak্তi-vādinis*, who do not take number to be the denotation of a compound, specially *ekāt-saṃdeśa*, inspite of the presence of the case-endings that indicate number (as in *kaṃphe-kalāḥ*).

Reference has already been made to the two views—*ekāt-tibhāṣa* and *vyapekya*; the grammarians evidently uphold the former (as it is quite clear from the interpretation of the Mahābhāṣya), while the Naiyā�ikas and the

¹ नायायिकः प्रतीक्षा संदेश = गुणो द्वा उपासनाविभवः प्राप्तुः।—*Babda-daksh.*

Mimīśakas seem to have supported the latter. The main point at issue is that the *ekārth-dhāratādīna*¹ are of opinion that a compound as a whole has the distinct power of expressing a sense in addition to the meanings usually signified by the members,² whereas the *vyaapekṣātādīna* have either taken recourse to *lakṣayit* wherever the members of a compound are not likely to bring out the full signification or have taken the sense of a compound as exactly equivalent to those of its members.

The arguments usually advanced in favour of the *ekārthikārd* view are as follows :—a compound-form like *citrugrah* (*Bahvrikhi* naturally indicates 'the owner of handsome cows'; *rājapuruṣaḥ* means 'one having relation with the king'; *upakumbhaḥ* gives the idea of 'proximity with a pitcher' and *pūripādaṁ* expresses the sense of a 'collection of hands and feet' (*samdhōra*). These meanings, to speak the truth, are not directly expressed by the members of those compounds; as, for instance, the sense of the 'owner' is not denoted by either *citrā* or *go*, the idea of 'relation' is not brought out by either *rājan* or *puruṣa*, and 'collection' by either *pūri* or *pāda*.

¹ एकार्थीति विवाद एवः एकार्थीति च नवीनात्मानिति अवशीकारीतिं एव
सिद्धान्तस्यात् । १३८. कुषेऽपि इति विवादन् इतिष्ठानीति विशिष्टादीपि एवमा प्रति-
पादन् च नवीनिति हमर्पि तदि विवाद विवादस्य एकार्थीतिरितो इति विवादम्
विवर्णते ।—Vaiyakaraprabhāṣṭa.

² एतादे चतु भित्तेष शेषोऽपह विवादः । विवादो ह विवादोऽपि विवादैरु-
पादान् । आप्तव्यं भीतो विवादेकारीतिं विवादः ॥—Vaiyakaraprabhāṣṭa,
Kār. 83.

and so on. The grammarians have, therefore, assigned the power of expressing such special or additional senses as those of 'owner,' 'relation' and 'collection,' etc., to the compounds, taking *Samskrta* as a whole or an indivisible unit of speech.

The word *pankaja* admits of double meanings—one as 'lotus' signified by *sauvadāyaśakti* and the other as 'something that grows in the mud' (*asayasaśakti*) denoted by its parts. Similar is the case with a *Samskrta*; it has one meaning as is denoted by its parts and the other as expressed by the whole. According to the *Naiyayikas*, the word *pankaja* falls under the category of *yoga-rūpa*, that is to say, it has two-fold signification as denoted by the parts and the whole. The grammarians have recognised such a *sauvadāyaśakti* in order to arrive at the additional sense of a compound.

Moreover, the *ekārthibhūta* view is not vitiated by prolixity or *gaurava* as is the case with the *vyapekṣāvāda*. The *Naiyayikas* or the *vyapekṣādīdins*, on the contrary, are not prepared to admit of such *sakti* or power of expressing the additional sense so far as compounds are concerned. They have rather taken recourse to *lakṣaṇa* whenever they failed to get the intended sense directly from the members of a compound. They have, for

¹ एवेचावस्थिति देवतिवद्यतः । य च वायुर्गीर्ति अस्मिन्द्वयं वैष्णवेऽप्यन्तः ।—Yāgaśāstra 20.25.52.

instance, resorted to *lakṣaṇa* in the case of *citragnih* so as to obtain the sense of the 'owner.' Kṛṇḍabhaṭṭa maintains that in such cases the assumption of *ākti*¹ is almost unavoidable, since *lakṣaṇa* in regard to either *citrā* or *go* is not sufficient to bring out the full significance, i.e., the owner of beautiful cows. But there is some difficulty in the way ■ applying such *lakṣaṇa*,² for, if the word 'citra' were indicative (*lakṣaka*) of 'the owner of the beautiful cows,' it would have no consistent relation with the meaning of the word *go*; again, if the word *go* were to indicate the same sense, the meaning of the word *citrā* would not be compatible with that of 'the owner' (because it is not the owner who is *citra* or handsome but his possessions—the cows). In a *Tatpuruṣa* compound such as *rājapuruṣah*,³ Gaggeśa says that *lakṣaṇa* is to be attributed to the relation as is denoted by the genitive in *rājñoh*. According to the *Mimāṃsaśāstra*,⁴ the whole sentence should be taken as *lakṣaṇa* or indicative (as Gaṅgotsa has clearly pointed out).

¹ विज्ञुरिक्षादी स्मारकादिप्रतीतैः अविवाचयन्ति। एव वाचवा निरौपः—Vidyākaraṇī, 1st Edn., under लक्षणः, p. 34.

² एव विज्ञपदं 'स्वरक्षीयादिविकल्पं, तत्र वीष्यद्वावेनवाचाम्। नावि गोऽपि वाचनं शीर्खात्तिं विज्ञपदविकल्पादेतोः।—Tattvacintāmaṇi—Gobdekhapaṭa, p. 702.

³ राजपुरुष इत्यादी शूलपते प्राप्तं वाचनं वाचनं विविधात्तिं वाचवादी—Gobdekhapaṭa, p. 41.

⁴ गवान्नामादेविकल्पीकल्पितवा तु इत्यन्वयीत्येति। वाचने एव वाचनेति—Tattvacintāmaṇi—Gobdekhapaṭa, p. 527.

The Naiyāyikas have, however, resorted to *lakṣaṇa* in regard to only one *pada*, either *citru* or *go*, and taken the other as only suggestive or *Tatparya-grāhaka*, as in *rājaparīkṣāḥ* the word *rājan* is said to be indicative of the relation with the king and so on. They do not, therefore, agree with the Mīmāṃsakas so far as the indicativeness of the whole sentence is concerned.¹ It is specially in the case of *Bahuvrīhi* and *Tatpuruṣa* compounds that they have taken the help of *lakṣaṇa* for the purpose of getting the intended sense. It is not necessary to resort to *lakṣaṇa* in a *Karmadhāraya* compound,² where the sense of identity is derivable from the very relation of meanings.

The expressions *nīḍdoṣṭhapati*, *yājayet*, *varṣeṇa rathakāro'guimaddadhiṣṭa* have given rise to considerable difficulties. The Mīmāṃsakas do not take *nīḍdoṣṭhapati* as an instance of *Tatpuruṣa* (as in that case *lakṣaṇa* is to be resorted to) but construe it as a *Karmadhāraya* compound (*nīḍda eva sthapatiḥ*) identifying *sthapati* with *nīḍda* (the architect who is one and the same as *nīḍda*).

¹ यदीर्थो न भवते अवश्य, विजु वर्ति...वाग्यकर्त्ता वाचस्मारता—*Tattra-*
cintāmaṇi. ए दि यदीर्थो अवश्यतावाऽपाप्यविकल्पम्...एकपदसाच्चवच्चवापाप्य
यदीर्थेऽप्यवाप्यत्तम्—*Sabdaśākthiprakalpaḥ*—*Sāṃkētikā*, p. 50.

² चक्षेत्वादेव न अवश्य, यदीर्थोऽप्यवाप्यत्तम् चक्षेत्वा वाप्यत् ।—*Vāky-*
kāraṇabhedānusāra, कालावधिरिक्षणः, p. 148.

CHAPTER IX

GRAMMAR IN OTHER SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

Language and Grammar—problems of grammar in the
Aññāgama—Nāya and treatises on dṛṣṭiprakāśa.

Grammar is a popular branch of study. Consciously or unconsciously, every one makes use of grammar or follows certain principles in the verbal expression of his thought. Man as a speaking animal is first acquainted with grammar, though he does not know that the way in which he combines one word with another presupposes a number of principles upon which is based the science of grammar. Grammar has its origin in the popular mode of expression, and derives its vital essence from the popular usage. Grammar, particularly Sanskrit grammar, is indispensably necessary for an adequate knowledge of all branches of literature. Bhartṛhari calls it *adhividya*¹ in order to point out that grammar is intimately connected with all branches of learning, and in consequence of this intimate relation it is held to be the most useful of all departments of studies.² One

¹ एवं विद्यामनुभवित वर्णते।—Vidyavādī, Kar. I, 14.

² शब्दं लोकं विद्यावादेष्विद्यावाक्यम्।—Ibid.

can hardly expect to make a profitable study of any branch of Sanskrit literature without having a thorough knowledge of grammar. Grammar, Patañjali rightly observes,¹ is a useful companion in the study of the entire Vedic literature.

Speculations on grammar naturally presuppose the existence of language; and the relation in which the study of a language stands to that of its grammatical system is an intimate one. The grammar of a language generally makes its appearance when that language in particular has reached a certain stage of development and produced literary records comprising a vast field of knowledge. Based as it is on the strictly scientific method of generalisation (*saṅgraha*) and particularisation (*apavarga*) on the one hand, and that of agreement (*anyatya*) and difference (*vyatireka*) on the other, Sanskrit grammar is found to have thrown much light upon what are known as the fundamental problems of philology. Moreover, the rules of Sanskrit grammar, as they unfold the laws that regulate the growth, formation and correctness of the recognised linguistic forms, are in themselves short formulæ of the science of language. Again, the rules, such as *parah sannikarṣah saṃphila* (Pāṇ., 1.4.109) and *akah svarne dirghah* (Pāṇ., 6.1.101), which

¹ पतञ्जलिर्विद्याः—*Mahabhasya*, under the rule Pāṇ., 6.5.12.

virtually show the tendency of two vowels having close proximity and homogeneity to lengthening, are as much phonological as grammatical. There was, as we have already pointed out, a period in the history of the Sanskrit language when, in the absence of such technical devices of grammar, *Semantics* had to be determined by different modulations of voice. The division of sound into *śabda*, *anudatta* and *avarita*, the transformation of sounds as is illustrated by the rules of *sampradhāna*, and the principles of euphonic combination (*sandhi*) are indication how intimately grammar is related to phonology.

The study of Sanskrit from a philological basis and that of the methodology of its grammatical systems present before us problems of Semantics which, as a cognate science, deals with the psychological aspects of language. 'The science of meaning,' though of comparatively modern growth in the domain of western philological researches, seems to have already developed into a scientific branch of study at the hands of the *Nirukta*s or etymologists. The antecedence of ideas to words,¹ the relation between the sign and the object signified, the eternal² connection between *aboda* and *artha*,

¹ वाक्यवाचः वस्त्रवीयः । एति लोकान्विज्ञानीयि वाक्यः व्याप्तिः ॥—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 14. कर्म इति वस्त्रवीयवाचाने व्याप्तिः ॥—Tattra-Nirukta, under 1. 1. 6.

² शौकुपरिवद्यु वस्त्रवाचेन वस्त्रवः—Bṛ. Sūtra, 1. 1. 5. विद्ये वस्त्रवं वस्त्रवे न लिखो वस्त्रवाचेन विद्यापः ॥—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 7.

the derivability of words¹ from verbal roots, the method of naming objects, the origin of certain words (as *kūka*, *kokila*, *dundubhi*, etc.) from an imitation of natural sound,² and the way how words change their meanings (as *kavi*, *mrga*, *kuṭola*, *pravīṇa*, etc.) are facts that have been scientifically dealt with by the *Niruktas* and the grammarians. The etymological explanations of words, as they occur in the *Brahmana* and *Nirukta* literature, is an evidence that investigation in the science of meaning was not only necessary for the proper understanding of the Vedic texts, but formed an important part of the study of Sanskrit grammar. Though an independent branch of study mainly devoted to the psychological side of language, the *Nirukta*, as Yākṣa maintains, is materially akin to grammar, the former serving as a complement of the latter.³

In course of foregoing discussions on grammatical problems, we have had occasion to make reference to certain philosophical views, mainly from the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Nyāya* systems, having direct bearing upon problems of purely grammatical interest. As a department of study intimately connected with the process of thinking, grammar, like

¹ वर्णान्तरात्मापैति वाचानो विद्यत्वम्—*Nirukta*, I. 12.

² वाक् इति अव्याकुरुते विद्यत्वं पृष्ठम् ॥—*Ibid.*

³ एवं विद्यत्वात् वाचानां वाच् च वाचेवाच्य च ॥—*Nirukta*, p. 115.

logic, deals with a subject (*sabda* and *arthā*) that forms the very basis of knowledge. The supreme importance of *Sabda-sāstra* lies in the fact that it deals with words whereby we think, know and express our thoughts to others. Every word is a symbol of intelligence. No knowledge whatsoever, says Bhartṛhari,¹ is possible without words; knowledge of all denominations is materialised through the medium of words. Pūṇyārṇava² particularly points out that the use of words (*sabda-bhīṣṭāṇḍ*) acts as an important factor in the manifestation of qualified knowledge (*savikalpaka�āna*). An attempt is made here to show the extent to which grammar is related to other philosophical systems, specially the Mīmāṃsa and the Nyāya.

Certain Mīmāṃsa doctrines are found to have close relationship with those of grammar. (i) The eternality of *Sabda* (*Sabda-nityaśraddha*): The Mīmāṃsakas have not only accepted the eternality of words with all earnestness but have made it a fundamental tenet for defending the eternal character of the Vedas. It seems to have been on the part of the Mīmāṃsakas a pious necessity to maintain the eternality of words inspite of the arguments advanced by the Nyāyikas. Unless words are held to be eternal, it is not

¹ न श्रीरङ्गि वाचो लिखे यत् चन्द्रानुकलादपि ।

चतुष्प्रवर्तिष्व वाचं हन्ते वदेव भावते ॥—Vākyapādīya, Kār. 2, 124.

² सा हि पूण्यता व्याप्तिः एव विवरणात् व्याप्तिस्तिवैश्वर्यः—Pūṇyārṇava under Vākyapādīya, Kār. 1, 125.

possible to establish the authoritativeness or trustworthiness of the *Vedas* which, as we find, consists of a huge collection of words representing the *Mantras* and *Brahmanas*. The *Mim.* *Sutras* 6-11 are those that are usually put forward by the *Naiyayikas* against the eternal character of words. The *Mimamsakas* had their arguments ready to refute those attacks one after another (*Mim.* *Sutras* 12-19) in a manner that reflects much credit on them. The final conclusion is arrived at by the statement '*dartanasya pararthataat*' which means that words are held to be *nitya* on account of their being used for the purpose of signifying the sense. Words¹ do not, as the *Naiyayikas* hold, exist only for a moment and totally disappear after the utterance is over, but continue to exist so as to express the intended meaning.

Grammar, as we have already shown, though based on a purely analytical method, has also established the eternity of *abda*. But there is some amount of difference regarding the standpoints from which the eternity (*nityataa*) has been conceived by the *Mimamsakas* and the grammarians. The *Mimamsakas* take sound to be eternal,² as it is manifested by the utterance

¹ दर्तनु वाचस्पति प्राप्तं नाम—*Mim.* *Sutra*, I. 1. 18.

² इमेष्टुष्टात्मे अप्यादात् परमे वाचस्पतिः प्रतिक्रिया वा विद्ये एवं वाचस्पतिः न विद्यते—*Sakuntala*.

³ विद्यु विद्युष्टः विद्युष्टः विद्यु विद्युष्टः—*Naiyaya*. विद्युष्टिः विद्युष्टः—*Pradyumna*.

and is represented by the letters, whereas the grammarians have gone a step beyond sound as such and sought to find out the subtle element which is exactly manifested by sound, that is to say, they realised the existence of *Sphoṭa* as the final cause of sound. The grammarians understand *Pākya-Sphoṭa*¹ as representing the true type of *nitya-sabda*. A glance into the characteristic attributes with which *nitya-sabda*² is comprehended by Patañjali is sufficient to corroborate the view that *Sphoṭa* to the grammarians was the same as Brahman to the Vedāntins.

(ii) The Mimamsakas have agreement with the grammarians in regard to the relation of words with their meanings. The Mimamsa Sutra, I. 1. 5, states expressly that a word (preferably those that represent the Vedic mantras) has inborn or eternal relation (relation that is permanently fixed) with its signification.¹ The first Varttika of Katyayana² and the exposition of Patañjali thereon purport to establish the very same view so far as the relation of words with their meanings is concerned. The view of Katyayana as incorporated in the opening Varttika goes to show that the grammarians used to look upon words, meaning and the relation as

■ वाक्यस्थीटनकरे (वैज्ञानिकां) संवित्रये — इन्हीं

* ये सुट्टन्हासिकांशमवस्थो भूत्तिकालेषु प्रथा। द्राव्यवैष्णव वृत्तिरूपिति ।—Mahabharata, Vol. I, p. 6.

३ श्रीनगरिया उद्घाटन समाप्ति।

• विद्या विजयवर्मी •

permanently fixed (*siddha*). Patañjali¹ has expressly stated that a significant word is permanently related to its meaning. The relation of a word with its meanings is called *nitya* in this sense that it is found to be current in popular usage from time eternal² (*anadi*). This relation is grammatically known as *tak्ति*³ or may be viewed as one of identity; a word is *takta*, i.e., capable of denoting the sense, the meaning is *takya* and the relation subsisting between them is called *takti* or *yogyatā*.

(iii) The Mimāṃsakas agree with the grammarians in respect of the denotation of a word. The Mim. Brāhma, 1.8.38, lays down that all words denote a class (*akṛti*), the individual being comprehensible by means of mutual dependence⁴ between the class and the individual or *avinabhava*. The author of the Bhāṣya has clearly pointed out the difficulty that arises, if an individual only is held to be the denotation of a word. The two well-known grammarians, Vyādi and Vṛtjaptyāyana, held opposite views, the former advocating the class-theory and the latter supporting the individualistic one. The view of Pāṇini,⁵ as explained by

¹ पतिष्ठी चर्वेदान्तर्मनिष्ठानः।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 7.

² वाचस्पतिः वाचहरवद्यतेभावितिरूपः।—Kaiyāyī.

³ अनुप्रस्त्रीः सम्बन्ध विद्यते वाचान्तर्मनिष्ठिः।—Pradīpodiṣṭa.

⁴ वाक्यतिरिः जटा विवरकम्।—Āśvara-Bhāṣya.

⁵ वाचस्पत चाचार्यो च द्वादशि विवरकम्।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

Patañjali, is that both the class and the individual are denoted by words.

(iv) In the *Slokavārtika*, Kumārila has devoted a lengthy chapter to refute the theory of *Sphoṭa* as expounded by the grammarians. As the theory of *Sphoṭa* is apprehended to destroy the glorious edifice of the Vedas by declaring all divisions of sentences and words as merely artificial, the Mīmāṃsakas could not recognise the existence of *Sphoṭa* apart from sound. The assumption of *Sphoṭa* is thus untenable from the Mīmāṃsā point of view. So far as experience goes, letters that constitute a word are found to be significant,¹ and it is, therefore, nothing but unreasonable to acknowledge an incomprehensible being as *Sphoṭa*, which is materially distinct from letters.

(c) There is a distinct section in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras called *vṛkṣāraṇḍikāraka* dealing mainly with the problems of grammatical interest. The subject discussed in this particular section is almost the same as dealt with by Patañjali in the first āhnika of the *Mahābhāṣya*. The question² that presents itself for solution is to ascertain the reason for using words of purely Sanskrit origin. While correct forms (as *gauḥ*)

¹ वीपदा वर्त्तावर्त्तादृः विवरणः ।

प्रथमं प्रतिपत्तिस्थानवर्त्तम् विवरणम् ॥—*Slokavārtika*, 24, 106.

² वीक्षणे वर्ता समादिक्षणी वर्त्तम्, वी वर्ता वाचादीत्युपेक्षिवाचेऽपि ॥—*Mahābhāṣya*, under 1, 3, 25.

as well as the incorrect ones (as *gāci*, *gōti*, *gopatlikā*, etc.) are found to be equally expressive of sense, it is really difficult to understand the import of the scriptural injunction¹ which unconditionally prohibits the use of corrupt words (*apabhrāntas*). This prohibition seems to have been strictly followed by Sanskrit-speaking Brahmins, particularly at the time of mortificial performance, lest the purity of their rituals might be vitiated by the utterance of corrupt words. These incorrect words, hold the grammarians, are distorted forms of Sanskrit, this distortion or mutilation of forms being due to wrong imitation or inability of pronouncing the correct words of Sanskrit origin.² The grammarians have drawn a clear line of demarcation between these two classes of words as the first and foremost function of the science of grammar.³ As it helps the discrimination of correct words, the science of grammar has been elevated to the dignity of *śmyti* by the Mimikṣakas.

Though the meaning is equally expressed by correct and corrupt words, it is the use of correct words alone, holds Patañjali,⁴ that is attended with religious merits. It must be,

¹ वाचस्पतिं ग ये विनार्ते नामाभिरन् । वे अहो व या एव वदेष्वर्णः ।

² ददृष्टिशासु दग्धात्—Utt. 672a, l. 4, 26. वीजप्रस्तुताप्रविश्वासीय क्षमिक्षिक्षकाः नामोद्धृताविश्वः ॥—Sabara-bhāṣya.

³ चकुदिष्योऽस प्रश्नेष्व विविष्य इत्यनेत्रेनेति उद्दाक्षावान् ।—Māgadī.

⁴ वस्त्रप्राप्यावर्तवनो वस्त्रेन वायवदेव च योग्यम् । तिवक्षु शब्देन्द्रियार्थियो भाषणं नियते तिक्ष्वाक्षम्बुद्धपात्रं वायीय ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 8.

however, remembered that this principle of preferring the use of words strictly in conformity with the rules of grammar to those that do not come under the cognisance of grammar, is based on a purely religious consideration. How, then, are we to distinguish correct words from incorrect ones? According to the *Mimamsakas*, it is grammar or *Pyakarana-murti* that serves as the helping guide for such a discrimination. The rules of grammar are, therefore, held to be authoritative and a kind of trustworthy evidence.

(vi) The *Mimamsa-Sutra*, 1.8.28, makes it clear that the origin of corrupt forms should be traced to natural inability to pronounce the correct words, and that the meaning is expressed by such distorted forms on account of their structural similarity¹ with correct words. This view is exactly analogous to what is held by the grammarians in regard to the origin of *apabhrangas*. Patañjali² maintains that *apabhrangas* or perverted forms are the result of imperfect imitation and labora inaptitude. Bhartrhari has the following: Sanskrit is a divine tongue current from time immemorial;³ it has undergone distortion at the hands of those who failed to give utterance to the correct Sanskrit word by reason of their natural

¹ असुद्धो ति वर्णान्विषयेष्व—*Sabari-kbhya*.

² पतञ्जलमतुकरणाद्—*Matsbhbhyā*, Vol. I, p. 19.

³ देवो यज् यज्ञोऽप्यनुष्ठानविवाहमिति—*Vidyapadiya*, Kār. L. 116.

incompetency. They are also significant like correct words, but their signification is a matter of inference,¹ that is to say, they become significant only by recalling the corresponding correct words with which they have close resemblance.

(vii) In the *dhārārthādhikarana*, there is a discussion as to whether noun or verb is related to the result (*apūroo*). As it is produced by the action, *apūra* is connected with the word indicating the verb and not with words denoting either substance or qualities.² The Mim. Sutra, 2.1.1, enjoins that all verbs should signify action. This view bears close comparison with the statement of Patañjali (*kriyāraano dhātuh* and *dhātūraano dhātuh*). The view of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the meaning of the root and of the suffix (result and action respectively) is different from that of the grammarians.³ The Mim. Sutras, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, give the definitions of *nāma* and *akhyāta* respectively, which remind us of the definitions suggested by Yāskas. The Mim. Sutra, 2.1.6, speaks of a twofold division of action, namely, primary and secondary, and the subsequent rules give their definitions.⁴

¹ एव वाच्यभूतमिति वाक्यीरूपानिरूपः ;

साक्षात्कार्यतुष्टयक्तेव इत्यापेत्य वाक्यावकाः ॥—Tākṣyapadīya, Kārt., 1.182,

² जन्मदेवा एवाग्रहं विषयावकाः, व उत्तमुपादाविभिः—Gobardhanībhāṣya,

³ विद्युलनिधाः—वाक्यान्ते वाक्याद्दं, वाक्यादः वाक्यादः ।

⁴ त्रिप्रत्ययानि वाक्यानि, प्राप्तिवेचान्तर्वाचान्तर्गतानि—Niruktā,

⁵ अठ॑ एव विक्षेपेभ्यो तापि इत्यावाक्यानि इत्यस्माकम् सूक्ष्मावाचान्तर्गत्—and विक्षुप्ति विक्षीर्णेभ्यो गुरुवाचान्तर्गते वक्त्वा द्वयावाचान्तर्गतम् ।

The Nyāya system, specially the Navya-Nyāya has made valuable contributions to the study of grammar. The Naiyāyikas are credited with having expounded the most scientific theory about the origin of sound. To the Naiyāyikas, *sabda* is a quality of the sky, i.e., space (*sabda-pragamatātma*). Though they have taken *sabda* as the product of human effort, the Naiyāyikas have included *sabda* or, more properly, verbal cognition, within the category of *pratibhasa*.¹ In accordance with their view, *sabda* is liable to production and destruction²—two important characteristics of all things that are *karya* or non-eternal. They have sought to explain the relation between *sabda* and its meaning with reference to the will of God. Sakti or primary signification of a word is not determined, hold the Naiyāyikas, by social convention, but seems to have been fixed by the volition of God (*anaketa*) expressed in the following strain : 'let this word be denotative of this sense' (*ayam sabdo'mumurtham pratipādayatu*). According to the Naiyāyikas, *Sabda-bodha* or verbal knowledge is derivable from a sentence³ and not from individual words; and so far as verbal cognition is concerned, the knowledge of

¹ वाक्यानुभवोऽप्यन्तराद् वाक्याभिः ।—Nyāya-Sūtras, 1. 8.

² शत्रूपरेभावीकर्मेच एव वाक्यान्तरिक्षोभात् शब्दसम्पर्कात् ।—Nyāya-Sūtras, 2. 2. 19 and 2. 2. 14.

³ वाक्यावशास्त्रा वार्ताकालवोचेः ।

सम्पूर्णे शब्दोचेः च वाक्यावश वोचेः ॥—Sabdamukt., Ksh. 12.

*viseṣyā*¹ (adjective) must have precedence to that of *viseṣya* (noun). They have made a distinction between *Upasargas* and *Nipatas*, holding the former to be indicative (*dyotaka*) and the latter as directly expressive of sense (*cācaka*).

Gāgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is an epoch-making work, remarkable throughout by its originality of thought; it ushered in a new order of thinking that was readily assimilated by the later grammarians. The *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is, indeed, a valuable record marking the height of perfection which the Indian thought had reached at that time. Scholars of outstanding genius such as Rāghunātha, Māthurākāshā, Jagadīśa and Cūḍāhaṇa tried their level best to popularise this new school of logic following in the wake of Gāgeśa. This work is divided into four parts dealing with perception, analogy, inference and *sabda*.

The *sabda-khanīṣa* deals, among other things, with all important problems of grammar: (i) it has established the trustworthiness of *sabda* as a *pramāṇa*; (ii) it has advanced arguments in support of the non-cternal character of *sabda*; (iii) it has shown how to determine the *tak्ति* or primary signification of words;

¹ नामकोन्दिविषयम् जीवावेद्येवृत्तावान् एव अन्योपि नामप्रतीकसामान्यं विद्यत्वात्।

(iv) it has given an adequate treatment of *Dhātu*, *Upasarga*, *Nipāta* and *Samāsa*; (v) it has elaborately dealt with *expectancy*, *compatibility*, *proximity* and *import* as important factors of verbal knowledge; and (vi) it has discussed the question of the origin of corrupt words (*apabhrāntas*). How indispensable Jagadīśa's *Śabdadekṣiprakasikā* and Godādhara's *Vyutpatti-vāda* are for the proper study of the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar has already been pointed out.

In Grammar lies the origin of the science of Poetics. The *Māṇikāra-śāstra* is not less akin to Grammar than is the *Nirukta*. The contribution of grammar is nowhere so prominent as in this particular branch of study. The science of poetics may be said to have been principally based on grammar. *Śabda* and *artha* not only form the subject of grammar but have also provided the fundamental basis upon which stands the whole fabric of the *Māṇikāra-śāstra*. *Vyākaraṇa* and *Māṇikāra* are organically connected and used to be studied in India as cognate departments of study.

The rhetoricians or *Aśaṅkārikas* have extensively dealt with poetical compositions with special reference to their merits and defects. Having regard to what constitutes the essence of poetry, they have expounded the doctrine of *syañjana* and made an elaborate treatment of *rasa*.

Poetry is the outcome of joy. Endowed with the power of articulating his voice and born in the midst of magnificent beauties of nature, man feels naturally inclined to clothe his emotions in a rapturous and rhythmical language, seeking proper expression for the music of his heart and tending to give a poetic touch to his thought, when he is in an ecstasy of joy. Whether it is 'a spontaneous overflow of powerful emotions' or whether it 'makes us inhabitants of a world to which the familiar world is a chaos,' poetry appears to be the living manifestation of the internal storehouse of joy. Poetry has been rightly called *Abdaikamya*, that is to say, 'comprehending joy alone, rising from a source that is often represented as the sea of joy (*Gandabhihi*).

The three attributes generally ascribed to Brahman are *Being* (*satta*),¹ *Consciousness* (*cit*) and *Joy* (*ananda*). To a Vedāntin, the transcendental self is an inexhaustible source of joy. The expression *rasa rati saty*² is explained by the Vedāntins in such a way as to identify the supreme self with *rasa*—the joy of all joys. A religious devotee, particularly a *Paisava*, adores a deity who is the repository of all

¹ वीत्तदन्तोऽन्यादित् —Vedānta-Sūtra, I. 1. 12.

² अपदमेव चक्रं 'रसि ति एव' एव एवं रसमयुक्तो च ते 'रसि नृष्णा न रसा वासनी गति —Gandabhihi.

beauty, full of joy and the bestower of all blessings. Sri Kṛṣṇa, as depicted in the Bhāgavata, is an incarnation of joy and love, characterised by things that are not only exceedingly beautiful but serve to excite the most pleasant emotions in a moment of deep devotion. If the supreme Godhead has any conceivable form, or, to put the idea in a different way, if the formless is at all cognisable in any particular form, it is joy and joy alone. He is, to speak the truth, the embodiment of joy. The *yogis* of the Upaniṣads have called him *rasa* and *anṛita*—the fountain source of perpetual joy.¹ One that dwells in us all is joy² itself, serene and supreme; it is the immortal (*anṛita*) in all beings that makes us sometimes joyful even in the midst of cares, and anxieties. What is called *mukti* or final emancipation is only a state of everlasting joy, what the *yogins* yearn to attain is a serene joy that knows no bounds; what the artist designs to paint is the image of the one that is most beautiful and joyful; what the poets of all ages have been eager to depict with all their resources of imagination is the figure of perfect beauty and joy. The ultimate motive of all arts is to find out this eternal source of joy, the attainment of which quenches all thirsts and satisfies all mundane desires. To

¹ रसे जापनाम तम अप्येद एवो विष्णुः—Taittirīyaopanīad.

² अनर्तानाम विद्वास्तुत्वात्—Bṛhma-bhāṣya.

those who have visualised the *Beautiful* in themselves, the whole world appears to be dancing in an ecstasy of divine joy.

Poetry is the expression of such joy. The mission of a poet is to reveal this thrill of joy hidden in the storehouse of nature, touching those tender chords of the heart that are naturally moved by emotions. The poet is a creator in the idealistic sense of the term, his creation being a world of ideal beauty—a dream-land shining with touches of fine imagery. *Rasa* which forms the life of poetry is brought into existence by the genius of the poet through the suggestiveness of his composition. The imaginative pictures drawn by the poet are different from those that are found in the world of experience!

The art of poetry seems to have been cultivated in India from a very long time. The hymns of the Vedas, which embody the most ancient literary records, are specimens of beautiful poetry with considerable amount of rhetorical embellishment here and there. The hymns in their simple flow represent the genuine outburst of a heart seized with extreme joy and wonder, excited by the awe-inspiring splendour of nature on all sides. More poetical

• विश्वामित्ररक्षितो इसेकमीमांसवरदानः ।
कर्मपूर्विदा विद्विश्वद्वयी शारदी कनिष्ठेभिः ॥

—Ksh. vijayaprabha, Ksh. I.

प्रतिलिप्ता एव विद्विश्वद्वयी—१९५२,

In outlook are the Rāmāyaṇa and the Maha-bharata—two great monumental works in Sanskrit epic poetry, written in simple but elegant style, and preserving a brilliant record of Indian culture in all its phases. These two epoch-making works prepared the ground for the advent of a more advanced type of classical poetry as is evident from the works of Kalidāsa and others. The sweet melody and high-flown similes of Kalidāsa, the pathetic touches of Bhavabhūti and the beautiful expressions of Śrīharṣa will continue to keep the poetical horizon of India reverberated for ages to come.

Turning to the definition of Kātya, we find that it is *sabda* and *arthā* that go to constitute a Kārya.¹ The body² of a Kārya, to use the language of the rhetoricians, is composed of two elements, namely, *sabda* and *arthā*, or a combination of words capable of expressing the intended sense.³ A word, some hold,⁴ expressive of a beautiful sense is Kārya. Viśvanātha has laid greater stress on *rasa*, comprehending it to be the vital element of poetic compositions. To quote his definition, Kārya⁵ is a combination of words possessing *rasa* in an appreciable extent.

¹ सब्दैर्यो अस्मान् चकुरावचार्यो युजः कृषि ।—Kātyayana.

² अश्वार्थी प्रयत्नम् —Bhāskarī.

³ अदीर्ये लोकादिकार्यादेवत्त्वात् वदान्तः ।—Kāvyādarśa.

⁴ इन्द्रीयादिविषयकः वचः वाचः ।—Bhāskarī.

⁵ शब्दं रसांकर्त्त वापेत् ।—Bhāskarī.

Kāvya is generally divided into two classes, namely, *superior* and *inferior*. A poetical composition,¹ where the suggested sense appeals more beautifully to our sentiment than the meaning ordinarily expressed by words, is known as the best type of poetry. An inferior class of poetry is one that is characterised by only sonorous words and marked by the absence of suggestiveness (maximum of words with minimum of sense). Mammata has referred to the grammatical doctrines of *Sphoṭa* in connection with the definition of the *superior* class of poetry.

The Ālampikāras have divided words into three classes,² namely, *vocaka* (expressive), *lakṣṇika* (indicative) and *vyāñjaka* (suggestive). This threefold division, it must be remembered,³ refers intrinsically to the designation (*upādhi*) and not to the object designated (*upādheya*), because there are no fixed classes of words as denotative, indicative and suggestive. The same word, say *Gangā*, as in the expression *Gangāyam ghoṣah*, may be taken either as denotative or indicative according to the context and propriety of sense. It should be particularly noticed here that *vyāñjaka*, as an additional entity, has been accorded a prominent place only

¹ इत्युपादनविविधं वर्त्ते वाचाविभूषेः चक्रः :—Kāvyaśāstra, 4.

² लाङ्गोशी वाचस्पतिः सम्बोध व्याख्यानिकः :—Kāvyaśāstra,

³ व्याजावीकर्त्तव्यं च व्याख्यानात् :—

in the science of Poetics and not in other systems of thought.

The grammarians have acknowledged *tākti* (primary signification) and *Lakṣaṇa* (secondary sense or implied signification), and, consequently, recognised both *vṛdeka* and *Lakṣaṇika* as two kinds of words. *Lakṣaṇa* is called by other names also, such as *upacāra*, *āropa*, etc., and the sense that is indicated is often called *bhākta* in philosophical treatises. Gotama¹ has enumerated the causes that give rise to *upacāra* or transference of one's attributes to another.² Quite in agreement with Gotama and almost in the same language, Patanjali³ has under the rule Pāṇ., 4. 1. 48, clearly shown the four different circumstances under which *Lakṣaṇa* is usually resorted to. Viśvanātha's definition⁴ of *Lakṣaṇa* is materially the same as suggested by the rhetoricians.

Bhartṛhari has divided the meanings of words as *gouya* (secondary signification) and *mukhya* (primary signification) and has shown twofold *upacāra* (imposition) as pertaining to *sabda* and *artha*. Those who take one word⁵ as capable of expressing several meanings, that is to say,

¹ *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, 4. 2. 63.

² पदानुभवि तदुपचारः ।—/M.

³ अनुस्मित एवत्वेतत्प्रियं च परमः । लोकस्मित्याद्यात्मानस्त्वानीवाचत्वाद्यात्मस्मीदिति ।—Panchasikshya.

⁴ सबधा वस्त्रहस्य चास्त्राद्युपचारिणः ।—Bhāskaracharya.

⁵ एवलाकृतेऽनांश्च अद्यमने परोऽकाः ।

विभिन्नात्मेषादेवज्ञ वाचोन्म तत्त्वं निरयते ॥—Vakyapadiya, 2. 252.

find only one word like *go* which is applicable to both cow-individual and *Vāhiṇī*, have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accidental meanings.¹ It must be, however, remembered that a word does not simultaneously express more than one meaning.² The other meanings, apart from what is called primary signification, seem to be quite as good as synonyms, comprehensible by either context or connection with some other words.³ Bhartrhari⁴ maintains that the word *go* which is used to denote a being possessing dewlap, hump, hoofs, etc., is also applied to *Vāhiṇī* (an inhabitant of *Vāhiṇī*—modern Punjab) on account of his proverbial similarity to an ox in point of dullness. Now, then, are we to justify the division of meaning as *ganya* and *mukhya*? The first meaning, we must admit, seems to have obtained more currency than the latter, that is to say, the word *go* is popularly used to denote a cow and implies *Vāhiṇī* only indirectly or accidentally. The author of the *Vakyapadiya*⁵ states clearly that it is popular and accidental usage that renders one meaning *mukhya* or *ganya*. In connection with imposition (*upasdra*)

¹ शीघ्रपत्तदर्थे वाहीवाराः अस्याद्यनिविलिक्षणः ।—Pūṇyachch.

² शीघ्रपत्तदर्थम् पर्वदे वाचसित्ती—Vakyapadiya.

³ वर्त्तमानानि न शोकान्तराद्वरेण या ।—Ibid.

⁴ यजा दावादिमात् पितॄ वोऽप्येवादिवैष्टोः ।

सत्य ए एव शीघ्रदो वात्माभैर्पि स्वधृतः ॥—Ibid.

⁵ प्रतिविसिद्धादीक्षम् गुह्यतं शीघ्रस्ते ॥—Ibid.

pertaining to *artha*, Bhārtyābāri¹ speaks of two kinds of meanings, namely, *sartipa* or naturally fixed by its very form and *bāhya* as is indicated by imposition or *upacīra*. The word *go* denotes a class *gōta* by the force of *mukhyārtha*, and the same is transferred to *Vāhika* for the purpose of implying the same amount of stupidity and dullness on the part of a *Vāhika*. Thus, we find that the Alāmkārikas not only agree with the grammarians in regard to the circumstances and causes that necessitate the acceptance of *Lokṣyā*, but have made use of the same examples (*Gangām ghoṣah* and *guṇodhikah*).

The difference is, however, remarkable so far as regards the treatment of *rystjana* in the science of Poetics. *Rystjana*, as distinct from both *sakti* and *Lokṣyā*, has been given a prominent place in discourses on Poetics, though an additional *rystti* like *rystjant* is not actually accepted by other schools of thought. In accordance with the view of the Alāmkārikas, it is *Rystjana* or suggestiveness that gives rise to *rasa* in all poetical compositions. As *sakti* and *Lokṣyā* are not sufficient to bring out the sense of extreme coldness and sanctity of the Ganges, in the expression *Gangām ghoṣah*, the Alāmkārikas were compelled, as it were, to

¹ *Vakyapadiya*, 2, 256.

कौशलस विनिष्ट रुद्रं गाहतः । यत् शिखवायादेवीम् चाहैसि-
राम्भवत्ते, अद्यत् वैष्णवस्थां चर्तु गाहार्त्तरात् ।—Bhārtyābāri.

acknowledge the suggestiveness of words.¹ The Naiyāyikas and the earlier grammarians have not recognised *vyanjanā* as an additional meaning like the Āśaṅkārikas.

Jagadīśa² has referred to the same example *pinkham vikasitaśmitam* (face blooming with a smile) whereby suggestiveness has been established by Mammata and others, and discussed at length whether *vyanjanā* is at all worthy of recognition. There is no justification, he argues,³ to recognise the existence of something like suggestiveness, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a word is concerned. The so-called suggested sense, i.e., extreme coldness and sanctity, or fragrance (i.e., the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers) is derivable by the usual mental cognition, the special beauty of the erotic sentiment (*camatkara*) being a matter of mental apprehension (*mūhaca-bodhi*).

The meanings of words,⁴ says Bhartṛhari, are not only determined by their very forms, but there are other instruments such as sentence, context, time, place, etc., which also help us

¹ विरागाद्यनिधानात् दधार्थो भीषणेऽप्यतः ।

सा हरिष्यकम् तात् वद्यतावैदिकम् च ॥—Bālīcayadarpaṇa,

² Śabdadeuktipratibhāṣī, under K. 21.

³ एवा कवयित्रुनन्दयत्वेण वस्तैव विविहधीसुवाचान्, समोरचिन्मुक्तावैद-
एकविदिसे असंत्वाद प्रभवि वाचकेण नवसक्तयि वेदविलेक्षण देववाचः सुवर्णां ।
स्मवान्मृष्टप्रदीर्घाकारक व्यवप्रकल्पता अन्तर्दुर्दीर्घते दृश्यम् ॥ व्याख्यातिरिच्छासञ्जावैति
संविदः ॥—Śabdadeuktī, under K. 21.

⁴ असाध् इत्यरबाद्यर्दीर्घित्वाद्य व्याकाशतः ।

श्वरात् विद्यन्नाम व्यापदिव उक्तात् ॥—VYāyapadīya, 2. 228.

in ascertaining the intended sense, specially when a word happens to have more than one meaning. When the primary signification of a word having several meanings is fixed or restricted by association, etc. (as shown by Bhartṛhari), the other meanings, holds Mammata,¹ are to be regarded as suggested (*vyāñgya*). This is called suggestion based on primary sense in the science of Poetics.

There is no evidence to believe that *vyāñjana* was ever recognised by the ancient grammarians. Among the grammarians, Nāgoda has definitely supported *vyāñjanī*, and he lays much emphasis on the desirability of acknowledging it from the standpoint of grammar.² Nāgoda has, however, tried to show that he was not the first among the grammarians to recognise *vyāñjana* as such. In accordance with his interpretation, the grammarians,³ like Bhartṛhari and others, have also indirectly referred to *vyāñjana* by supporting indicativeness (*dyotakataś*) of the *Nipātas* and taking *sphoṭa* as what is suggested by sound. With Nāgoda, *dyotakataś* is the same as *vyāñjakataś*. The sense of perfection in *prajoyati* and that of measuring in *prādeśam vīlīkheti* is nothing but suggested, because *takṣyā* in such cases is not admissible

¹ अभिवर्तन व्याकृत व्याकृते निरविदेः।

संग्रीतप्रैत्यनामाद्योऽप्यत्यनिरप्यन् ।—Bhartṛhari, 1. 19.

² द्योक्तरवाचाव्येतद्योक्तार वाचव्याचः ।—Nāgoda, p. 129.

³ व्याकृत विषयाव्याचे द्योक्तव्यं व्योक्तव्य व्याकृत च व्याकृतव्याचक—*Ibid.*

owing to the absence of primary signification on the part of *Nipātas*. Thus, what we call *dyotakatva* in connection with *Nipātas* and *ākṣepakatva* in relation to *Karmapravacanlyn* are only different in names, but indicate the same thing, viz., suggestiveness (*vyañjakatva*).

The science of Poetics comes in closer touch with grammar in regard to the problem of rhetorical defects (*dosa*). The entire discourse on *dosa* is more or less grammatical in nature. The most prominent among them are as follows : *ayutarakshyti*¹ (ungrammatical form) such as *anunāthate* for *annūnāthati*; *apreyukta* (not sanctioned by popular usage) as *devataḥ*; for *devatām*; *avamartha* (incompetent) as *hanti* in the sense of *gacchati*; *nirarthaka* (meaningless) as *hi* in *mama hi gouri*; *asdeka* (not capable of expressing the sense), as the use of the word *dina* in the sense of 'bright'; *esimṛṣṭavidheyādāśa* (to place the predicate before the subject), as - *nyakkdro'yantra* instead of *ayamena nyakkuraḥ*, etc. It must be, however, remembered that these and similar other grammatical mistakes were committed by the poet almost unconsciously. Poets found it often difficult to abide by the rigid rules of grammar, and even the most famous of our poets had the boldness of using certain forms in direct violation of the rules of grammar. This is why Mallinātha often calls them *nirāktava* (ungovernable).

¹ *Kavyapradīpa*, 7.

The beautiful poetry of the Vedas exhibits a considerable amount of rhetorical excellences. Sometimes we meet with examples of beautiful similes and metaphors in the hymns. The poets of the Rk-Veda have not only poured forth ritualistic prayers and invocations to the forces of nature, but also succeeded in giving a stamp of poetical beauty to their expressions by making use of some well-conceived figures of speech, mostly similes and metaphors. The sun-god¹ (riding in a chariot drawn by seven horses) running after the resplendent Dawn (uro) is compared to a man following a beautiful woman. How brilliant is the conception with a touch of classical beauty! Again, the goddess of *Vak*² is described as unfolding her graceful person to a learned man, just as a loving wife dressed in fair garments shows herself to her husband. We have other instances of beautiful similes in the following: 'just as one sifts the barley corn by means of a sieve, even so the wise discriminates the correct words by intelligence'; 'as the water of a pond is agitated by a strong wind'; and 'overcoming' the sins just as crossing a river by means of a boat.' A well-chosen metaphor conveniently used in the Upanigads to show the difference between

¹ रुद्रो हिमेशुरं देवतानां मनो च वीरामयोऽप्यथृ—Rk-Veda, 1. 18. 125.

² रक्षी अस्य कम्बे विवाहे व्यासेन पवत उवात्पौ शुभाम्भा—Rk-Veda, 10.6. 71.

³ रामेन्द्रियं मित्रात्मा तुष्णी तस चौरा नवाहा वाप्तमात्—ibid.

⁴ नामेन चिन्त्य इति॒श्चापि—ibid.

fūṭman and *paramāṭman* is as follows : 'two beautiful' birds related to each other by mutual friendship reside in the same tree, one of them eating the sweet fruit (*pippala*) and the other only witnessing without partaking of the fruit.' There are other instances ■ beautiful *upamā* such as *āṇḍāvīcā patalāmā* (falling like swans), *rīpho na bhīmā dyandhāni bibhrat* (holding weapons as dreadful as lions) and so on. Here and there we meet with brilliant poetic expressions as *amṛtasyo putrāḥ* (the children of the immortal); *Nasycū pāñkhanusvēti sādhu* (following the path of righteousness); *ṛtena yātāpihitam* (truth veiled by truth); *aglo devānāmāsi* (*Agni* is described as the messenger of the gods) and *dyāvratāḥ pīlāḥ prītītā mātā* (heaven is your father and the earth is your mother). These show unmistakably that the *Rishis* of the Rk-Veda were acquainted with the poetical use of beautiful metaphors.

Grammar seems to have some bearing upon *alayuktāra* or figures of speech, specially upon *upamā*. As one radically connected with most of the *alayuktāras* and one that leads supreme excellence to poetry in general, *upamā* is placed at the head of all figures of speech. The main principle underlying *upamā*, viz., similarity¹

¹ वाता कलः पुष्टिरसी चनिष्ठायौ दोषः ।—Rk-Veda, 5. 6. 78.

² चा तु चाहि चकुवा चक्रता चक्रं तु च परिपक्षामैः लोहितः पितॄर्वा चाक्षम् चाक्षरी चनिष्ठायौ दोषः ।—Rk-Veda, 1. 22. 164.

³ चापेष्युक्तम् नेत्रे ।—Bṛh. Upasaka.

between two different objects (*samāna-dharma*), has been clearly explained by the rules of grammar (Pāṇ., 2.1.55 and 2.1.56). *Sādṛṣya* or similarity means *tadbhinnatre sati tadvata-bhāvayodharmaśteṣām*, viz., two things are said to be similar when they are materially different but possess some common properties. The particles and suffixes that often indicate similarity (*vati*, *iva*, *yathā*) are also clearly shown by the rules of grammar (Pāṇ., 8.1.105). *Jīmatasyevo* (like the cloud) occurs in the R̥ik-Veda and has been made use of by the grammarians as an instance where the case-ending is not dropped (*ut्त्वा-समानः*). The expression *puruṣaydgṛhṇī* (a tiger-like man) shows that the man, though different from the tiger, as belonging to two distinct species, possesses those qualities such as valour, strength, courage, etc., which are generally found in the tiger. Under the rule *upanidānāni samānyatācānāḥ* (Pāṇ., 2.1.55), Patañjali¹ has thoroughly dealt with the characteristics of *upamāna* and *upameya*. He says that two things are generally related to each other as *upamāna* and *upameya* when they are in possession of some properties that are common to both. Quite in keeping with the Ālambārikas, Patañjali² has explained

¹ एवं शब्दे यत्र निर्भित् प्रत्यक्षं च विद्यते निरेवत्तदेवाद्यनीयत्वे वरहः ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, under the rule Pāṇ., 2.1.55.

² चतुर्मात्रो द्वितीये—कथमपि तुष्टः एव चारी विष्टव्यता का व्यवै ।—*Ibid.*

the expression *candramukhi devadattā* by observing that qualities in the moon such as gracefulness in the sight is transferred to the face on account of its striking similarity with the moon. The popular example under the rule Pan., 2. i. 55, i.e., *għonadyd mnh*¹ (black as the cloud), where the common property is expressly mentioned, is an attribute of Kṛṣṇa, who is often compared to a cloud on account of his black complexion. The Vedic expression² *mrgo as bhīmaḥ* (fierce as the beast) is a similar instance where the common property, i.e., *dreadfulness* is clearly pointed out.

प्रत्ययात्मकम्

¹ ग्नेतरस्तीति विद्युत्प्रसारकोशल विभावनवक्तव्यः ।
² Rig-Veda, I. XL 154.

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EXTRACTS FROM OPINIONS ON THE WORKS OF THE AUTHOR.

1. *The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*—(published by the University of Calcutta).

Mahamahopadhyaya *Ramakanta Narine, Shikshacharya, M.A., Senior Professor of Sanskrit, Paine College* :—

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2. *Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus* (published in the Journal of Letters, Calcutta University, Vol. XIII, 1936).

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Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, January 1926, pages 113-114 (reviewed by J. Chardin) :—

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Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies—Vol. IV, part II, Nov. 1926, pp. 377-378 :—

"This work is an interesting contribution to the history of linguistics and is an attempt to bring into a convenient whole the linguistic theories of ancient Hindu philosophers and grammarians. The author gives a fairly complete exposition of Hindu theories on the origin of language and his treatment of the well-known controversy on the eternity of sound shows considerable frankness and sound judgement."

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